"The whole village consulted and came to the conclusion that the Germans had come to 'climb on our heads'. What could we do? Those who said they had come to develop us had come to destroy us only. We started planning a resistance. The people sent a bag of stones to the white man with the message: 'Mpaw Manku wants to fight with you to see who is stronger!'" (Apa Martin Apa, 2001).

This study shows how power was constructed, enacted and contested by discursive and non-discursive strategies and practices. It emphasises the local and historic divergence of these processes and illustrates how Germans and Africans were able to produce exclusive power arenas but also engaged in a reciprocal extraversion of the respective power of the other.
Encounters/Begegnungen
History and Present
of the African-European Encounter
Geschichte und Gegenwart
der afrikanisch-europäischen Begegnung

edited by/herausgegeben von
Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst, Reinhard Klein-Arendt,
Stefanie Michels

Volume/Band 2

Imagined Power Contested
Germans and Africans
in the Upper Cross River Area of Cameroon
1887–1915
Von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Köln angenommene Dissertation.

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.
ISBN 3-8258-6850-8
Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2003
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of figures</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of maps</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German terms and translations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military ranks</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 History, Meaning, and Truth</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dancing a plot</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Terminology and conventions</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The problem of boundaries</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 The Upper Cross River area as my unit</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 Established 'ethnolinguistic' groups</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.3 Needed, desired, imagined, unknown – my agenda</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic and social networks</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Forest and farm</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Regional specialisation</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 'Trade routes' and 'market places'</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 <em>Ekpe</em> polity</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 'Owners of the community'</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 Community</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 <em>Kefaw</em> and <em>kesensi</em></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3 The 'council' and the associations</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4 <em>Ntumfam</em> and <em>defang</em></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Levelling and accumulating</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Making the road to Bali - Upper Banyang 1888-1893 .......................... 93
3.1. Crossing into the Cross area ......................................................... 93
3.2. What was Zingtgraff up to - where from, where to? ......................... 95
3.2.1. Schutzgebiet Kamerun' - land and people under the German flag .... 95
3.2.2. Schutzgebiet Kamerun' - river, town, and country ....................... 102
3.3. Defang and Zingtgraff - the first encounter (July 1888) .................... 105
3.4. Defang and Zingtgraff - reinstatement of 'regard' (December 1888) .... 109
3.4.1. Offering 'friendship' .............................................................. 112
3.4.2. The Banyang women ............................................................... 116
3.5. A vision for 'Kamerun' and its hinterland ...................................... 118
3.6. 'Peace' with 'the Banjang' (1890) .................................................. 120
3.6.1. Zingtgraff transforms into an elephant - discourses of witchcraft .... 122
3.6.2. Stations in 'Miyimbi' (1891) and Tinto (1892) - 'mutiny' and 'irregularities' .......................................................................................... 123
3.6.3. 'Terror' along Bali road (1892) .................................................. 126
3.6.4. Zingtgraff expelled (1893) ........................................................ 130
3.7. Forest and grassland - dichotomies ................................................. 131
3.7.1. Forest people, grassland people ............................................... 131
3.7.2. Open grassland, confined forest .............................................. 134
3.7.3. 'Unhealthiness' - death and sickness ....................................... 137
3.7.4. Transport .................................................................................. 140
3.7.5. Between forest and grassland - the Banyang ............................... 141
3.8. Summary ...................................................................................... 143
4. 'New order' (1895-1903) ................................................................. 145
4.1. 'Sufficient means of power' .......................................................... 145
4.2. 'Re-opening' of the Bali road ....................................................... 153
4.2.1. Zingtgraff, Esser, Conrau (1896-1899) ........................................ 153
4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900) ................................................. 157
4.2.3. Military post Tinto (1901) ........................................................ 160
4.3. 'German-Eko war' (1899-1900) ..................................................... 161
4.3.1. First phase - Queen's .......................... 1899.......................... 162
4.3.2. Second phase - from Bali road (March 1900) ............................... 163
4.3.3. Third phase - 'Muthwillige Zerstörungen, grausame Mißhandlungen und grundlose Tötungen' (June 1900) ............................... 169
4.3.4. Military station Nsakpe (1899-1901) ......................................... 177
4.4. Summary ...................................................................................... 178
5. Making colonial boundaries ............................................................. 181
5.1. The silent scramble - from friendly to unfriendly rivalry (1895-1900) 181
5.2. Bottles and flags - Nsanakong 1900-1901 ...................................... 190
5.3. Small steps - from the Cross River to Yola 1904-1913 .................. 194
5.4. Effecting the boundary: customs posts and boundary pillars .......... 196
5.5. Control over land or people? ......................................................... 200
6. GNK - concession, claims, and chaos .............................................. 203
6.1. Who commands the land? ............................................................. 206
6.2. Trading posts or points of payment ....... ................................. 219
6.2.1. Monopoly or competition ....................................................... 220
6.2.2. 'Non-European trade' ............................................................ 224
6.2.3. The Calabar conundrum - a discussion .................................... 225
6.3. Labour ....................................................................................... 235
6.4. Salt, plantations, and industries ................................................... 238
6.5. Damages 1904 ................................................................. 240
6.6. Lack of success ........................................................................ 241
6.6.1. 'Lack of competence and morals' ............................................ 245
6.6.2. Transport .............................................................................. 249
6.7. Withdrawal of concession ............................................................ 251
8. New "Eingeborenenpolitik" — "Gebranntes Kind scheut das Feuer" (1904-1914) ......................................................... 321

8.1. Establishing power and healing wounds .................................................. 324

8.1.1. Rape ................................................................. 330

8.1.2. 'Problems with the chief' ........................................... 332

8.1.3. Amalgamation (nchemtì) ........................................... 337

8.1.4. Taxation — 'a metal called mark hung round the neck' ....................... 342

8.1.5. Njokmansi — 'work without pay' .................................... 345

8.2. Extending marginal power ................................................................. 351

8.3. Extraversion of power — "so that their fellow blackmen should be afraid of them" ... 353

8.4. Evading power .................................................................................. 358

8.5. Summary ......................................................................................... 360

9. Germany must go (1914-1939) ................................................................. 362

10. Conclusion — 'blood has fertilised the soil' .............................................. 372

Appendix:

Languages, tribes and ethnolinguistic groups ............................................. 377

Proverbs in Kenyang ............................................................................. 384

Southern Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Commission Protocol ................... 386

Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Kamerun, betreffend Verbot der Einfuhr von Vorderlaternen und Handelspulver ........................................ 388

Bekanntmachung des Gouverneurs von Kamerun, betreffend die Einfuhr von Kriegsmaterial und den Handel mit solchem ........................... 388

Namentliches Verzeichnis der Expeditionstruppe — Pückler's column of 1904 (casualties) ................................................................. 389

Telegram Diehl to AAKA, 28.08.1900 ......................................................... 390

Photographies ...................................................................................... 391

Oral Testimonies .................................................................................. 397

Assistants ............................................................................................. 398

Bibliography ....................................................................................... 399

Archival Bibliography ................................................................. 414

Archival Sources ............................................................................... 426

Magazines and Proceedings .......................................................... 429

Maps .................................................................................................. 430
List of figures
Figure 1 Ages of people interviewed ..................................................30
Figure 2 Estimated number of Boki, Ejaham, Denya, and Kenyang speakers ..................45
Figure 3 Total number of Boki, Ejaham, Denya, and Kenyang speakers 1908-1860/90 ........................................45
Figure 4 Languages spoken in Ossidinge Bezirk 1908 ..................................46
Figure 5 Languages spoken in the Upper Cross River area 1920 ................................46
Figure 6 Force of the ‘Schutztruppe’ (1897-1914) .....................................128
Figure 7 Force of the ‘police troops’ (1900-1914) ...................................129
Figure 8 The plantation in Abonando 1907 .............................................200
Figure 9 Occupation of the 'non-native blacks', Ossidinge Bezirk 1906/1907 .................296

List of maps
Map 1 Drainage area of the Cross River ...........................................36
Map 2 German Kamerun and the district of Ossidinge 1912 .........................39
Map 3 Area of study ........................................................................49
Map 4 19th century salt production and trade ........................................53
Map 5 19th century trade routes and market places ...................................56
Map 6 "Cross-Schnellen-Expedition" Besser 1900 ....................................134
Map 7 Ramsay's journey .................................................................207
Map 8 Mpawmanku wars May 1904 ..................................................251

Abbreviations
AAKA Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial-Abteilung (Foreign office, Colonial Department); 1890-1907
ABM Archives of the Basel mission, Basel Switzerland
ABTC Ambas Bay Trading Company
ANY FA Archives Nationales, Yaoundé, Cameroon, Fonds Allemands (German records in the national archives, Yaoundé)
AP Archives of the Palaotines, Limburg, Germany
ASK Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Kameruns (official newsletter for the Protectorate of Kamerun)
BAB Bundesarchiv Berlin, (National Archives, Berlin, Germany)
BKB Bauleitung Kamerunbahn, Bonaberi/Douala (management of construction, Kamerun railroad in Bonaberi/Douala)
BNK Bremer Nordwest-Kamerun, Ltd.
BNKG Bremer Nordkamerun Gesellschaft
C&F Chem.-Langethe and Fomin
C&R Chilver and Röschenthaler
CCC Complaints by the Christian Community, Ossidinge
D.O. Divisional Officer
DKG Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (German Colonial Association)
DKZ Deutsche Kolonialzeitung (German colonial paper, released by DKG)
DQA Deutsch-Ostafrika (German East Africa)
DWHG Deutsch-Westafrikanische Handelsgesellschaft (German West African trading company)
E&B Eyongetah and Brain
EV Erhard Voelz
F&G Fomin and Ngoh
fn footnote
GNK Gesellschaft Nord-West-Kamerun (Abb. GNWK by other authors) (Concession company North-West Kamerun)
GR Gouvernementsrat (local advisory council), in Kamerun since 1905
GSK Gesellschaft-Stid-Kamerun (Concession Company South Kamerun)
HBMG Handbuch für deutsche Militärgeschichte, vol. 3; ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1979; Bernhard & Graefe
Hptm. Hauptmann
J&T Jantzen & Thoméhien (trading house)
KBA Kaiserliches Bezirksamt (imperial district office)
KGK Kaiserliches Gouvernment Kamerun (Imperial Government Kamerun)
KK Kolonialkalender (colonial calendar)
KLG Königliches Landgericht (king's regional court)
KMS Kaiserliche Militärstation (imperial military station)
KOS Kaiserliches Oberkommando der Schutztruppe, Berlin (Imperial High Command of the Protectorate Troops)
KR Kolonialrat (colonial council), 1890-1908
KRS Kaiserliche Regierungstation (imperial government station)
KSS Kai Schmidt-Soltza
KST Kaiserliche Schutztruppe (imperial protectorate troops)
German terms and translations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aufstand</td>
<td>uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt</td>
<td>Reich Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Befehlshaber der Schutztruppe</td>
<td>Commander of the colonial army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezirksamt</td>
<td>District office (Ossistinge since 1906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezirksamtmann</td>
<td>(1909 selbständige Station)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Schnellen-Expedition</td>
<td>District officer (1910 komm. Bezirksamtmann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Expedition to the Cross River rapids'</td>
<td>'Expedition to the Cross River rapids', the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>so-called 'punitive expedition against the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangwa, Eko and Keaka' of 1900 under the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>command of von Besser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft</td>
<td>German Colonial Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutscher Kolonialkriegerbund</td>
<td>Federation of German Colonial Veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faktorei</td>
<td>Trading post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faktoreileiter</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gefreiter</td>
<td>Lance-corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouvernement</td>
<td>Colonial government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouvernementsrat (GR)</td>
<td>Colony's council (local advisory council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiserliche Schutztruppe</td>
<td>imperial protectorate troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolonialabteilung</td>
<td>Colonial office in the Ministry of Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolonialrat</td>
<td>Colonial council in Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongogrenel</td>
<td>atrocities in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landkonzessionsgesellschaft</td>
<td>Land concession company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 71</td>
<td>Mauser 71 (breech-loading rifle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polizeimeister</td>
<td>Police Master</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polizeitruppe</td>
<td>Police troops or police force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regierungsstation</td>
<td>Government station (civil, but no &quot;Bezirk&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichsverband der Kolonialdeutschen</td>
<td>Reich Association of Colonial Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schutzgebiet</td>
<td>Protectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schutztruppe</td>
<td>Protectorate troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamnkompannie</td>
<td>Permanent squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationschef</td>
<td>Commander of station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationsleiter</td>
<td>Head of the government station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stellvertretender Gouverneur</td>
<td>Deputy Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unteroffizier</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urwaldstimmme</td>
<td>Tribes of the primordial forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zollbeamter</td>
<td>Customs inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zollstation</td>
<td>Customs post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KVO: Kronlandverordnung (Crown Lands Ordinance)
Lt.: Leutnant
M.: Mark (currency of the Reich)
MFGDS: Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten (reports by researchers and experts from the German Protectorates)
MST: Military station Tinto
NAB: National Archives, Buea, Cameroon
Obt.: Oberleutnant
ONAREST: Office national de la recherche scientifique et technique (national office of scientific and technological research)
PCO: Provincial Commissioner's Office (Nigeria)
R&A: Rutherford and Anderson
RK: Reichskanzler (German chancellor), 'colonial minister' before 1907
RKA: Reichskolonialamt (German colonial office), since 1907
RSA: Reichsschatzamt (German treasury)
s.b.: see below
S&C: Sharwood and Cantle
SC: Sally Chilver
Sgt.: Sergeant
UR: Ute Rosenthaler
ZIES: Zeitschrift für Eingeborensprachen (Journal of Native Languages)
Military ranks

Offiziere (commissioned officers)
- General
- Generalleutnant
- Oberst
- Oberstleutnant
- Major
- Hauptmann
- Oberleutnant
- Leutnant

Unteroffiziere (non-commissioned officers)
- Hauptfeldwebel
- Feldwebel
- Sergeant
- Unteroffizier

Mannschaftsdienstgrade (rank and file)
- Hauptgefreiter
- Obergefreiter
- Gefreiter
- Schütze

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank:
The Graduiertenförderung NRW, the DAAD and the Kathie-Hack-Stiftung for their financial support. The staff of the archives in Berlin, Basel, Limburg, Buea, and Yaoundé. Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst – without whose support I would neither have been able to start nor to finish this work. Monika Feine for her superb cartographic skill and endurance. Jenny Chio and Reinhard Klein-Ahrend for proofreading my work. Erhard Voeltz for giving me access to his typescript, copies, useful hints on literature, stories of his own experience in the Upper Cross area in the 1970s, stories of stories ("den haben sie gefuttert") and comments on linguistic data. Ute Röschenthaler for commenting on a final draft, sharing her detailed ethnographic knowledge about the region and helping me through 'chaos' at various stages of the work. Sally Chilver, for making available copies of her unpublished translations of Zintgraff's travels and providing information about the aims and consumers of her earlier translations. Heiko Möhle, for carrying a video deck to Cameroon and returning with hundreds of copies from the archives in Buea for me. Kai Schmidt-Soltze for proofreading my work at various stages and sharing his knowledge and a bottle of Inhebeck with me every time we met in Mafie. All those people in Cameroon, who shared their time and patience with me, and offered me a place to sleep and food to eat. I am especially grateful to Mrs. and Mr. Takang, and their family in Tinto, the Liku family in Abonando, Florence of Kajifu, the wife of HM Fidelis in Nasaragati, the headmaster's wife in Basho, Mary in Nannakang, Nadine, 'Mimo', Jeanne, Beatrice, Per, 'la tante', and Wilbe in Yaoundé, Efue in Buea, and the people who did the same for me in Akwa, Nhang, Mokonyong, Mbu, Mfakwe, Kekukisem I and II, Bodum, Dadi and Abegome. Mr. Ayamba for trying to teach me Ejagh, HM Fidelis for assisting me, as well as Martin Takan Ashu, Michael Ojong Liku, Richard Etchu Ayuk, and Enoow of Tinto with his various cousins and friends, and most warmly Samuel Ekule from Besongbang, for developing a real interest in my work and concealing that I was "struggling in life" just like himself. The staff of PHS Besongbang and the "PHS women" for accepting me amongst their midst, especially my neighbours, Catherine and Paul Lyonga, Mrs. and Mr. Achale, Chief Tangwe, and Schwarr Azegor Echuhu-Njang. The same refers to the members of the MATOP family, especially Bertha and Peter Aheebeme, Ernest Akisses and Bertha etc. Christina and Perry Arrey and their children Ebanga, Nchenge, Tabi, Efue, Ndip, and Egbe for accepting me into their family and supporting me through various stages of my life as a Cameroonian. Oben Eyong Tabi and his mother Helen for being friends and supporters. My parents and grandparents, as well as Ulli and Britta, who invested into this project both emotionally and financially. Especially my mother, who accompanied my research in Cameroon during a vital stage and became my accomplice in crossing boundaries. The various 'imagined communities', especially the 'G4' and the 'Singletons' to which I belonged and belong, for providing a feeling of 'identity' in spite of all chaotic experiences. Finally all those 'friends lost along the way' for one reason or the other, for having been part of my journey down the winding and undulating path of life.
Preface

La violence du colonisé [...] unifie le peuple [...] Au niveau des individus, la violence désintoxique. [...] Illuminée par la violence, la conscience du peuple se rebelle contre toute pacification. (Fanon 1961:51-53)

On the twelfth of September 2001 Mr. Perry Arrey who had become my foster father in Cameroon and his son Ndp picked me up at the airport in Douala. I commented on the flood I seemed to have noticed in some parts of Douala, but they were not willing to discuss this and broke news to me that "the World Trade Center was down", a picture I was unwilling and unable to believe until we reached their house, where the TV was tuned to CNN and family and friends commented on an event that I had completely missed while travelling from Cologne via Paris to Douala. Since it had taken place more than 24 hours ago, it took some time before I actually realised how "down" the World Trade Center was: a sight so much beyond my comprehension that I refrained from commenting on it the whole evening. The people gathered in the room already had opinions on it, which they were quite eager to share. Almost everybody who came to their living-room in the next couple of days, agreed that the USA deserved having been hit, drawing a causal link between their walking out of the racism conference in South Africa less than one week earlier and these attacks. Besides this political side to their argument, the fact that it had been "simple knives" that sufficed to effect this serious blow to US security was appreciated most.

"Simple knives!!!" was an exclamation repeatedly accompanied by a knowing handshake yielding everybody's consent. These Cameroonians (Christians by the way) were quite content. They were happy, not because people had died (those were pitied), but because the world had to acknowledge that "simple" things were still powerful if used with a well-prepared plan. Frankly, I was shocked at their reaction and from the next morning on entered the discussion by expressing my fears: that things would just get worse from now on, that the USA would not learn anything from what had happened but would retaliate with all the sophisticated weapons available to them. More innocent people were about to die and the terrorists should have anticipated this reaction. But all these considerations did not matter as much as the triumph these Cameroonians celebrated, against a country that in the past had hardly missed any opportunity to demonstrate the world their superiority and total disrespect for anybody who was not willing to sing their tune.1

These events and the responses are striking for this study in two respects:

1. The reaction of my Cameroonian hosts and their friends was quite representative for most so-called third-world countries regardless of the religious orientation of their inhabitants.2 This phenomenon vividly demonstrates how they perceive their role vis-à-vis global politics/economy: as marginal, inferior, less developed, simple, powerless, passive.3 The solidarity with the terrorists was an homage to the power of the seemingly powerless, to the sophistication of simplicity.

The dichotomies that still hold true in the perceptions and certainly by the experiences of Cameroonians: centre – periphery, superior – inferior, developed – less developed are directly linked to colonial discourse. The superiority of the "white man" and thus his "burden" was then termed "civilisation". It seems that in the 21st century the label of the project has changed to "globalisation" but the project and the power relations inherent in it have remained unchanged and are generally accepted.4 This underlying belief was important for my work, because it influenced or, rather, determined the attitude towards colonialism: the overwhelming impression was that Cameroonians did not question the mere neces-

---

1 By the way all these considerations did also not matter to the USA, Europe and most of their citizens. The way the media must have covered the event (as was vividly explained to me later by family and friends) created such an emotional atmosphere that doing "something" was offering the relief everybody needed in an atmosphere that was still tense four weeks after the hijacking and just a few days after the USA and Britain had actually started bombing Afghanistan, which was when I returned to Germany. People in the USA and Europe were scared; most of them had never been so scared in their lives. Some of my friends even wondered if this was how their grandparents must have felt after World War II had broken out.

2 As I gathered not only from my own experience in Cameroon but also by the media coverage on demonstrations in solidarity with Bin Laden, the popularity of Bin Laden posters in African countries as well as informal information flow from people living in African countries. For the record, I do have to add that many officials and high ranking people expressed their solidarity with the USA. In Cameroon's capital Yaoundé a mourning ceremony was enacted (KSS, 2001) and many Cameroonians signed a condolence book at the US-American embassy. These people were laughed at by the Cameroonians I talked to in Douala: "Do they think they will give them a visa for that?".

3 Bayart (1993) stresses that the construction of Africa as "doomed, crippled, disenchanted, adrift, coveted, betrayed or strangled, always with someone to blame [...] serves as a useful alibi for many Africans" (1).

4 Certainly I do not want to simplify the complexities of "modern" Africa that is translating, debating, creating and constructing its own versions of "globalisation" or "modernity".
sity of having been colonised. Often only the choice of their "master" remained to be debated.⁵

2. While thinking about the interdependence of violence, power, fear and hate in the context of events in the Upper Cross River Area in 1904, I suddenly realised that the emerging pattern in that case generally also applied to US action after the September 11 attacks: Power is believed to lie with the own group (German colonialists; USA), thus violence also belongs exclusively to this group. It therefore does not have to fear anything, since it is superior, invincible, untouchable. What happens when this (discursive) monopoly on power and violence is broken (September 11 attacks; attacks on Germans and their stations in the Upper Cross River Area 1904?) The forbidden existence has to be eradicated; the discourse on power has to be reinstated (Bin Laden wanted "dead or alive", bombing of Afghanistan; colonial wars of terror and extermination, at times with genocidal character).⁶

The discourse in the USA on the legitimate right to use power had been completely closed, i.e. it had been self-evident, absolutely unquestioned and unquestionable, that the USA was overpowering the rest of the world, just as the label "superpower" suggests. On September 11, 2001 they had to witness thousands of people (most of them US citizens) being killed, and the political, military and economic symbols of US superiority being shattered – something so unimaginable before, that only aliens from outer space had been suspected of being capable of producing the same destructive images CNN was repeating for weeks after the incident. This demonstration of the existence and thus power to hurt by something/somebody else caused one and only one immediate reaction: fear – and this fear inescapably called for "retaliation", i.e. the destruction of the existence of what had not been foreseen to exist in the US-superpower discourse. The attacks on Afghanistan followed. At this point the outcome is not clear, but if the parallel to the German reaction to violence in the Upper Cross River Area 1904 were to hold true, that after the eradication of the cause of their fear they are to actively acknowledge their fear, nonetheless, they will not remove the cause for it, just as it occurred in the German colonial experience in Cameroon!⁷

1. Introduction
1.1 History, Meaning, and Truth

Les colonisés savent désormais qu'ils ont sur les colonialistes un avantage. Il savent que leurs maîtres provisoires monteront. Donc que leurs maîtres sont faibles. (Césaire 1935:8)

Historic representations are always fictional, stories told to produce meaning and an identity (even if it just means to negate that history has meaning) no matter how it is told or who is telling it. Attempts to define and differentiate "academic" historic writing from "non-academic" representations of history, especially of those (hi)stories that are transmitted orally, therefore juggle with balls of which some are bound to fall to the ground. Consequently both the mere concept of history – just like the concept of culture – should either be dismissed altogether or discussed in terms of "construction of meaning" (Rüsen), "discourse" (Foucault) or "order" (Waldenfels). As experiences, these concepts are fluid and transient, even chaotic – caused by confrontations with what is outside of or alien to them: their 'other' – but they can also be inert, hegemonic and persistent, especially if they have come to be regarded as being 'the truth'. The very notion of 'truth', however, has been challenged recently, stressing its relative character. Appiah (1992) supposes, "we may acknowledge that the truth is the property of no culture, that we should take the truths we need wherever we find them" (ibid.:5). A 'True History' is constructed in order to create meaning, and identity. A quest for 'the truth', i.e. trying to uncover 'how it really was', thus grapples with the fundamental problems of authenticity and authority, and according to Mudimbe (1988) "any successful will to truth, converted into a dominating knowledge and actualised as an imperialistic project [...] may transform itself into a will to 'essentialist' prejudices, division, and destructions" (213). Destruction is however not only caused by 'dominating knowledge', but also by the knowledge produced by those who are dominated, and construct destructive counter-discourses. The mere concept of 'dominating knowledge' therefore appears to depend on the position of the observer. "Books are weapons" was the title of the German weekly magazine ZEIT in 2001 (Dachs 2001) – weapons in the fight over the 'true history', in this case of Israel and Palestine, as taught to children in school, the very children who might grow up to use 'real weapons' in a real fight against each other. As you see from the mere volume of this work I have produced my own book, a book which documents not only my quest for an understanding of the history of the Upper Cross River area within the German colonial project, but also assumes a position in the 'fight of books'. Previous 'books' have fought over Germany's 'accomplishments' as a colonial power. For example:

---

⁵ Although I think it is safe to say that the "development-equals-domination" discourse is hegemonic, especially among modern elites, other discourses still exist as I will discuss below (cf. Michels 2003a, 6).
⁶ Condensing my hypotheses in this way may seem oversimplified and disputable. I will try to present and unfold the more complete story on the remaining pages of this work.
⁷ In both instances not only was the destruction of the physical existence of the enemy an immediate reaction but also a call was made for more security (Schutztruppe shall not be replaced by Polizeitruppe in Cameroon, DKZ no. 14, 1904:134).
1) sympathetic

It was naturally a time characterized by a good deal of warfare and little opportunity for a peaceful administration under civil authorities [...] Due consideration being given to this peculiar situation, one feels tempted to regard Germany's accomplishments in the Cameroons as having the quality of a very great achievement. (Kudin 1938:414)

2) guilty

Die Eroberungsziele und Strafexpeditionen waren mit der weitgehenden Dezimierung der Bevölkerung ganzer Gebiete verbunden. Wie in unseren Studien zur Eroberung des Südens und des Nordostens von Kamerun anhand zahlreicher Beispiele mehrgewiesen wird, war der mörderische Terrorismus eine bewußt angewandte Taktik und nicht etwa, wie oft behauptet worden ist, beschränkt auf Exzesse afrikanischer Söldner, die ohne Wissen, zumindest aber ohne Befehl deutscher Offiziere handelten. (Stecker 1968:7)

Wie kann man überschauen oder verdrängen, daß die psychische Destabilisierung des 'Eingeborenen' und seine soziale Deformierung – seine Transformation zum kolonialen Untertan, zum landlosen Plantagenarbeiter, zum Knecht im Dienste der Herrscher – gerade zum Wesen kolonialer Herrschaft gehörte? (Nestvogel and Tetzlaff 1987b:9)

3) proud


At times my own analysis will contradict previous constructions in certain respects. There are some areas though, where my own story agrees with other texts – coincident of meanings that may be called 'truth' or 'facts' by others, e.g. the death of Graf Pückler in a river close to Basho in 1904. As McCullagh (1998:13) pointed out, there are in practice a lot of things, which are regarded as 'true', because they are supported by much reliable evidence. Confidence in these 'truths' is destructed in theories that challenge "the truth of history" on the following fronts:

- The historians' epistemic values influence or determine the conclusions they draw from available evidence;
- Evidence is linguistic and has no particular relation to 'reality as it was' (McCullagh 1998; see also Mudimbe 1988).

Bearing these contentions in mind, I will discuss the basic propositions of this study about its subjectivity and the relation of texts, reality and history.

Acknowledging the impact of personal experiences on my text would be stating the obvious. Though nobody can separate herself from her subjectivity, the more different narratives we gather, the more reliable the interpretation of evidence becomes; the more evidence we gather the more reliable the narratives become.

The conclusion which historians generally adopt is that if an historical statement is well supported by abundant evidence, and much better supported than any alternative account, then the statement can be rationally accepted as very probably true. It is always logically possible that the evidence is misleading, or that their beliefs about it and the other beliefs on which they base their inference are mistaken [...] At any rate, even when it is entirely rational to believe an historical description is very probably true, historians must admit that it could possibly be false. (McCullagh 1998:23)

Reliable narratives about history (small or grand) are needed because they offer people a reference scheme for construction of identity, social practice and interaction – especially in a field as sensitive as colonialism.

Texts and the statements they contain exist not only in relations to themselves but also in relation to an outer-discursive material base – a 'reality' (cf. Hofmann 2001:21). What I want to do is try to unravel how the gap between the texts and 'reality' was closed in various discourses on the Upper Cross River area. These discourses will therefore be transsected into discursive sub-formations embedded in different loci of subjectivity. These loci of subjectivity not only generated new objects and counter-discourses, but also represent the linkages between discourse and non-discursive practices, the strategies and techniques of power. A question unresolved by this approach is the location of gnosia and the nature of experience. In a model of subjectless discourses, gnosia is transferred in the discourse and experience by a subject vanishes.

The masterful demonstrations by Lévi-Strauss and Foucault do not convince me that the subject in the discourse on the Same or the Other should be a mere illusion or a simple shadow of an episteme. What they teach me is different; namely, that we lack a theory that could solve the dialectic tension between creative discourses and the epistemological field which makes them possible, on the one hand, and Lévi-Strauss's unconscious that sustains discourses and accounts for their organization, on the other. In fact, there is an obvious way out of this problem by means of the subject, who directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, participates in the modification or the constitution of an epistemological order. (Mudimbe 1988:35)

I want to combine 'classic' discourse analysis, i.e. constructing the 'other', with concepts of 'experiencing' the other. I posit this experience and the gnosia in the individual, the subject – whose perceptions are constrained through the discourses in which they operate and through the identities they attain, i.e. the epistemological field. I will argue that experience and discursive power are often pulling at different ends with at times unpredictable outcomes. Methodologically I thus follow Bayart in an alternation between "empiricism and conceptualisation" (Bayart 1993:xxi). I will try to consider both the epistemological contexts
of the texts I used but I am also interested in their sociohistorical origins (cf. Mudimbe 1988:ix, who is more interested in the former, while acknowledging the latter).

History with a capital H suggests a temporal whole of past, present and future, where experience always conditions expectations (cf. Ricoeur 1997). If History is perceived as having a meaning, its construction and reconstruction is moulded to fit into that meaning. Whoever has the right and power to speak or whichever elements are allowed in a discourse control the shape of History by setting the epistemological frame.

The fact of the matter is that, until now, Western interpreters as well as African analysts have been using concepts and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological order. [...] Does this mean that African Weltanschauungen and African traditional systems of thought are unthinkable and cannot be made explicit within the framework of their own rationality? My own claim is that thus far the ways in which they have been evaluated and the means used to explain them relate to theories and methods whose constraints, rules, and systems of operation suppose a non-African epistemological locus. (Mudimbe 1988:x)

Mudimbe refers to the discourses on African philosophy. Much the same applies to "African historiography. One might of course question the more concept of "Western epistemological order" as opposed to "African epistemological order". All historians depend on some things when trying to tell their stories: the epistemological framework under which they operate and the sources/texts they use. Both have indeed written a certain kind of bias into the history of colonialism. But the "rationality" of the historian's methods and sources are being questioned (Fabian 2001) and the use of sources that historians have long regarded suspiciously is becoming (oral, material). When people were turned into objects by colonial techniques of power (Kaplan 1995:881), it was a perception by those who were creating and thus owning the colonial discourse. In their reports they were 'conquering' their colonial subjects by writing them (Certeau 1991:7), they were first creating the space that they later filled with meaning (Noyes 1992), their "imperial eyes passively looked out and possessed" (Pratt 2000:7). What do we know about the discourses of those who are silent in the written sources? What could their discourses tell us about the "rationality" of colonialism and colonial discourse (cf. Fabian 2001). When the colonial discourse orders their field, produces knowledge and makes people to objects, one might read this as the exertion of power, as Kaplan (1995) argues. One might also read this as hysterical attempts to construct a meaningful reality – one in which meaning is owned by those who control the discourse that has created it, those who are powerful in the discourse and those who are thus free of fear.

I want to unpack how power was imagined and contested in the Upper Cross River Area by the Germans and the African population. A focus of this work will therefore be the unmasking of the texts "masquerades", the strategies they employed for the construction of colonial reality (cf. Noyes 1992:3). Discourses exert power by restricting access to it (cf. Foucault 1997:25, Hofmann 2001:24). The power/knowledge of a discourse is relevant only within its 'truth'. What if there were numerous discursive systems, completely closed, each thus giving the other zero possibilities of access? Is this concept of power a useful category?

It is useful only in understanding the transformations or inertia of discursive formations. Restricting the analysis of the strategies of power within a discourse would not be able to achieve a radical critique of colonial discourse and its rationality (cf. Fabian 2001). Discourses thus have not only to be read as constructions of reality but also as imaginations or desires nursed by deeply chaotic and traumatic experiences. They are created from the desire to produce order where chaos was experienced, the imagination of power where weakness was felt, the assurance of superiority where fear was encountered or atrocities committed. As such discourse analyses become intertwined with questions of identity. German discourses – as preserved in the archives and published texts – are mainly loud and heady; they produced in their texts a colonial reality, meaning and truth – an ambition concealing vulnerability – a vulnerability that only surfaces on the rarest of occasions, for example in the following citation, (cf. Morlang 2002 for an example in German East Africa):

Glattes, der ein sehr stiller, ruhiger Mensch ist, fühlt sich in der Kolonie sehr unglücklich, und schon seit seiner Ankunft in Gidam-Sama zeigten sich Anfänge von dieser Niedergeschlagenheit und Melancholie. Wiederholt äußerte er den Wunsch, bald nach Hause zu kommen, und sprach von der Angst, die er hatte, zu längerem Aufenthalt in der Kolonie gezwungen zu werden. Ich halte ernstere Folgen, sogar die Möglichkeit, daß Glatte Hand an sich legen könnte, nicht für ausgeschlossen. (Stephani to KGK, 20.04.1909)

The discourses about the German colonial area in the Upper Cross River Area are heterogeneous depending on the loci of subjectivity, but generally acknowledge weakness and emotions, such as fear. They are a "phenomenon of the contact zone" (Pratt 2000:6). Following Certeau I will understand 'history' as a quest for meaning with which the 'other', the unknown can be understood and appropriated (cf. Certeau 1991:12). The aim of this quest for historic meaning may be to confine the dead who still haunt the presence to scriptural graves (Certeau 1991:12), but still "leaving real people now dead some room to dance" (Berman and Lonsdale 1992:207).

1.2. Dancing a plot

Just like a detective investigating a case I set out to gather as much information – testimonies and evidence – as possible about the topic of my concern. I had to travel extensively within Europe but more so at the scene of the act. I discovered that other investigators had come before me, and they had drawn their own con-
clusions — some fixed in writing, some not. After two years of searching I had gathered material that completely filled my one-room apartment. Most of the material had taken on the form of written texts, but there were also tapes, photographs, videotapes, some objects, a lot of memories of past experiences in my mind — some had indeed left scars on my body, as well as the omnipresent urge to leave my room to take in some new experiences that could again completely alter the relationships between all the material that I tried to come up with.

The texts prepared by Germans who were alive during the period remain a valuable source. Many are published monographs and can be classified under a certain genre, e.g. travelogues (Zintgraff 1895, Haase 1915), memoirs (Puttkamer 1912), or ethnographies (Mansfield 1908, Staschewski 1916, Hutter 1902). The genre conventions were observed by these authors and the historic information contained in the texts has possibly been shaped accordingly. Generally the same refers to the articles published in various newspapers and magazines. Each magazine or newspaper served a different end and the articles were written, selected, and in many cases altered, likewise: MGkDS (scientífico/adventurous/geographic), Globus (ethnographic/popular/exotic), ZfES (linguistic/ethnographic), DKZ (political/economic) at times even propagandistic, DKB (official), KK (informative/pragmatic), Stern von Afrika (misionary, protestant), Heidemote (misional, catholic).

In the case of articles published in the DKB, the official colonial magazine, published by the AAKA/RKA, these alterations — at times one is even inclined to call it censorship — can be traced through the original files of the AAKA/RKA, preserved in the Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB). What was not allowed and undesired in this discourse was at times more telling than the favoured and at times stereotyped topos which the German public at home was used to swallow, e.g. 'indolence of the negro', the 'negro' as a child, breaking the chain of 'middlesmen', German colonial 'heroes', etc. These 'blind spots', 'biases', and deliberate camouflage at times also surfaced during controversial discussions, e.g. in the DKB, in the Reichstag, in the correspondences, in the sessions of the GR or during the colonial congresses of 1902, 1905, and 1910.

In the BAB, the files of the AAKA/RKA were the most relevant for this study. They included correspondences between the AAKA/RKA and the KKG, trading companies, other institutions of the German state, internal discussions, and some memoranda. Correspondences and files from within the colony of Kamerun are only preserved in those cases when they were deliberately copied and sent to Berlin. Therefore the quantity and quality of issues that had somehow aroused an interest in Berlin is at times profound. In the case of the so-called "Cross-Schnellenexpedition" of Hptm. von Besser in 1900, for example, that had turned into a 'colonial scandal' and was judged at various courts, the files of the AAKA even contain the internal commands that Besser had exchanged with his fellow officers during the military campaign.

In Kamerun itself, there is an impressive amount of files accumulated over the years, not only in the KKG (correspondences with the AAKA, the stations, the various colonial interest groups in the colony, etc.), but also in the local stations. The files of the stations are lost. More than 2000 files were left in the KKG in Buen when the Germans left during the military operations of WWI. Secret and current files were taken along to Yaoundé and in 1916, when the Germans finally withdrew to Spanish Muni (Equatorial Guinea), they destroyed a great number of the files and took the remaining ones with them to Muni and from there via Spain to Germany, where again some were destroyed. The rest fell victim to an air raid during WWII. In 1974/75 roughly half the files left in Kamerun, today found in the national archives in Yaoundé (ANY) was microfilmed by the AA of the FRG and made available, first in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, and after German reunification in Berlin (cf. BAB R175, report by Geissler 1985). Unfortunately many of these films are hardly readable, since they are out of focus. Therefore and also in order to access the files not available on microfilm, I spent four weeks in the archives in Yaoundé. While some relevant files could be accessed there, e.g. about Zintgraff's expeditions 1886-1892, a great number of files were missing or untraceable in the archives.

Apart from the national archives, I visited two missionary archives: the Palotines in Limburg/Lahn and the Basel mission, Basel. Although the period of missionary activities in the Upper Cross River area was short (two to three years), the reports of the missionaries with their different approach has benefited my work.

In the recent past the Cross River Area in Cameroon has not received much attention by scholars. A few European anthropologists have produced 'reference' works for the area (Ruel 1969, Rosenthaler 1993). The contemporary colonial and ethnographic writing on the area was hardly interested in history but rather focused on the political and social 'present'. General studies on German colonialism in Cameroon refer to the area only superficially or not at all (Rudin 1938; Hausen 1970; Wirz 1972). These historical studies attempting to give an overview of the German colonial era in Cameroon only achieved in setting a framework for the developments in the Upper Cross River area. They had no understanding of the specific situation or the specific area. Although Hausen, for example, tried to sympathise with the local people, her having no ethnographic background wrote a new bias into the History of the relations between the Cross River Area and the Germans and made her prone to overproportionately 'believing' the rationality of the written texts produced by contemporary Germans.

East German historians explicitly stated their interest in history with respect to the present. They regarded past, present and future as a single story ('Weltgeschichte') with a final outcome that for them, as historians of the German Democratic Republic with a humanist and internationalist mission, already seemed within reach (cf. Büttnner 1959-VI). They were therefore quite explicit as
to where they stood, i.e. "against" colonialism in whatever form and for the national liberation movements of the colonial people and dependent countries" (ibid., emphasis original). More precisely they wrote against the 'chauvinist', 'imperialist', 'bourgeois' (Bütten 1959:1) contemporary west German writing on colonialism, that, according to them, was inspired by a romanticism over the "lost" colonies during the interwar period (ibid.:5). They further stressed that imperialism and capitalism continued in the Federal Republic of Germany, while the German Democratic Republic with the Soviet Union condemned colonial exploitation (ibid.:2) and could do so with a clear conscience. West German historians had to continue apologising for a colonial enterprise led by the bourgeoisie that they themselves belonged to. Even in the 21st century, it is indeed soothing to read the uncompromising refusal of colonial rhetoric in the GDR publications (e.g. "Befriedigungskaktion", "Kolonialheld", "Kolonialmacht", "Entdeckungsgeschichte", "Deutsches Kolonialreich", "weiße Flecken", "Schutzgebiet") that many other scholarly pieces still fall short of. Discomforting though is the self-assured and condescending claim to the "truth" ascertained in all writing on German colonialism produced in the German Democratic Republic (although, only the densest of such claims are restricted to the introductions). The studies undertaken and directed by Helmut Stoecker became the East-German reference on the German colonial time in Cameroon (Stoecker 1960, 1968, 1977a). The chapter by Jolanda Ballhaus (1968) on the land concession companies gave attention to the Upper Cross River area, drawing some fundamental and hitherto unchallenged conclusions about motivation and organisation of the war against the Germans of 1904 (the Mpwunmu wars, Ballhaus "Anyang-Aufstand"). In the introduction the German colonial army tactics are described as 'lethal terrorism', employed as the only means available to assure supremacy. Binding certain parts of the population to them by non-violent means, even if it were possible, was - according to Stoecker - not attempted by the Germans. Africans who refused unconditional surrender and exploitation by the colonisers had no right to exist (the terminology I used here very closely follows Stoecker 1968:8). I will argue that these tactics, referred to as 'genocidal' by some Cameroonians authors (Oru 1996:43; Ebat 2001:62), were indeed the basis for German colonial power in the Upper Cross River area; however, extraversion of German power by local people and vice versa occurred at all stages of the German colonial project.

Books on general Cameroonian history, even when especially focussing on the Anglophone region only brush the Upper Cross River Area superficially. Just one monograph by more pronounced Cameroonian historians has come out recently (F&N 1998). Most studies concentrate on either the Banyang or the Ejagham and neglect groups living "outside", i.e. north of the Cross River (Mveng 1978; E&B 1974; Ngoh 1988; cf. Ebai 2001 critically aware of this fact).

Thanks to students in the Universities of Buea and Yaoundé who have origins in the area quite an impressive number of theses on the Upper Cross River area have been accumulated over the years.11 These studies are highly valuable because they make abundant use of oral history and oral tradition. What they fall short of - and the authors can certainly not be blamed for that - is the critical use of archival material and secondary sources. Most of the students do not read German and thus only access the records left by the British. The information that the British records on the German era contain has mostly been gathered by fieldwork carried out by colonial officers after the Germans had left the area (starting from 1916) and are thus based on oral history.12 These assessment reports give an overview over the pre-colonial and colonial history; they also recorded lineage groups and settlement history, noted some ongoing disputes, and gathered general ethnographic information. While these are often the first records which allow any insight into the way the population perceived the Germans and what they did in their country, contradictions still arise.

Since studies like the students' theses and general history books on Cameroon are what is available to students who wish to carry out similar studies, a certain version of "the" history of Manyu Division, mostly perceived as the history of the Banyang and Ejagham is consolidating itself in the Cameroonian academic discourse. Even if oral traditions point into another direction it is difficult for the authors to contradict what already seems to be "the truth". "The truth" is further cemented by teaching Cameroonian History in Secondary Schools and High Schools, thus providing all Cameroonians with O- or A-levels with the feeling that "they know how it was" (Criaud w/o year; F&G 1986; Tangwe 1999). 'Feedback effects' are at times considerable in the oral traditions, at times subtle (cf. Henige 1973).

Apart from the written texts both published and found in archives, I tried to access the German colonial history of the Upper Cross River area through the

11 None of them are published and they are only available within the respective departments, thus their readership consists almost exclusively of students, mainly preparing a thesis themselves and the supervisor.

12 The 'assessment reports' prepared by the British are accessible in the National archives in Buea and are listed under NAB with the archival sources.
memories and oral traditions of the people living in the area today. I spent nearly ten months in the Upper Cross River area, encountering people and places, listening, asking, travelling, and residing. Since history transmitted orally is easily adapted and reinterpreted to the needs of the present and the hopes for the future, I will briefly describe the present discourses in the Upper Cross River area before and against which the reconstructions of the past are positioned.

The Upper Cross River Area seems to have been quite marginal to the grand events of both history and presence as portrayed in the canonical curriculum of ‘history’ as a subject in schools. But even a very superficial glimpse at the state of its administrative headquarters in the town of Mamfe and its inhabitants, may surprise a visitor by their capability to endure situations and the strong belief in the future nursed by pride in the capabilities of the people and their land. When in September 2001 people had to wait four days at the neighbouring village of Okoyong before any vehicle could enter Mamfe town due to the state of the road — if these ploughed piles of mud shall be called that — everybody pitied the situation at the same time expressing the conviction that ‘this shall be the last rainy season we will suffer like this. The contractors are due to tar the roads around Mamfe town in the dry season'.

I do not want to dwell on the politics and local discourses about the reasons for the perceived “underdevelopment” of Manyu Division as compared to other regions in Cameroon — a notion contested by some but held as a general truth by the majority of the “Manyu-men” — interesting as it would be. What I want to stress are two points:

1. Manyu Division or the Cross River Area of Cameroon, is indeed marginal in a number of ways:

   - The economic opportunities lie mostly in farming, hunting and gathering and small businesses which depend on good roads, thus most young people seek for opportunities outside of Manyu (the "luckiest" of them making it to Europe - a source of income and pride for their families). This is not a recent phenomenon but dates back to the British colonial time, when migration to the plantations in the south was common. Investment in infrastructure is a recent phenomenon; since the year 2000 private contractors (Chinese) maintain existing roads and extend roads, e.g. towards Akwaya in the north. Politically, Manyu Division is a stronghold for the ruling party CPDM and in the politically fragmented South West Province they have no strong allies (see Nyamnjoh 1999; Eyoh 1998; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997), but rather suspicion and ‘tribalist’ tendencies as generally in the South West are also found here (interestingly the dividing line runs between the divisional boundaries, thus there is a strong feeling of togetherness and familiarity of “Manyumen”15. The notion of the nation state as a farm tended by God and harvested by man (Bayart 1993) is thus strong in Manyu. Projects aided by foreign development agencies, e.g. Profa (Protection of the forests in Akwaya) are coming to be regarded as a further opportunity for communities and individuals in Manyu. The area has not received much attention by scholars. Information that has entered reference books on Cameroon history available in Cameroon itself has presented itself as "the truth". This truth can be described very roughly as the "colonial paradigms of development", that holds that in pre-colonial times people were primitive and "civilisation" in the western, colonial sense, coinciding with what people perceive as "modern" is progress, i.e. "development". This "development" was first introduced by the Germans.16 There are - of course - some voices contesting this notion, I shall deal with this in detail later.

2. This marginality has created a strong conviction of being "left out and behind".

Against this discursive background I carried out my research about the German colonial period in this area. Not only did I have to enter numerous discussions about recent political, economic issues but also about "the Germans" and their "œuvre" as it is referred to in the history books and conceptualised locally mainly by the material relics left behind by the Germans, such as bridges, graves, roads, and ruins.

When I set out to talk to the people in the Upper Cross River Area, my main concern was to bring into focus what they had to say about their own history. They have indeed taught me a lot, especially about the violence and brutality with which the Germans achieved their 'superiority'. I started asking myself new questions: Why this violence, why this brutality? I did not easily come up with an answer, but when browsing the University catalogue in Cologne with the key word "violence", I realised from the results I got that violence, power, fear and hate somehow went hand in hand with each other. While violence and power were concepts existing in colonial self-reflections, official documents and the like, emotional concepts like "fear" and "hate" were mysteriously absent. Did it not suit the superior males to express these kinds of feelings? Did these feelings

---

13 Cf. Oral Testimonies:414 in the appendix for a list of those testimonies I used in this study.
14 In the year 2000 that road ended in Mba (in the dry season) or Nyang (in the rainy season), a bridge over the river Mawne was under construction in 2000 (existing alongside with a hammock bridge used by people in the rainy season).
15 Which are mainly perceived to comprise Banyang (dominant) and Eja/gham people. Denya-speaking groups to the north (in Akwaya subdivision) are regarded as backward and somehow different but still sharing a common burden with the Banyang or Eja/gham. The Boki-speaking villages of Cameroon are so few and unimportant that they are regarded only as a marginal group.
16 Cf. for this thought Koponen (2000). And many authors in the 1980s before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
17 A brutality and violence that seems to have generally been practiced – most prominently by both German and African members of the army (cf. oral history of Maji-Maji – description of soldiers in almost the same stereotyped wording that I got – Laurien 1995; Gewald 2003).
not exist? Did they exist but were not admitted? Were they admitted but passed
over in silence – as the most radical critique of an "other" (cf. Waldenfels
1997:120)? Is the passing over in silence to be regarded as analogous to the
physical extermination of those who have assumed a position of power that they
were not entitled to in a discourse that constructed them as harmless and power-
less?

To answer these questions I had to turn back to the texts left by those whose
emotional state I was interested in. The people I talked to in the Upper Cross
River Area thus redirected me to the prominent written sources that I had
wanted to stamp out. But they made me read them with different eyes.

The oral accounts themselves – heterogeneous and contradictory as they were –
surprised me ever so often in the details about the past that they contained. In
an at times breath-taking dialogue with the written sources they have been an
invaluable source for the story I am presenting here.

The 'testimonies' I refer to were numerous and personal. I spoke to over 120
people in 66 villages. Some testimonies were given in a large group (20%), the
majority however in smaller groups of two to three pre-selected resourceful
people (45%). Some were individual testimonies (20%). Nineteen people were
interviewed with a semi-structured questionnaire by my assistants without my
presence. These always took place in the local language, and were later tran-
scribed and translated. All together one third of the testimonies were given in the
local languages (Kenya, Ejagham, Denya, Boki), being translated to me orally
when I was present. After transcription a written translation was prepared.
Forty-two percent of the interviews were based on Pidgin, the lingua franca
of the area, with only occasional reverting to the local languages. In these cases the
role of the assistant as translator was limited and his influence reduced. When
the testimonies were given solely in Pidgin or Standard English, no translation
during the testimony took place. This was the case in 18 percent of the inter-
vews. Due to the vastness of the area and the different languages involved, I
relied on six assistants (see appendix). Six people were interviewed by me alone
– these were mainly people in my neighbourhood whom I knew well.

In the Upper Cross River area there are no specialist historians; the people
were selected due to their age, relation with prominent people during the Ger-
man time, and social standing. Only thirteen were women, four of them 'eye
witnesses'. I tried to consider women, but they did not consider themselves able
to speak about history, unless their superior age qualified them. The majority of
the people I interviewed claimed they were relating stories told to them by a
specific family member (66%), while others referred to unspecified means of
transmission, mainly 'elders of the village' (32%). Eleven were undoubtedly eye
witnesses, many more claimed to have been eye witnesses, and considering that
seventeen worked on the 'German' plantations at the coast in the interwar period

they actually saw Germans in Cameroon with their own eyes. The average age
of the people I talked to was 75, the youngest 35, the oldest over 100.

Figure 1 Ages of people interviewed

Source: fieldwork Michels 2000/2001

Almost half the people had no formal education, 24% had primary education,
20% secondary and three had a University degree.

There existed no universally known monolithic 'tradition' in the Upper Cross
area of which each 'testimony' was just one variety. The testimonies were dis-
puted, even within the same village. According to Henige they should therefore
not be called 'traditions' but 'testimonies' (Henige 1982). However, apart from
the 'eye witnesses', the 'testimonies' did not rely on personal experience, but
were "at least one generation old" (Vansina 1985:3). In Vansina's classification
they would be termed 'personal traditions' (Vansina 1985:18-19) with the fol-
lowing characteristics: short transmission chain, minimal control over the trans-
mission, preservation takes place only in the memory of individuals. These 'per-
sonal traditions' are therefore part of a 'communicative memory' (Assmann
1999). The communicative memory does not encompass a period longer than the
'epoch of contemporaries', i.e. the grandparents' generation. The 'communicative
memory' connects the 'memory of experience' with the 'cultural memory' (Ass-
mann 1999). I was able to glimpse at all three of these stages, although the
'memory of experience', i.e. the 'eye witnesses', were almost too few to mention.

Both 'oral traditions' and 'oral histories' are subject to limitations quite differ-
ent from written sources (cf. Vansina 1983:186-201). As 'traditions', they have
been 'traditionalised' in order to give them meaning in the present (cf. Hobs-
bawm and Ranger 1985). The elements used in this process, are however not
mere 'inventions' of the present, but often non-material 'relics' (cf. Peter 2001;
Weiz 2001). The 'relics' that have been maintained in the 'collective memory',
have often lost the meaningful order or discourse of which they were part. Their
surfacing at different places and in different contexts by different speakers at
times allowed an attempt of reconstructing these discourses (cf. especially the 'magic bottle incident' in chapter 5.2. Bottles and flags – Ndoakong 1900-1901:191 and chapter 7.2 Mpamanku wars (1904-1906): 'Angst, die Wahrheit einzustehen':265). One of the major disadvantages of the oral testimonies was their blurred chronology. Apart from extraordinary events like the Mpamanku wars and World War I, it was mainly impossible to date and order the events related. I assume that the testimonies I gathered were predominantly referring to the nearer past, i.e. the phase between the Mpamanku wars (1904) and the end of German colonialism, that was often perceived to have been in 1939, when German traders, plantation owners, and most missionaries were finally deported from Cameroon. The earliest German penetration into their areas was referred to very rarely, e.g. the story about the first whiteman in Agborkem (DMA, 12.10.2000) or chief Defang's account of the encounter of his great-grandfather with Zingriff (DTAM, 11.08.2000). In most of the Upper Banyang area where Zingriff had been the first 'whiteman' in 1887/88, his name was only remembered by people who had read about him in books. The 'floating gap' of the 'communicative memory' or the 'personal traditions') is generally held to lie not more than three generations (80 to 100 years) in the past (Bering 2001). Considering that the average age of the people I talked to was 75 years, and I had to place the 'floating gap' in the year 1904 this either indicates that the 'communicative memory' in the Upper Cross River area does not encompass more than one generation, or that the events before 1904 have been mainly erased by the hegemonic memory of the Mpamanku wars and the subsequent experiences with German colonialism. The part played by the oral testimonies as a source in my reconstruction thus becomes considerable only in chapters 7, 8 and 9.

I refrain from an in-depth critical assessment of both the written and oral sources in these introductory remarks. The biases, contradictions, lapses, shortcomings, but also the opportunities of each text will be appraised thoroughly at the respective place of relevance. The story I will tell is therefore not a smooth one. Rather than pretending to have found 'the truth' I will point to probable interpretations, try to balance them and if possible present the story I believe to be the most likely. Since all the sources I relied on are extremely biased and patchy, the result is often highly speculative and therefore open to re-interpretation. I have never tried to hide these controversies, since I believe they are the basis for any historical reconstruction. Comparing as many texts as possible is the best way to grasp the extent and direction of biases and re-interpretations in all of the available sources, both written and oral. As Jones (1990a) stated:

Am interessantesten ist die Feststellung, ob eine Überlieferung 'zuverlässig' ist, sondern die Erklärung, warum es zu verschiedenen Zeiten und an verschiedenen Orten Ungleichheiten zwischen den jeweiligen Fassungen dieser Überlieferung gab, denn die Ungleichheiten sind ein Zeugnis menschlicher Auseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit. (ibid.91)

My focus is on the specific situation in the Upper Cross River region – a rather vast and heterogeneous area. Although reference works on German colonialism in general and in Cameroon in particular exist (Rudin 1938; Steer 1939; Steecker 1960, 1968; Hausen 1970; Wirz 1972; Gamm and Duignan 1977; Bade 1982; Nestvogel and Tetzlaff 1987a; Gründer 1995; Eckart 1997; Nuhn 200018), I felt it necessary to insert some general remarks at various places of this study where they are of direct importance either to my argument or to the understanding of the local situation. With regard to the last phase of German colonialism – the establishment of a full-fledged administrative system – these reference works (esp. Rudin 1938 and Hausen 1970) give a thorough and detailed overview, and I have saved myself the pains of constant repetition. Furthermore, for this period, especially the years between 1912 and 1914, the written sources available on the Upper Cross River region are thin, owing to the fact that these files were lost or destroyed in the courses of the military operations of WWI. The oral testimonies on the other hand, is extremely rich for this period. I have therefore tried to create a dialogue between the oral testimonies of the Upper Cross River area and the reference works based on written contemporary German documents. Whenever possible the unique character of the Upper Cross River area has been highlighted.

A number of topics have been neglected here, mainly in order to reduce the scope of this study, e.g. health and sanitation measures19, experimental farming, missions and schools. Since the first missionary stations were opened in 1912, their impact for the period under review here seemed too small to justify any exhaustive pursuit. The developments after the official end of the German colonial period will just briefly be mentioned, mainly because the German presence in Cameroon finally ended with their deportation at the outbreak of WWII and for many people in Cameroon German colonialism only ended when their former masters were arrested, chained and led onto the ship that took them away – a vivid scene in local discourses, since many eye-witnesses of it are still alive.

This study is the first comprehensive study of the German colonial time in the Upper Cross River region. Much time and effort had to be devoted in tracing the bits and pieces which are its basis. The painstaking task of assessing the various genres of texts and combining them has been the main focus of the work and the approach is mainly empirical. I would have liked to be more detailed in a number of areas, e.g. the effects of colonialism on the power relations within the so-

18 The case of Nuhn's book illustrates that the differentiation between 'primary' and 'secondary' sources is in many cases not a useful one. It is published in 1900, but its style and agenda place it within 'colonial discourse'. In that respect, it is however, very useful, because Nuhn obviously had access to sources and archives that are not public.

19 Cf. Eckart 1997, Rudin 1938:348-349 (leper center in the area); Haase 1915 (smallpox vaccination campaign).
cieties of the Upper Cross River area, but due to limitations of time and finance this had to be postponed to the future.

The organisation of this work may at times seem unorthodox. Although it generally follows a chronological order: chapter 2 (precolonial), chapter 3 (Zintgraaff, 1887-1892), chapter 4 (1895-1901), chapter 7 (1902-1906), chapter 8 (1905-1914), chapter 9 (1914-1939), I had to juxtapose two chapters that cut through this chronology: chapter 5 on the establishment of the colonial boundaries and its implications (1895-1913), and chapter 6 on the contents concerning the concession company GNK and its successor BNKG (1899-1914).

1.3. Terminology and conventions

I have decided to maintain most of the German termini technici, since an exact translation was often not possible. The main terms as well as the military ranks are compiled and explained in a glossary on page 13. Along this line I will always refer to the German colony as 'Kamerun', since the present day Cameroon does not coincide with the German colonial Kamerun. By maintaining the German terms, their reference to colonial discourse remains overt. Whenever I use contemporary German 'jargon', I have identified it in the text by inserting 'single quotation marks', when I have translated the term or the expression into English, e.g. 'native', 'hero', 'negro', and 'double quotation marks' when I have maintained the original German term, e.g. 'Eingeborener', 'Held', 'Negro'. Whenever terms feature, that have not only been used within German colonial discourse but beyond, I have discussed their implications and identified my own terminology, e.g. 'uprising'. Some general terminological contents shall be discussed here briefly. Stoecker and Gründer (2000) refer to the African soldiers of the 'Schütztruppe' as 'Soldat', i.e. 'mercenaries'. Such a 'mercenary soldier' is defined as: "One who receives payment for his services, chiefly, and now exclusively, a professional soldier serving a foreign power" (OED 1989:618; cf. Killingray 1989). In the beginning of the 'Schütztruppe', the African rank and file were indeed 'mercenaries' following this definition, all of them hired from outside of Kamerun, e.g. in Sierra Leone or Nigeria. The participation of people from within Kamerun increased however, with time. Whether the 'colonial power' can be regarded as a 'foreign power' in this respect is a question I do not want to solve here. Therefore I will call the African rank and file within the Kamerun Schütztruppe "soldiers" - a term which is neutral and also used in Cameroon itself, e.g. by the sons of "German soldiers". The OED definition of "soldier" includes that he receives pay for his services - a condition certainly true for the Africans in the Schütztruppe. Fighting against the Germans, however, were not organised into a professional army and therefore were not salaried soldiers. Generally these are referred to as "Krieger", i.e. 'warriors'. The term 'warrior' as opposed to 'soldier' does however have certain connotations: it is often "applied to the fighting men [...] of primitive peoples, for whom the designation soldier would be inappropriate" (OED 1989:935). Because of these connotations I will instead use the term 'warrior' only as a reference to colonial discourse. I will rather refer to the African fighters as such or as 'combatants'.

I have applied the Harvard quotation system throughout, both for published and for unpublished sources. When quoting from the files in the archives, I have indicated the author of the text and the recipient, if it was possible to identify them, and the exact date the text was prepared, e.g. "Mansfeld to KKG, 10.11.1907". The full reference is to be found in the "archival bibliography". The files from which these individual texts were extracted, are listed under "archival material" with their titles. When a document in a file contained neither author nor date, I have directly cited the file and page. When quoting from the files in the archives, I had to at times decide which version I wanted to use, since insertions, comments, and strike-throughs often by unknown authors altered the 'original' text. As a general rule I have tried to revert to the most 'original' one, possibly indicating what was cancelled, or added. The pagination of the files in the archives was often disordered or unidentifiable, since different pagination systems had been used. If a file was paginated both with stamped and handwritten numbers, I have followed the stamped numbers. If pagination was extremely disordered, I have indicated this under "archival material", where the respective file is mentioned. All information added by myself inside the quotation will be in [square brackets]. When place names are mentioned in the quotations, I have indicated the way they are commonly spelled today also in [square brackets]. Since the use of these brackets is therefore abundant inside the quotations, I have refrained from adding my initials inside each bracket. For the place names a variety of spellings occurs. I have included the ones used presently in Cameroon in the brackets. The oral testimonies I used have also been compiled in the appendix. They are quoted in the text by the person's initials and the date the interview took place. If the speaker's name was not known, I identified the testimony solely by the place where it was recorded.

To avoid lengthy insertions of works cited frequently, I have used an abbreviation for some. These are identified under abbreviations on page 13, e.g. S&C (Sharwood and Cantle), C&R (Chilver and Röschenthaler). Terms in the African languages generally follow the transcription of my assistants. An open "o" is identified as "aw", as is conventionally done, e.g. Mpawmawku. "e" stands for open "e" and "ng" for the velar nasal. The maps have been prepared by Monika Feinen of the Institute of African Studies in Cologne. She used Moisels's map F.I. "Ossidinge Bezirk" as its basis, the other maps used are listed in the appendix. Therefore the sources of each individual map have not been given below each.
1.4. The problem of boundaries

Vansina (1990) asked himself whether he was not creating a false unit when categorising all people living in the forest area of equatorial Africa. He justified the unity despite all the differences within them due to the similarities when compared to the people living outside of this zone. For the Upper Cross River Area — as a much smaller unit — the argument has to be the same and different. The Cross River area generally encompasses the region and the people in the vicinity of the Cross River that it bears a major and direct importance to them, be it due to economic, cultural, linguistic or historical considerations as will be elaborated in detail below. I will first present the ‘unity’ of the ‘Upper Cross River area’, as defined for this study, then I will — at least partly — discuss the ‘ethnolinguistic’ and ‘tribal’ boundaries established in the Upper Cross area within colonial and postcolonial epistemological orders.

1.4.1. The Upper Cross River area as my unit

The Upper Cross River area can geographically be defined as the low-lying forest area in which tributaries empty themselves into the Cross River. A mountain range, separating the undulating basin with isolated mountains from the high plateau of the so-called Bamenda and Bamileke grassland, is the watershed to the north and east and differentiates not only the forest from the grassland, but also grassland (or "grassfield") languages and culture from the languages and culture of the inhabitants of the forest area. The extent and nature of this separation or rather ‘transition’ and changing perceptions of the Cross River area as a single region (cf. Tonkin 1990:137) will be discussed in this chapter.

The general course of the Cross River was known in Europe since 1842 when a British captain travelled the Cross River up to the ‘rapids’ (Chilver 1961:235), today at the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. The name ‘Cross River’ is either derived from the fact that due to its bends consistent crossing from one bank to the other was required when plying it, or it may refer to the crosseted by Portuguese sailors in order not to miss the mouth of it (cf. Niger-Thomas 2000:118). It was only in 1895 during the first joint Anglo-German boundary commission that the Cross River came into the limelight of the German colonial project as the only river being navigable from the coast up to about 300 km into the interior. By that time all possible German claims to its mouth at Old Calabar had been given up and Old Calabar was part of the British 'protectorate of southern Nigeria' (cf. Ramsay 1904:25-26 and S. Making colonial boundaries:181). It entered European discourse and early European maps as the 'Calabar river', 'Old Calabar', 'Alt Calabar', 'Ojono' or 'Kalahabirilu'. The term 'Calabar river' co-existed with 'Cross River' till the late 19th century (but Clarke 1848 solely refers to it as 'Cross River'). Since 1895 the name 'Manyu' for the Cross River beyond the 'rapids' had been suggested, since the term 'Cross River' was unknown to the local population (Besser 1898).

During the German colonial era, the name of the river was officially retained as 'Cross River' and on the official German map of 1912 it bears this name up to the joining of the rivers 'Fi' (from the Mbo mountains) and 'Manyu' (from the grassfields) in Upper Banyang. Between Ossidinge (Mamfe) and this confluence the river bears both the names Manyu and Cross River. The sources of the 'Cross River' are thus found in its various tributaries: apart from the Manyu, the Badi, the Fi, and 'Mbu', the Mo, Wadjje, Mawne, Oyi, and Bapuno from the north, and the Munaya and Awa from the south (to name to most important ones). As such it seems well-defined, but geographic considerations alone would not justify this unit.

21 The 'Calabar River' was later established to be a separate river from the Cross River, forming an estuary at Old Calabar together with the Cross River and some other smaller rivers (cf. Moisel's map 1912, "Ossidinge").
23 "Child of the river/water", the Monaya is a tributary to the Cross River.
The term Cross River has been employed both for the river itself and to the people living in its area since early colonial time (Partridge 1905, Mansfeld 1908). The name has survived into post-colonial academic writing (Ruel 1969, Nicklin 1974, Röschenthaler 2000) most prominently with respect to "Cross River art styles" (Nicklin and Salmons 1984; also: Nicklin 1979) mainly referring to masks, which belong to the various associations in the area (Leib and Romano 1984; Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985; Koloss 1985; Röschenthaler 1993, 1998). A "Cross River art area" was established along these lines at the centre of which were the "Ejaghama modes" extending to the "Bamenda and Bamileke grassland modes" to the east. Transition zones were 'Widekum' to the northwest, 'Bangwa' to the west, and 'Igbo' to the west (cf. Gebauer 1964:46; Nicklin 1974:8; Nicklin 1984:24, Nicklin 1979:57; Nicklin and Salmons 1984; O'Neil 1996). The "highly distinctive art of covering a wooden carving with animal or human skin is found only in the Cross River region" (Nicklin 1979:54), and this art is perceived to have "diffused" from the "Ejaghama" to their neighbouring groups (ibid.). Nicklin (1979) suggested subdividing the Cross River art zone into "Lower", "Middle", and "Upper Cross River". The Cross River area that this study refers to mainly falls under his "Upper Cross River" art style area (Nicklin 1979:59). Since within the "Cross River studies" the area under review here, is almost entirely part of the "Upper Cross River", I will refer to the area thus, although the 'common art styles' that were instrumental in its definition by Nicklin (1979) are of only secondary importance for this study. The "Cross River area" as established by the "Cross River studies", is, however, in itself a construction by scholars - its uncertain edges (Igbo, Tiv, Widekum, Bangwa), are admitted. Within the 'single region' 'Cross River', the edges have to remain as fuzzy, especially when 'cultural' boundaries are sought (cf. chapter 2. Economic and social networks:53).

A pre-colonial conceptualisation of the Upper Cross River area was as the 'area of salt'. Salt ponds were found along the Cross River itself (Egbekaw, Nsakakaang, Nsanaragati, and further west into Nigeria) and some of its tributaries, most prominently the Munaya and Awa (Mbakang, Aiyewawa, Ebhins, Inokkun Nsapke, Mbenyan), but also the Ngang in Upper Banyang (Ejwengang), the Mfu in the Takwai/Kebe area (Moise's map 1912, F.L. "Ossidinge"; Herrmann, Sept. 1906:77), as well as north of the Cross River along the Mawne close to Bache, Takamanda, Obonyi, and Kekpane (KSS, 28.10.2002). The Bamenda and Bamileke grassfields to the north and west reportedly only had a few minor sources (cf. Essen/C&R 2001:108, to 25). This 'area of salt' thus encompassed the whole Cross River basin, i.e. the low-lying forested area of the Upper Cross and its tributaries. The terms 'Manyang', 'Anyang', 'Banyang', 'Kenyang', 'Keaka' (Ejaghama) and 'Ejaghama'\(^2\) – with which the population, areas, and languages of the Upper Cross River area are identified – very probably all derive from a common root, referring to salt. The Bali referred to the Widekum migrants as 'Bakop ng/wang', i.e. people of the salt area (Jeffreys 1962:184, referring to a British assessment report of 1923). The terms 'Bakonguan' (Zinnafr 1895) 'Konguan' (Koelle 1854) and 'Akuungo' (Clarke 1848) certainly derive from this conceptualisation. The origin, spread, and referents of these terms have

\(^2\) "Akang" and "ngang" are the words for salt in Ejaghama and Kenyang respectively.
not yet been linguistically investigated\(^{24}\), but it clearly indicates the perception of the Upper Cross River area as the 'area of salt' at least by the early 19th century, probably much earlier (cf. Clarke 1848; Koelle 1854; Jeffreys 1962:184; cf. chapter 2.2. Regional specialisation:58).

During the German colonial period the Upper Cross River region became the "Ossidinge Bezirk". The demarcation of its boundaries was subject to considerable change over time, in the west connected to the disputes concerning the Anglo-German boundary (cf. chapter 5. Making colonial boundaries:181) and to the south, east and west due to the changing administrative order within the German colonial project. "Ossendinge\(^{25}\) was the name of the station that the Germans erected in the area in 1901, located at the Cross River, not far from the border to the British protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Therefore the 'heartland' of the district included in the beginning the so-called 'Boki', 'Ekoi', 'Keaka', and 'Anyang' areas. The eastern part of the so-called 'Banyang' was at first divided between the station in Ossidinge and the station of Tinto (Upper Banyang), and were only 'unified' when the district headquarters was moved to Bamfle, further east on the Cross River, where it was maintained under the name 'Ossidinge' in 1908. The district was then neighbouring Rio del Rey (in the southwest), Johann Albrechtsböhle (in the southeast), Fontem/Dschang (in the east), and Bamenda (in the northeast). Since 1903 the Germans sought out the 'natural boundary' with Bamenda (cf. Pückler, 24.10.1903:162-163, 169). In 1912 the people living in the grasslands northeast of Basho were included into the district of Ossidinge. The 'natural' geographic boundary (the mountain range at the transition between forest and grassland) was abandoned in favour of a boundary respecting the existing economic networks (Adameutz, 25.09.1912:146-147; BAB R175 P265:20). In the same year a dispute arose between the districts of Ossidinge and Bamenda over the Widekum area, formerly in Bamenda district. In January 1913 it was finally decided to fall under Ossidinge. The German argument was both 'natural' (it was within the forest zone) and economic (it had long-established trade relations with the Cross River, especially with regard to palm oil trade).

\(^{24}\) An in-depth linguistic analysis would require a systematic comparison between neighbouring languages in order to regular sound changes. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, however, a tentative assessment of about 30 languages of the South-West Province in Cameroon has supported the common root in the term for "salt" in the above named terms. For these insights I am highly indebted to Erhard Voelitz, who has shared his linguistic expertise and data with me.

\(^{25}\) Derived from "Osjiungi", i.e. "fishes in the pond" - a well-known spot for fishing at the Cross River, between the villages Agboekem and Oban. When the station was moved from the western Cross to Mamfle in 1908, the name 'Ossidinge' was retained, both for the headquarters and for the district.
Further corrections of the boundaries of 'Mamfe Division'—as it was then called—were added by the British. By 1967 the "Widukum-Menka" area had been annexed to the Gwofow prefecture of the North-West (Chiver and Kaberry 1970:249). The "Balundu/Bakogo" areas in the south were transferred to Kumbo Division in 1929, due to "ethnic" considerations.

The Upper Cross River area I am referring to in this study is more or less congruent with present-day Manyu Division within the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Although it seems to have clear-cut boundaries, these are contested and changing: Manyu Division was formerly subdivided into Mamfe Central, Akwaya subdivision, and Fontem subdivision. Fontem subdivision, encompassing the so-called "Bangwa" and at the transition zone to the 'Bamiike grasslands' has been made into the autonomous Division Lebalaem in the 1980s. Mamfe Central Division was further subdivided into Eulomjojok, Mamfe and Upper Banyang (Tinto) subdivisions.

The boundary in the west is the 'colonial boundary' with Nigeria, and there is no other justification for this boundary other than the fact that Great Britain and Germany have created it, and the post-colonial states of Nigeria and Cameroon have maintained it. This boundary—very roughly fixed in 1895, partly executed by 1900 and finally demarcated by a joint Anglo-German boundary expedition in 1912, did not coincide with pre-colonial 'ethnic', linguistic, nor any 'natural' geographic boundaries. It became relevant during the German colonial time more as an opportunity than a constraint on the local population (cf. chapter 5. Making colonial boundaries:178). During the British administration, when "the Cameroons", as the area was then called, were administered from Nigeria, its impact ceased to exist. Since the unification of West Cameroon with French Cameroon in 1960, the boundary has become increasingly important but is still easily crossed by Nigerians and Cameroonians both at the official frontier posts of Ekok and Otu and also by canoe and on foot paths, for example for trading (Ikom, Agbokrom waterfalls) but also for temporary or permanent migrations in search for education and labour. Where the presence of the Cameroonian state is weak, the international boundary bears only very marginal importance for people's daily lives, especially since people on both sides of the boundary are related, speak a common language, and share cultural institutions. Nevertheless I have chosen the international boundary with Nigeria as the western border for my research simply because German intervention (with a few exceptions) was restricted to the territory which today is part of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The "Upper Cross River area" that I am referring to, might thus also be called the "Cross River area of Cameroon", or ultimately the "German Cross River Area". In the Cross area itself, these colonial boundaries have inscribed themselves in the names of the two villages of Agbokrom, situated at the opposing banks of the Cross River a distance apart. While one is identified as "Agbokrom waterfalls", the other is "Agbokrom German" and up to date this has remained its name.

Since the Germans left, we have always remained as 'Agbokrom Jaman'. The Germans don't remember us at all, we are only known as 'Agbokrom Jaman'. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

As Fosso (1982, 1986) argued and as has already tentatively become apparent from the above discussion, there are transition zones in which cultural traits co-exist and are adopted and adapted by the respective groups. As I will show in more detail below, a continuum of such transition zones characterised the Cross River area and extended beyond it. It is therefore not possible to identify boundaries by drawing lines on a sheet of paper. Transition areas never divided but united people by allowing exchange between them (cf. Fosso 1982, 1986). The village of Essagot (lit. "marketplace") at the Cross River, for example, organised the trade between Okuni (present Nigeria), Mamfe, Egbekaw, Kesham and Eshobi. They were eastern-Ejaghum speaking but intermarried with all the villages. Maintaining peace for the sake of trade was their primary objective (R&A 1929:16). In fact, inter-marriage was the most successful means of enabling and securing longer distance trade, since the trader could feel safe in his own as well as his 'in-law group' (cf. Besong 1990:66). As will be discussed later, both Banyang and Ejaghum speaking groups deliberately extended settlements into meeting zones—eventually even forming 'bilingual' villages (Ossing, Nienako, Ajiayiunyup, Talangayi).

Transition zones extended to the west and south, but were more marked to the east and north, where the mountain ranges with extremely steep rises divided the low-lying forest areas from the grassfields (Mbo-mountains in the south east—up to 1550 m high). The grassfields were densely populated and a centralised system with royal courts, retainers, pawns and slaves had developed. Economic networks extended to Adamawa and the Hausa traders. No direct contact with the Europeans at the coast existed. The grassfields had undergone a distinct historic development, in the 19th century influenced by the establishment of the emirate of Adamawa as part of the caliphate of Sokoto in the north, which had effected considerable migrations of people. The 'Bali' for instance belonged to the 'group' of 'Chamba raiders and refugees', more specifically the diaspora of the Chamba Leko, who consisted of a mixture of people raided and cumulated

24 I was forced to "cross" this boundary on one or two occasions when travelling on the Cross River, because canoes had to be exchanged and petrol bought. The diplomatic implication of this —my having no official visa to enter Nigeria — was only realised by my travelling companions when Nigerian police were advancing towards the bank of the river where we were busy transferring luggage.

25 During the colonial period always referred to as "Obokum" or "Obokom", both by the Germans and the British (cf. Moisels's map 1912; Besser, 30.11.1895).

26 Referred to as "Obokum", "Obokem", "Abokem" or "Abokum" (cf. Moisels's map of 1912; Mansfeld 1908; Puttkamer 1901).
along their way (Fardon 1988). While the 'Chamba' made a journey, the 'Balbi' were made by this journey (89). As such they were a new element in the grassfields since the 1820s or 30s with considerable influence on the transition zones, especially the "Widukum/Moghamo" people in whose midst the chieflydom of Bali-Nyonga was situated and who suffered on-going raids. Most Widukum groups had become subjects to Bali-Nyonga by the end of the 19th century in one form or another (Kaberry and Chilver 1961; Chilver and Kaberry 1970; O'Neil 1991, 1996). Most of the "so-called Widukum peoples"29 claimed to originate from the Upper Cross River (Kaberry and Chilver 1961:356). The Balbi were not accustomed to the climate of the forest. They had reportedly tried settling in the forest region, but soon realised that the area was not 'healthy' for them, since many died, and moved back (cf. Conrau 1899). Balbi went to Sabes, the first village in the 'Banyang forest', to trade, but did not penetrate further (Zinagraf 1895:125) partly due to the well-founded fear of being sold as slaves to Calabar (Conrau 1899). The relations between Upper Banyang and the grassfields had certainly been severely disrupted by the installation of the 'Balbi' aristocracy in the grassfields, subjecting an indigenous population called 'Bakongguan' (Zinagraf 1895:207).

The 'Bangwa' represented the link between Banyang and Bamileke, and are generally regarded as a Bamileke group. Relations between the eastern Banyang groups, especially Takwai, and Bangwa were close and determined by shared interests, e.g. against a common enemy from the South: the Kebu and later against the Germans (cf. chapter 4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900):127). The Kebu or Mbo lived south of Bangwa and eastern Banyang country in the Mbo-mountains, an extension of the Kupe-Manenguba chain. The advancement of the Mbo into the Upper Cross River area in the late 19th century resulted in pronounced violent actions and alliances in the southern Cross River area.

The areas that represent the "gateways to the grasslands" (Thompson 1974:175)30 are the margins of this study to the east and north. In the south, the 'Obang area' seems to have been the transition zone between the Cross River area and the so-called Bakogo (Bima and Oroko speaking) as concerns linguistic, economic and political criteria. The "Ossidinge Bezirk" had included the "Bakogo/Balundu" area south of Obang that C&R (2001) identify as "Batanga/Oroko-west" (188), but it will be excluded from this study. Kenyan-speaking groups (Bakuni/Kiwui) also lived outside the Cross River area towards Kumba in the south, with the main settlements Manyemen31 and Baduni. Early European travellers termed them 'Banyang', in 1912 'Bacui' was added, the language was referred to as 'Kitwii' and is today regarded as a dialect of Kenyan (Grimes 1996; cf. C&R 2001:139, fn 2). Between the Kitwii and Kenyan-speaking groups early European travellers met groups they identified as 'Mabun' (Nguti), probably made up of Bafaw and Mbo speaking groups (cf. Moisel's map 1912 F.1. "Ossidinge"), identified as "Basosso" of the Miyenje group by C&R (2001:188; cf. ibid.:139, fn 2). Relations between these groups and Kenyan-speaking groups further north existed, but due to pragmatic considerations have to be ignored for this study (cf. Ruel 1969:10, 59).

The 'Cross River region of Cameroon' certainly is a 'single region', not only as perceived by its inhabitants today, who regard themselves as 'Manyemen' within the Federal Republic of Cameroon and within its Anglophone part. The boundary between the Federal Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, though a colonial outgrowth, has initiated divergent developments in the respective parts of the Cross River area since the late 19th century. At least by the early 19th century – and very likely much earlier – the area was perceived as 'the area of salt' and shared political, linguistic, economic, and artistic forms indicate considerable exchange and relations between the different groups (cf. chapter 2. Economic and social networks:55).

1.4.2. Established 'ethnolinguislic groups'

Der Übergangszusammenhang der diagonalen 'Kamerun-Crossfluß-Semibantu', die diese Kulturprovinz bilden, ist in jeder Hinsicht offensichtlich. (Hirschberg 1979:355)

In 1984 the journal African Arts devoted a complete issue to "Cross River Studies" (Nichlin 1984, Nicklin and Salmons 1984, Rosevair 1984, Leib and Romano 1984, Ekpo 1984, Harris 1984, Cole 1984, Udoka 1984, Koloss 1984), in which these studies were presented in the classic ethnographic sense as "research and publication on the peoples and cultures on the Cross River region" (Nicklin 1984:24). The object of the "classic" Cross River studies are thus 'ethnographies', i.e. the "writing of ethnics". Ethnographies in the structural-functionalism tradition were bound to social units, which have been termed "tribes", "ethnic groups", or, as in the case of the Cross River studies as defined by Nicklin as "ethnolinguislic groups", a "dubious social-cum-linguistic classification" (Tonkin 1990:141). The term 'Kamerun-Crossfluß-Semibantu' that Hirschberg (1979) used, is such a "dubious social-cum-linguistic classification" as well.

Cross River scholars have seized a number of such 'ethnolinguislic groups' as and have "written them", i.e. 'Banyang' (Ruel 1969), 'Bangwa' (Brain 1972, Brain & Pollock 1971), and 'Widukum' (O'Neil 1987, 1991, 1996) in Cameroon; 'Yako' (Forde 1961, 1964), 'Mhembre' (Harris 1965), 'Effik' (Forde 1965, Jones 1956, 1963, Latham 1973, Nair 1972) and 'Ibibio' in Nigeria as well as 'Ejaghun' (Koloss 1984; Koloss 1985; Röschenthaler 1993, 1998, 2001) and

29 Esimbi, Beba-Befang, Ngom (Ngwo), Ngie, Menemo (Meta), Moghamo, and Ngemba (as grouped by the British into Native Authorities due to language and traditions of origin) (Kaberry and Chilver 1961:356).
30 Kendem, Widukum (Moghamo), Manta, Baminge (Baminje), Assumbo, Atolo, Oliti, Bangwa, to name the most important ones.
31 UR (2002, p.c.) holds that Manyemen was Balong speaking in the pre-colonial era.
'Boki' (Ifeke & Flower 1999) 'divided' by the international boundary. According to their 'art styles', they have been grouped thus:

"Lower Cross River": Qua (Ejaghim), southern Ejaghim groups (Calabar Division), Efik, Efut (all in Nigeria);

"Middle Cross River": Etung (Ejaghim), Boki, various groups of Ikom, Oubria, Akamkpa and Ogoua Division, Nigeria;

"Upper Cross River": eastern Ejaghim, Anyang, Banyang, Widekum; Bangwa (all in Cameroon) (Nicklin 1979:59)

While "the Ejaghim modes" are perceived as the art style centre of the "Cross River art area", specific "Ejaghim" sub-groups fall under all three distinct art style areas.

The "situational, fluid, instrumental" conceptionalisation of "ethnic groups" has more or less replaced the "primordial, static, essentialist" concept in anthropology, mainly due to Fredrik Barth's book on "ethnic groups and boundaries", published in 1969. Doubts about the 'tribal unit' had been raised as early as 1940.

To describe them [the Tallensi] in northern Ghana as a tribe suggests a cohesive or at least well-defined political or cultural entity differentiated from like units. Actually no 'tribe' of this region can be circumscribed by a precise boundary -- territorial, linguistic, cultural or political. Each merges with its neighbours in all these respects. In the transition zones between two 'tribes' dwell communities equally linked by residential contiguity and by structural ties to both. (Forbes 1940:239-240)

Nevertheless [I]the fact that lots of anthropologists are talking to each other about ethnicity, combined with the disciplinary enthusiasm for detailed ethnography rather than theory, may lead to some things being taken for granted" (Jenkins 1997:14). The post-structural critique of ethnicity decentralises cultural identity and makes it into a process of identification (Hall 1999:93). Difference would not establish a border between "cultures", but be the origin of culture, which comes into being only by the constant process of negotiating difference (Ha 1999:175). Such a concept makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define and label bound entities, especially for pre-colonial West Africa (cf. Tonkin 1990). While I cannot enter the debate on a "traditional West African Model" of the person and identity (Fardon 1996) or ethogenesis (Peel 1989) at this point, I feel it necessary to discuss the 'state of affairs' of the "ethnolinguistic groups" of the Cross River area in Cameroon. Some more general conclusions will be drawn afterwards.

The term "ethnolinguistic" groups partly circumvents the problem of ethnicity by shifting the focus to linguistic evidence, often perceiving language and culture as an intrinsically connected whole:

What unites Banyang and distinguishes them from other peoples are the qualities and attributes of 'Kenyang', the language they speak and the culture [...] they follow. (Ruel 1969:1) Therefore, I will first investigate the linguistic situation and then show how the 'tribal boundaries' were constructed within German colonial discourse on the Upper Cross River area.

Linguists working on the languages in the Cross River area (Voeltz 1978; Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983; Tyhurst 1984; Watters and Leroy 1989; Faracelas 1989, Connell 1994; Connell and Maison 1994; Watters 2001) have made numerous attempts to classify these languages. While there is agreement on some fundamentals, in many specific cases the situation remains confused, dubious and chaotic. The linguistic and historic discussion has to be mainly omitted here, due to the scope of the study. Some of its contentions can be gathered from a compilation in the appendix (cf. Languages, tribes and ethnolinguistic groups -- a compilation: 377).

Linguists have identified the following languages in the area under review here: Ejaghim, Kenyang, Denya, Kendem, Boki, Mundani, Moghamo (Meta), Manka, Ipulo, Evand, Ibeeve, Ambele and Menka. Figure 2 provides a rough overview about the developments in numbers of speakers of the most important languages: Boki, Denya, Ejaghim, and Kenyang:

32 Most of them under the auspices of SIL, whose main aim is to promote literacy in the Bible translated into the local languages. In 2000 the new testament was translated into Ejaghim (Western), partly into Kenyang (Upper) and the book of Luke had just appeared in Denya. Four of my research assistants worked with the structures SIL had put up together with the Cameroon state. The "Ethnologue for Cameroon" of SIL (Grimes 1996) gives the only overview of status, number of speakers etc. of the Cameroonian languages.
While in the 1980/90s Kenyang was by far the dominating language in the Upper Cross River area as far as numbers of speakers is concerned, in 1908 this was different:

Figure 4 Languages spoken in Ossidinge Bezirk 1908

Sources: Mansfeld 1908:8

In 1908 the Germans had not come into contact, let alone collect census data, with the northern groups of the Upper Cross River area, these are excluded from the chart. By 1920 the British had added these groups and came up with the following figures:

Figure 5 Languages spoken in the Upper Cross River area 1920

Sources: British assessment reports

---

The SIL numbers can generally be regarded as overestimated (EV) and in the case of Kenyang the Kiwui speakers of Ntian Division have been included. Ruel 1969 estimated the number of Kenyang speakers in 1969 at 18,000. The SIL figure of 65,000 thus seems grossly exaggerated.
As I will show in more detail in the course of this study, the European concept of order and bounded entities is not useful for the Cross River area of Cameroon neither for pre-colonial times nor of today.

Although linguists have tried to identify and classify languages and dialects, they met substantial difficulties in judging borderline cases. Dialects of one language extend as continua, the speakers of dialects not neighbouring each other often not understanding it.\textsuperscript{34} Not included in this discussion has been the issue of bi- or multilingualism that has been high in the area even in pre-colonial times (Ruel 1969:4 fn 2; Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983:10; Conrau 1899:201; Pückler, 24.10.1903:161; D.O. Ossingde 1921:5-6) as well as intermarriage and language change.\textsuperscript{35} Remarkable cultural and linguistic differences within identified "ethnolinguistic groups" and strong cultural affinities in the transition zones between these groups have been acknowledged.\textsuperscript{36}

The Cross River-Cameroon's zone [...] is one in which the complexity of linguistic pattern and the diversity of origin are perhaps without parallel in any African territory. In the absence of precise ethnic classification, the terms, Eko 'cluster' etc., are appropriate designations. (Anene 1961:189)

It might also be a forward move to abandon those categories, at least when regarding historic situations and thus acknowledge that the desire to discover bounded entities is "ours", not "theirs" (cf. Wright 1999:424, Fardon 1988:17-18 similar).

1.4.3. Needed, desired, imagined, unknown – my agenda

The perceived "ethnic" boundaries in Manyu Division of today have been created in a complex dialogue between local people, (colonial) administration and western scholars.\textsuperscript{37} I am not going to follow these seemingly established conventions, but will differentiate areas within the Upper Cross River area according to its position within the German colonial project and present-day Cameroon.

"Upper Banyang" (today a subdivision of Manyu Division with its headquarter in Tinto) developed quite differently from the rest of Manyu Division due to a number of reasons: the famous "road to Bali" of Zingraff passed through the area and violent encounters with the Germans took place as early as 1888 but ceased after 1900 (cf. chapter 3. Making the road to Bali – Upper Banyang 1888-1893). In 1891 the first trading post was opened. Between 1891-1892 and 1901-1903, it was controlled directly by a military station in Tinto. From 1903 to 1907 the area fell under the station of Foment in the 'Bamileke grassfields' and only from 1908 it did become a part of the district of Ossingde, administered from the station in Mamfe. In terms of the Germans Upper Banyang was perceived as the Bali-road area; first needed then abandoned.

Distinct was also the colonial history north and south of the Cross River. Almost like the Rhine for the Romans, the Cross River divided zones of diverging German influence. This is partly due to geographic reasons – since the Germans were progressing from the coast northwards, partly due to strong opposition north of the river and subsequent political decisions by the Germans to concentrate on the southern part. The area can be regarded as the area of administration – the imagined area. Where German control was established, ultimately the German colonial leaders attained the power to establish a colonial order widely referred to as "System Mansfeld" (cf. chapter 8. New "Eingeborenenpolitik" – Gebrauntes Kind scheut das Feuer" (1904-1914): 321). The river Munaya divided the "Njemaya" in the west from "Ngonyaya" in the east. In the pre-colonial times these terms were relative, but today "Njemaya" has become synonymous with "Western-Ejaghm speaking groups", while "Ngonyaya" denotes the speakers of eastern Ejaghm who are referred to as "Keakat" by Kenyang speakers to the east. Between the Kenyang-speaking and the eastern Ejaghm-speaking groups is a transition zone which withholds all attempts to define a boundary or attach an "ethnic" label to it. Since it is in the middle of the southern Cross River area, I will refer to it as the 'Mamfe central' area (today a subdivision of Manyu division).

When I refer to "outside", as is commonly done today in Manyu Division (cf. Ebai 2001:2; Niger-Thomas 2000), I do not picture a clear-cut boundary through the middle of the Cross River (as at Mfum bridge in Ekok), nor along its northern bank, but a zone between the mountains and the grassland to the north and the rivers Mvime and Cross to the South. "Outside" was perceived by the Germans as the area of indigenous power – the desired area.

The area further north in which Tivoid languages are spoken – partly in the grassfields – will mainly be excluded from this study since German penetration here was limited and it remained "unknown territory" for them. "Outside" has resisted (German) colonial just as "linguistic" and "ethnographic" appropriation. From an academic perspective "outside" is still to a large extent unexplored,

\textsuperscript{34} These cannot be discussed here, but pronounced cases are Kendem, Bittuka, Numba (Tyhurst 1984), and the emergence of a "Central Kenyan dialect" (Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983).

\textsuperscript{35} The "Eva-ebu" speaking "Bokit" but "being Anyang extractions" (Gregg 1925), "Anyangisation" of Nyang and Mukonyong (Gorges 1930); likewise "ejaghisation" of the Obang area (Röschenthaler 1993). More examples could be quoted.

\textsuperscript{36} "Banyang" (cf. Ruel 1969:4-5; Gorges 1930:1); "Ejaghm" (Röschenthaler 1993:20; Swebey 1937); "Bokit" (Gregg 1925:17); "Anyang" (S&C 1924:2; SE, 03.11.2000); "Mania" (S&C 1924:74, 82).

\textsuperscript{37} As Fardon has noted "quite who is writing whom, and in terms of what, becomes increasingly difficult to decide, quite apart from the steps (some of them now lost) by which we got 'here'" (Fardon 1996:41; cf. also Jones 1990).
unknown. The same applies to the north-eastern transition zones to the grassfields. These areas will only be marginally included in this study.

Map 3 Area of study

2. Economic and social networks

When discussing 'ethnolinguistic groups' I have proposed that rather than existing as bounded entities, people and identities were shaped by economic and social networks with the local residential group as a centre. While the economic networks passing through the Upper Cross River area have received some attention with regard to long-distance, and especially the so-called 'slave trade', the social networks have so far been a neglected category and are only indirectly or marginally acknowledged with regard to art styles and the spread of associations. A thorough investigation of the pre-colonial setting in the Cross River area is well beyond the scope of this study. I have concentrated on the realms that became important during the encounter with the German colonial project. They should have been embedded in a broader study of political systems, regional social networks, e.g. kinship, as well as the complex interplay and distribution of other associations, migrations, stratification of the society, witchcraft, etc. All these issues can only be tackled by further research – therefore my statements have to be regarded as preliminary.

The earliest references to the Upper Cross River area are by Koelle 1854 and Clarke 1848 (ed. by Ardener 1972); haphazard information exists in early German official and unofficial reports, e.g. Besser, 30.11.1895, Besser 1900 (various), Conrau 1898, 1899. Explicit historic accounts of the Upper Cross River area are C&F (1995), F&N (1998), on 'slavery' among 'the Banyang' and Röschenthaler (2000) on migration of Ejaham-speaking groups. Substantial ethnographic work has been carried out by Ruel (1969) on the "Banyang" and Röschenthaler (1993, 1998) on the "Ejaham" and in a less scholarly way by German colonialists (Hutter 1902; Mansfeld 1908, Staschewski 1917). These focus on the 'ethnographic present' situation, but refer to the past occasionally. The British – obsessed with the identification of the clans and tribes they needed for indirect rule – prepared numerous detailed assessment reports39. Early on, missionaries have developed an interest in the languages of the Upper Cross River area and compiled proverbs and tales, e.g. Ittmann (1932, 1935/36). On the basis of these sources, I will first describe the economic activities of the Upper Cross

---

39 The assessment reports I used are listed in the appendix. The relative early date of their production (1920s to 1930s) and their prolific information make them an invaluable source on the pre-colonial history of the area as well as the situation during their compilation. However, they are subject to an "overtraditional" bias. The British colonial officers were looking for "traditional authority" on which they could base their indirect rule. The people in the area were "political realists" and tried to use this opportunity for their advantage. The British needed "tribes", "clans" and "villages" with "eponymous ancestors", "clan heads" and "village heads". Most reports overtly state the desperateness in the undertaking of the British (cf. Ruel 1969:128-129).
River in the impersonal manner that economic history prefers, and then link it to the question of authority and 'leadership'.

2.1. Forest and farm

Almost everybody writing about the Cross River area starts out by first describing the "great rain forests" (Durell 1953:15) and then the people, who "know the forest, having been born in it" (16). However, the Cross River area is not homogeneous as far as climate, soil fertility, natural resources, relief, population density and political organisation are concerned (cf. Röschenthaler 2000, Michels 2000:25-36). The forest itself - which alongside with the many rivers and streams, is the most remarkable characteristic of the area - varies in density, with the area in the southeast being densest (Hunt 1916:1). The area of more fertile volcanic soils around Kembong had been partly deforested due to agricultural activity even in pre-colonial times, and the Germans described it as a "Parklandschaft" as early as 1900 (Besser, 18.09.1900:112). A natural oil palm belt marks the transition from forest to grassland (Widekum, Bangwa). The forests were inhabited by a number of large animals, most notably leopards, elephants, gorillas, chimpanzees, antelopes and pythons. Forest products were important resources both in subsistence and trade, e.g. camwood and bush mangoes for local, ebony and wild rubber for European demand (cf. Sharow Smith 1924:34, Gorges 1930; Besser, 30.11.1895). According to Mansfeld gathering and hunting in the forest was only done by men. The rearing of cattle was extremely difficult in the forest, due to the occurrence of the tsetse fly. Livestock rearing was thus confined to chicken, goats, sheep and pigs. While chicken were kept by the women, goats, sheep and pigs were a sign of wealth and their meat was highly valued and mainly used for special socio-cultural events (Taku 1977:16-17). Hunting and fishing were the main sources of protein.

Footpaths through the forests were cleared halfway by both communities, connecting villages as long as they maintained good relations. The streams were crossed by numerous means: if they were small, they could be waded through, or crossed on logs placed over them (up to ten to 20 metres). During the rainy season, streams became broad (40 to 50 metres) and fast flowing and so called 'hammock bridges' had to be constructed. Those stretched between two strong trees at either side of the river. They were constructed like hammocks from ropes of certain lianas. A ladder - three to five metres high - was constructed at either side on the tree to allow access to and from the bridge. Passage over these bridges was generally subject to a 'bridge toll' (cf. Esso/C&R 2001:94). On large rivers, such as the Cross, canoes were used for crossing and longer journeys (cf. Staschewski 1917:39-40).

Food was produced both for subsistence and for sale. Yam - demanding fertile soil - was the main crop in the western region, especially around Kembong and Okuni (present day Nigeria) (Besong 1990:27), while in the other areas plantain and colocasia (cocooyam) were the staple crops along with sweet potatoes, groundnuts and "plums" (Staschewski 1917:29-30; R&A 1929:27; Taku 1977:2-5). Mansfeld listed the following crops: maize, sugar cane, yams, colocasia (cocooyam), cassava, beans, different types of 'spinach', melons (egusi), tomatoes, plantain, banana, pineapples, lemons, mangoes, seville oranges, coconut, spices (pepper, ikang4), tobacco, colanot trees and oil palm. Farms along the Cross River were big and often far from the villages, and temporary shelters as well as 'slave' settlements were erected on them (Mansfeld 1908:86). The felling of trees and clearing of farms were carried out by men (Schuster 1914:953). Plantains were planted and harvested by men, planting of yam was marked by gender-specificity; the rest of the crops was harvested by the women or 'slaves' (cf. Michels 2000). Palm wine was the favourite drink, was produced by the men or slaves4 and consumed by both women and men (Mansfeld 1908:100-101). Palm wine was primarily manufactured in the dry season, when the quality was better and most festivities took place (Gorges 1930; Röschenthaler 2001). The palm wine was produced from the same tree that supplied the palm nuts from which the palm oil was obtained. These oil palms were found in the whole Upper Cross River region, but in varying intensity. They were less abundant in thick forest due to the competition for light. They rarely have to be planted, since their seeds are disbursed by rodents; they are simply considered as growing 'semi-wild', since they do not need human cultivation, which is weeding and pruning. They also do well on poor soils. The palm oil4 and kernel oil4 was traded especially from the oil palm belt to the grassfields and the coast. A general observation for pre-colonial West Africa has been that there was more land available than labour to cultivate it (Hopkins 1973:15). Economies were thus mainly constrained by labour. Alleviation was sought by extending control over labour, either by acquiring female labour, or engaging 'slave' labour (24). Boserup (1970) suggested that female participation in production decreases when lower-status people, such as slaves, are available to do agricultural work. In fact, the tasks assigned to women and slaves in the Upper Cross River area were often identical, e.g. harvesting, processing of palm oil, carrying produce, marketing. Certain tasks, however, were the exclusive domain of the slaves, e.g. harvesting of palm nuts. Salt production in the Ngonaya area was however de-
ependent on female labour — there seems to have been no slave-labour available. The eastern — Upper Banyang area — has also been marked as one where individual people acquired much wealth and prestige — and obviously many slaves. In the Ngonya area oil palms were abundant, but the nuts were not harvested (Besser, 18.09.1900:110). These areas were obviously constrained by shortage of labour and had thus not been able to accumulate wealth — in contrast to the Upper Banyang area (F&N 1998:38; R&A 1927:29; S&C 1924).

2.2. Regional specialisation

The most important specialisation was salt production in villages that owned salt ponds. Mbakang was locally perceived as the major source for salt at the end of the 19th century. Mbakang, as the origin of the 'Keaka salt' was pointed out to Besser in 1900 as lying west of Nfainchang (Besser, 18.09.1900). People from Ejwengang in Upper Banyang held that the salt of their 'Ngang river', i.e. 'salt river', was transferred there by the Mbakang people by witchcraft (Interview Ejwengang, 02.08.2000; Bessong 1986:5). The "Keaka" salt — produced by women — was in great demand locally and entered long-distance trade to the grassfields (Swabey 1937:2; Bessong 1990:33-34; Bessong 1986:5). Those who owned salt ponds exchanged their salt or the rights of access to the salt ponds (cf. Gallwey to KGK, 10.05.1900) for foodstuffs and other commodities and hardly did any farming themselves (Mansfeld, 30.08.1905; Mansfeld 1908:86). In the main salt producing area around Mbakang a three partite local economic system had developed. The owners and producers of the salt had formed the 'salt group' (Mfoakum) and had a spokesman who represented them and regulated the exchange of the salt. Their immediate neighbours to the east in Atubakwelle (present villages of Afiap, Bakwelle, Mbatop) brought the salt into the trans-local trade at Kembong market (Swabey 1937:21). Both 'Mfoakum' and 'Atubakwelle' mainly regulated economic issues, such as protection of the salt ponds, quality and price for the salt. Swabey even reports that the Mfoakum people had gone 'on strike' when they had not been successful in their negotiations with the 'Atubakwelle' (ibid). A similar system was enacted around the salt springs of Egbekaw at the Cross River close to Mamfe. The Egbekaw people produced the salt, exchanged it for livestock with their immediate neighbours (Nchong, Okoyong), who in turn traded it further to Bachuo and Upper Banyang (Glauning, 03.10.1901:167). Salt had become one of the major articles sold from the European traders at Old Calabar by the second half of the 18th century (Latham 1987:268). The Calabar trading houses sought to monopolise trade with salt at the Lower Cross River, where salt was obtained from the ocean. By the middle

of the 19th century they had succeeded (269). In the Upper Cross River area, however, the local salt trade was the main trade item traded between the Ngonya, Upper Banyang and Bangwa area at the end of the 19th century (Besser 18.09.1900:113; Ramsay, Dec. 1900:15; Esser/C&R 2001:84). In 1904 the Germans still held that the whole population of the Upper Cross River area was provided with local salt. Its major advantage over traded salt was its price: 10 kg local salt cost two mark, while 10 kg of imported salt (as sold by the GNK) cost five mark (Mansfeld to KGK, 30.08.1905; cf. chapter 1.4.3. Needed, desired, imagined, unknown — my agenda:32 for the conceptualisation of the Upper Cross River area as the 'area of salt' and chapter 6.4. Salt, plantations, and industries:238 for the importance of the salt within the German colonial project).

Map 4 19th century salt production and trade

44 The Germans stated that salt was found in the area where sedimentary soil prevailed and suspected that in early geological times the area was connected to the ocean, then cut off and the basin slowly filled with sediment (KRS Ossingdeo to KGK, 01.04.1906:174).

45 Today salt is still produced locally, but only by a few individual women, e.g. in Mbakang (three in 1990, Besong 1990:36) or Nsamak. The salt is used for "ceremonial cooking and in the preparation of certain traditional medicines" (ibid).
The conceptualisation of the Upper Cross River area as the 'area of salt' that is reflected in many place names and the uneven distribution of salt in the area suggests that salt production and long distance salt trade had been an activity of the people in the Upper Cross River area for a long time (cf. Austen 1996:23 on long-distance salt trade in general).

Apart from salt, a number of articles were produced by specialists in the Upper Cross River area for trade purposes: Crafts, such as sleeping mats and baskets that were produced in the whole area, also entered long distance trade, mainly towards the grasslands (F&N 1998:49). Staschewski mentioned that the "Banjangi" women were the producers of sleeping mats and earthen pots. Besong (1990) refers to the once famous "Kembong red clay pottery" (28). Earthen pots were the containers for palm oil and thus probably in great demand (cf. Latham 1987:274 for the Lower Cross area). Men were weavers of baskets and cloth for bags (renowned were the "Obang bags", F&N 1998:49). Those crafts were not produced by households but by specialists and traded (cf. Staschewski 1917:33-34; Mansfeld 1908 111-114, and all British assessment reports similar).

The 'yam area' exported to the 'non-yam area' to the east and south (Besser, 30.11.1895; Besong 1990:27). In the non-yam area, yam was a luxury food stuff (Taku 1977:5). In the densely forested western area, oil palms were scarce, and elephants - although abundant - not hunted. A fairly new trade commodity, namely rubber, could be extracted from a liana in the forests. This rubber - alongside with camwood - was the main traded commodity here at the end of the 19th century (cf. Besser, 30.11.1895). In 1903 rubber was an article of some, albeit relatively minor importance in the indigenous trade between Bitiuku and Upper Banyang (cf. Pückler, 24.10.1903:160).

Iron production hardly took place in the Upper Cross River area. The only blacksmiths in the area were slaves from the grassfields, who produced knives, lamps, axes, spears and brass bangles (Strümpell, 18.12.1900:140; Staschewski 1917:35-36) and repaired guns (Mansfeld 1908:112). Iron products, slaves and livestock were the main commodities coming from the grassfields into the Upper Cross River area.

2.3. 'Trade routes' and 'market places'

In 1614 slave trade with an outlet in Ambas Bay was first recorded (cf. Chilver 1961:237). European trade with Old Calabar started in 1668. It had become "a well-known minor trading centre for slaves" by the beginning of the eighteenth century (Simmons 1956:4; Leib and Romano 1984:48). Clarke, writing in the 1840s, remarked that many slaves from 'Bazit in the Bayung District' were "sent to Bimbia and to Cameroons" (Ardener 1972:77). Clarke (1848) gave an account of the 'slaves' he spoke to in Fernando Po:

[T]hey are sold and driven in the frightful slave 'coffe' to the next, and so onward, from one market to another, and from one land to another, until they are sold to the sea side trader, and by him to the Slave-buyer, to enter the Baracoon of the European! (Clarke 1848:74)

After 1820, however, Britain had abolished slavery and enforced this in the Gulf of Guinea by navy patrols, and demand for palm oil had sky-rocketed. In Calabar slave trade continued till 1841, when anti-slavery treaties were signed between the British and the representatives of the Calabar trading houses. Palm oil then replaced the slaves as principal commodity demanded by the European traders (C&F 1995:192; Simmons 1956:8; cf. for Douala Wirz 1972 and Eckert 1991; Austen 1996). The main source for slaves had been the grassfields, 'enslavement' within the Cross River groups occurred on a small scale, mainly as a punishment for criminal offences, or the inability to settle debts. Slaves remained in demand at the coast even after the switch from slave to palm oil and eventually rubber as the main commodities demanded by European traders, because the domestic demand for labour increased. Palm oil could be produced in the whole forest area and the crucial role of slave labour in its production has been referred to earlier (cf. Chilver 1961:237; Thorndaihlen 1884; Wirz 1972; Eckert 1991; Damen 1970; Austen 1996). Slaves also played a vital role in the organisation of the trade as carriers, but also as agents of their 'masters'. F&N point out that rather than slave "trading", Banyang were involved in slave "dealing". Slaves - rather than being mere articles of trade with the only value of being sold and resold - were maintained in slave settlements owned by the community or individuals (38). Slaves were thus used in multiple ways as labourers, producers and as a commodity (cf. F&N 1998:4:5, 8; Staschewski 1917:24). It can be assumed that among the slaves a considerable range of economic and social status existed (cf. Jones 1956:147 for the status of slaves in Calabar; Ittmann 1953:45-46). Conrau mentioned that wealthy slaves might in turn own slaves themselves (Conrau 1894:95). The differentiation between 'household' and 'field' slaves as observed in Calabar (Jones 1956) and Douala (Eckert 1999) thus also seems to hold true in the Upper Cross River area.

44 Mansfeld does not mention the blacksmiths to be slaves, he mentions about one dozen of forges in the district, but notes that they have been subject to steep decline due to the imported iron products (ibid).

47 Since 1810 ships of the Royal Navy were patrolling along the coast. In 1827 a base for the barrier of the Bight of Biafra was established at Fernando Po (Wirz 1972:61).
Latham (1987) suggested that palm produce and slave trade were not the central activities of the economies concerned (ibid:272; cf. Niger-Thomas 2000:119 similar). He stressed the crucial role of the women in the processing and the marketing of palm oil and other staple crops among the ibibo – a situation which was very different in the Upper Cross River area, especially at its transition zone to the grassland in Upper Banyang. Here, at the interface between 'slave-giving' and 'slave-using' economies, gains from trade represented the basis for new wealth, accumulated by some influential individuals, like Mme Imbi of Talu, who had access to labour of a large number of dependants, such as slaves. Trade seems to have been organised following the "political model", whereas further to the west, in the 'ekpe polity', the "ritual model" prevailed (cf. Austen 1996:93). The trade is generally described as having been organised through a "relay system" (F&N 1998:5), i.e. goods were sold and resold at various big market centres acting as entrepôts. The main market centres and directions of trade are presented on the following map.

Map 5 19th century trade routes and market places

While Austen held that the ekpe system merely extended the 'ethnic relay' of the Efik, at the end of the 19th century ekpe had in fact spread beyond the Efik trade zone (having reached Besongbang in 1880). Austen explicitly states that goods "passed by a system of relays from one ethnic group to another" (91), while later specifying the crucial role of social networks, such as mutual residence or intermarriage for the functioning of the so-called relays (92-93), e.g. Upper Bangang and 'Bangwa', or Esagum at the Cross River.

The notion of the 'relay' system is connected to the notion of the 'middlemen'. Specific 'ethnic groups' or 'tribes' were perceived as barring trade from the next group. The first 'middlemen' identified by Europeans were the 'coastal middlemen'. In the case of Kamerun, the 'Duala', the first people whose economic activities before and during German colonialism have attracted scholars (Wirz 1972; Eckert 1991; Austen & Derrick 1990). Although the Germans soon realised that 'middlemen' were not only found at the coast, but that rather the 'chain of middlemen' continued behind them, attempts were made to define the term and the role of 'middlemen', often perceived as 'the relay between the European trader at the coast and the African producer in the hinterland' (cf. Eckert 1991:66). The term 'middleman' has its origin in colonial discourse and perhaps it was a discursive weapon. A 'middleman' was somebody who did not produce anything himself, but rather bought from one end and sold at the other end, maintaining the profit – a profit that the European trader lost, because he could not enter into direct trade relations with the producer. Such a middleman was 'parasitic', 'indolent' and 'greedy' (cf. Wirz 1972:82).

Through the Upper Cross River area, a number of commodities were indeed exchanged that were not produced locally, e.g. European goods, slaves and livestock. All these commodities belonged to the luxury goods sphere and did not represent the bulk of the trade. Salt, yam, crafts, camwood, palm oil, rubber all originated from within the Upper Cross River area. These goods were marketed by the producers themselves, at times through sophisticated systems, e.g. in the salt trade. The notion of the 'middlemen', especially when discussed in terms of ethnicity is therefore not a useful one. In the Upper Cross River area, specialist producers (salt), specialist traders and all degrees in between existed concurrently (cf. 6.2.2. 'Non-European trade'; 6.2.3. The Calabar conundrum – a discussion; 225).

The 'relay' or market-to-market trade combined local and long-distance trade – it was not unidirectional, nor was the direction of goods known to all the actors. The emphasis on the long-distance 'trade routes' in the Upper Cross River area and their two endpoints, grassland and Calabar, overlooked trade relations of different directions, e.g. towards the Korup/Ododap area, Rio del Rey and

---

48 Prepared on the basis of C&F 1995; F&N, R&A 1929; Kaberry and Chilver 1961; Strumpell, 18.12.1900; Pücker, 24.10.1903; Besser, 30.11.1895; Ruel 1969; Staschewski 1917; Conrads 1899; S&G 1924; Sharwood Smith 1924; Schipper to KGK, 12.12.1912; Gregg 1925; Keukusim II, 08.07.2000; Gorges 1930; Zingraf 1888:191; Hutter 1902:269; Esser/C&F 2001; Zeuner 1888.
Douala — the various ports of trade thus competed for the same supply zones (cf. Austen 1996:92). Identifying 'trade routes' can thus prove problematic, the 'trade networks' were diffuse and multidirectional.

It is often assumed that the Cross River was an important trade route since it provided fast and easy transport of slaves and other commodities to the coast. Although it was used by traders and their canoes, it was not the most 'direct' route to the ports of trade. The Njemaya people traded towards the south, rather than the west. The route over land was relatively fast and connected to the rivers of the Korup (Odudop) area: Akwa-Korup or Akwa-Iyafe. Since the 18th century the Korup (Odudop) area had been the destination of trading journeys of the big Calabar trading houses (cf. Antera Duke; Besser, 30.11.1895:38) (see for a detailed discussion of the 'borders' of the Efik trade dominion chapter 6.2.2. 'Non-European trade':224).

The era just before German penetration into the Upper Cross River area was marked by the transition of European demand for slaves by palm products and rubber. The major difference between these two domains of commodities was their accessibility. While slaves belonged to the sphere of prestigious goods, only those people, who had already established themselves as a person of standing, could enter this trade. As Latham (1986) and Austen (1996) caution, the impact of European demand on the economies of the interior should not be overestimated. If one turns, however, to the commodities exchanged in the Upper Cross River area apart from those with the final destination Europe, it seems that many of these goods were luxury goods, e.g. livestock and yam, and of course goods of European origin: brass rods, beads, cowries, cloth, liquor, guns, bottles, watches, mirrors, etc. Austen (1996) suggests that the 'new' products palm oil and rubber were not as 'precious' as the earlier ones, and thus brought the primary producers into the market (97). In the Upper Cross River area this referred especially to the slaves. According to Mansfeld they were required to produce a certain amount of palm oil for their masters. They were free to do own-account palm oil trading, but half of their profits belonged to the master. The slaves were also sent to harvest rubber and were rewarded part of the gain (Mansfeld 1908:169). Thus the new commodities of rubber and palm oil also benefited those who controlled labour and did not drastically alter the structure of commercial enterprises.

2.4. ekpe polity

As mentioned above the Cross River area has been noted for its associations and the masks, artistic styles and dances associated with them (Leib and Romano 1984, Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985, Nicklin 1974, Nicklin and Salmon 1984, Koloss 1984, Röschenthaler 1993, 1998). The interest for this kind of art dates back to early colonial time, especially with regard to skin-covered masks, collections of which can be found in museums (cf. Anthropologische Gesellschaft 1901), "the supposed use of human skin in their manufacturing has contributed to the romantic aura surrounding the masks" (Nicklin 1974:8; cf. Hirschberg 1979:367). The associations that they belonged to were purchasable; they thus spread creating numerous networks. Currently Dr. Ute Röschenthaler is researching the historical spread of the associations. Therefore the following remarks have to be regarded as preliminary.

Ruel describes the associations as "formally constituted group[s] who have agreed to abide by common rules of membership and who participate in certain formally defined activities" (Ruel 1969:199). This is a summary of their general features:

- existence of a "constitution"
- existence of one or several "lodges" (units of corporate organisation), connected to a residential group, normally not hierarchical
- most often purchased, also created, divided, copied
- membership mostly depends on the payment of fees
- membership fees are usually graded according to various grades
- formal secrecy (what is discussed inside is not repeated outside; especially with regard to symbols, sign language); depends also on the grade
- formal authority over members (fines, punishment)
- recreational aspect (eat, drink, dance, sing)
- prestige in the community
- public identity: expressed by an adorned figure, e.g. a mask, gown or body painting displayed during public dances
- carrying out of public actions (punishment, oracular pronouncements, etc.)
- cult agency (powers, beliefs, rituals)

---


50 Hirschberg reports that 'originally' the skin of slaves or killed enemies was used (Hirschberg 1979:367). When in 1899 the first German who penetrated the Njemaya area was killed, the skin of his head was reportedly retrieved while it was being prepared as a cover for such a mask (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Efut war' (1859-1900):161).
women's and men's associations had complimentary functions, powers and expressions


As Ruel has noted, the spread of the associations was linked to the trade networks (Ruel 1969:12). Among the associations – Ruel calls them "cult agencies" – that were passed from West to East, he names: Mfam, Ngbe (ekpe), Basinjom (Obasinjom), Mbokondem (Nbohandom), Naibiri, Eja (ibid.). I will restrict myself here to the discussion of ekpe and the 'polity' it created, since it has immediate and major relevance for this study (for the others not less important ones, especially Mfam and Obasinjom that revealed witchcraft, cf. Ruel 1969:210-213; Röschenthaler 1993; Koloss 1984, 1985).

What Forde noted for the Yakó (in the "Middle Cross area") with respect to the governmental roles of their associations is generally also in accordance with the Cross River area under review here:

• between the different associations there was little explicit hierarchy of political authority
• membership depended on inter-clan relations and the prestige of the candidates as judged by the other members
• patricians and lineages could influence the associations' actions and decisions and also derive prestige from them only through the membership of their own elders and respected men
• the authority of the 'community leaders' was limited
• new associations could challenge the power of the old associations

(Forde 1961:313-314)

The association ekpe is also called "leopard association" (Röschenthaler 2000) or "leopard society" (Leib and Romano 1984). The leopard – often called "tiger" in pidgin – is the biggest, most dangerous and most feared predator in the forests of the Cross River area. In the 1970s they were to be found, even along the Mamfe-Kumba road (Bachu Naui). By 2000 they had seemingly disappeared in the whole region. However, leopard skins were still kept as prestigious objects. ekpe is "leopard" in Efik, the language of the people of Calabar. Ngbe is "leopard" in Ejagharm and the name of the 'leopard association' here is Ngbe. In Kenyan leopard is nku/ (Upper Kenyan), therefore the association is sometimes referred to by Kenyan speakers as Nyankwe or Nyanke (Ittmann 1932:227 no. 482; Oru 1996), literally "animal of ekpe", referring to the masked figure of ekpe (nymankwe is also the Ejagharm term used for it – nyam and nny are the terms for 'animal' in Ejagharm and Kenyan respectively). In Boki leopard is "nkwe" and the association is called "nyangkwe" (Gregg 1925). "Egbo" supposedly is an old pidgin term for ekpe used by Europeans at the coast (Leib and Romano 1984:48; Partridge 1905:34; Simmons 1956:66; Talbot 1912a). The Germans called all associations commonly "juju", but also "losango" (a generic term for 'associations' in Duala), while the ekpe of the Cross River area was referred to as 'ewi-ngbe' by Mansfeld (Mansfeld 1908). The term Nyanke, too, has the aura of being a Europeanised form, while today it is quite popular, e.g. in songs. The general term for the leopard society of today is ekpe. Ekpe may thus today be considered as the pidgin term for Ngbe, nyankwe, nyankwe, etc. I will employ the term ekpe throughout, since it is most common. Ekpe is first described in the diary of Antera Duke of Old Calabar (783-8) (Antera Duke 1956).

From the 1760s the European slave buyers gave credit to the Efik trading houses of Old Calabar that were safeguarded by ekpe which had the ability to invoke sanctions against defaulters. Sanctions against ekpe laws involved: boycott, confiscation of property, fine, arrest, execution, mutilation, confinement, attack, looting (Jones 1956:142-3).

The trade between Europeans and Africans was organised in much the same way all along the West African coast and first described in 1699. Sanctions were invoked by the Courts of Equity which were dominated by Europeans since 1849. The Europeans had to establish personal trade relations with an African trading house, which involved paying of a fee, generally called "comey" or "Kumi". They allowed the European to start trading and guaranteed him and his colleagues protection against looting. Substantial credits (called "trust") were important for the initiation of trade especially in Old Calabar and Douala. Europeans advanced goods that at the end of the main trading season had to be reimbursed with export products (Rüger 1966; Wirz 1932:66-81; Jones 1956:124-132; &T 1892:15-31). The title of "King ekpe" was used for the head of the ekpe society by Antera Duke in Calabar. The office entailed payment of slaves. King ekpe was recognised by the European traders and registered in the "comey book", ekpe also protected the passage of the traders between communities.

The Efik themselves had acquired and adapted ekpe in the seventeenth or early eighteenth century from the "Oqa", an Ejagharm-speaking group that had migrated to the Cross River estuary southeast of Old Calabar from the Oban hills by the 1600s (Forde 1956; Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985:37-38), and exported it to their trading partners (Ruel 1969:250-251).

By the end of the nineteenth century the association had spread over a large area stretching from Calabar to the Cross River bend, from the eastern coast and the Buburu and Mbak of the Cameroons, an area roughly corresponding to that whose immediate trading connections were with Calabar (251).
In pre-colonial days the eastern frontier of ekpe was Besongabang, which acquired it in 1880. In the 1920s ekpe was well established in the Bitiek area (Gregg 1925:34-35; S&C 1924:68; Sharwood 1924:130), and it was just approaching the grassfields (Manta, Ambele, Otuwu/Atong) (S&C 1924:107; Sharwood 1924:153). Whether ekpe had been present in Douala at the end of the 19th century is questionable. Thommöhlen described it in Douala between the years 1868 and 1874 (ibid. 1884). Neither Thommöhlen nor Wiz mention the role of "Egbo" in the trade with Europeans, although Thommöhlen was the main representative of Woermann in Douala for six years. He makes the only reference to 'Egbo' in Douala. Röschenthaler suspects that he witnessed 'Egbo' in the Rio de Rey area, where he also traded and used the name 'Egbo' generically for other associations (UR 2002). The Rio de Rey area had intense trade relations with Calabar since the 18th century (cf. Antera Duke 1956) and the direction was maintained at Calabar and not Douala until the Anglo-German boundary upset this (Westgrenze des deutschen Schutzgebietes Kameruns, 1889:33).

I suspect that the association was primarily important for the organisation of trade on the African side. The Europeans were involved through different institutions, like, comey, trust and dash (cf. Jones 1956:135) and only in exceptional situations became member of ekpe and used it to control their trade partners (Jones 1956:141; Nair 1972:18).

Although the association took on various forms during its spread, especially with regard to the different grades, common features prevailed, like the 'leopard' voice, the 'stone' in the ekpe house, the 'masked' figure, nsibiri (see below) and a hierarchy of grades. Some authors make a connection between the skin-covered masks and a practice called 'head-hunting' (Mansfeld 1908:157-158).

Members who had entered a certain stage of ekpe and shared its "secret" knowledge were allowed to see the "bush" of ekpe in other villages (Leib and Romano 1984:51). ekpe's main function remained the sanctioning of community laws or the protection of individual rights. It was also incorporated into pre-existing structures, since it only took authority up and expressed it (Ruel 1969:254-257).

The creation of an "ekpe polity" (Ruel) or "ekpe system" (Austen 1996:95) favoured trade networks since it guaranteed common grounds as far as sanctions, liabilities and solidarity were concerned. It was thus an instrument to maintain peace between communities. Because of its graded nature and the absolute exclusion of slaves—a potential commodity—it symbolised the social stratification of society.

By the end of the nineteenth century much of the political power of ekpe and its trading role in the Efik hinterland area was broken by the British, despite resistance to missionaries and government (Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985:40; Latham 1973).

In contrast to this, Swahley 1937 mentions "Keaka and Ekwe villages along the main trading routes have made [ekpe] laws that no trader shall be molested in any way as they bring wealth to the people" (18).

Ekpe also eased communication—even over long distances—by the distribution of the knowledge of nsibiri. "Nsibiri" is a name given to a way of conveying information by pictogramic or ideographic signs. These signs can be conveyed through "writing", sign language, symbols or talking drums. The nsibiri pictograms were painted on the body, walls of houses and calabashes. The symbols were tied with sticks or other objects, or they were acted as gestures or with the fingers. In the graphic context the nsibiri signs were an art form of women; all the other contexts they were male (cf. Röschenthaler 1993:100). These signs could express love as well as adultery, fights, punishments or a call for a meeting. They could even tell stories by ordering pictograms into groups relating to each other (cf. Talbot 1912:447-461).

There are singular nouns or verbs represented by drawings but they are far outnumbered by complete thoughts or descriptive drawings. (Campbell 1983)

Campbell calls it a narrative ideographic system. The sharing of the same "secret" or symbolic knowledge, expressed by nsibiri is likely to have acted as "a charter for consensus" (Leib and Romano 1984:50) within the "ekpe polity". The

53 Each grade had its own dances, songs, masquerades and status—there was and is considerable variation of these within the "ekpe polity". Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985 suggest that the grades were added to ekpe by the Efik, that is, among the Qua-Ejaghm ekpe there was but a single grade and it was mainly associated with warfare (ibid. 1985:43).

54 This seems to refer to all places where ekpe was established: Calabar (Ruel 1969:255), Douala (Thommöhlen 1884:421, who names the intimidation of slaves and women as the main function of Egbo), Cross River area (Ruel 1969, Röschenthaler 2000). In pre-colonial and early colonial times slaves were killed in certain ritual sacrifices, e.g. as climax of the "war dance" etogbi. Members of high status could be buried with one or more slaves ("Keaka": R&A 1929:43; "Boki": Gregg 1925:37; "Anyang": S&C 1924, cf. Nicklin 1974:16). Slaves implied wealth and thus status, the ability to kill slaves thus represented authority.


56 First-born sons were initiated into Nsibiri and the art styles during their seclusion in the "attending houses" as monsikim ("circumcised child") and excelled at their use (Röschenthaler 1993:105, 1998:40-41). Later in life such women may become honorary members of ekpe (ibid.)

57 "Nsibiri" sometimes was a grade in ekpe where the mimic form of Nsibiri was practiced. The members of Nsibiri executed people convicted by the elders (Röschenthaler 1993:104). Röschenthaler 1998 states that "Nsibiri" was an old association among Ejaghm-speaking groups owning skin-covered masks that was gradually being replaced by ekpe (40, fn 2).
knowledge of the *nsibiri* for the wild bush spirit of *ekpe*, for example, showed that the person knowing it had entered a certain grade in *ekpe* and was thus entitled to see the secret *ekpe* bush of any village he was visiting that also had *ekpe* (Leib and Romano 1984:51). An 'international sign language' in the forest and grasslands was described by Hutter (1902); whether this was a reference to *nsibiri* is uncertain, but possible (482).

*ekpe* as a consensual basis for a 19th century 'Cross River political area' is disputed by some (cf. Anene 1961:190), but it certainly did provide a common ground for communication, exchange, and liabilities – and was used to organise resistance against the Germans over a wide area in 1904 (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpawmanu wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzustehen":265).

2.5. 'Owners of the community'

When the Germans entered the Upper Cross River area, they identified 'chiefs' in 'villages'. At times they differentiated between "Unterhäuptling" and "Oberhäuptling" (Strümpell, 18.12.1900:138) or listed a range of 'chiefs' (cf. Glauning, 03.10.1901:164; Besser, 30.11.1895). Many of those villages claimed today that "there was no chief during the German time [...] By that time, we lacked the idea of a chief and the elders were ruling the villages" (MM and AG, 08.11.2000). Röschenthaler (2000: 192) stated that in pre-colonial times the villages in the Ejaghama-speaking area were governed by the council of elders with the help of associations. Who were those people called "Häuptling" by the Germans? To find an answer to this question, an understanding of the pre-colonial political systems in the Upper Cross River area would be necessary. From the ethnographic records, the British and German records, and the tales some basic principles emerge. The field is, however, very complex, especially since the pre-colonial political systems were heterogeneous. The interdependence of economic and political status translated through the associations – expressed in the phrase 'owner of the community' – seems to be one characteristic for pre-colonial concepts of 'leadership' and authority.

2.5.1. Community

Population density was relatively high in the fertile Kembong area and in Upper Banyang. The rest of the area was characterised by sparse population density and scattered small settlements. Tali and Sabes were big settlements at the end of the 19th century and intensive agriculture was carried out (Hutter 1902:275, 282). The settlement type varied from small nucleated villages to scattered dis...

58 Hutter directly contradicts what Ruel held to have been the "traditional" settlement pattern in Upper Banyang: "generally small settlements, averaging no more than three or four houses, but with the settlements of community leaders larger, going up to as many as forty houses in the case of the leader of Tali" (Ruel 1969:27).

59 These 'villages' were the products of the forced amalgamation and relocation of communities during the German colonial time (cf. chapter 8.1.3. Amalgamation (ncemiti):337).
tection in pre-Government days" (21). The name mfoakum probably refers to Mfaw Akum. The "traditional hero" is identified by R&A as Atambeng (Atah Mbang), grandson of Mfaw Akum (R&A 1929:12-13). Ehhinsi and Ayukaba decided to acknowledge Atah Mbang as leader in order to better exploit and protect their salt ponds. Issues discussed within the group included the preservation of the salt ponds and the prices of salt to be paid by the neighbouring villages. Swabey even mentioned a strike held once in order to obtain a desirable price for the sale of salt. The "clan" Atubakwelle of the neighbouring villages Bakwelle, Mbatap and Afap also regulated economic issues connected to the salt trade. Among the "real" clans mentioned the method of succession of the "clan head" was either "obscure" or rotated between the villages (Swabey 1937:21).

The fluidity of status and authority among communities seems to have clashed in many instances. What Forde observed for the Yakö concerning their ward and lineage system generally seems to hold true for the Upper Cross River area:

[Both the wards and the patriarchs [...] were said to have been formed by processes of fission and accretion associated with the growth of population, ruptures of relations between lineages within clans, and coalescence of lineages and migrant men in other units. (Forde 1961:311-312)]

Ruel (1969) stressed that "common descent and common residence were two basic principles of grouping within the society" (ibid.:72). The residential grouping depended on a more or less free individual choice. Movement of settlements due to economic, political, social and geographic reasons was common (cf. Röschenthaler 2000). Kinship was, however, ascribed and could not be denied. Common descent and common residence might coincide but this was not a fixed rule. Ruel thus classified the Banyang as a "segmental" rather than a "segmentary" society (ibid.:77-78). Forde analogously challenged the notion of the Yakö being a segmentary society:

But these bodies [the associations] did not constitute a segmentary system of kin groups. Their members did not consist exclusively or mainly of the heads of clans. Lineage organization did not extend beyond the patrician and the matrician, and authority derived from it was confined within these comparatively small unilinear groups. (Forde 1961:320)

---

60 "Atah" seems to parallel the use of "Ta" in Kenyang, referring to a person of respect, mostly an elder, probably partly coinciding with "mfoaw" in the Kenyang-speaking area (cf. Ebot 1994:95).

61 Cf. Horton (1985) for a definition of a "segmentary lineage system": "where a society is organised from top to bottom in terms of a single, embracing genealogical scheme, and where this scheme provides the sole or the dominant principal of social organisation" (93).

---

Tonkin (1990:144) argued that "segmentary tribes" — at least in West Africa — were historical products, and "lineage theories" mere constructions by ethnographers.

The determining process was always that by which residential groups acquired the size and strength to assert their own autonomy. (ibid.)

This is indicated by the spread of various associations, e.g. ekpe, which was acquired and secured by the residential unit, the community and all free male members were encouraged to join (Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985:37).

2.5.2. Kejew and keksen

The concept of 'community leaders' - bafaw - as developed by Ruel (1969) for the Banyang shall briefly be expanded, before I engage in a more general discussion of authority and leadership.

The phased autonomous concept of community developed by Ruel manifested itself in the various 'leaders' of these communities. In Upper Banyang a community leader was called mfoaw etawk, just as the leader of each level of community. There existed thus the bafaw etawk - the 'community leaders' - some of whom represented sub-groups. The authority of these bafaw, or 'community leaders', was expressed by their rights in certain 'animals of the community', the most important of which was the leopard. A hunter who had killed a leopard had to inform the community leader of the lowest level, whose duty in turn was to inform the next highest. The person with whom the leopard finally ended had the right to carry it and redistribute it. This person was the holder of the 'leopard-knife'. The action of 'carrying forth the leopard' visualised and legitimised the structure of the community, but could also uncover or even aggravate conflicts if the structure itself was contested (cf. Ruel 1969:24, 54-59, 120-121).

On the level of the village group there was no mfoaw, although the 'carrying forth of the leopard' still showed the feeling of solidarity within the village.

62 Next were the python, the crocodile, the elephant and the 'bush-cow'; less important animals were the baboon, the haressed antelope, the bush-pig, the giant ant-eater, a further species of antelope and the golden cat (Ruel 1969:59). Rights of certain people ("clan or village heads") in certain animals or part of animals existed in the whole region (cf. R&A 1929, Gregg 1925, S&C 1924; Schuster 1914).

63 The "leopard-knife" also exists in the Boki-speaking area and its ownership seems to have had all the consequences Ruel named for the Banyang, possibly even greater. "The sacred leopard-knife is superstitiously feared by the people. The knife has to pierce the carcass of a leopard seven times before the skin can be removed. The Bokis do not eat the flesh of a leopard because once upon a time Ebisi stole the knife from the Bokis, and it is believed that a leopard brought it back" (cf. Gregg 1925:15, 31).

64 I will just hint at a probable 'grassfields' connection especially of the term mfoaw (fon, fo, faon) and the concept of 'leadership' and its visualisation by the 'rights in the leopard' (cf. Igeka 1992 for the 'leopard power' in Nsa).
group, as some community leaders informed the other leaders of their village
group to join in the capture celebration (Ruel 1969:24). Powerful leaders could
call the members of other village groups to join to further accumulate prestige
and influence. Mfaw Defang of Mbang was such an ambitious man. Ruel retells
the story of a leopard being killed by a hunter from Mbang in Manyemen, about
30 kilometres from the Mbang area itself, who transported the leopard all the
way from Manyemen to mfaw Defang. Mfaw Defang in turn invited not only the
members of Mbang, but also people (probably bafaw) from far places like
Nkokenok, Bakebe, Ekpor, Tali and Manyemen itself. Ruel concluded that
mfaw Defang did this to establish his pre-eminence among all his neighbours.

Villages may recognise two leaders: "one, who holds the traditional, ritual
office, and a second, usually younger, man, who acts as effective leader in
day-to-day-affairs" (Ruel 1969:60). In 1888 Zeuner described such a 'dual chief-
tainty' for Nyansoso to the east of the Upper Cross River area:

Ich frug nun zuerst nach dem Häuptling. Er ist im Busch! war die Antwort. Darauf frug
ich nach dem zweiten Häuptling, worauf ein schon etwas grauköpfiger Neger aus der
Menge, die sich inzwischen angemalt hatte, hervortrat. (Zeuner 1889:13)

Ruel cited several instances, where the leopard knife was not in possession of
the village leader, pointing in the difference in recognition between the "tradi-
tional" and the actual authority, which he called a "compromise" between his-
toric and effective legitimisation (62-63). There was also a strong element of
popular support for the actual village leader who could also turn into the "tradi-
tional" leader. The "voice of the people" was cited as the origin of power to
those cult-objects that represented the "heart of the community", e.g. in Bakebe
(66). Ruel concluded that "any man may become a leader (mfaw) who acquires
his own supporters or 'followers', where these constitute a residential group (et-
awk) defined in relation to him; and, secondly, that a village leader is chosen and
put into office by the collective action of the village" (66).

Staschewski (1917) differentiated between "Oberhäuptling" (paramount
chief) and "Dorfhäuptling" (village chief). For the village 'chief' he included
the title 'mfö' and added that his influence was limited and that he was often at
the same time "Medizimmann".

The broad spectrum of the use of the term mfaw could be an indication of the
diffuse concept of authority. Ruel himself mentioned that "mfaw!" was an
expression used during debates to denote anybody who had spoken decisively
(ibid.:67). Noteworthy is also the translation of the term mfaw in the proverbs
collected by the missionary Ittmann, published in 1932.49 I have listed proverbs


49 Ittmann's translations for mfaw (pl. bafaw) ranges from 'king' ("König"), 'big
man' ('Großer'), 'chief' ('Häuptling'), 'respected man' ('Angesehener') to 'rich
man' ('Reicher'). This corresponds to the translations of kafaw: 'rule' ('Herr-
shaft') and 'wealth' ('Reichtum'). Ruel (1969:66) translated kafaw as 'leaders-
ship'. In the small Kenyang-English dictionary prepared by CABITAL in 1998,
mfaw/bafaw is listed with the sole translation 'chief/s'. Kafaw as a noun is de-
oted with the sole meaning "royal" (in composite nouns, e.g. cawkwuf-kafaw =
'throne'), in the grammatical sketch its meaning is given as "chiefdom" (Mbuag-

It seems logical that a person having kafaw was mfaw. Kafaw was not leader-
ship in its own right, but referred to "wealth" and this "wealth" did not only ap-
ply to material things, as can be seen by the translations of mfaw both as 're-
spected', 'big' as well as 'rich' person. Mfaw thus was a person of relative
status. This observation is supported by Ruel's accounts on numerous 'leaders' within
a community, 'big' and 'small' leaders (Ruel 1969:67). Whether a person was
mfaw or not depended on the status of the other people present in the group.

The fluidity and circumstantialities of the status ranking of community leaders gives
rise to various, sometimes ad hoc, ways of describing their position (68).

A different source for authority was kasan. Ruel translated it with 'elderhood'.
An elder is thus (mu) nsensi, elders ba siansi (or b sieve n basensi). Kasan is
obtained by age and/or kinship position (cf. ibid.:97; Ittmann 1932, 1935/36:17).
Ruel cited Banyang saying "elderhood comes first" (ibid.) in relation to kafaw.

Ruel also referred to the "senior elder" whose authority was granted due to
genealogy, i.e. the patrilineage (nurek). The patrilineages in the whole Upper
Cross area were corporate groups with an acclaimed head, i.e. the "senior elder",
who was "its moral head and ritual spokesman" (Ruel 1969:94). Postnuptial
residence in the whole Cross River area seems to have generally been virilocal;

48 Pastor Johannes Ittmann spent the years 1911-1914 and 1927-1940 in Cameroone. He was
the academic among the Basel missionaries, having published widely on linguistic and ethnog-
ographic topics. He also collected and published a number of tales in Kenyang and a gra-
matical sketch of Kenyang (cf. publication list in Kähle-Meyer 1961).

49 Proverbs are generally held to be a 'resistant' genre, since their structure is semi-formal and
this form is often memorised (Jones 1990:86; Varsina 1985).

50 Naou classes 1 and 2.

51 cf. "faw" - "to be fat" (Ittmann 1935/36).

52 A detailed ethnographic study on these concepts - as well as the Ejigbam concept of "fon"
is still needed. My assessment here must remain tentative.
however the wives did not become permanent members of their husband’s patrilineage. After their death they were carried back to their father’s patrilineage and buried there (Röschenthaler 1988). And they could be demanded back upon failure to pay the full bride price or sent back by the husband’s patrilineage if the woman did not please, e.g. did not bear children, with the demand for a new wife or reimbursement of the bride price (Enoh 1987:12). Lineage groups could be sub-divided into ‘minor lineage groups’ which generally were exogamous (Ruel 1969:96). Ruel noted that the membership of a lineage did not only comprise the direct descendants of the ancestral founder, but assimilation of ‘quasikin’ (Ruel 1969:94). The ‘slaves’ and other dependants were also part of the lineage and the ‘father’ of a ‘house’ was responsible for his ‘slaves’ as for his sons, e.g. paying their bride-price, settling their fines (F&N 1998). According to Röschenthaler 1993, the ‘houses’ of the ‘Ejaghams’ were comparably small (158). Schuster (1914) writing about the social organisation of the ‘Banjange-Stamm’ the ‘Banyang tribe’ discussed it solely in terms of family and ‘patriarchy’. Among the rights of the ‘patriarch’ (the eldest male member of the family) he named the presentation of animals to the patriarch who organised a celebration for the family during which prestations were made to the dead. Schuster mentioned a set of animals⁷⁸ that had to be given to the patriarch but drew attention to the elephant, the python (‘Riesenschlange’) and the leopard (cf. Schuster 1914:950). Schuster’s ‘patriarch’ was different from the ‘chief’ (‘Häuptling’) (ibid.). Schuster arrived in the area after the Germans had introduced changes in the organisation of villages. The chief he is referring to could possibly be the official chief, as recognised by the Germans.

Ruel referred to the situation of the 1950s and 60s mainly in Upper Banyang.⁷⁷ And here the concept of mfaw as a ‘leader’ might have been more developed than in pre-colonial times. In any case, if the senior elder was not the one with the leopard knife, it was usually the senior elder of a lineage who awarded it to a person of status and influence (Ruel 1969:70). The dual organisation in community and descent was thus expressed by the concepts of kefaw as opposed to kesensi. While kefaw was derived from personal qualities, such as character and wealth, kesensi was acquired by birthright and achieved by age. A mfaw thus depended on the implicit agreement of the group while the authority of kesensi was not easily contested (cf. Ruel 1959:97). The pre-colonial concept of bafaw thus seems to parallel to concept of ‘big men’ as developed by anthropologists and was not a formal office in pre-colonial times (cf. Eckert 1999:112). Zingtgraf admitted that the people he termed ‘Häuptling’ were rather

‘big men’ (‘große Männer’), indicated by the size of their compounds (Zingtgraf 1888:191).

Kefaw and kesensi represented two distinct hierarchies of authority, the first one based on wealth, the second on legitimacy (cf. Rowlands and Warner 1988 for Gabon and Southern Cameroon). Jones’ account of Efik social system suggests a similar complex interplay and competition between descent and residence (Jones 1956:117-124). In Lower Banyang the two concepts often merged and the respective person was addressed as ‘Ta’, i.e. ‘father’ or ‘nii’, i.e. ‘head’ (Ruel 1969:99). In Upper Banyang, where kefaw was more important as a source for authority, the exclusion of slaves – who could never challenge their dependant status in the hierarchy of legitimacy – was maintained fervently. After 1930 the D.O. of Mamfe clarified to the Lieutenant-Gouverneur that “chieftainship as defined in the Interpretation Ordinance does not exist amongst the Banyangis” (cit. in Ruel 1969:109); instead, he identified a “village head” as exercising “executive powers, whether derived from delegation by the village elders, or in the German time, compulsorily, as the sole responsible authority in the village” (ibid.).

In the Ejaghamspeaking area, the ‘nui mfam’ was perceived as the ‘chief’, while the ‘owners of the community’ were the afon (cf. Mansfeld 1908, Swaby 1937, Röschenthaler 2000). Besser (1895) frequently mentioned a number of ‘chiefs’ with whom he interacted, e.g. ‘chief Oyun’ in Naskapé [Nchaekpit] and the ‘other chiefs’: Oybosok and Oyon (2) (cf. Besser, 30.11.1895:38). The settlement of Nsanaragati, which Besser himself did not visit but gathered information from one of its ‘chiefs’, maintained six ‘chiefs’. The ‘supreme chief’ was identified in connection with his wives, i.e. wealth:


This observation corresponds to the concept of kefaw and the interdependence of economic and political power in the Kenyang-speaking area. Quite possibly, these concepts were not as divergent as in Upper Banyang. Röschenthaler (1993) expanded the Ejaghams concepts of act etek (ncieci) and a fon (nfon) etek, with the former being the ‘heads of the village’ and the latter the ‘elders of the village’. Probably both act etek and a fon etek were addressed as ata (cf. Ebot 1994:95). The Ejaghams nfon/afon certainly derives from the same root as the Kenyang mfaw/bafaw. If the corresponding Banyang terms kefaw and kesensi were employed, one would expect, that the act etek had kesensi, while the a fon etek had kefaw. Röschenthaler’s description of their qualities is however reversed: the a fon etek were the ‘senior elders’ of a lineage, elderly respected men and women and the elder members of the associations (Röschenthaler 1993:162).
2.5.3. The 'council' and the associations

Leib and Romano call the members of the highest grade of *ekpe* in Babong "the most traditional of the Ejagham villages" *Ebyongbe*, or the "council of chiefs" (Leib and Romano 1984:50, 56; cf. ebhuni-ngbe = 'men of the highest grade of *ekpe*, Röschenthaler 1993:165). *Ebyongbe* comprised the senior members of the five oldest patrilineages of the village. Three of these men were the descendants of the founders of Babong. The office of iyamba (head priest) — always a member of *ebongbe* — rotated between these three families. If a member of *ebongbe* died, he was replaced by his eldest son. Leib and Romano make numerous references to "chiefs" that had to be respected by nyamkpe during public appearances, whether the title "chief" here refers only to the five members of *ebongbe* or to other members of high rank remains unclear. Ottenberg and Knudsen employ the term "master of Ngbe" for "those with greater degrees of knowledge" (Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985:37). The highest grades of *ekpe* were thus hereditary (cf. Röschenthaler 2000:208); one might also interpret this situation as the complete merging of the concepts wealth vs. legitimacy. This likely led to conflicts between the first settlers and newcomers. While "strangers", i.e., new patrilineages, were usually welcome to settle in a community, were willingly assigned usufruct land use rights and easily adopted as members of it, e.g., in the associations, the highest positions remain closed to them, although sometimes complete assimilation was achieved after some time and effort, e.g., in Mbakang (209). Sometimes newcomers maintained their own identity by building their houses separately from those of the first settlers, continuing their own associations and constituting their own authority — at least over their section of the community (cf. Röschenthaler 2000:209; Ruel 1969). In the Ejagham-speaking area it seems to have been the norm rather than the exception that members of different patrilineages (ndenjui) formed one residential group, i.e., one community. In this situation a "village council" was created in which representatives of all 'lineages' (or 'families', or 'houses') present in the village participated. These representatives were usually the "senior elders" (Röschenthaler's *afon etek*). The system was, however, open to considerable interpretation and change, as becomes evident from Swabey's account of the 'village council' of Ndekwai: It consisted of four distinct patrilineages, each settled in different "quarters" and ranging from only four or five to 40 or 50 persons. Each "quarter" sent two representatives to the village council. If the legitimate representative was judged unfit due to sickness, 'lack of sense' or his being "of no account" (Swabey 1937:15-16), he could be replaced. In certain areas, "senior elders" held the rights to wild animals killed (Swabey 1937:16). As Ruel has noted for

---

72 Tafang Tiku in 1888 also wore a red cap (Zintgraff 1895:115; cf. 3. Making the road to Bali – Upper Bayang 1888-1893:93).
the "Banyang", "village and quarter heads" could "retire", i.e. pass their duties on to a younger man, while they still received the honours and carried out ceremonial tasks (ibid.). Swabey also notes that this "dual" system was the norm in the Ejaghjem-speaking area in 1937. Swabey indirectly related to the problem of "first settlers" versus "newcomers".

In some villages the headship goes in turn from quarter to quarter and in others it is confined to certain senior quarters. (ibid.:17)

He perceived this as a static situation, while almost certainly the position of the "senior quarters" was threatened by the others — sometimes eventually with success (e.g. Mbakang).

While from Leib and Romano's account one could get the impression that the "iyamba" of the eyongbe grade of ekpe was the person with the highest authority in Ejaghjem-speaking villages, Swabey identified the "senior elder" of the community. Actually both accounts do not contradict each other. Swabey noted that, "in the village in fact the executive and religious appear to have been combined in principle but often divorced in practice". "Religious" here refers to the associations, including ekpe. He observed that a "Nyankpe law" was the same as "a law by the Village Council".

If the Village council makes a law, it is announced by Nyankpe drum and is often called a Nyankpe law. It is not that, however, but an order from the Council promulgated through Nyankpe. In the same way any infringement of these laws is a fine to Nyankpe but it is not really that but a fine for disobeying the Council. The fine however is generally in livestock and the livestock is kept and killed at Nyankpe feasts. (ibid.:18)

Leib and Romano have described how lineage-organisation was an integral part of the organisation of ekpe. This underlines what was stated above: ekpe easily accommodated and utilised pre-existing authority structures.

In 1937 the concept of the "chief" was not expressed in terms of his rights of the leopards, as in Upper Banyang in the 1950s and 60s (Swabey 1937:17). Unfortunately Swabey did not give the local names for the "senior elder" or "quarter head", but he did mention the use of ntii mfam for the "village head" (see above). It seems that in the Ejaghjem-speaking area the two sources for authority, namely bafaw and kesenst, were quite often congruent as has been stated for the Lower Kenyang-speaking groups. The two concepts were still acknowledged, and provided space for both questioning and demanding authority.

As mentioned earlier, the area north of the Cross River has been a "no man's land" as far as ethnographic research is concerned. The assessment reports prepared by the British are the only available information on the pre-colonial organisation. I thus cannot provide any outstanding insights on the question of "chieftaincy/leadership" in this area. Generally the organisation seems to have been similar to the one described above, with the Clan chief's powers in the Boki-speaking areas seemingly being more extended:

The highest authority is the Clan Chief. He is the civil, religious, and military head of his people. Judicially he is the President of the Clan Council or court of appeal which adjudicates in the more serious inter-village disputes. The Clan Chief's authority is partly rendered to him voluntarily by the clansmen, and in part because he possesses the ancient leopard-knife (Baping of the Bokis, and Nkwe-Epang of the Ebambas) is superstitiously feared by the people. (Gregg 1925:31)

Gregg also mentions that clan members were obliged to do a certain amount of work on the farms of the "Clan chief".

In the Denya language area the concept of 'chief' (mfwa) is expressed in terms of the higher ranks of ekpe, with one 'chief of ekpe' being identified who is addressed as 'tata'.

In this organisation [ngbe], not everybody is of the same rank; there are lords [afwa; pl. of mfwa] and there are commoners [bawà rétau - people nothing]. The person who is the head of this organisation [mfwa ngbe] is called tada. Once he speaks it is final. (Abangma 1987:112-113)

While in the Kenyang and Denya speaking areas the term mfaw/mfwa was identified with the European approaches towards the concept of a 'chief', in the Ejaghjem-speaking area, the term ntii(m)fa(m) is connected to the concept of 'chief'. Just as I propose that the concepts bafaw/bafaw and afom/afon are connected, a concept corresponding to ntii[m]fam might be defang in the Kenyang-speaking area.

2.5.4. Ntii[m]fam and defang

Röschenthaler (2000) stated that 'the Ekwe' have the office of a saccal chief - "ntii[m]fam etek" (ibid.:133) without any political power, but representing the fertility and well-being of the community. As such, he is a senior member or head of all important associations, e.g. angbus, njoms, mfams, cebe, and ekpe (Röschenthaler 1993:162-163). Swabey (1937) translated Ntii[m]fam as "head man of the village". He took mfam as synonymous with etek (village). Ruel held that the 'Oban Ejaghjem' differentiated between etek and mfam. While etek referred to the residentially constituted group of people, mfam was the 'village as a political and territorial unit'. The concept of mfam disappeared in the Ngonaya and Banyang areas. For Oban and Otu (Njemaya) Ruel gave ntii[m]fam as 'village head', while in Ossing (Ngonaya), where the concept mfam did not exist, ntii[m]fam generally referred to a village leader (cf. Ruel 1969:7-8). The term ntii[m]fam implies a connection to the mfam not as the residential village, but as a 'cult agency' with associational features (Ruel 1969:203), that was probably more powerful than ekpe in pre-colonial days, especially in the western area, from where it spread east and south (cf. Ruel 1969:12; Ittmann 1953). It assumed much of ekpe's functions, namely safe-guarding debts, although its anti-witchcraft powers have attained more importance but as such it generally maintained the moral values of the community (cf. Ruel 1969:63, 137-139; chapter
2.6. Levelling and accumulating: 86. Mfam was always described as having a 'high priest' (D.O. Ossindinge 1921:6). Since mfam's function as described by Ruel, paralleled that of ntufam portrayed by Röschenhailer, I concede that historically ntufa(m) was the 'head of mfam'. Most probably the etymology of ntufam is ne mfam (head of mfam). The name existed also in "pre-Government" days (Swaby 1937; Mansfeld 1908) and the main duty of him was to rally people in times of war (Swaby 1937:11-12).

Then, as now, he did not have power to give any order or make any decision of the least importance unless he had previously consulted the council and they had agreed. (ibid:12)

As a general rule Swaby observed that the Ntui mfam should be the "oldest living descendant of the founder" (ibid.) he would thus parallel the "senior elder" of Ruel in the Banyang area. I want to draw the attention here to the link between the ntui mfam(m) and his "rallying for war". In an earlier report (R&A 1929) the organisation of the "Keka" was discussed in terms of "age class", differentiating the "senior class" from the "fighting class". The senior class reputedly approved the leader of the fighting class who in times of war became

An outstanding personality and tends to overshadow the elders at village meetings [...] but all he can do is to aggrandize his office as executive head and on his death the senior age class at once reacquires full influence and whatever of its authority it has lost. (ibid.)

R&A suggested that the "first contact between the European and the Village Council would naturally be through the head of the fighting class" (36). The role of the ntufam as the leader in times of trouble, was expressed in the story about the first contact between Germans and the people of Agborkem, as related to me by DMA (12.10.2000):

"NHING atuofam nba ari ka etek" they called the atuofam (pl. of ntufam) who were in the village (etek)

Atuofam was translated by HMF as 'chiefs' in this case. But the atuofam were different from 'ata Abhuk', one of our fathers who had foresight. 'Ata Abhuk' was translated as 'chief Ahbuk'. The title ata or za used in Ejigdam and Lower-Kenyang speaking villages was an expression of respect; today it has been replaced by the Pidgin term 'Pa' and conferred on elderly respected men (cf. Ebot 1994/95). The English term 'chief' thus encompassed both ntufam and ata in this case. Ruel noted that in the Lower Kenyang area the concepts of elderhood and leadership were more congruent than in Upper Banyang. The title mfam did thus not develop in these areas. In the Boki area differentiation between 'war leaders' and 'the chief' also occurred:

They [the Germans] arrested all chiefs beginning with Dadi and executed all of them. Those executed in Dadi were Abagapar, Obi Sanyo and Lane Bèché. They were the war leaders. The chief was chief Martin Mbe-Mbogbang. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

The title 'chief' even in 2000 was conferred on the 'oldest man' in Dadi, probably the 'senior elder'. The present chief of Inoking, Njemaya area, confirmed that the 'oldest man' was always the chief in pre-colonial days and that the concept of chieftaincy was introduced by the Germans (cf. chapter 8.1.2. 'Problems with the chief':328).

Röschenhailer mentioned age classes (ntkam) which used to exist both for women and men (Röschenhailer 1993, 2000:199). In the assessment reports reference is made to the 'senior class' and the 'fighting class'. It seems that in the course of colonial administration and the enforced pax colonialis the nkan have lost most of their pre-colonial importance. Ruel also observed this in Banyang, where the bokak or baku had largely disappeared at the time of his fieldwork (Ruel 1969:205). At this point I can only speculate on the pre- and early colonial conceptualisation of ntumfam in the western Upper Cross area. It might be that he was the head of the cult agency mfam and as such he must have been a member of the senior class. Perhaps he was 'the war leader' and a member of the junior 'fighting class' and the notion and title of ntumfam of today is an historic adaptation.

In the Kenyang-speaking area the case is clearer: A person respected as a war leader was referred to as 'defang' in pre- and early colonial days. Zintgraff, the first European to enter Upper Banyang in 1888 met two 'defangs': one of the Mbang group in the south (Tafang Tiku) and one in the Ndkfaw group (Tali): 'Defang Tal' or 'Defang Baimbi' (Ruel 1969:305) also 'Miymbi' (Zintgraff 1886, 1889), actually "Baye Mbi" (Enoh 1987). Hutter (1902) guessed that for defence purposes the different 'Banyang districts' would unite, e.g. against Zintgraff and himself. Conru, who in many instances had a more in-depth knowledge about the forest area than Hutter, stated the opposite: each Difang commanded his own combatants. Conru knew of three such Difangs: Difang Miymbi (Difang Tali), 'Difang Nyonge' (Tafang Tiku) and 'Sabe', 'Difang Nyonge' with about 400 fighters with flint-lock guns was the most powerful in the Banyang area (Conru 1894:193). Hutter and Conru noted the abundance of guns in Banyang and northern Mabum area, where almost every man carried a long flint-lock gun (Hutter 1902:293) and 'the Banyangs' were generally known for their frequent warfare (Conru 1894:104). The office of defang was however not confined to the Upper Banyang area. In 1901 the 'Defang' of Besongbanga (Lower Kenyang) was 'fined' by Glauning because he had failed to clear the roads on demand. Glauning held that 'Defang' had been the name of 'the chief of Besongbanga' (Glauning, 03.10.1901:167).

'Defang' of Mbang and 'Defang' of Tali of the late 19th century were long remembered in the area, the former for his warlike qualities (DTAM, 11.08.2000),
the latter for his power and wealth (Ruel 1969:305). The influence of these defangs went beyond their own group: Defang of Tali helped a man from Ekpok to retrieve his sons from Kendem, defang of Mbang assisted the people of Bara to fend off the Kebu (Gorges 1930:7).

There may exist a connection between the terms ndifaw, defang, and ntuimfa(m). The son of Mfomtem of Kembong who had migrated to Upper Banyang and eventually gave his name to a group of people is remembered as 'Ndifaw'. Just like the connection between the 'Debe ngui' people of Upper Banyang whose group name quite probably refers to the Ejaghame term 'Ndebenju', a similar connection between ntuimfa(m) and Ndifaw is possible. The term 'Ndifaw' then could have been interpreted differently in a new language – just like 'Ndebenju'. The term 'Ndifaw' itself was first recorded by Gorges (1930). 'Ndifaw' is a term that also makes sense to a Kenyanger-speaker. ndi is 'head', thus corresponds to nek or nti in Ejaghame. The ending faw could be a new interpretation of 'fma(m)', because faw was a concept in Upper Banyang for a respected person, but not in the Ejaghame-speaking area. 'Ndifaw' is remembered as a powerful leader whose installation as leader over a strange local group alludes to a violent incident in the past, i.e. the killing of one of his sons (Ruel 1969:61-62). The 'Ndifaw' incident probably took place ten or twenty years before the first Germans entered the area. 'Difang Tale' or 'Miyimbli' (Zingtgraf 1895, cf. chapter 3.4.1. Offering friendship: 112) could possibly be 'Ndifaw'. The term 'Ndifaw' is not mentioned in any early German account – possibly pointing to a later interpretation of the term. The term defang utilised by Zingtgraf could be a misunderstanding of the term 'Ndifaw' and the omission of the syllabic nasals 'n' and 'm' occurring frequently, cf. Ndebenju – Debe ngui.

In Upper Banyang people hold that defang means thunder (DTAM, 11.08.2000; Conrau 1899:202). In Kenyango however, thunder and lightning are ndewu-ikrem and nsan respectively (Mansfeld 1908). In the Obang area however, 'defang' is listed by Mansfeld meaning 'lightning'. In western and eastern Ejaghame (Keaka), the term he lists is nshan (ibid.). Therefore, defang in fact means thunder/lightning, but in the language of a neighbouring group with whose language the people of Upper Banyang, especially the Mbang people, were probably familiar. Additionally, the ntuimfa(m) Ndifaw, Mfomtem's son, had come from the same direction, speaking almost the same language with the Obang people. The ntuimfa(m) was perceived by the Upper Banyang people as a powerful and possibly destructive person, characteristics that also applied to thunderstorms (cf. chapter 2.6. Levelling and accumulating: 85).

The connection between the terms ntuimfa(m), defang, and ndifaw is thus more than likely; unfortunately, we can only speculate the direction of the changes, which can only be assessed thoroughly by a broad linguistic study.

2.6 Levelling and accumulating

Orji kanchi oju kenvah kisin

He who eats without sharing with others would have to kill the tsetse fly on his back.

(Obi 1987:58)

Geschieri (1997) has noted the ambiguous relationship between witchcraft and power, on the one hand as a weapon of the powerless, on the other hand as a means to accumulate power (10). It could be a weapon in the hand of the powerless, expressing an egalitarian ethic, a "moral economy" (Austen 1993), but it also explained and acknowledged ambition and hierarchy.

A central trope of witchcraft beliefs is the misappropriation of scarce reproductive resources from households or communities for the self-use of accumulating individuals (ibid:100).

The term 'witchcraft' itself may be too broad and should be broken down into the various concepts of 'supernatural power' (Ittman 1953). Although Ittmann has mainly used the Duala terms and concepts, his work officially applied to the whole northern forest region and referred to other languages, e.g. Bakossi and Kenyango were included. I will follow the Duala terms, when no data on the Upper Cross River is available.

ekong (Duala); oje (Ejaghame)

ekong opposed to ekong ('jealousy'). Jealousy is regarded as malicious and detrimental for the kingroup. Jealousy also implies accusation of witchcraft. Those with ekong have an 'evil eye', they are witches and can harm people, bring about illnesses and even kill. Those accused of jealousy have to undergo the poison ordeal (ibid.).

ewusu (Duala); efome (Ejaghame)

the power to transform into a were-animal. This power is mainly perceived as being employed for one's own or one's group advantage, and in order to harm those excluded from the group. Although it is possible to brag about having ewusu, it can still lead to accusations and the poison ordeal, but only in exceptional cases (121). Ewusu was at-

---

75 Ndifon is a personal name in the western Upper Cross River area in 2000.
76 Cf. Ruel (1969:123-124) for the story about the so-called re-organisation of the 'Debenju' clan. Eventually it comprised Funbe and Mambat (living in Sabes, Upper Banyang), Mbinjong, Mfinenjang and Obang (formerly living with Bachuo Nta). All claim some connection to the Keaka area. According to Ruel "the name Debenj (or Debengun) which was given to this newly constituted clan appears to have been provided by Mfinenjang although it is used by them in genealogical accounts as the name of an ancestor, it means 'the mountain of pigs' (debe nji) and is associated with their claim that the mountain at whose foot they live and which is inhabited by wild pigs among other animals, is their own ancestral land" (ibid:124).
tributed to the powerful 'Defang Tabe' (Miyimbi) (Esser/C&R 2001:78 and Zingraff, cf. chapter 3.6.1. Zingraff transforms into an elephant – discourses of witchcraft:122). This power was engaged consciously or subconsciously. A variety of animal species are possible efeune-animals, but a human acquires his/her efeune animal by birth. The fate of the animal transform and the person is connected – if a hunter kills one's transform, the person, too, dies. Women are more susceptible for efeune than men (Röschenthaler 1993:148). Men suspected of transforming into destructive animals (leopards and very likely elephants) were usually tried by ordeal. The British divisional officer perceived this as a 'Keska' belief (D.O. Ossaming 1921:8), but it seems to have existed throughout the area, at least along the Cross river well into Nigeria (cf. Ebai 2001:13-14; Talbot 1912a:375-376; DKZ 1909 no. 13:218-219).

The transformation of human beings into animals can be one expression of a person's power (Ifeka 1992:137). Apart from elephants, transformation was possible into other animals, including leopards, pythons, and crocodiles in the Upper Cross area (Conrau 1898:199). Ifeka described the projection of an animal transform in Nso' in the grassfields as gender and rank indiscriminate (ibid.:138). The power to transform comes from the belly. In Nso', the 'power to raise an animal transform [...]' is thus imagined in terms of fecundity, of giving life, that is common to both genders' (ibid.). 'Fecundity' itself may be an imagination of power or vice versa. In the Upper Cross River area, too, the belly contains the 'animal' of a person and can be detected upon his or her death by opening the belly and analysing the intestines (Ruel 1969; Conrau 1898:199). Ifeka's concept of 'fecundity' may be paralleled by 'control over productive and reproductive resources', which has been identified as the source for wealth and thus power in the Upper Cross River area. The power of the animal transforms in Nso' can be used for good or for evil (ibid.:137). It is an ambiguous power, detrimental only for those outside of the own group. As such it is regarded as malicious and damaging.

lemba
'witchcraft', caused by ekáwn; lemba is not connected to wealth or prestige like ekáng and ewusu, but appears by heritage or by accident. It is a power and usually harms other people. The ordeal proves the possession of lemba. Balembo were mostly killed, sometimes exiled or sold as slaves. Balembo may be male or female (ibid. 29).

mfám
an association spreading from the western Cross River region to the east and south (since the 1930s) and was "conceived of as protecting the community from the duplicity of its members, notably witches [lemba], but also thieves" (Ruel 1969:170; Iltmann 1953:38). Mfám was asked to attack the accused if guilty and leave him at peace when this was not the case (Ruel 1969:169). Mfám was headed by one person, in whose keeping were the most powerful objects, to which the oath was sworn, but the 'owners' of the community were also members. Offences against mfám could be appeased by payment of fines.

Iltmann recorded the announcement when mfám entered a Banyang village:


Obasinjum, mfám (ewa), ekáng, evu, amok were associations that could expose lemba. The choice of the association varied according to time and place (ibid.44; Gorges 1930:96; D.O. Ossimding 1921; Röschenthaler 1993:192-197). Both ekáng and ewusu were ambiguous concepts. Within the group they were positive, outside negative (cf. Iltmann 1953:47). Since power was manifested in the 'big belly', i.e. control over productive and reproductive resources, mystic powers were often expressed with the idiom of eating or food.

Defang Tabe (Miyimbi) – probably the most wealthy and respected man in Upper Banyang at the end of the 19th century – was perceived by the people as having ekáng, i.e. 'accumulative witchcraft'. Shortly after his death in 1896 a tornado and an elephant destroyed much of the farms, uprooted trees and plantain, and the people told Conrau that Defang had sent the tornado and the elephant to appropriate the people's food. Miyimbi, considered by others as ambitious and malicious, was perceived – like Zingraff – as 'eating' at the expense of the population. "Es hiess nun allgemein, Defang habe diesen Tornado gesendet und den Leuten die Speise weggenommen" (Conrau 1898:201). Esser, being told the same story, added that the people believed "Defang Tabe" was asking for more of their resources, namely more slave sacrifices. Already, 30 slaves had been killed during his funeral, but that had not been enough – Tabe wanted more (Esser/C&R 2001:78). The people had expressed ekáng in terms of eating and one person taking at the expense of the other's conforming to Auster's moral economy of witchcraft. Tabe's ekáng was so strong, that the people started moving away from the settlement (ibid.) – they evaded his power, a strategy they later successfully used with German colonial power (cf. chapter 8.4. Evading power:358).

As Geschiere (1997) noted, 'accumulative witchcraft' was generally connected with 'new wealth', both by those possessing it and by those excluded from it. Miyimbi's wealth probably stemmed to a great deal from the fact that he controlled one of the most important markets at the interface between forest and grassland. Wealthy and powerful people generally protected themselves against the suspicion of 'eating at the expense of others', by being members in the important associations (Röschenthaler 1993:195). The associations transformed ambiguous power (oke, ekáng) into benefits for the community, mainly through economic means (fees, feasts) (cf. ibid.:196). Those enjoying ekáng, materialised in wealth, would otherwise soon arouse ekáwn and then misfortune would befall them. Since slaves (and also women) had less means to establish themselves in-
side the community, they were more vulnerable to witchcraft accusations (ibid.196).

In pre-colonial times slaves were barred from entering the associations of the freeborn (Mansfeld 1908; cf. Jones 1956 on Calabar). They were also barred from marrying a freeborn and thus remained an "endogamous inferior class" (Ruel 1969:13). Although the slavery system in the Upper Cross River area was thus not assimilatory, the slaves were attached to a certain household whose head had the same rights and obligations for them as for his children, e.g. paying dowry, paying fines for crimes the slave had committed (Besong 1990:53-54). Not much is known about the organisation of the slaves and their associations. F&N state that they acquired the same associations as their masters', i.e. ekpe, Obasinjom, mfam (F&N 1998); they further indicated that slaves had their own associations and dances that the freeborn feared, e.g. ebangleha, ndong, beteneh and abiang (F&N 1998:43-44).

In the slave-dealing Upper Cross River area, slaves were not regarded as equal by the freeborn. Etogobi beti (Kenyang) or etogobi atau (Ejaghm) was a dance of ekpe that slaves were not allowed to see. It was staged at midnight and at its climax a slave used to be killed, very often a woman or girl (F&N 1998:42-43; Ebai 2001:25; Besong 1990:89). Their potential status as a tradable commodity was staged each time a slave was killed in honour of a freeborn.

The prevalence of witchcraft and uneven distribution of wealth and power have been observed as connected (Austen 1993). F&N call attention to the coexistence of slaves and witchcraft in the Banyang area. Slaves – as own-account producers of palm oil and traders – were surely able to accumulate wealth. On the other hand they were strictly barred from the process of transferring their economic into political wealth. This rift is classically bridged by witchcraft, "an ambiguous attribute of power" (Austen 1993:92).

Those accused of lemba were forced to confess or undergo a poison ordeal in the Cross River and the surrounding areas (Calabar, Buea, Moghamo) – the ordeal involved a potion brewed from the esere or ‘Calabar’ bean (esède in Kenyang) by the sister of the victim, usually resulting in death when not vomited (Conrai 1898:199-200; Gorges 1930; S&C 1924:66; D.O. Osisiogu 1921:7; Mansfeld 1908:178). The use of the Calabar bean was confined to the Cross River area, where it was also used as arrow and fish poison. In the south-eastern areas of Cameroon the ordeal was made from sawdust (kwa), which did not lead to death (cf. Ittmann 1953:27; O’Neill 1991).

In Old Calabar the use of the esere ordeal and the sacrifice of slaves had become excessive in the late 18th century – in a society characterised by fast acquisition of wealth and power on the one hand and social stratification and exclusion on the other. In Old Calabar in the 19th century those forced to drink the esere ordeal because of witchcraft accusations were the rivals amongst the freeborn. Slaves fell victim to mass human sacrifices (Jones 1956:153-157). From the account of Old Calabar I gather that only the freeborn accused of witchcraft were forced to undergo the esere ordeal while slaves were executed at once. F&N confirm this for the Upper Cross River area, where slaves guilty of lemba were killed or sold (F&N 1998:44; cf. Talbot 1912a:29-30).

We do not know the extent of friction between slaves and freeborn in the Upper Cross River area during the pre-colonial period. Certainly it was not as intense as in Old Calabar. Slaves kept within the margins to their places of origins seem to have enjoyed some protection by these groups. The Mbo from the south cite the killing of some of their fellow men who were held by the Mbang people as slaves because of their fear of the Mbangi people. In the northern area, a neutral zone seems to have developed between slave-giving and slave-receiving groups (Manta) through which the people were exchanged. Although today in Upper Banyang the preoccupation with the distinction between slave and freeborn is strongest in the Upper Cross River area, in the 19th century upward mobility and intermarriage seemed possible (Mande, wife of Defang, was of grassland origin, cf. Zingtgraf 1895).

Still, there were indicators of considerable tension: including references to the 'mystic powers' of the slaves and the 'fear' of the freeborn (Zingtgraf 1895:81; F&N 1998 – owing to oral testimonies of 1981 and 1997; Besong 1990, citing oral testimonies of 1990) and their continuous status as an inferior endogamous class (Ruel 1969:13; F&N 1998; C&E 1995). The spread of associations to contain witchcraft (Mfam and Obasinjom) paralleled that of ekpe and the integration into the trade-network (cf. F&N 1998:44).

Witchcraft is thus not confined to situations of disparate distribution of wealth (Austen) but also of political power (cf. Rowlands and Warnier 1988 for the modern Cameroonian state). Witchcraft may generally be the means by which devalued people – like the slaves – threaten the power that is the source for their devalorisation. This applied also to women, who were perceived as having more witchcraft and efene power than men (cf. Röschenthaler 1993:195). As Rowlands and Warnier point out, it is usually not the successful people who are accused of witchcraft (called 'sorcery' by them), because that might eventually lead to a fight of preternatural powers that could easily get out of control. Accused are the socially inferior people who are believed to be jealous and malicious (Rowlands and Warnier 1988:123), employing lemba. Mansfeld (1908) suggested that the result of the poison ordeal was controlled by the 'fetish men', i.e. those 'owning' the associations exposing witchcraft, e.g. mfam and obasinjom (178). The ordeal was thus merely a legitimisation of existing power inequalities, just like in Old Calabar.

---

77 Slave sacrifices and the 'ashwood ordeal' in connection with witchcraft accusations were mentioned for Buea in 1891 likewise (Preuß 1891:133-4).
2.7. Summary

The first whitemen in our area were the Germans. They were the people who brought chiefships (otuai). In those days, when you where the eldest person in the village, you were automatically a chief (ntufam). But it were the Germans who brought chiefships (otuai). He also brought villages (nten) together. He came and met people living in smaller communities far from each other, families (ndebehipi) lived in their respective settlements (ejii). It was the Germans who assembled people into bigger communities (nten). It were the first whitemen who came with 'togetherness' (echnoni) and chiefs (ntufam). (SOO, 19.10.2001)

What united the Cross River people was the communication and contact between them. They were organised in networks through which commodities, institutions, people and other cultural traits were exchanged. Regional variations of social organisation and institutions existed but were not great. The area was heterogeneous as far as the physical environment, natural resources (salt), economic specialization, settlement patterns and distribution of associations were concerned. Although various languages and dialects were spoken, the great degree of bi- and multilingualism – to a great extent due to intermarriage and migration – assured easy interpersonal communication throughout the area. The grassland to the north and east was more fundamentally different not only in the physical environment, but also due to social organisation which was more centralised and economic activities. It was the source of slaves that the Upper Cross River people kept and traded. The trade was organised through "middlemen" in transition zones, e.g. Manta or through markets, e.g. Kendem, Widekum, Tali. The market-to-market trade depended on peace maintained in each transition zone through social exchange, e.g. intermarriage.

At least by the mid-nineteenth century the different communities were part of an intensive trade network in which transport on the Cross River played a crucial role. Demand for slaves and palm oil in Old Calabar at the mouth of the Cross River fuelled the trade. Slaves – mainly originating from the grassfields, with some from the area itself – became an important resource for the Upper Cross River people as "productive capital and negotiable chattel" (Austen 1977:313). They profited from their economic activities both as field slaves (palm oil) and household slaves (traders, porters). The slaves were strictly kept separate from the "freeborn", both in residence as in political, cultural and social respects. The disparity between their economic wealth and political exclusion probably represented an element of tension resulting in witchcraft accusations and human sacrifices.

The Efik – trading directly with the Europeans at the coast – seemingly supported the spread of ekpe northward to their direct trading partners, from where it spread further. ekpe and the symbols, e.g. nsibiri, and policies attached to it acted as a unifying element between these different communities and created an ekpe polity that before the advent of the Germans had reached as far east as Besongabang in the Mamfe central area.

People were organised by descent and residential grouping. Complex processes allowed the integration of non-related people into an existing community, while conversely, some communities also split into smaller units. "Ethnic" identities were not employed. Power – wealth and status – were sought by the community and for the wider group (village/lineage group) it belonged to, as well as by individuals. Material wealth translated into symbolic wealth; people who had acquired both were respected and politically influential. Authority was derived from a complex interaction between genealogical rights (legitimacy) and acquired influence in the community (power), mainly expressed by belonging to prestigious associations. The concept of one leader with whom ultimate coercive authority lay did not exist; rather, 'elders' and 'owners' acted for the community but also with the community. "Coercive authority is directly or ultimately a function of the community acting corporately" (Ruel 1969:133). Each source of authority could be counterbalanced by the other. This applied not only at the level of residential groupings but also within descent groups and created a situation that was marked by constant competition and disputes over authority in which a variety of institutions could be mobilised, e.g. women's Ekpa and men's ekpe, witchcraft, esere ordeal, slave sacrifices and ultimately warfare. What Forde has noted for the Yakobi generally seems to apply to the pre-colonial Cross River area:

Wider political relations [...] largely resolve themselves into modes of co-operation with and competition between such associations. The co-ordination of political action in government does not therefore depend directly on the solidarity and co-operation of lineages on the one hand or on the paramount authority of a chief and its delegation to his subordinates on the other. It is achieved to the extent that there is mutual adjustment of their distinct competences by the several associations which may include some form of conciliar organization of their respective leaders. (Forde 1961:310)

Within the two competing concepts of power, i.e. legitimacy - the 'small lineage aristocracy' (Bayart 1993:134) and 'leadership', i.e. personal prestige, an arena for constant struggle over power was opened up. It seems that although the concept of 'lineage legitimacy' was important it was not impossible for individuals to emancipate themselves from lineage domination, e.g. Ndifaw in Tali, who was a 'stranger' and eventually became the lineage elder. Warfare always produced a possibility to accumulate status and even trans-local influence independent of both kefaw and kesensi. The Upper Cross River area was protected against penetrators from the south in the "Kebu wars" taking place between 1870 and 1880, probably extending from east to west. The defence was carried out by "war federations" both in Upper Banyang/Bangwa and Ngonaya and created powerful personalities – known in Upper Banyang under the title Defang, in the Ejaghamb-speaking area as 'ntui mfam' – probably referring to the one
gathering the combatants. In 1888 a first encounter between a 'Defang' and a German took place.

3. Making the road to Bali – Upper Banyang 1888-1893

Darum mit Gott, wenn ihr die deutsche Ehre im Herzen treu und rein bewahrt, tragt
deutsche Sprache über ferne Meere und deutsche Arbeit, deutsche Art unter die Völker,
ein leuchtend Geschlecht, tragt euren Glauben und tragt euer Recht!
Und wer als Forscher heimkehrt von der Reise, und jeder kühne Pionier, er sei gegrüßt
in deutscher Männer Kreise, wir heßen euch willkommen hier, von euren Leiden die
eindische Spur tilget im Becher auf heimischer Flur.

(Khym of the Explorers’ KK 1890:140-141)

3.1. Crossing into the Cross area

In the peak of the rainy season 1888, a group of 35 strangers entered the eastern
Cross River area. They had traversed 'Mabum' to the south and now reached the
Kenyan-speaking Mbang group to the north. The strangers were under the
command of a German by name Dr. Eugen Zintgraff. He established good
relations with the inhabitants of the 'Mabum' village Sokwe (Sukwé – Zintgraff
1895:101) of Nguti by killing an elephant for the people. Sokwe was the last big
settlement of 'Mabum' before entering the Cross River area.

Nguti had described his neighbours to the North – called 'Banyang' – as most
unpleasant and had warned Zintgraff against penetrating into their area (cf. Zint-
graff 1895:102, 114). Zintgraff insisted, and Nguti declined all responsibility for
the group, but assigned people to guide the group into 'Banyang country'. The
relations between Mabum and Mbang were evident by the lack of communica-
tion between them. Zintgraff described the zone dividing the two groups as dif-
cult to pass through. Thick undergrowth, lack of a bridge across the river 'Saro'
in the boundary zone and tall reeds indicated that the groups were not involved
in regular everyday exchange. Although Zintgraff's 'expedition' – as it was
called – had spent some time in Nguti's area, the Mbang people did not seem to
have received information about the coming of this strange lot (cf. Zintgraff
1895:114). A hammock bridge over the Mbu – a large stream – was constructed
but satellite settlements of Nguti's people between the Mbu and its tributary Saro
probably served as early warning systems against anything unexpected coming
from the north. The relation of the Mbang and Nguti-people was apparently
marked by shared interests (probably trade) as well as shared intimidation.
Whether the Nguti-people were the 'Kebu' who had tried penetrating into the
Upper Cross River area is uncertain but possible. Zintgraff described a direct
trade partnership between the Batom area and Banyang groups north of Mabum,
excluding Mabum. Since the Mabum area transected the Kenyan-speaking
Mbang groups from the Bakoni groups, it is most likely that the people of Ma-
bum profited from the trade – if not as middlemen, then by imposing tolls.
Zintgraff's men were Vai from Liberia and Kru from Sierra Leone who acted as armed porters. These armed porters are still known in the Banyang area as 'Monrovia' or 'Barovia' (DTAM, 11.08.2000). Included were also two interpreters (one Hausa, one Bayong). Beyond than translating words from one language to the other, they adapted and explained concepts, customs, beliefs and aims. An earlier expedition of Zintgraff was denied passage in Batom halfway between Kumba and Ngui due to instigation by the 'interpreter' Soppo Bell (cf. Zintgraff 1895:90-95). The interpreter that Zintgraff depended on when entering Mbang was called Muyênga. Muyênga was a slave of Manga Bell – as son of 'King' Bell of Douala, who carried out his trading activities along the river Mungo. Muyênga was from the grassland and spokePidgin English (cf. Zintgraff 1895:96-97). His native language was 'Bayong', possibly Ndemi, either a dialect of or closely related to Tikar (cf. Grimes 1996). O'Neil conjectures he could have been part of a Bamum refugee group settled in Galeta's new settlement before he became a slave (O'Neil 1996:85). He did not speak Konyang; communication took place via bi-lingual slaves found in the whole forest region.

Half an hour's march north of the river Saro (a tributary to the Mbu) Zintgraff's expedition reached a small settlement ('Tamba' = Ntembng - 'lower Mbang') where they spent the night. Ntembng was part of the Mbang group. This group had a 'Defang', i.e. a war-leader (cf. chapter 2.5.4, Ntembng and defang:81). He was called Defang but he was not born under this name. His real name was Tafang Tiku, but because of his braverness they called him Defang [...]. They gave him this nickname meaning 'thunder' (DTAM, 11.08.2000)

Tafang Tiku had previously been an ally to Fontem of Bangwa and their alliance continued against the Germans (ibid.).

In Zintgraff's perception 'NTok Defang' was the name of the paramount chief 'Oberhäuptling' of the Banyang. 'NTok Defang' is certainly etawok Defang, i.e. the settlement of the defang. Zintgraff describes this settlement as being vast and clean. In Tafang Tiku's absence it was kept by a slave of high status ("Sein Leibsklave", Zintgraff 1895:115). Tafang Tiku - as the war-leader - was the person who had to confront Zintgraff and his soldiers. He seems to have used the time since Zintgraff's arrival in the Mbang area to gather the men of the fighting class. Two hours after Zintgraff and his men had occupied his settlement, he appeared with four other leading men ('brothers') and a crowd of hundreds of people. The 'brothers' were probably the other 'owners' of the Mbang group. The men of Tafang Tiku were armed with 'dane guns', the "Danish Black Guns" (flint-lock) muzzle-loaders (Chilver 1961:242-243). These guns were almost the size of a man. Zintgraff's men had shorter guns, mainly breech-loaders. The Mbang people referred to them as 'children's guns' because of their size (Zintgraff 1895:116). Thus was the setting for the first encounter between Zintgraff and Defang of Mbang. The course this encounter took not only determined Zintgraff's disrespect for the forest people in general and the Banyang in particular but also initiated the contest for power between the inhabitants of the Upper Cross River area and the German colonialists.

Zintgraff came from the south, the area of the Mbang people's enemies with whom infrequent fighting took place (SB, 8.8.2000). He wanted to proceed to the north, to the area in which the people traded and got their slaves from. His group was small as were their guns. The fighters of Tafang Tiku were many and their guns long. Surely Tafang Tiku and the Mbang people must have wondered what Zintgraff was up to.

3.2. What was Zintgraff up to – where from, where to?

Zintgraff had a mission. He strove to establish a direct route between the coast and Adamawa, the area north of the grassfields. The coastal areas had become a 'protectorate' of the German Reich, named 'Kamerun' three years earlier. Zintgraff's personal mission, objectives and imaginations are to be embedded in a wider story, the story of a German project called 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun'.

3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – land and people under the German flag

L'Indiège est déclaré impénétrable à l'étiquette, absence de valeurs, mais aussi négation des valeurs. Il est (…) l'ennemi des valeurs. (Fanon 1961:10)

Enlightened Europe had constructed Africa as its inverted self-image. Africa "marked the point at which humanity gave way to animality" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:99). The Europeans, the 'white' or 'caucasian' race, was not only the most enlightened and civilised, but also the most beautiful race. This knowledge provided the legitimisation and even necessity for (cultural) imperialism and acted as the grounds for the identity of "the bourgeois [male] subject of the new Age of Capitalism" (ibid.101). The European nation states were perceived as rivaling 'economic bodies', each fighting for their 'share' (cf. Simo 1986:184-185; Eckart 1997:191). The economic needs of the German state sufficiently legitimised all colonial acts, aspirations and competition. Haenßen identified the equation of nationalism and colonialism as a means by which private economic actors pursued their overseas profit interests by pushing the state into a financial obligation (Haenßen 1970:21). The German intelligentsia which dominated public opinion partly used colonialism as an ideology to create a unity within the newly founded German Reich that was threatened both by confessionalism and socialism. Colonialism became important in building a 'German' identity. The
shaping of an identity out of a crisis with the use of colonies was not a uniquely German phenomenon (cf. Gikandi 1996) — but Germany's position to the other European nations was different, in that she was perceived as inferior. Germany was late: late in becoming a nation state and late in becoming a colonial power. The prolific display of national symbols — especially the flag — is but one indication for this 'national insecurity'. A national bourgeoisie assumed the responsibility of improving this situation. Germany's imperial identity oscillated between feelings of minority and cultural arrogance. It aimed at achieving an international equilibrium as well as an expression of national uniqueness (cf. Kundra 2003).

These tendencies were only consciously absorbed by a small part of the intelligentsia, and they only marginally influenced military elites, but they laid the groundwork for more popular radical national and imperial goals, e.g. those of the "Alledeutscher Verband" (HBMG, 3:25-26). The "Alledeutscher Verband" came into being when nationalists protested against the ratification of the Helgoland-Sansibar-Treaty between Germany and England in 1890 — they had their official launching in 1894. In their early publications some ideas emerged as leitmotifs, e.g. the Germans as a "Heimvolk" that took its legitimate share of the world without depending on another nations' elecency. The colonial movement also used these leitmotifs:

Wie aber jedes kräftige Volk nach Ausdehnung seiner Herrschaft und seinen Einflusses strebt, so führte auch die wirtschaftliche und politische Einigung des Deutschen Reiches mit einer gewissen Naturnotwendigkeit zu dem Verlangen nach eigenen übergreifenden Besitzungen [...] Das deutsche Volk war im Innern so weit erstarkt, dass es die Befähigung seiner Kraft und den Absatz seiner hochentwickelten Industriezeitungen nicht mehr auf den engen Raum beschränkt konnte, der ihm in Europa zugewiesen war. Die junge Grossmacht musste eine Weltmacht und damit eine Kolonialmacht werden. Somit ist die deutsche Kolonialbewegung nichtemachte, und sie ist weder ein Kolonialzwielicht, noch ein Kolonialhieber, mit welchen Schlagworten ihre Gegen um sich zu werfen pflegen. (Hasselt 1899.3; Hasselt was a student of Ratzel)

Until 1914 the Alledeutscher Verband rarely had more than 20,000 members, mostly from the high bourgeoisie, especially teachers and professors; many were co-members of other national associations, e.g. the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG). Their internal enemies were the social democrats, the external enemy Great Britain. Preventive wars were conceived as legitimate strategies for the maintenance and extension of Germany's power. Nationalism and imperialism thus went hand in hand.

All legitimisations for the acquiring of colonies were rooted in a unique German national minority complex — an identity crisis — a feeling of being left out and behind, of having been weak in the past (Hildebrand 1994; Klenke 1995; Gründer 2000:31-33). Although this complex was exposed only by comparison with European nation states, especially Great Britain, it was displayed and enacted in the colonies. Whether by the laws of history, economics, nature or power: the staging of a colonial enterprise had to prove that Germany was neither weak nor timid. National pride, the national flag and national power were but fragments of the same discourse, a discourse in which weakness and fear were atopto.

In the beginning of German colonialism evolutionary legitimisations dominated. The African, 'the Negro', occupied the lowest and the European the highest rank of human nature. In racist or biologic legitimisations, an 'education' of the 'negro' was superfluous, since his belonging to a different 'race' denied him the capability to reach the 'stage' of the 'white race'. Each 'race' developed separately from the other. Decisive for the spreading of these ideas was the essay of Comte de Gobineau on the inequality of the human races, which was translated into German between 1898 and 1901. Contrary to the evolutionary theories, in racist theories the acculturation or europeanisation of Africans was needless. The superiority of the European was natural — in the body, in the race — and insurmountable. The European was superior by nature, not by force. Simo (1988) stressed that racist theories were grounded in the fear that the colonised might use the weapons of the Europeans to turn themselves against the latter. By denying the Africans the ability to attain culture (Kulturunfähigkeit), they eliminated this risk at least in the discursive domain.

Explanations based on social Darwinism rested on the right of the strongest to dominate the weaker. Colonisation was perceived as a natural right of the Europeans because they were stronger: the development/expansion of the stronger necessitated the oppression/repression of the weak. The right for Europe to appropriate the world was thus justified; indigenous people could maintain their culture, but European populations should be transplanted to other parts of the world. The Struggle for life corresponded to a struggle for space. Power equaled right. Force was the only and ultimate means of achieving this goal. These ideas contradicted the racist theories in that the superiority was not given by nature. They did thus not easily eliminate the fear of being proven weaker — which remained possible. What was common in these discourses was the conviction that Africans were not able to advance on their own account, but needed the help of the Europeans. This concept was translated into the favourite metaphor of Africans as children and Europeans as their father or teacher (cf. Dipps 1973:52-55; Simo 1986; Scheulen 1998:107-184; Markmüller 1995:215-231).

79 Priester (2003) has drawn attention to the fact, that Gobineau's essay is not the first manifestation of a fully developed racist doctrine. Rather, it rests on an earlier aristocratic racism, elaborated by Henry de Boulainvilliers (1658-1722), who calls for the "social closing" of the aristocracy. Such "class racism" is differentiated from the "ethnic doctrines" in 19th century Germany and also from anti-semitism, but it already contained all elements of race doctrines, such as the notion of the blood cleanliness, and the connection of a biologic class conscience with the relation to a certain soil ("blood and soil") (cf. ibid:44-49).
The hoisting of the German flag by Gustav Nachtigal, a former explorer appointed as Consul-General and Commissioner for the West African coast by Bismarck, on the plateau of Jos is generally held to mark the birth of the "Schutzgebiet Kamerun". This event took place on the 14th of July 1884. The act was preceded by diplomatic and economic interactions 'on the spot' that have been analysed and described in detail elsewhere (Stoecker 1960, 1977; Hausen 1970; Eckert, Wirz 1972:36-57; Owona 1973; Rudin 1938:17-75). I highlight the significance and omnipresent display of the German flag as a symbol of power and pride and contrast it to the underlying 'German national minority complex', since the contradictions between these layers will remain pertinent for the German 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' and its enacting in the Upper Cross River area.

Nachdem Deutschland durch den sieg- und ruhmreichen Krieg von 1870/71 wieder fest gegnet war und sich zur ersten Landmacht Europas emporgeschwungen hatte, begann es die gesunkene Seemacht wieder zu hebem und zu foedern. Mit Stolz kann Deutschland jetzt auf seine Flotte schauen, nimmt sie doch zur Zeit bereits eine der ersten Stellen unter den Kriegsflootten ein. (Heßler 1894:1)

Thus begins the book: "Die deutschen Kolonien: Beschreibung von Land und Leuten unserer auswaertigen Besitzungen" by Carl Heßler, published in 1894.

The introduction ends:


The flag and the thunder of cannons marked the coming into being of Germany's colonies both practically and metaphorically.

While in popular perception the "Schutzgebiet Kamerun" came into being by the hoisting of the German flag and the firing of canon shots, these acts were preceded by a precise and legally significant procedure laid out by Bismarck two months before the flag-raising were enacted. It involved the following steps:

1. The German government arranged with private companies operating in the Bay of Biafra to acquire possessions in the name of the German Reich in Bimbii, Kamerun (i.e. Douala), Malimba, Small Batanga, Bota and Benito either by treaty or contract of sale.

2. The Treaty or Contract was signed by the inhabitants of the area and the private German companies.

3. The Treaty or Contract was immediately legalised by the public German party, i.e. 'consul' Nachtigal.

4. The Treaty or Contract was taken over by the German Reich in the name of the Kaiser, signed between the German private and the German public party.

5. The representative of the German Reich in the presence of the nobles of the inhabitants solemnly proclaimed the sovereignty of the Reich over the territory, accompanied by hoisting of the German flag and firing at least one cannon shot. (Ndumbe 1986:49, 53)

In the case of "Kamerun" (Douala), a treaty was signed between the German traders Woermann and J & T and the so-called "Kings and Chiefs of Cameroon" on the 12th of July. The area of Cameroon referred to the estuary of the rivers Mungo, Wouri, Dibamba and Ndonga. Gustav Nachtigal - as the representative of the German public party - proclaimed the German sovereignty over the area on the 14th of July. The hoisting of the German flag in the presence of the nobles of the inhabitants acted as the visible manifestation of this proclamation. Similar "Schutzverträge" were signed with other peoples at the Biafran Bay in the same month. The 'solemn ceremony' took place immediately after the German private and public party had signed their contract of protection (Ndumbe 1986:55). The scene visualised a German construction of self both in "reality" and in the representation: it has been described and depicted not only in early colonial discourse (DKZ 1884, 1, 18; Nachtigal 1884, Heßler 1894:89; Hassert 1899:1; Hutter 1902:1; Zimmermann 1912:246) and the romantic discourse of the interwar era (Kienitz 1941:64; MacLean 1940:38; Steer 1939:150), but also in post-colonial German-European discourses, academic (Stoecker 1977:20; LeVire 1970:132; Hausen 1970:11; Gründer 1995:83; Volz 1989:422; mentioned with a critical assessment by Wirz 1972:56-57; Rohde 1997:69) and popular (Fuchs 1998:149; Nuhn 2000) and post-colonial Cameroonian discourses both academic and popular (Owona 1973:23-24; F & G 1986:62, Criaud 1980:72; Mbeng 1978:168) The visible German flag thus symbolised possession, i.e. exerption of power, over a territory. The flag could act as the representative for the German nation and all its pride and aspirations. The hoisting of their flag over a new territory enlarged the glory of the German nation in the scramble with other European nations but also by becoming the patron of the natives. These associations with the flag were seldom explicitly stated in contemporary discourse but can be gathered from the use of it both in visual as in linguistic representations. Hutter (1902) described the setbacks of Zintgraff's second expedition to Bali in 1890 and the subsequent military expedition solely in terms of the flag.


Wir hatten hier oben wieder festen Fuß gefasst und die deutsche Flagne war wieder geachtet, wurde gesucht. (Ibid:23)

Beyond this symbolic value of the flag the act of creating the "Schutzgebiet Kamerun" comprised some more general suppositions that had been tacitly assumed before they were enacted. Some years after the creation of the German protectorates these assumptions surfaced in the discourse by jurists trying to define the legal status of the German "Schutzgebiete" (e.g. Stengel 1886). The relevance of these considerations was never fully acknowledged, the colonial practice continued to work on tacit assumptions.

Stengel differentiated between 'protectorates' and 'colonies'. Colonies were by international and national law part of the mother country, whereas protectorates were an international and not a national relation between the protectorate state and the protecting state ("schutzherrlicher Staat"). The protecting state acquired the right to act in exterior matters for the protectorate state and protect it against attacks from the exterior. The interior matters of the protectorate state remained untouched and untouchable by the protecting state. A protectorate thus came into being by a treaty between the protectorate and the protecting state. Following colonial practice and Prof. Stengel's judgement, Germany did not acquire 'protectorates' but real colonies, i.e. full sovereignty rights for the German Reich.


Central to Stengel's argument is the fact that a protectorate treaty can only be signed between two states ("staatlichen Gemeinwesen"). If the people in the protectorates were not organised as a state, it was simply not possible for them to enter a protectorate relation with the German Reich. Stengel, obviously following the conventional wisdom of the time, generally judged all people of the German colonies to lack the necessary state-like structure. The basis for the acquisition of those areas were thus not the treaties signed with 'kings and chiefs', but the occupation of the territory (Ibid.).

The relevant part of the acquisition procedure as outlined above was thus solely the hoisting of the flag. Through this, an area which was previously unoccupied by international law, inhabited by people who by definition were not able to enter into any internationally binding relation became internationally relevant as a colony. The hoisting of the flag over these territories defined its status vis-à-vis the other sovereign states ("scramble for Africa") and it defined the status of the people living within these territories as "Eingeborene" who were legally not endowed with the possibility to oppose or influence their change in status. All this was represented by the flag and explains the abundant use of images of the fluttering German flag (numerous photographs in Dominik 1908), description of the flag (see above) and expressing colonialism in terms of the flag (Hutter). This conceptualisation of (German) colonialism that accepted 'states' (in the area of Cameroon besides Germany only France and Britain) as the sole legitimate actors framed a cognitive and discursive background against and within which a certain kind of colonial knowledge and colonial speech was ordered. The consensus about this background was so common that it was rarely necessary to explicitly state it – as in the discourse about the legal status of the German protectorates. This will be demonstrated in the chapter on the so-called 'uprising' (cf. chapter 7.2 Mzawamukwars 1904-1906: 265).

The display of the flag, the cannon shots and other national symbols and rituals had the de facto function of signalling possession of the area to the other European powers. For Germans, they were an expression of national pride, and the 'natives' were supposed to be impressed by the spectacle. This 'power by spectacle' was by no means confined to German colonialism. Kaplan has described it for Poona, India and Britain in the same way, also stemming from a position of weakness:

"Worried by the military successes of Haidar Ali, the governor argued that company officials [East India Company] needed to fly the Union Jack, even in the presence of the king's ships, in order to 'maintain their consequence among the Natives'. [...] 'It was all the more important to maintain prestige by elevating (the) governor into a 'prodigious great Man' with splendid titles and an impressive body of retainers.' He goes out in great state. A Company of Sepoy Guards, with Chubbars and the Union Flag carried before him'. (Kaplan 1985:93)

'Power by spectacle' was a technique of colonial power that was most popular in a position of actual weakness, and as such was an integral part of the 'colonial identity' (cf. Eckl 2003). Zinggraf reportedly preferred long yellow boots because "they made a great impression on the natives" (C&R 2001:63, fn 1). He and Zeuner also wore impressive hats with an extremely broad brim.

---

80 Since the German Reich executed the sovereignty over their territory, they were subjects of the Reich (Reichsuntestanten), but not citizens of it (Reichsangehörige). The citizenship had to be acquired by naturalisation (Stengel 1886:230, fn1, 2nd column).
3.2.2. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – river, town, and country

The term "Kamerun" in 1884 referred to a river (the Wouri), a town (Douala) and a country. In the treaty of the 12th of July 1884 this country is defined as: "on the Cameroons River, between the River Bimbia on the North side, the River Qua-Qua on the South side and up to 4°10' North Latitude" (cit. in Ndume 1986:45).

In 1885 the German protectorate of "Kamerun" consisted of several places along the coast acquired by sale's contract or negotiated treaty: Yoko at the River Benito, Cameroons, i.e. Doualas-towns, Bimbia, Jibaret and Sorokow, Small Batanga, Malimba, Ndoo and Bakundu, Kribi, Campo River, Botu and Benita (cf. Ndume 1986:57-58, 63). The Germans soon started gaining control over a territory by military action and subsequent 'peace agreements'. The first military action took place against Kum'a Mbape (Lock Priso), chief of Bonaberi (Hickorytown), who had not signed the treaty of 12th July 1884 (cf. Rudin 1938:55-56). The 'peace agreement' was signed on the 13th of January 1885. As Ndume notes, its tone was completely different from the negotiated treaties, especially that of 12th July 1884, to which was added a list with the wishes of the people of the Cameroons that had been signed by the representative of the German government. The first 'peace agreement' as well as the following ones amounted to total political and military submission with no conditions, generally accompanied by payment of indemnities. Kum'a Mbape and the people of Bonaberi had been attacked from the sea, by the German navy. Not until the creation of an infantry in 1891/1894 were the Germans able to carry out military operations on land (cf. chapter 4.1. 'Sufficient means of power':150).

81 "Der Name Kamerun, englisch Cameroon, kommt von dem portugiesischen 'camaram' her, welches Krabben bedeutet. So nannten sich die Portugiesen einst die Bucht, weil sie sehr zahlreich von diesen Tieren bewohnt wird." (Heßler 1894:67).  
82 In 1901 when the central Government was moved to Buea the Germans replaced the term "Doula" for "Kamerun-Stadt" (cf. Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und in der Süßsee im Jahre 1900/1901:37). Both referred effectivley to a number of settlements of different groups of Douala, which were referred to as 'Bell Town', 'Akwa Town', 'Dido Town' and "Hickorytown" respectively (cf. Ndume 1986:44-45). "Vorbei an einer ebenfalls mit dem Namen Malimba bezeichneten Delta-Insel geht es in die wilckliche Kamerun-Mündung hinein, an welcher sich mit einer einheimischen Bevölkerung von ungefähr 20000 Seelen Missionsstationen, Ansiedlungen und Negerdörfer mit pomphafnen Namen, wie König Bells Stadt, König Aquas Stadt, stromaufwärts in ziemlicher Menge finden. Alle dieser Plätze sind unter dem Namen Kamerun-Plätze zusammengefaßt. Sie liefern mit ihrem noch wenig erforschten Hinterland den größten Teil des westafrikanischen Palmöl, Palmkerne, Ellebenk, Kakao, Kaffee und viele andere tropische Produkte." (DKZ 1884, 1, 18:356).

Bismarck's idea of chartered private companies governing the area had failed by 1885 and in July 1885 Julius von Soden was instated as first Gouverneur of Kamerun and commissioner for Togo, residing in 'Kamerun'. The German 'protectorate' thus became nationalised and dependent on the funds of the German state. The budget of the German Reich was voted by the Reichstag which thus obtained some powers of supervision over the colonies and introduced an element of centralisation. The policies in the colonies were linked to domestic policies, with the Center party (Zentrum) and the Social Democrats (SPD) being most critical towards the colonial administration and colonialism in general (cf. Gann and Duignan 1977:24-25; Gründel 1995:85).

At the beginning of the colonial era the German activities were limited to the coast of the Bight of Biafra, in "Mittelafrika". The coast, with its mangrove swamps and hot and extremely humid climate, had seemed so undesirable and dangerous for Europeans that the traders operating in the area had managed their business on board of ships, the so-called called hulks. The recurrent characterisation of the area as "unhealthy" clearly demonstrated German preoccupation with their health, or rather, their fear of damaging or loosing their good health (cf. chapter 3.7. Forest and grassland:131).

"Mittelafrika" was the destination of adventurers and explorers like Livingstone and Stanley. It was mainly unknown territory, an empty space on the map as well as in the mind, it was dark and mysterious:

83 "Die Landschaft an dem Gewässer stellte, wie der Kundige gar nicht anders erwarten wird, eine einzige Mangrovenwüste dar, in der sich nur wenige Ansiedlungen von Eingeborenen vorfanden. Im oberen Teil war das flüssige Element derartig in zahllose Cikus (Naturkanäle) ausgetrieben, daß die Entwässerung in diesem Labyrinth äußerst schwierig wurde. Der DeutscheFLOATING TRADING POSTS were purposefully stranded and firmly anchored and a European staff permanently on board. Main advantages of the hulks were the security for the Europeans (high ship walls) and the "healthier" conditions. In 1893 three hulks were still in use in the Douala estuary, mainly due to "health" considerations. (cf. Hutter 1902:43-45)." Eine Hülle ist ein völlig abgetaktes Schiff, die Wörminnene war ein altes russisches Kriegsschiff von 600 Tons Inhalt. Das Deck ist in seiner ganzen Länge mit einem Dach aus Palmblättern versehen, welches Schutz gegen Sonnenbrand und Regen bietet. Auf dem Hinterdeck ist ein kleines Haus aus Planken errichtet, welches als Wohn- und Schlafhaus für die Hulks dient. Die ununterbrochene frische Seebrise, welche das ganze Jahr hindurch in die Mündung des Kamerun von Morgen bis Sonnenaufgang hineinhäupt, macht den Aufenthalt an Bord der hulk zu einem bei weitem angenehmern als am Lande, abgesehen davon, daß die vielen Unannehmlichkeiten von tropischen Insekten und Reptilien fast ganz in Wegfall kommen." (DKZ 1884, 1, 18:356).
In the 19th century adventurers and explorers had brought home information around the area of Lake Chad and the Niger-Benue region (explorations by Heinrich Barth 1850–55, Vogel, Gerhard Rohlf's 1867, Owerweck, Nachtigal 1870s; Robert Flegel 1882/83 – cf. Steecker, Mehrs and Mehrs 1968:60; Rudin 1938:76-77). They described big cities, empires, flourishing markets and trade which enflamed the colonial imagination, greed and desire and gave the interior of Kamerun an 'exaggerated importance' (ibid.:76). A "Denkschrift" (memorandum) by A. Woermann adopted by Hamburg's chamber of commerce in July 1883 demanding Bismarck to acquire colonies at the coast of Cameroon substantiated by the need to break the trade monopoly of the coastal 'middlemen' in order to gain access to the markets of the interior.


Before embarking for his Niger/Benue expedition in 1883 Flegel is reported to have spoken the following words:


In the same DKZ-article Adamawa was characterised as an elevated hilly country with a climate agreeable for Europeans and even suitable for European settlement. Its inhabitants were judged more advanced than the people of the coast. Trade relations were expected to develop easier in the stately structures of the Adamawa people. In short, all the nuisances of the coast did not exist in Adamawa.

Die auf vorgerückterer Kulturstufe stehenden Bewohner (Mohammedaner), deren geschlossenere staatliche Verfassung im Gegensatz zu den versplitterten politischen Zuständen der Küstenbewohner das Eindringen europäischer Handelsunternehmungen weSENTLICH erleichterte, haben bereits jetzt einen namhaften Bedarf an europäischen Industrieerzeugnissen. [...] Die Höhenlage dieses [...] Berglandes [...] mäßigt das Klima so hinreichend, daß die Möglichkeit eines dauernden Aufenthaltes dem Europier die günstigsten Aussichten auf kolonisationäre Unternehmungen der verschiedensten Art eröffnet (ibid.:394-395).

But between the coast and the desired North existed an area of about 450 km, which was completely unknown to the Germans. German desire was aimed at surmounting these 450 km of the forest belt, which proved a long and tedious task sidelined with deprivations and casualties. Circumventing the forest by directly entering Adamawa by the Niger-Benue failed due to non-cooperation with the British (cf. Stoecker, Mehrs, and Mehrs 1968:61; and DKZ 1888, no. 4:32). Not until 1888 could German expeditions into the hinterland report a success. In 1889 Kund and Tappenbeck founded the station "Jaunde" 200 km and a journey of 22 days east of the coast and managed some short advances into the grassland (Rudin 1938:82). The expeditions of the "Afrika-Reisender" Dr. Eugen Zinggraf initiated by the AAKA marked the sincere opening of the battle for a passage to Adamawa in which both the climate and the people proved hostile (cf. chapter 3. Forest and grassland – dichotomies:131).

Die Deutschen [...] mussten sich mühsam durch die feuchten Urwälder und feindlichen Völkermassen hindurcharbeiten. (Hassert 1899:52-53)

This was Zinggraf's mission when he encountered Tafang Tiku in the Upper Cross River area.

3.3. Defang and Zinggraf – the first encounter (July 1888)

Tafang Tiku – and the men of the fighting class behind him– advanced towards Zinggraf. Zinggraf recollected the moment seven years later:


Tafang Tiku did not greet Zinggraf immediately but stood and watched him intently – an appropriate behaviour given that 'warriors' backed both men. The physical description Zinggraf gave is entirely negative and alluded to the racial features of the inferior 'Negro'. Tafang Tiku stared at him 'lurking', his body frame being 'squat'. This is the description of an animal, not a human being, but

---

83 'Traveller of Africa' – this is the title that Zinggraf used in his letterhead when corresponding with the German authorities.
a dangerous animal, a predator. Later Zingtgraf explicitly portrayed the eyes of Tafang Tiku as glowing predatory ("das raubtierartige Leuchten der Augen Tok Difangs", ibid.:117). Tafang Tiku's skin colour is described as dark black, his face broad with protruding cheekbones. This is the description of the 'Negro' type, with the corresponding idea that, the darker the skin, the more 'primitive' the race. His 'primivism' was underlined by his nakedness.

Tafang Tiku's grandson suggests that when his grandfather saw Zingtgraf, it was the first time he saw a 'yellow or red' person and that he should have taken Zingtgraf for an animal. Zingtgraf was the first European the people saw with their own eyes and they had no idea about his mission, so they suspected him (DTAM, 11.08.2000).

The first action in their encounter is Zingtgraf's taking Defang's hand and shaking it. Zingtgraf's description of his behaviour does not leave any doubt of its appropriateness. Shaking of hands is an act understood by his readership and himself as the polite way of greeting people. By taking Tafang Tiku's hand Zingtgraf demonstrated two or three things: He, Zingtgraf, came without any hostile intentions to Tafang Tiku's area and had left Tafang Tiku in no doubt about this; Zingtgraf, too, had to start 'doing something', since Tafang Tiku was just standing around lurking; in the same line Tafang Tiku had failed to signal his good intentions towards Zingtgraf, on the contrary, by refusing to greet him, he had already committed an act of hostility. Tafang Tiku's following actions -- giving a speech and supplying Zingtgraf and his men with an abundance of food -- even goats -- could not revert the first impression Zingtgraf already evoked in his readership. Tafang Tiku's 'wary', 'treacherous' eyes further discredited him.

Zingtgraf drew on racist discourse by making Tafang Tiku into a 'Negro' as well as on evolutionary discourse by presenting him as primitive, naked and 'uncivilised'. Tafang Tiku was in a position of considerable strength vis-à-vis Zingtgraf who was accompanied by 35 armed men, but in Zingtgraf's written account of 1895, this strength was reduced to the strength of a dangerous animal.

Zingtgraf was forced to spend two days in Defang's settlement. During this time it was discussed whether one should grant him passage and give him guides. The 'Bayong' slaves of Tafang Tiku had spread information to Zingtgraf's men about the cruelty and treacherousness of Tafang Tiku who, they said, had once killed a group of eight trading partners, whose skulls were still displayed in the community hall. Zingtgraf's men started feeling uneasy and relieved when consent was reached -- Zingtgraf was given guides, and the expedition left Ta-

86 In Ashong at the escarpment towards the grassfields, Zingtgraf's colour of skin was also described as 'red like fire' and Zingtgraf himself as a 'thing' (O'Neill 1996:85). Zingtgraf reported that Galleau's first action during their encounter was touching his skin in order to feel whether it was burning as he had been told (Zingtgraf 1895:183). And only after Zingtgraf drank from a calabash he had proven his being as human and not as an animal (O'Neill 1996:85).

fang Tiku's settlement towards the grassland. But they did not get far, after having advanced for three quarters of an hour Zingtgraf reached the small settlement of a man named Tabé. This man was mfaw in this settlement and thus addressed as Mfaw Tabé. Zingtgraf called the settlement itself 'Fo Tabé' -- and this is its present name (Fotabe).

The name of this village came from chief Tabé (mfaw Tabé), he was the chief when the Germans were there. The first chief was Tanyi Eyong. He was the father of chief Tabé. He lead here first [i.e. moved here first ...]. The name Fotabe came from those who were already a bit enlightened [lit. whose eyes were opened small]. [...] That name mfaw Tabé, the way the Germans wrote it is Mfotabe, but today when a white person writes it, it is 'Fotabe'. (TJE, 11.08.2000)

Tabé and his men demanded their own toll from Zingtgraf and his men and the guides of Tafang Tiku were sent back. Zingtgraf engaged in bargaining about the toll, which lasted till after midnight and no decision was to be reached: "der grauhairige Häuptling verlangte viel und war zähe" (Zingtgraf 1888:195). Zingtgraf had to spend the night.

Tabé also belonged to the Mbang group and normally should have respected the decision reached with Tafang Tiku. He had probably decided to grasp the opportunity of this stranger passing through his country to fight for a stronger stand against Tafang Tiku (cf. Ruel 1969:59). Tafang Tiku had received gifts from Zingtgraf. Whether he intended to keep them for himself or to share them in one form or the other with his people is uncertain. The two-day discussions in Tafang Tiku's settlement had surely centred on this question and apparently it had been settled. Tabé -- by sending Tafang Tiku's guides back and demanding his own toll -- demanded what Zingtgraf had granted Tafang Tiku, and implicitly rejected his role as a 'smaller man' than Tafang Tiku.

Not surprisingly Tafang Tiku and his party could not let this challenge pass. At two o'clock in the morning -- informed by the returning guides -- they reached the settlement of Tabé and started serious disputes immediately, their respective 'warriors' by their sides. Amongst Tafang Tiku's party was one of his wives wearing the war attire: Manda, called 'Manda' or 'Mandega' by the wife of DTAM (11.08.2000). Manda was of grassland origin, but she was 'powerful' and 'black', which was why Tafang Tiku married her (DTAM, 11.08.2000). Finally Tafang Tiku told Zingtgraf that it was not safe for him in Tabé's settlement, and he had better return to his own place. Zingtgraf and his men -- obviously confused and scared -- agreed. The expedition returned to Defang's settlement with loaded guns in their hands, led by a torch carried by Manda (Zingtgraf 1885:117). Tabé's party made Zingtgraf's advancement impossible; Tafang Tiku was powerless against their decision, although they belonged to the same group and Tafang Tiku was a very influential man even beyond the Mbang group (Ruel 1969). Zingtgraf did not want to retreat since he knew Lt. Zeuner was on
his way. Zintgraff and his men thus spent three weeks in Tafang Tiku's settlement waiting for reinforcements.

These three weeks were spent in constant fear for his life until he had turned into a de facto prisoner afraid to leave his immediate surroundings. Whether his fear was substantiated or whether he was just misinterpreting alleged rumours is difficult to assess. No hostilities occurred however and his men were allowed to keep their guns throughout. There is even indication that Tafang Tiku did indeed protect him against the more radical faction.

Defang [war] äußerlich ein tadelloser Wirth […], der es mir und meinen Leuten an nichts fehlen ließ, mir sogar die üblichen Bettelerei und sonstigen Scherereien vom Leibe hielt. (i-bd:124)

Wenn noch ein Zweifel an den verräterischen Gesinnungen Defangs bestand, so mußte das Erschein en zahlreicher Gesellschaften benachbarter Banyangstämmen hierüber Klarheit verbreiten, die, wie mir hinterbracht wurde, ganz offen sich darüber aussprachen, ob die Schätze des Weißen denn noch nicht bald zur Vertheilung kämen. (i-bd:119)

After three weeks of confinement Lt. Zeuner arrived in Mbang, having found the hammock bridge over the Mbu destroyed. Zintgraff and Zeuner decided to try and reach the grassfields with their soldiers and ammunition, leaving most of their goods with Tafang Tiku. He agreed, but the opposing party warned Zintgraff's group not to advance - otherwise they would attack. Zintgraff and Zeuner had to retreat to Nguti, where further rumours about the hostilities of the Banyang were exchanged. Zintgraff himself doubted their truthfulness, but cited them nevertheless in his book. According to one, a group of armed men had expected Zintgraff's expedition at Tabé's place upon their departure from Defang, ready to fight (126). Protection of their privileged connections with the trading partners to the north seems to have been a strand of the argument. Zintgraff cited Mbang people as declaring he would bring too much 'sense' to the 'bushpeople' (Zintgraff 1888:197).

Whatever the case, the fact remained that Zintgraff, Zeuner and their men were not able to pursue their goal. They had to retreat. The Mbang people had dictated the terms of their encounter. This amounted to a serious humiliation. Zintgraff compared himself with Moses and the grassland with the holy land - he knew that he was only two days away and he had even seen the hills of Adamawa from his involuntary residence, had heard about the grassland traders in the settlement of Sables (Sabi) and seen their products (Zintgraff 1888:196, 1895:125). His men - especially the Kru, used to working on ships and the coast - were not willing to return to the hostile hinterland. Zintgraff was forced to retreat right to the coast to look for new recruits (127).

Zintgraff blamed one person for his failure: 'Defang' of Mbang. The indications for Tafang Tiku's bad intentions were asking Zintgraff back from Tabé's settlement, the destroyed hammock bridge over the Mbu at Zeuner's arrival, the delegations of men from other settlements asking for the partition of Zintgraff's goods, rumours spread by the Mambo people and the slaves and Tafang Tiku's character in general - mainly expressed by his physical appearance. Zintgraff apparently overestimated Tafang Tiku's authority. When the Mambo people stated that it was 'Defang's men' who destroyed the bridge, it is still questionable whether they did so on his command. Both Tabé and Akpo Ako of Ntembang (També - the first Banyang settlement, were Zintgraff spent his first night) - were eager to challenge Tafang Tiku - in the course of interaction with the Germans both managed to gain power and wealth at the expense of Tafang Tiku (cf. Anderson 1929:22). On two occasions Tafang Tiku had agreed to let Zintgraff leave his compound and gave him guides; he had kept him in his compound for three weeks, was hospitable throughout and had even protected him against factions with other intentions. When Zintgraff and Zeuner decided to retreat to Mambo they did so peacefully. Not for one moment did Tafang Tiku employ any kind of force against Zintgraff and his men. Tabé too, did not force Zintgraff to stay in his place - he only demanded more than Zintgraff was willing to give, and before the dispute was settled, Zintgraff had left back to Tafang Tiku's place.

In his first text about his encounter with Tafang Tiku, published just a few months after it had taken place, Zintgraff introduced him with the certainty that it had been Tafang Tiku's intention from the beginning to attack and rob him:

Der erste Häuptling des Landes, Defang, faltete schon gleich beim Erscheinen des Weißen den Entschluß, derselben zu überfallen und zu berauben. (Zintgraff 1888:195)

This alleged hostility was Zintgraff's pretext to return with a much bigger force and surmount the Banyang forcefully (Zintgraff 1888:197).

3.4. Defang and Zintgraff – reinstatement of 'regard' (December 1888)

On the 19th of December 1888 – this time in the dry season – Zintgraff and a new expedition force of 175 men took off from the station in Barombi towards Mbang. His group was made up of 100 men from Lagos, 70 Vai, his personal servant Munoika, and the two interpreters Muchenga and Benedict, a Hausa. The men acted as porters and soldiers at the same time, each carrying a load and a weapon: the men from Lagos had 93 muzzleloaders, their leaders four Mausers; the Vai had 47 Mausers, 21 old Swiss 'Vetterligewehre' and three muzzleloaders, the rest had five hunting rifles, and two just had swords. The expedition was vanguarded by the fluttering German flag (Zintgraff 1895:130). Zintgraff's power this time rested on the might of five times as many soldiers than were present during his first encounter with Tafang Tiku five months ago.

* Possibly M71.
From Nguti's place, Zintgraf ordered Tafang Tiku to meet him there, using the German flag as a symbol of authenticity and authority. Tafang Tiku, however, did not follow the flag's command, stating that Zintgraf was welcome in his settlement. On the 31st of December Zintgraf and his men crossed the Mbu using both the hammock bridge and a ford. They met Mande and a 'brother' of Tafang Tiku at the river who had waited for them and tried to welcome them, but Zintgraf boldly shrugged these attempts off, if only in his written account:

Ohne ihnen irgend welche Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken und den Versuch einer plumpen Vertraulichkeit seitens des Weibes grob abwehrend, ließ ich gleich ins Banyangland hineinmarschieren. (ibid.:133)

He was now determined and did not depend on the goodwill of the Mbang people, let alone a woman. Zintgraf and his army advanced into the Mbang area with loaded guns, while people stood along the way and watched – for Zintgraf a sign of their maliciousness (ibid.). Tafang Tiku himself received Zintgraf and his group in a most friendly and hospitable manner, giving him a tour of the newly constructed compounds. Food was served, accommodation granted and Tafang Tiku agreed to supply guides for Zintgraf's expedition. But Zintgraf was requested to spend two days in his compound for him to prepare everything. Zintgraf again took this as a hostile action on behalf of Tafang Tiku, whom he suspected of preparing a war against him, and Zintgraf thus insisted on leaving the next day. In his accounts Zintgraf did not explain why he had felt safe in Etwak Defang for three weeks with 30 men and was now afraid to spend two days there with 175 heavily armed men. Tafang Tiku had had abundant opportunity to attack and kill Zintgraf's expedition in July, but had not done so – on the contrary he had protected him against Mfaw Tabe's faction. Zintgraf himself acknowledged this, and he had also witnessed the disputes his arrival stirred among the Mbang and other Banyang-groups and the limited authority of Tafang Tiku. Nevertheless Zintgraf threatened and thus provoked Tafang Tiku, holding him responsible for all potential hostile acts carried out by any Banyang.

Alle Unruhen, die etwa durch die feindliche Haltung der Banyang entstanden, würden lediglich Difangs Schuld sein, den ich, und zwar mit Recht, den bösen Geist der Banyang nannte. (ibid.:133)

Zintgraf had to spend one night in Etwak Defang; this night was noisy, with drums beating throughout. Zintgraf and his men were expecting trouble. The next morning Tafang Tiku – armed with a gun – visited Zintgraf and was immediately questioned about some stolen goods, including two guns. Tafang Tiku was uneasy concerning Zintgraf's departure, probably because he knew that it was not safe for Zintgraf to continue. Zintgraf thought he could appease Tafang Tiku by giving him a present, since he was convinced that the 'Negroes' were greedy and only cared about his precious goods. Tafang Tiku – having come in war attire – was undignified and threw the gift into Muyänga's face, stating that 'he was no woman!' Zintgraf interpreted this as a hostile act. Tafang Tiku's intentions Tiku at this time will never be known, for Zintgraf's determination for action started a war between Zintgraf's expedition and the Banyang people. For no apparent reason Zintgraf decided to hold Tafang Tiku hostage, i.e. grab him by the arm and point his revolver at him. The first spear was thrown at Zintgraf. Tafang Tiku managed to escape, and Zintgraf's men suffered serious wounds and were at first unable to put up an ordered resistance. The description of the first few minutes of the 'war' are pitiful:


The Mbeng men retreated, but most of the civilians were still in their houses. The majority of the villages had tied their goods into carrying frames, obviously preparing to leave the settlement. Zintgraf and his men took all of them hostage and arrested them in the assembly hall. Fifteen men guarded them, while Zintgraf and the rest 'conquered the surrounding area. After having done so for six hours Zintgraf claimed that the area was now in their possession: within a radius of eight kilometres all houses and settlements were burnt down, ten Banyang and two of Zintgraf's men were dead, farms destroyed and a good number of women taken hostage. Zintgraf declared, that the women had disclosed a plan in which Tafang Tiku was supposed to have led Zintgraf into a trap where the men of the fighting class had assembled. Zintgraf probably needed this claim to justify the attack that he himself had instigated on the spur of the moment, taking even his own soldiers by surprise.

In 2000 the grandson of Tafang Tiku, the present chief of Defang village, offered the annoyance of Zintgraf over stolen goods as the reasons for the outbreak of war, which was independently confirmed by Enow Baiye Jacob – an elder from Defang II (DTAM, 11.08.2000; EBJ 09.08.2000). Most of the details mentioned by Zintgraf (1895) did not feature in his account of 1890. In the earlier version the fight against 'Defang' began because he declined the presents offered and soon the 'natives' started shooting. The whole episode of taking Tafang Tiku hostage and threatening him with his pistol is not mentioned. The fight itself is described as having been over quickly and no burnt down villages are mentioned. He also concealed the nature of his hostages, who are presented as prisoners and probably assumed to be men, not women by the readership (cf.
During Zintgraff’s journey to Adamawa, one of these women died. In Zintgraff 1890 the woman who died was a “Bayongweib”, not a “Banyangweib”. I suspect that the editor had corrected “Banyang” into “Bayong”, (people living in the grassfields), since he had no idea that Zintgraff actually travelled with female hostages from the forest area (cf. Zintgraff 1890:77).

Protected by these hostages, Zintgraff advanced northwards. All the settlements he passed through were desolate; in Tabe’s compound two slaves begged Zintgraff for peace, which was granted in return for guides. The two slaves guided Zintgraff towards ‘Miyimbi’, probably the most wealthy and influential man in Upper Banyang and a rival to Tafang Tiku. Miyimbi was the ‘Defang’ of Tali. They passed Tinto, crossed the river Nfi – a tributary to the Cross River – and reached Miyimbi’s settlement. Three daughters of Miyimbi were among the hostages and Zintgraff felt safe. Miyimbi’s settlement was part of the Ndifaw group, and corresponds very roughly to the present village of Tali. Some of Zintgraff’s men, who arrived in Lagos on the 6th of August 1889, among them Myénga, refer to it as ‘Lefatari’ (Expedition des Dr. E. Zintgraff 1889:119), Zintgraff himself corrected it to ‘Difang Tali’ (the ‘Defang’ of Tali). While some hold that ‘Tali’ was a name given to the settlement by the Germans (C&R 2001:184), others relate it to the Ejahgan-element in this community (Ruel 1969:63; cf. chapter 1.4.2. Established ‘ethnolinguistic’ groups: 47).

3.4.1. Offering ‘friendship’

Mbaye Mbi’s outer appearance was not judged quite as unfavorably as Tafang Tiku’s, yet still he was described as a ‘dark type’ (Zintgraff 1895:146) with the same ‘deceitful’ look in his eyes like Defang (Zintgraff 1890:75). In Zintgraff’s written account, the encounter between Zintgraff and Mbaye Mbi took place in the latter’s compound after Zintgraff had shaken his hand. Three slaves and half a dozen elders accompanied Mbaye Mbi. Zintgraff was the first to speak, and he explained that he was a friend of the black people, he had come into the country to visit all chiefs, establish friendship with them and give them presents. The first chief of the Banyang, Defang, had been a traitor who did not trust Zintgraff; now all his settlements were burnt down and he had lost his wives and two sons who were among the hostages. Then Zintgraff went on to threaten Mbaye Mbi: if he did not grant safe passage through his area, his three daughters would be killed. After hearing this statement Mbaye Mbi stared at Zintgraff for a long time. "Lange Zeit sah mich der Häuptling stumm an" (ibid.:147). The argument put forward by Zintgraff was as presumptuous as it was contradictory. He asked for ‘friendship’ while at the same time threatening to employ force; if Mbaye Mbi did not agree. ‘Friendship’ was presented not as a choice, but an obligation. The ideal position the ‘natives’ were to take was one established by ‘trust’ and ‘fear’ towards the European. Trust and fear were not perceived as antagonistic, but the prototypical basis for the regard (‘Ansehen’) he deserved.

Die im Januar gegründete Station am Elefantensee hatte allmählich angefangen, festen Fuß im Lande zu fassen und an Ansehen bei den Eingeborenen zu gewinnen; man hatte Vertrauen zum Weißen und Furcht zugleich vor ihm. (Zintgraff 1888:185)

Zintgraff was proud to call himself the ‘feared governor for bush’ (ANY FA 184/92). After consultation with the elders, Mbaye Mbi agreed to grant safe passage and give guides. Still, his plea to surrender his three daughters was boldly declined by Zintgraff and the way he left Miyimbi did not seem to have stricken him as awkward:

Auch Miyimbi [Mbaye Mbi] erhält ein gutes Gastgeschenk, und ich beruhigte ihn nochmals wegen der Zukunft seiner Kinder, womit er sich denn endlich auch unter verlegem Lächeln anscheinend zufrieden gab. (Zintgraff 1895:147)

Three men guided Zintgraff and his men towards Sables, passing through a settlement Zintgraff called Ngang (referred to as ‘Janga’ by Zintgraff’s men, cf. Expedition des Dr. E. Zintgraff 1889:119). ‘Ngang’ is the word for ‘salt’ in Kenyang. It is also the name of a small river, a tributary to the Manyu from which salt was extracted (Interview in Ewengang, 02.08.2000). The people living in the Ngang area were of the Ndifaw group (Tali). They seemingly had created a ring of early-warning settlements around Tali (Miyimbi), comprising of the Ebeagwa people to the south (Mbo), the Tanyi Tafang Tiku people (present Ewengang) to the north towards the grassfields (EBJ, ENE, DNT, 02.08.2000). The main settlement of the Ngang area Zintgraff passed through was probably that of Tanyi Tafang Tiku. All the compounds were deserted. The inhabitants of Ngang returned after some time – probably enticed by the men from Mbaye Mbi guiding Zintgraff and started exchanging food for tobacco when a group of Mbaye Mbi’s men who, resting at a stream, were attacked, the gunshots heard in ‘Ngang’. All the people of Ngang fled at once; Zintgraff’s men, without any reason and without Zintgraff’s approval, killed one person. The rearguard that had been attacked had lost all their loads and one of their men had been killed. Zintgraff quickly ascertained this attack to Tafang Tiku and his combatants, looking for an "Augenblickserfolg" – a temporary success, ignoring the fact that he might endanger the hostages. Zintgraff feared all available men of the ‘fighting class’ in the area might unite, a force he estimated at about 1500 (Zintgraff 1895:149).

Whether Tafang Tiku, Mbaye Mbi or another group carried out the attack remains uncertain. Zintgraff himself was obviously quite ignorant about it, although he hinted that the people from Difang Tale noticed the separation of the 30 men from the bulk of the group (Zintgraff 1890:76). He still judged that they were pushed by Tafang Tiku (ibid.). Considering that Mbaye Mbi had let Zintgraff pass with his daughters and guides and the peaceful behaviour of the
Ngang people, it seems unlikely that Miyimbi was planning to attack Zintgraf, especially since Miyimbi later became a German ally (cf. chapter 4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900):157). Tafang Tiku, too, could not have easily entered Mbaye Mbi's area with his men and have attacked without previous consultation with Mbaye Mbi. Quite probably the attack was carried out ad hoc by a small faction of Ndifaw-people who had left their settlement to hide in the bush and had noticed the isolated group of men. Zintgraf gave the number of attackers at 200 which seems grossly exaggerated.

Whatever the case, Zintgraf judged it too dangerous to advance towards Sabis. His men were not trained soldiers and they each had loads to carry. So he turned N'Gang into his fort, cut down all plantain farms and burnt the houses. Troops of 30 men were sent in all directions and when they encountered men in hiding, they drove them back and captured cattle, goats, chicken and other food items. Zintgraf's stand in N'Gang where he was left with 40 men was also attacked, but in vain.

The situation in N'Gang persisted for seven days and started getting serious. A number of Zintgraf's men were wounded, and the rest wary, including Zintgraf himself. Among the loads captured by the Banyang was one with ammunition for the muzzle-loaders resulting in acute shortage of bullets. The brass bangles of the Banyang women had to be chopped and used as ammunition. The Banyang far outnumbered Zintgraf's men; the situation became critical and could not be improved through persistent battle. Zintgraf thus decided to secretly depart from N'Gang in the night and sneak to Sabis.

'Sabi', as Zintgraf called it, was the last village in the low forestland. Zintgraf had heard about it and its market that was frequented by grassland people since July 1888. When he arrived, the village was empty and involved in the fight against him, as fresh blood stains from wounded combatants in the settlement witnessed. From Sabis, Zintgraf left the roads and followed his compass northwards. Only one minor battle had to be fought after Sabis. Then the expedition disappeared into the mountains and after three strenuous days they eventually reached the grassland and the Moghamo-speaking village of Babessaong, "trade friends" of Bali-Nyonga (O'Neill 1996:85-89; Kabarry and Chilvers 1961:363). The passage through the Cross River area had taken approximately two weeks, during which more than 100 people had been killed - only four of Zintgraf's men, four men were lost during the march from N'Gang to Sabis at night, three of which were either killed or sold as slaves (cf. DrZ 1889:228).

Numerous settlements had been burnt down, especially in the Mbang area and around N'Gang, animals and crops destroyed and about 30 people seized.

One year after the fighting, Zintgraf returned from a journey that had taken him through the grassland, via Nigeria and Yola to 'German' Adamawa and back. The Bali and their chief Galle had become 'friends' of Zintgraf's expedition and Zintgraf had founded a station in their capital. Descending from Bali accompanied by eleven men from Bali he quickly passed through Upper Banyang and reached as far south as Tabe's settlement without any violent encounter. On his way most of the settlements he met were deserted or the inhabitants were packing their belongings in preparation. Bali had warned the Banyang beforehand and had stated that Zintgraf was now under their protection. Tabe's people - having been granted peace with Zintgraf the year before - greeted him cordially, and even the women came to welcome him in a friendly manner (Zintgraf 1895:330). Shortly after Tabe's place, advancing towards Tafang Tiku's settlement, the rear of Zintgraf's expedition was attacked, but the losses were all on the side of the Banyang. For Zintgraf, this was a renewed indication for the Banyang's 'deceitful' character. Later he was told by Mbaye Mbi that he had been attacked, because one of his daughters had not been brought home alive as Zintgraf had promised (355).

Comparing the current state of war with the Banyang to his previous encounter with them, Zintgraf (1895) favoured the former, since he could easily understand what was going on, and the situation was clear. As the commander of his people he was strong and powerful, whereas when trying to raise concern for his mission via different means he had been weak and ineffective.

Aber nach Negerart legten sie diesen ehrlich gemeinten Wunsch [peaceful relations] als Furcht und Schwäche aus, und je größer die Ruhe und die Geduld war, die ich zur Schau trug, desto größer wurde auch ihre Freiheit. (ibid:140)

Many Germans after Zintgraf legitimised the use of force along these lines, using the same words and concepts. The German on the one hand sincerely wished for peaceful relations (good!), he was calm and patient (good!), but the 'Negro' was cheeky (bad!). The use of the term 'cheeky' draws on the evolutionary discourse in which 'Negroes' were children. Children are cheeky, they test their limits and the adult has to maintain these. The use of force is acceptable, indeed, it is for the good of the children who cannot yet understand the rules and regulations of the adult world. This is the more overt way of reading colonial discourse and certainly the one intended by the Zintgraf (1895).

Another mode of interpretation links German explanations to the underlying German minority complex (cf. chapter 3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' - land and people under the German flag). The 'cheekiness' of the 'Negroes' challenged German authority - assumed as a natural right as the stronger and superior race. Expressing fear and weakness contradicted this self-construction, and this alleged stigma has to be wiped out by demonstrating boldness and strength. Zintgraf did this in the Upper Cross River area in 1888/89. The 'regard' of the Germans and their symbols, especially the flag, became the central relation to the 'natives'. The 'regard' was damaged by 'fear and weakness'. Whenever the 'regard' was in some way damaged or low, force was the next solution. Puttkammer in his memoirs held this to be the only right principle vis-à-vis the 'negro'.
Zintgraff recalled his intentions after his first unsuccessful attempt to cross Bangang country:

Da ferner die Bangang sich als verräterisch erwiesen hatten, so erschien ein erneuter Besuch derselben auch im Interesse unseres Ansehens wünschenswert. (Zintgraff 1890:74)

The interpretation as their behaviour being 'treacherous' indicates that anything but complying to the European's demand was unacceptable and justified vengeance. Zintgraff's offer of 'friendship' to the 'chiefs' had the same quality.

3.4.2. The Bangang women

Zintgraff claimed that these women called him in the evening after their capture and demanded to know about their fate, and if he wanted to kill them that he should do so at once. Zintgraff decided to assign one of his men for each woman and claimed the women to be quite happy with the arrangement, "mit glänzenden Augen und lachendem Munde dankten sie mir" (Zintgraff 1890:139), and later on even assisted the porters with carrying of their loads. The happiness about their situation and the gratitude towards Zintgraff seem so unlikely that I suspect Zintgraff invented this in order to silence critique about his having taken women hostage and deporting them. The women he captured were the young women of Defang's settlement, probably his wives, and his sons' wives. Zintgraff does not mention any elderly women or elderly men among the initial prisoners. Surely those people must have lived in the compounds. Why should Zintgraff's men have let them flee while arresting only the younger wives? The fate of the children is also not mentioned. Whether elderly people and children were arrested in Defang's place is not certain, but likely. It is difficult to imagine a mother packing her belongings preparing to flee and being captured without at least the youngest ones of her children. Whether or not the children were among the hostages in Defang's place, they did not accompany the expedition alongside their mothers. Their fate remains uncertain. Assuming the women were happy and grateful because they were assigned new 'husbands', had to leave their children, families, house, farms, and familiar environment was probably judged as being impossible by many readers, even at the time of his writing. Zintgraff nevertheless decided to maintain this story in his detailed account in 1895, while trying to conceal it in 1890. The female hostages were last mentioned in Mbaye Mbi's settlement, where they were used to enforce a safe passage and the women were being 'led' to wash in the morning — like true prisoners, they were 'led' by one of Zintgraff's men. Trekking from Tafang Tiku's to Mbaye Mbi's compound, Zintgraff described them as chattering 'gaudily' with their newly assigned mas-

ters — one wonders which language they used — and even laughing, while some carried the loads of those of Zintgraff's men who were seriously wounded. The load — designed for a man, usually 25 kg — could possibly have been too heavy for the women, but Zintgraff immediately dispersed those thoughts by stating that the wounded man was jovially conversing with the woman who 'briskly walked alongside him' with his load (Zintgraff 1895:143).

The argument in this story rests on the tacit assumption that 'Negroes' were different from Europeans. The women were perceived as the property of their husbands. Zintgraff did thus not alter their situation, but just assigned them new 'owners' (Zintgraff 1895:139), probably better ones. An African woman was perceived as having absolutely no power in her society. Her status was reduced to that of a slave, who was a stranger to the land he lived on. If he thus described their chattering and laughing when leaving Defang's compound, he even evoked the feeling that he had rescued them to his readership. He employed the same argument when explaining the cooperation of the slaves, who supposedly saw Zintgraff as a possible 'saviour' (cf. Jones 1999:88 — on the legitimatory role of the African woman for European intervention). It also drew on the metaphor of the 'negro' and the 'child' that — according to Zintgraff was easily dispossessed, but easy to please, without deep emotions and attachedness that Europeans boasted.

About a later incident where sixteen people died while crossing a high mountain range during a thunderstorm he wrote:

Die Freude der dem Unwetter Entronnenen war größer als die Trauer um die Umgekommenen, wie denn der Neger überhaupt von einer großartigen Gleichgültigkeit in solchen Fällen ist, die auf uns, die wir kameradschaftliches Gefühl kennen, abstoßend wirkt. (Zintgraff 1890:85)

The 'Negro' was presented here as an inferior human being — if a human being at all. The 'negro' lacks compassion; he is indifferent and thus cruel (cf. Dippold 1973:47).

Another conviction of Zintgraff that became evident through the incident with the Bangang women was the 'Negro's slave nature', 'bending and breaking under any superior power' (ibid.). If this superior power was employed by a European, the European was simply assuming a natural role. This was displayed by Zintgraff's description of the 'husband-assigning ceremony':

Und zwar beugte sich jede einzelne Gefangene vor mir und umfallte meine Knie, die sie nicht eher los ließ, bis der betreffende Mann angetreten war, in dessen Hand ich dann die ihre legte. (Zintgraff 1895:139)

The Bangang women were now the property of Zintgraff's men, but legitimised by the ultimate authority, Zintgraff himself, acclaimed by the devote women bowing before him, clutching his knees. Zintgraff had become the women's saviour.
But what became of the women in the course of Zintgraff's journey? Zintgraff tells us about the death of one woman in the mountain range in Adamawa, where altogether sixteen members of his expedition died, the others — including the remaining women — had to suffer from extreme cold, a thunderstorm with hail and chilly, strong winds.

Finger, Ellenbogen und Schultern waren sofort steif vor Frost und den Leuten, von denen die Wenigsten mehr wahrscheinlich starben. Erstarrten die Kniegelenke, so daß die Breiteinheit nur langsam sich verwirklichen konnte, wie Trunkenwanken, während sich der Kopf wie bei Idioten willenlos schüttelte. Sprechen konnten nur Einige und diesen klapperten die Zähne so, daß sie nur unverständliche Laute hervorbrachten; die Hautfarbe hatte sich in einen schmutzigen Aschgrau verwandelt. (Zintgraff 1890:85)

Apparently, the other women survived these strains; they were, however, not mentioned in the rest of the account. Exactly how they were returned to their home area was never disclosed by Zintgraff. The daughters of Mbaye Mbi had supposedly been returned before Zintgraff's second visit in 1890 — the third one had died on the journey (Zintgraff 1895:355). Zintgraff's acknowledgement of the death of one Banyang woman can possibly be read as an attempt to further suppress even graver scenarios. The women's role and function during the journey was never mentioned. The journey was extremely difficult: continuous fighting, hunger and extreme climates had to be endured. Twenty-four of Zintgraff's men had died. According to Gorges (1930), twelve of these women returned, so one can assume that at least eighteen died on the journey (9).

The subsequent reaction of the Banyang people to the encounters with Zintgraff after 1889 were aimed at protecting their settlements, i.e. their women and children. They had all moved to the west of the 'Bali road' Zintgraff had taken, and upon Zintgraff's return in 1890, when he 'made peace' with the 'Banjue', he encountered only one woman (cf. chapter 3.6. 'Peace with the Banjue' (1890:120).

3.5. A vision for 'Kamerun' and its hinterland

Zintgraff's expedition was a huge success for Germany's colonial project after its first serious crisis (cf. J&T 1892:7). He had led the way to the riches of Adamawa and had 'discovered' the densely populated grassland, where the Bali had become German allies, the Fon of Bali and Zintgraff had 'mixed blood' and a station 'Baliburg' had been erected and seven of Zintgraff's men were stationed there.

Zintgraff returned to Germany in 1890 and started sharing his 'adventures' and 'discoveries' with politicians, colonial enthusiasts and the interested public in general. A canonical knowledge about Kamerun and its 'hinterland' soon developed; the recurrent theme in this discourse was the dichotomy between the 'bush Negroes' of the coast and forest, and the inhabitants from the grasslands and Adamawa. What was cherished particularly among the grassfield people was their union under one strong authority. Winning one person for the European's cause was deemed an easy task, especially one as ambitious as Galega (Zintgraff 1895:341). The people of the forest area with their 'uncountable small tribes and as many small chiefs' were judged by Zintgraff as living in a state of 'anarchy' (Zintgraff 1895:340). In a presentation to the German Association for Geography in 1890 he stressed the advantages of the grassfields population, both physically ('strong' and 'tall') and in character ('free', 'independent', 'more developed'). He made the Bavi and Hausa into the most intelligent people he met. Nevertheless all 'Negroes' were greedy, jealous, and mendacious, albeit 'civilized'. Like children they were easy to satisfy but also easily satisfied if only able Europeans handled them (Vortrag Zintgraff am 3. Mai in der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde 1890:126). Not only the inhabitants but also their land was judged by Zintgraff as 'amenable to culture'. Alongside the trading company J&T (cf. J&T 1892), he thus pushed for a fast mise-en-valoir strategy. German interests in Cameroon were based on two pillars: trade and plantations (7). Stations in the hinterland were held to be the key to this endeavour and Bali was of course best suited. For the purpose of trade the 'opening up' of the hinterland promised direct trade with the origins of natural resources, for plantations the hinterland was envisaged as an invaluable source for the scarcest resource in Cameroon: labour.

When also a station in this Gegend angelegt werden sollte, so war bei dem sonst ausgezeichneten Verhalten des Hauplings und seiner Leute das Ballind wohl dazu geeignet, schon wegen seines anderen Vegetationscharakters (Zintgraff 1890:76)

He did suspect problems with the people living between the coast and a station in Bali — probably thinking about the Banyang — but trusted in the joint power of Germans and Bali (77) that had safely led him through their country when returning from his journey in late 1889. The main economic advantages of connecting the hinterland to the coast were the provision of manpower from the populous grassfields — for plantation labourers, porters and indigenous soldiers — and the re-direction of local trade, especially palm oil and rubber from the British to the German sphere (cf. O'Neill 1996:57; Chilver 1967). What Zintgraff envisioned in 1890 was the 'opening' of a road to Bali, the 'Mundame-Bali road', passing through Upper Banyang, protected by a number of military stations along the route (Zintgraff 1895:341-342).

He convinced the authorities in Berlin to finance a second, even stronger expedition, to Adamawa. Apart from Zintgraff himself an army officer — Lt. von Spangenberg — the farmer Huwe and Carstensen, former servant of the Governor von Soden were part of the exploring expedition. The trading company Jantzen, Thormählen & Dollmann joined in a separate trading expedition that was commanded by Mr. Nebber, who had been responsible for trade and plantation in Bubundu at the coast for four years. Two more Europeans took part in the
trading expedition: Caulwell, who had spent several years in northern Africa and Tiedt, a seaman. Approximately 400 'Monrovian' people (Vai) - many of them from his first expedition made up the 'porters'. A group of 30 porters was commanded by an overseer, who in turn were under the expedition master, in this case Bai Tabo, who had made the first journey with Zingtgraf. Von Spangenberg commanded the exploring expedition, while Nehber did so for the trading expedition. Zingtgraf was the commander general (ibid.:343-350).

3.6. 'Peace' with 'the Banjang' (1890)

Before setting out for Bali, Zingtgraf sent von Spangenberg to the Banyang, to try to establish 'friendly relations', while at the same time depositing 1,250 rations of rice in Nguti, in case of an attack in Banyang country. Tafang Tiku accepted the establishment of peaceful relations with Zingtgraf and sent some elephant tusks as 'tribute' (Zingtgraf 1895:352).

In November 1890 the expedition left Barombi station and soon reached Nguti. Zingtgraf had ordered Tafang Tiku to meet him there, but he had not come, saying he was sick. When the expedition crossed into the Mbang area on the fourth of December 1890, all people had moved from their former sites. Tafang Tiku had erected three newly built houses and met Zingtgraf in the ruins of his old formerly thriving settlement. Tafang Tiku stated they had built one hour to the west (towards Obang) but refused to disclose its exact site.

Das frühere dorff- und gehörreiche Land Difangs, wo wir zwei Jahre zuvor uns herumgeschlagen hatten, war nicht wieder besiedelt. Die Gegend glich einer Wildnis, worin überall das Unkraut üppig emporgewucherte und nur noch ab und zu ein verholzer ein- oder anderer Dache an die früheren Wohnungen erinnerte. (Zingtgraf 1895:353)

Tafang Tiku sat on a stool, his knees smeared with white clay - a sign of his sickness. Fifty of his men stood behind him. Zingtgraf had ordered them to come unarmed. Zingtgraf was accompanied by six other Europeans and 400 armed porters (as opposed to 180 in 1888/89). Again, Zingtgraf took Tafang Tiku's hand to shake it and gave the following speech:


Zingtgraf in his later account cited this speech, without relating any of Tafang Tiku's reactions. His power had been surpassed; he was no longer expected to act, and if so, only on command.

Aisdam erhielt er den Befehl, mich zu dem Dorfe Fo Tabes zu führen, wo wir die Nacht zu bleiben gedachten. (Zingtgraf 1895:354)

Tabes settlement was described by Zingtgraf as having become much bigger - surely a sign of his increase in status. The 'Defang' of Tali, Mbaye Mbi, was in Tabes settlement when Zingtgraf arrived. The Ndifaw and the Mbang people had obviously decided to form an alliance and to follow one strategy. For Zingtgraf these three men along with the 'chief' of Sabi, who was not present, were all the 'chiefs' of the Banyang. Tabe had thus successfully ascertained a position of authority vis-à-vis the European. While Mbaye Mbi, Tafang Tiku and Sabi had been 'Defang', i.e. respected war leaders, Tabe had just been a mلف, i.e. a person of wealth and influence among others. Tafang Tiku and Mbaye Mbi seemingly still maintained their respective status and excluded Tabe - Zingtgraf mentioned the two sitting and discussing but never in the company of Tabe (cf. Zingtgraf 1895:354-355). Tafang Tiku, of the same group as Tabe, was regarded suspiciously by Zingtgraf and he obviously tried to reinstate good relations, e.g. by providing food in abundance, that Zingtgraf did not care to pay for.

Daß Difang jetzt Essen in Hülle und Fülle heranschaffen ließ, war natürlich, ebenso daß ich ihm meinen nicht sein Geschenk dafür machte, denn das sollte er durch kündiges Wohlsollen sich erst noch verdienen. (Zingtgraf 1895:354)

All the women had vacated the settlement. Tafang Tiku was accompanied by one 'wife', who was not Mande. This was the only woman Zingtgraf was allowed to see during this journey. From Tabe's settlement Zingtgraf continued to Mbaye Mbi, who again stated his grief and anger about the loss of one daughter, and then to Sabi's settlement. Both provided him with food. These were the 'peaceful relations' Zingtgraf had expected from the beginning, a mixture of trust and fear.

Jedenfalls ließen wir diesmal die Banyang als Freunde hinter uns, und ich nahm mir fest vor, sobald die Verhältnisse in Bali erst eingeräumt geregt wären, auch im Banyanglande eine Station zu gründen. (ibid.:356)

The founding of a station was seen by Zingtgraf as a benevolent act, sharing with the 'natives' the new culture of which a station was a visible manifestation. The 'natives' should perceive the white men as porters of a 'new culture'. For bringing this new culture they should be praised and welcomed. Here, evidently, Zingtgraf introduced a new pillar for the 'regard' for the white men. 'Trust and fear' could 'easily' be achieved by military victories, induced by superior weapons, bigger numbers of combatants and atrocities against civilians, i.e. burning of
houses, devastation of farms and capturing women. After appropriating the land and bodies of the people, their minds were the next target. The 'new culture' of the white man was its vehicle. Although Zinggraff admitted the incongruity of basing the colonial enterprise on the force of war, he tacitly acknowledged it to be a – maybe depraved – but still necessary initial phase.

Wenn wir, die wir doch in der Regel als unermüdliche Gäste im Lande erscheinen, lediglich einen Haufen Leichen, zerstörende Felder und rauchende Dorftrümmer hinter uns lassen, so dürfen wir uns nicht wundern, wenn wir in den Augen der uns gegenüber doch im Stande der Notwehr befindlichen Eingeborenen eben auch nur als Räuber und Mordbrenner dastehen, die sich von ihresgleichen nur durch die größere Macht und die überlegenen Hülfsmittel unterscheiden. (Ibid.:336)

The first phase is thus characterised by violence employed by both sides – the European one necessarily winning due to superior power and weapons and the possibility to harm the civil population. The face of war is always ugly. For the 'natives' it was presented as a usual scenario – did they not engage in slave raids and slave trade, as well as other malicious practices performed on human beings? But – in contrast to the 'native' – the European had 'culture' and after having reduced the 'native' to a 'friend' who accepted his role as obedient follower, because otherwise he would have to fear more violence, the European might well let the 'natives' share bits of their culture and 'educate' them to useful human beings (Puttkamer 1912:42; cf. chapter 3.4.1. Offering friendships:112). Here again, the European assumes the role of the saviour, just as Zinggraff had done with the Banyang women.

Zinggraff himself presented the 'peace' between him and 'the Banyang' as having been finalised in 1890. In his account from 1895 he left them as 'friends' when passing up to Bali, but the story did not develop as smoothly as he made his readership believe (cf. chapter 3.6.3. 'Terror' along Bali road (1892):126 and 3.6.4. Zinggraff expelled (1893):130).

3.6.1. Zinggraff transforms into an elephant – discourses of witchcraft

One and a half months later, in February 1891, Zinggraff, Caulwell, 100 'Barovia' and 40 Bali returned to Banyang country from Bali. Four Europeans and a great number of their men and Bali allies had died in a battle against Bafut – a serious blow-back to Zinggraff's aspirations (cf. Zinggraff 1895:359-388). He had to retreat to the coast to ask for reinforcement from Kamerun and Berlin.

They rested one day in "Miyimbi" [Tali] to talk about the founding of a station, to which the people of Mbaye Mbi's settlement agreed. Zinggraff chose the spot for the station on a small hill above the river Nfi three quarters of an hour from Mbaye Mbi's settlement. Nineteen of Mbaye Mbi's men – all in all ten Banyang – accompanied Zinggraff to the coast (389) – as messengers of peace (Zinggraff 1893:12), where they were introduced to the Gouverneur and the different trading houses (ibid.; Zinggraff 1895:419, here he speaks of ten Banyang). While Mbaye Mbi had welcomed Zinggraff in his settlement, the villages of the Mbang group were deserted, including Tabe's settlement, where a few slaves awaited him, explaining that the people were afraid of Zinggraff, because he had transformed into an elephant and destroyed the farms and even houses of the Mbang group.

Zinggraff's transformation into an elephant in Upper Banyang was perceived as harmful to the population (cf. Hutter 1902:297; Conrua 1898:199). Elephants were the most destructive force in the whole forest area. The destruction caused by his elephant transform occurred in the presence of Zinggraff. It was confined to the farms in the Mbang area, where Tafang Tiku – the person identified by Zinggraff as his main enemy – lived.

Zinggraff's transformation into an elephant displayed his destructiveness and his hostile relations with the Mbang people. The person who had transformed into the elephant and done evil in this form, was usually detected by 'versed men' and later accused of the deed. If he or she denied the claim, they had to undergo the poison ordeal (Conrua 1898:199; Ittmann 1953). Embedding Zinggraff in a witchcraft discourse demonstrated the population's contempt for his upsurge of power which was regarded as detrimental to the people's wealth. The destruction by the elephants repeated what Zinggraff and his men had done two years before.

Zinggraff was proud that he was held to be a powerful 'sorcerer' (Zinggraff 1895:390), probably assuming it increased his 'regard'. As has been described in chapter 2.6. Levelling and accumulating, those suspected of witchcraft were those who threatened a 'moral' balance of power. They were perceived as 'eating' more than they needed, they were 'greedy'. They wanted what they were not entitled to and harmed others.

3.6.2. Stations in 'Miyimbi' (1891) and Tinto (1892) – 'mutiny' and 'irregularities'

In Kamerun (Douala) Zinggraff was granted reinforcement of 120 men with guns. Conrua of J&T trading company was to replace Nebber, who had been killed in the grassfields. Zinggraff asked for 2000 Mauser guns from Berlin. He also asked for replacements for the dead Germans, and proposed the construction of a road from Mundame to Bali for political and economic reasons. Zinggraff awaited the decisions at the station of Barombi and started the road construction there. On the 25th of June 1891 he received the guns and two German officers, Rittmeister von Gemmingen and Leutnant Hutter. Their next task was

88 At the exact site a building still stood in 2000 that was known as the 'German factory'.

89 Zinggraff complained that the Gouverneur neglected these envoys, and never officially received them, probably did not even see them personally (cf. Zinggraff 1893:12).
getting the guns to Bali – a difficult undertaking in the rainy season, especially with a small number of porters. The station 'Miyimbi' – close to Bali – was instrumental in this task. Caulwell had founded this station that was maintained by people from Bali. Meanwhile two more stations had been opened between Barombi and Miyimbi: Dikumi (Batom) and Nguti (Hutter 1902:18). The guns were transported from station to station. Hutter – passing through the Mbang area in 1891 – found the settlements either deserted or guarded by a few men. No hostilities between the local population and the expedition occurred, as the people had withdrawn to avoid any possible encounter with the Germans.

The Vai porters however refused to advance to the grassfields, because they were afraid of another disastrous war (Zinggraf 1893:17-18; Hutter 1902:19) – as claimed by the Vai leader Bai Tabe, the contract time of one year had elapsed for some and they demanded to return to Liberia (Bai Tabe, 20.12.1891:33). The Vai had seemingly set off from Douala having been assured that they would not have to advance further then Miyimbi, a fact that constituted the basis for Zinggraf's later complaints against the Gouvernement (ANY FA 1/84:111; Zinggraf 1893). Hutter, however, took this as a 'mutily', tore up their pay-booklets and internal fighting occurred, lasting two days and three nights. The majority of the Vai – only 25 had agreed to continue – then went back to the coast, forced to sell their guns in order to attain food and shelter, and at times probably employing force (Hutter 1902:19; cf. ANY FA 1/84:91-93; Bai Tabe, 20.12.1891). Soon after these incidents on the 20th of August 1891, 300 Vai were sent to Miyimbi to transport the guns to Bali (Hutter 1902:18-19).

The leader of the Vai porters, Bai Tabe, who was held in high esteem by Zinggraf throughout his account of 1895, launched an official complaint against Zinggraf upon his return to Monrovia in 1891. He demanded payment of salaries and compensation for 66 Vai killed in combat and threatened to halt any future contracts between Vai and Germans if their demands were not fulfilled:


Da wir nun überzeugt sind, daß Dr. Zinggraf in keiner Weise berechtigt sein konnte, uns zu zwingen, länger als unsere contractlich bedingte Zeit zu bleiben und uns zu Gefechtszwecken zu benutzen, wozu wir gar nicht angeworben waren, am allerwenigsten aber berechtigt war, uns unseren redlich verdienten Gehalt einzubehalten, – so haben wir jetzt, da wir hier in Monrovia mittellos herumliegen, unsere Ansprüche durch die liberianischen Gerichte gegen A. Heffer geltend gemacht.


Wir haben unser Anliegen dem Kais. Konsul Herrn Hermann Jager in Monrovia unterbreitet und derselben um seine Vermittlung gebeten, unsere gerechte Forderung gegen Herrn Dr. Zinggraf dem Kaiserlichen Gouverneur bekannt zu geben, welcher mir um Schutz und Beistand bittet, da mit Herr Dr. Zinggraf und unser unter Lebensgefahr verdientes Geld nicht länger widerrechtlich vorenthalten und den ferneren Anwürfen nach dort auf diese Weise ein Hemmnis setzt, was jedenfalls geschehen wird, wenn wir nicht zu unserem Rechte kommen.

Monrovia, December 20.1891

der Anführer der 163 entlassenen Weileute
Ebaawe [Bai Tabe] Handzeichen [the names of all 163 Vai follow].

(Bai Tabe, 20.12.1891:33-34)

The 'mutiny of the porters' (Hutter 1902) later became a diplomatic case and a main reason for the increasing tensions between Zinggraf and the Gouvernement (cf. chapter 5.6.4. Zinggraf expelled (1895):129).

Zinggraf and Gallea of Bali signed a treaty on the 28th of August 1891 before the Bali were trained to use the guns and Zinggraf – as the representative of the German government – became the 'sovereign' over Bali-country (Zinggraf 1895:395). For Zinggraf this treaty marked the true 'possession' of Kamerun's hinterland, including the forest area (397). The hoisting of a flag was not mentioned; instead a Bali ceremony was enacted. Zinggraf obviously regarded Bali as a state and thus a legitimate party for the secession of rights of sovereignty. In this notion he – as a 'man on the spot' – differed from the 'academic' view of Stegel (cf. chapter 3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – land and people under the German flag:93).

The station on the river Nf 'Miyimbi' had been a trading station, erected and controlled by J&T. Between May and June 1892 Zinggraf founded a station in Tinio, three quarters of an hour to the west of 'Miyimbi'. People from the area were not involved in the building of the station – Zinggraf employed exclusively

---

99 Some foundations are still to be found at the place, which is today in the forest.
Bali and Babessong from the grassfields. The station Tinto had been staffed with three Germans, Dahorman and Bali people. Expedition leader Neumann was its head. In October 1892 he was replaced by Ehmann. Rittmeister von Stetten, who had been sent to investigate the situation on the Bali road and Zinggraf's expedition in general, reported that Neumann had committed several 'irregularities' and was therefore deposed (Stetten to KGK, 27.10.1892). 'Irregularities' occurred frequently during Zinggraf's expedition, and they were mainly directed against the local population along the Bali road.

3.6.3. 'Terror' along Bali road (1892)

Between 1891 and 1893 the 'Balistraße' was frequently used by Zinggraf and the other Europeans with small groups of porters and soldiers, both foreign and from Bali. When Zinggraf (1895) stated that single unarmed men could pass the 'Balistraße' without having to fear an attack (409) and both Zinggraf and Hutter described the 'Balistraße' as fully functional since it took only five days from Bali to Mundane (ibid.; Hutter 1893b:101), they directed the attention away from some 'difficulties' and 'irregularities'.

Between June and July 1892 Hutter decided to 'make an impression' on the Banyang with his newly established 'Bali Schutztruppe'. Whether his decision was based on the 'unsatisfactory' behaviour of the population along the Bali road is highly questionable, since he took a new path and entered a village that had previously not had any direct contact with the Germans. He probably wanted to test his Schutztruppe in a combat situation. In an article published in the DKZ in 1898 he wrote that he wanted to get an impression of the attitude of an area that they had so far not passed through (Hutter 1898a:353). In his voluminous book published in 1902 he stated that he wanted to 'present the newly established and enforced power of the white man sitting in their back up in the grassland' and the Banyang 'did him the favour':

[Sie] nahmen den letzten Anlauf, dem gehassten Europier, der die Sperre ihres einträglichen Zwischenhandels so nachdrücklich und so weit ins Innere hinein durchbrochen hatte, Schwierigkeiten zu bereiten, und gaben mir so Gelegenheit, ihnen die Wirkung der neuen Waffe in der Hand einer europäisch geschulten Truppe sehr nachdrücklich zu zeigen. (Hutter 1902:24)

The extracts of his 'diary' published in various issues of the DKZ 1898 gave a more vivid account of the 'difficulties'. He and 40 Bali soldiers left Miyimbi at six in the morning, crossed the river Nfi and took a new route to the east. At ten o'clock they entered a village of about 200 or 300 houses – later identified as 'Fomuni'.

'Fomuni' features on Hutter's map, although on Moise's map of 1912 no village of the name is found, but 'Mfonjong' in the Aitbong area is close to its site on Hutter's map. In the village Hutter met the men, in their war attire, but no women. Hutter had advanced in combat position without loads, only ammunition. He stopped in the middle of the village, demanding palm wine that was presented to him by two men shortly after. Since the men did not drink first, Hutter assumed they wanted to poison him, consequently he demanded they taste the wine before him. Upon this command the two men dropped the calabash and ran away. Hutter quickly took his gun and shot the two, both of which fell to the ground wounded, and the remaining people fled (Hutter 1898a:353).

By the way he described the scene, he used the occasion to observe the behaviour of his Bali soldiers whom he praised:

Mein Zug fämasich benommen [sic]. So wie so mit Gewehr bei Fuß in zwei Gliedern haltend, waren sie im Nu auf den Beinen und ohne weiteres Kommando im Augenblick in der Fertigstellung zu einer Salve bereit. (Hutter 1893a:354)

Before leaving the village he forced the two men, who were not dead, just wounded, to drink the palm wine, which they did, 'whining'. Hutter himself stated he did not have time to clarify the results. After having thus 'punished' the men, he 'allowed' his men to burn the village down.

Hatte keine Zeit die Wirkung abzuwarten, meinen Leuten gab ich noch Erlaubnis, das Nest in Brand zu stecken. In wenigen Minuten brannten einige Häuser und ich zog weiter. (ibid.)

The guides he had forcefully recruited used the turmoil to flee while the Bali were burning the village. Hutter and his soldiers were then left alone to find their way to Sabes. On their way they were occasionally attacked with guns and spears. Hutter himself was very lightly wounded. They later encountered a man from Sabes who was instantly recruited as a guide, but did not lead them towards Sabes and soon tried to escape. As punishment, he was tied up and told that if Hutter and his men would not reach Sabes before night, he would be shot. Eventually they reached Sabes. Hutter and five or six soldiers entered the village alone – the rest of the men stayed behind. Obviously Hutter had been proceeding faster than the others. The inhabitants of Sabes were all present and started crying and following Zinggraf. He advanced to the 'king's house', commanded the 'chief' to come outside and instantly took him hostage, retreating to a compound up-village, where he waited for his men and left Sabes early in the morning.

In Hutter's own account of 1898 the men of Fomuni had awaited him in their village. Hutter had came as an enemy, with his soldiers in combat position. He was not attacked, but presented palm wine upon his demand. The crime the men committed was their not tasting the palm wine. This was all the proof he needed to ascertain that they wanted to poison him. Shooting the guilty and burning their village was thus justified. Maybe he felt he still had to convince his readers of the legitimacy of his actions. He further substantiated it by quoting his ally Fon M'Bere from Bamessong (Moghamo-speaking), immediately bordering Sabes:
The rebellion was strong in a number of points. First of all, Fon M'Bere from Bamessang was antagonistic to the Dannyang and would naturally have presented them in a negative light. If the people had been too weak for open combat, how could they have made a pact to deny passage to the Europeans? How could they have known Hutter was going to ask for palm wine, could they have prepared the poisoned palm wine on such short notice? Why had the population of Sables not left the village if they had convinced with the people of Fonum?

Hutter had wanted to test his Bali soldiers in open combat – the rational explanations he gave in the detailed account remain very unsatisfactory. The explanations he presented to the general public in 1902 drew on the well-established topos of the 'middlemen monopoly'. In the absence of any logical explanation revenge for broken trade monopolies was easily believed by politicians, the public and possibly also by the 'men on the spot' themselves, although in the case of Hutter 1892 this remains extremely unlikely (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpo-wanku wars (1904–1906): 26).

Although Zintgraff and Hutter boasted that the Bali road was safe, the majority of the inhabitants of adjacent settlements obviously did not share their view. When von Stetten travelled from Mundame to Bali in 1892 he found the majority of the villages deserted. As an explanation he stated excesses against property and people by 'Bali' travelling the road (Stetten 1893; translated and commented in C&R 2001:133-139). C&R 2001 assume that the situation was more complicated and could not be 'blamed solely' on the Bali, proposing that possibly youth gangs imitating German forces were at work (139, fn 3). 'Bali', probably the 'soldiers' trained and tested by Hutter, were not the only people travelling the Bali road. Armed Vai and Dahoman porters with or without a German leader were probably behaving the same way that the 'Bali' did. Probably von Stetten in his account subsumed all 'blacks in German service', probably following the perception by the local population. Zintgraff solely blamed the rebellious Vai porters for the desertion of the Bali road in the forest area.
3.6.4. Zintgraff expelled (1893)

In 1893 Zintgraff's expedition was recalled by Gouverneur von Zimmerer with whom relations had been strained ever since he had taken over from von Soden in 1890. The AAKA not only ended Zintgraff's expedition, but also banned him from further private missions to the hinterland and because of the strained relations and his displayed disrespect for the Gouvernement, he was not permitted to return to Kamerun for two years (cf. Zintgraff 1895:410-412; C&R 2001:9). All personnel was withdrawn from the hinterland, and the stations terminated (Hutter 1902:26). In 1893 Zintgraff published his complaints against the Gouvernement (Zintgraff 1893). Already in 1892, while residing in Bali, he had officially charged von Zimmerer for 'endangering life and security of Europeans in the protectorate' (Zintgraff 1892). Zintgraff claimed that the Gouvernement did not assist him the way they could have, especially in preparation for the battle with the Bafut, which according to Zintgraff had only been disastrous as it was because he lacked ammunition that the Gouvernement was supposed to have sent through J&T (Zintgraff 1893:6, 8).

Further complaints addressed the attack on approximately 30 Bali soldiers in some Douala villages (ibid.:10-11) and the general contempt displayed by the Gouvernement for his person and his mission of the Bali road and the restrictions of his powers as 'governor for bush' (cf. ANY FA 1/84:92). The tensions between Zintgraff and the Gouvernement had reached the level of personal accusations and Zintgraff, writing complaint upon complaint from Baliburg, expressed bitterness and irritability. One whole letter was devoted to the question whether 'subaltern' members of his expedition - namely Caulwell and Carstensen - had been questioned by Assessor Leist in Douala about details concerning the 'defeat against Bafut', discovering certain contradictions concerning the circumstances of Spangenberg's death. Zintgraff bragged that the Gouvernement should 'thank God' that they had competent people like himself in their services and should refrain from discrediting them, especially by people of lower rank behind his back:

*Aber ich möchte es doch nicht unterlassen, Euer Hochwohlgeboren darauf aufmerksam zu machen, daß eine derartige Handlungswise jedenfalls nicht dazu beiträgt, das Ansehen der Beamten des Gouvernements dem Europäern im Schutzgebiet gegenüber zu haben und zu stärken, die Gott danken sollten, sachverständige Leute im Dienste zu haben, anstatt dieselben zu diskreditieren. Oder ist es in Europa, wo der Unterschied zwischen Personen nicht so sehr zum Ausdruck kommt, wie hier, etwa Brach, Leute der subjektiven Klasse über Respektspersonen hinter deren Rücken auszuforschen und denselben Zweifel an die Wahrheitsliebe derselben beizubringen? (ANY FA 1/84:95-96, emphasis original)*

Zintgraff was extremely bitter about this treatment and stressed his feelings throughout his book "Nord-Kamerun" written during the years of forced 'exile' from Kamerun. Cynical remarks about men who had no experience with Africa and who preferred staying at the coast because they were too scared and weak for longer expeditions and a 'real' feeling for Africa were certainly aimed at Gouverneur von Zimmerer (cf. Zintgraff 1895:19).

The book's epigraph reads:

"In Haß und seichter Eifersucht verrötet,
Wer auf dem Lager lässig träumt;
Der Held, der mutig der Gefahren spottet,
Er übt die Kraft, die in ihm schläumt;
Rustet der Arm, womit es nicht arbeiten gilt,
Rosset das Wappen auf eurem Schild!"

Zintgraff later indeed became one of the first 'heroes' of German colonialism in Cameroon, with a prominent place in German colonialism (cf. E&B 1974:57-58; F&G 1899:66; Nuhn 2000:81-102). Even before his return from his first journey to Adamawa the DKZ praised him as an 'meritorious explorer' (DKZ 1889, no. 29:242). This title was maintained by other contemporaries after Zintgraff's death (Hassert 1899:53). In 1890 Zintgraff was awarded the royal crown medal of the third class (DKZ 1890:112). Hutter remembered Zintgraff as his 'unforgettable leader', who had 'died much too early' (Hutter 1902:VIII). And Putkamer praised his skilful 'opening' of the hinterland (Putkamer 1912:24), while Esser pointed to the 'outstanding services' he had rendered to 'Kamerun' (Esser/C&R 2001:95). Maywald 1933 especially stressed the relationship of Zintgraff and his Vai (Maywald 1933:80), completely ignoring the strained and disastrous relationship between Zintgraff and his Vai employees.

3.7. Forest and grassland – dichotomies

German desire to 'step out of' or 'surmount' the forest and 'break through' to the desired grassland has been indicated above (cf. chapter 3.5. A vision for Kamerun and its hinterland:118).

3.7.1. Forest people, grassland people

Two encounters – one with 'Defang' (Tafang Tiku) in the Banyang forest, the other with the Fon Galega 1 of Bali in the grasslands – determined the character of Zintgraff's journey and may serve as examples of the subsequent perception of the forest vis-à-vis the grassland.

Zintgraff's encounter and interaction with the Fon of Bali and the grassland in general are among the best studied and best known events of the German colonial period in Cameroon. This is largely due to a discursive continuity from the
I need therefore not endeavour a summary of Zintgraff's encounter with Galega, but just point to the dichotomous description of his encounters with Galega on the one and Takang Tifu on the other hand.

As described in the previous chapter, Tafang Tiku was presented by Zintgraff as a prototypical 'Negro'; 'dark, squat, protruding cheekbones'. To this were added the character traits: 'treacherous', 'greedy', 'hostile' and a general 'uncivilised' or 'primitivist' air.

Galega and Zintgraff's first encounter with him were constructed in sharp contrast to Tafang Tiku:

Eine mächtige wohlbelebte Gestalt, im dunkelroth gefärbten Busnus nach Art der moslemmedinischen Tracht, dessen faltenerreicher Wurf das Massige seiner Gestalt nur noch mehr hervortreten ließ, so stand er aufgerichtet vor seinem Steinsitz, einem Augenblick schaft nach mir hinschau. [...] Ich stand gleichfalls auf und schaute ihm fest ins Gesicht, das verhältnismäßig wenig negerhafte Züge trag. Eine Zeitlang sah auch er auf mich, ein wenig mit den Augen blinzeln. (Zintgraff 1895:183)

This description was accompanied in the book by a photograph of Galega. Both invoke dignity, power, and pride. Galega did not have 'wary' and 'dangerous' eyes like Defang, who evaded Zintgraff's stare. Galega and Zintgraff's eyes interlocked. Both were powerful and as equals they tacitly acknowledged each other's strength which became the basis for later mutual respect. Galega was not 'hacked' as Tafang Tiku, but dressed in an impressive garment - identified by Zintgraff as originating from the desired northern Muslim territories. The 'racial' difference between Zintgraff and Galega was also described as less pronounced than between Zintgraff and Tafang Tiku: Galega's face was 'bearing relatively few negroid traits'. Esser, a few years later, described Galega making reference to these same elements:

His face showed strikingly few Negroid features [...] His sympathetic character, his engaging friendliness and simple dignity made a tremendously pleasant impression on us. (Esser/C&R 2001:82-83, 87)

Galega was accepted by Zintgraff and Esser as an impressive man, but his 'dignity' was 'simple' and 'Esser detected only one weakness in the character of this African ruler and that was an indescribable vanity about his dignity, his power. He harped again and again on his importance and his strength. (ibid.)

Helpless against the presentation of power while 'on the spot', Esser reduced it in his text, by exposing it as a 'weakness', as 'vanity'. The exclusion of the 'object' was achieved by the same epistemological ethnocentrism (Mudimbe) as the exclusion of the 'Duala' as 'objects' of 'contempt' (cf. chapter 4.1. 'Sufficient means of power':147).

The grassland population in general was judged favourably by Zintgraff in contrast to the inhabitants of the forest:
Auffällend war der wohlklingende, rhythmische Gesang, womit die Eingeborenen den Tanz begleiteten, und die Gewandtheit und Leidenschaftlichkeit, womit sie die gegen seitigen Gruppenkämpfe ausführten. Das waren nicht mehr jene schläfrigen Gesellen des warmen Waldlandes, das frische, kräftige Hochlandburschen. […] Diese lagen, dunklen Gestalten, deren Blick sich meinem Antlitz weit und offen wendete, waren andere Neger, wie die, welche ich bisher zu Gesichte bekommen hatte. Obwohl selbstbe wußt und stolz im Auftreten, waren sie doch wieder bescheiden und ehrerbietig, und ich empfand für sie schon damals eine gewisse Zuneigung. (Zintgraf 1895:172, 179)

The grassland people were 'tall', 'fresh', 'strong', and 'proud', at the same time being 'humble', and 'devout' and thus assembled the qualities of the ideal 'Negro' (cf. chapter 3.4.1 Offering friendship:112). Zintgraf’s contempt for the forest people went further—they were denied the mental capabilities of original invention:

Ob diese Hängebrücken eigene Erfindung der Waldbewohner oder aber bloße Nachbil dung der im nördlichen Hinterland im Grünland vorkommenden Brücken sind, ist schwer zu entscheiden; jedenfalls ist ihr Bau das Innereichste, was afrikani sche Intelligenz und Technik hervorgebracht hat. (Ibid:86)

Zintgraf admired the hanging bridges constructed in the forest area, at the same time suggesting their being mere copies of bridges in the grassland, placing the superior intelligence and technology in the grassland, not in the forest.

These differences between the forest and the grassland people had become conventional wisdom in German colonial discourse, and by 1904 it needed not be developed any further, when describing previously ‘unknown’ grassland people:

Auf den verschiedenartigsten Eindruck, welchen die Eingeborenen des Urwaldes und die Stämme des Graslandes bei einem Vergleich beider machen, habe ich schon hingewiesen. (Hütter 1904:613)

3.7.2. Open grassland, confined forest

The people inhabiting the forest were attributed with characteristics as unfavourable as the ecology in which they lived. The dichotomously constructed knowledge about the forest and the grassland was fed into the general discourse since 1890 and quickly taken up (cf. chapter 3.5. A vision for ‘Kamerun’ and its hinterland:119). In this rendition on discourse the grassland and the forest featured as deflected representations of ‘self’ and ‘other’. The grassland soon becoming identified as ‘Aliguá’—a fertile undulating pasture area in western Bavaria, famous for its high quality cattle products and cherished for its tranquillity and scenic views. Esser compared the climbing up to the grasslands as “climbing the mountains of Switzerland or Tyrol” (Esser/C&R 2001:78). Later he compared the escarpment of Babessong to the Feldberg in the Black Forest.

Anyone who has climbed the Feldberg in the Black Forest, looked down from its grassy ridge onto the wooded fir-crowned slopes, and has let his gaze wander further along the deep-cut, broad, fertile valley, can’t help thinking of the Feldberg when climbing the heights of Babessong. Not only are the formations similar, but we encounter the same numerous torrents with their charming waterfalls. But here, instead of the dark fir woods we see the light-leaved palm trees, instead of fertile valleys and open fields below, only an impenetrable swampy jungle. (Ibid:80)

Zintgraf recollected his first grassland experience:

Welt und breit schweifte der Blick über ein weites, im ersten frischen Grün der Gräser prangendes Land. Warm und hell schien die Sonne auf uns herab, und im Gegensatz zur feuchten, dumpfen Luft des Urwaldes sog die Brust mit Enthüllen die frische, kräftige der Berge ein (Ibid:169).

The perception of the “Urwald” (”Ur”-‘forest’) as confined and the desire of stepping out of the forest evolved as major topos in the German colonial project. Dippold (1973) drew attention to the connotation of the prefix “Ur” in the German language in connection to the description of the African environment. "Ur" cannot be easily translated with ‘primitive’, ‘primary’ or ‘primordial’. The term “Urwald” evoked an untamed, menacing, impenetrable, destructive environment, in which humans did not live.

La nature africaine, c'est le paysage du jour premier, indompté, inhuma n, regorgeant de sève, menaçant, destructeur. La force élémentaire de son fonc eion exubérant subjugue l'homme, l'èrease. C'est le monde sans l'homme. (Dippold 1973:37)

In his concluding remarks, Hutter characterised the ‘wilderness’ as opposed to the ‘civilisation’, expressing a romanticism for the "Ur-sprünlichkeit" (’originality’) of the ‘wilderness’ and the experiences within it.

Unberührt von Menschenhand, in ihrer vollen Ursprünglichkeit und Gewaltsamkeit tritt die Natur in die Schranken zum Streit mit sich selbst, zum Streit mit Menschenkraft und Menschengeist. Ungebändigter, ruher wohl, aber um ein gut Teil wahrer und offener kämpft der Mensch gegen den Menschen da draussen den Kampf um's Dasein. (Hutter 1902:548)

The unfavourable influence of the confined forest on human characteristics was not restricted to German colonial discourse.

Only the heavy thud of over-ripe fruit falling from its parent tree breaks the silence of the luxuriant forest. […] All beautiful, but it is a ripe repulsive beauty, cold, dank, and smelling of decay […] The forest is the home of the Boki, Eba-Mbu, and Ekokissam Class, and they have not escaped its lowering influence. To have the rank growth up to the very doors of their houses, to be shut in by an endless barricade of forest must mean deterioration, and they are indeed a most uncultivated people. There is no comparison between, for instance, the Bokis and the healthy intelligent natives of the Cameroon Grasslands. (Gregg 1925:1)

* The 'motif of the jungle' was not confined to German colonial discourses and has its roots in the Enlightenment (Montesquieu, Hegel). The isolatory effect of the environment caused the lack of historicity and the lack of development, thus the need for "outside intervention" (cf. Bayart 1993:3; and Gregg 1925 on this effect of the forest on the Boki).
And it has survived into the 21st century:

[Sehen direkt hinter der Kuppe erhob sich der schier undurchdringliche, nahezu wege-lose Urwald mit seinem ewigen Halbdunkel, seiner feuchtefeinen, modrigen Treibschauf- luft, seinem Chaos von Schlindgenblumen, seinem sumpfigen Boden und seinem dichten, keinem Sonnenstrahl durchlassenden Laubdach von Baumkronen. (Nuhn 2000:81)]

The air in the grasslands was depicted as 'fresh' and 'strengthening'. The grasslands also allowed expansive views, they were 'light', not 'dark' like the forest. The grasslands were not perceived as hostile but friendly, evoking familiar pictures from home, like the Allgäu, Tyrol, or the Black Forest. The view reached far into the distance, allowed for at least imagined appropriation of the land, its flora and fauna. Zintgraff (1895) and Esser in 1896 described their respective first grassfield-view as an awesome experience:

Da das hohe, braune Gras abgebrannt war und allearnhalten junge, frische Triebe hervorsprangen, so konnte der Blick unbehindert in die Ferne schweifen. (Zintgraff 1895:177)

And next morning when I stepped out of my hut [in Babessong], what a view! In a swirling mist below lay valleys and groves, and up above, in brightest sunshine, lay the far-spreadying grassfields. Along with this there was the most splendid mountain air which our lungs breathed in with delight. In the distance I saw antelopes and grazing buffaloes, and above us glided mighty eagles. (Esser/C&R 2001:80-81)

Seemingly personal aesthetic perceptions blurred some of its underlying motivations: greater visibility into a distant horizon allowed the easy detection of enemies and the undeterred sight thus guaranteed greater security and a more effective use of guns than in the forest. Esser had described the 'invisibility' of the 'enemies' of Taiyor in the 'Banyang forest' in 1896:

Soon we had mounted a height, but we could not see any of the natives; only the sound of their monotonous warning cry was heard. (Esser/C&R 2001:98)

The desire for a wide view was thus also nursed by fear – but never explicitly stated in the accounts. Fear was an element in the construction of the German in the colonies 'out there' that did not exist in contemporary discourse, in which 'men on the spot' constructed themselves and were constructed as 'great Africans', as 'heroes'.

But European victories solely relied on their superior weapons, the superiority of which stemmed from their wider range and higher destructive potential. In the forest area the use of powerful guns could not only be ineffective but also dangerous due to ricochets; the use of canons was altogether impossible. In the forest, where the Africans could approach the Germans and their soldiers using the protection of the trees, the major disadvantage of the weapons the Africans were using – their shorter range – was hardly relevant.

Um 12.17 wurde ich in einem für Buschläute ungünstigen Gelände, da man in dem weit auseinander stehenden Bala-Gras ziemlich weit durchblicken konnte und das Gras keine

Deckung gegen Schuß besitzt, die Nachspitze (Saltwater) angegriffen. Die Nsakpe- Lute aber wohl wegen der Ungunst des Geländes schon auf zu weite Entfernung schossen, hatte ich keine Verluste. (Besser to KGG, 27.06.1900; cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Exot war' (1899-1909):161)

When erecting stations in the forest area, the Germans therefore preferred elevated points. The place of the first station in Tinto guaranteed this and even provided a relatively wide view into the surrounding area. When Esser visited the place in 1896 – he claimed to have seen the snow-covered Cameroon mountains of the coast, the view was 'marvellous' (Esser/C&R 2001:76). Von Stetten also confirmed that the station was "picturesquely situated and commands a view of the Cameroonian Mountain range" (C&R 2001:135). The inclination to build on high ground stood in contrast to indigenous settlement patterns, which were built in valleys and depressions, mostly due to better and easier access to water, more fertile grounds and protection against thunderstorms (cf. Hutter 1902:269). The Upper Cross River area boasted a considerable large stretch of naturally un- forested land – directly opposite Mammfe at the northern bank of the river. Solid rocky ground made the growth of trees impossible. Since this stretch of land is also elevated, rising steeply from the bed the Cross River has cut into the rocks, it encompassed many of the characteristics desired by the Germans: a picturesque view up to Bamenda, Basho, and far into Nigeria – and fresh air. Not surprisingly, Mansfeld erected lodges on this plateau, which were to serve as a place of recreation for local officers and traders (Mansfeld to KGG, 07.01.1907). The open space and the far view were used to attack the British while they were entering the German station in Mammfe during WWI (Stolz, 30.03.1915; cf. chapter 9. Germany must go (1914-1939):361).

3.7.3. 'Unhealthiness' – death and sickness

The grassland was perceived as healthier than the forest and coastal areas, both of which were commonly described as 'moist' and 'sultry'. The issue of 'unhealthiness' certainly was of prime importance to Europeans in the tropics, an area feared as the 'white man's grave', the 'country of fever and death' (cf. Dippold 1973:41). The topos lived even in postcolonial German writing, e.g. Hausen (1970): 'Küstenvorland [...] mit seiner ungesunden Sumpflandschaft" (11). The perception of the environment as hostile also applied to the forest areas immediately following the coastal mangrove swamps (cf. Wirz 1993). Even if the forest was described as beautiful, its inaccessibility remained one of its predominant characteristics:

97 Gluming, then head of Ossidingke station, upon a visit in 1901 also commented on the wonderful view, but specified that the mountains visible were the Nts Ali (Zintgraff's "Sarko- plag"), Apium hill, Mount Hewett at the Anglo-German border, and the Bangwa mountains (Gluming, 03.10.1901:166).

(Heßler 1894:74-74)

The humid and moist climate of the forest made it unsuitable for settlement of Europeans ("Das Klima im Walldanne ist heiß und feucht; für europäische Ansiedlung ist es nirgends geeignet" - Zimmermann 1912:317), not only because of the strain involved, but because it posed a real danger to their life, in form of its 'daughter', the 'fever' - malaria and black-water fever - that innumerable Europeans fell victim to, among them many of the 'African heroes', e.g. Zinzigraff in Teneriffa in 1897 and Nachtigal on board the 'Mowë' in 1885.

So hat denn der unerhörte Feind jedes Weib in den Tropen, dem Nachtigal auf afrikanischem Boden so oft getrotzt, ihn auf seiner Heimfahrt ins Vaterland, das ihn mit hohen Ehren zu empfang'en vorgehait - was er in einem Briefe an einen Freund im vorigen Frühjahr in bezug auf die ihm von seiten seines Kaisers übertragene große und schwierige Mission schrieb: "...vielleicht geben wir dabei zu Grunde, aber rückwärts welche ich nicht!" - dieses ahnungsvolle Wort des todsicher gewordenen Forschers sollte sich zum Schmerze der Nation bewahren. (R.L. 1883:34-344)

Thirty percent of the missionaries in Cameroon died of tropical illnesses between 1886 and 1896 (Gründer 1995:138) before quinine was discovered as a cure and prophylaxis by 1889. Just as gunpowder was used against the 'savages', quinine was praised as protection against malaria (cf. Ngutu 1997; Eckart 1997:187-192).

Ein Beispiel dafür, wie die Europäer sich in Kamerun niemals aklimatisieren konnten, da das Klima für ihn nicht zuträglich, in den Niederungen sogar sehr ungesund ist; es gilt als das unge- sundeste an der ganzen Westküste Afrikas, da die Hitze der umschließenden Berge wegen drückend ist. (Heßler 1894:73)


The 'unhealthiness' of the coastal area was the main incentive for the Germans to move the central Gouvernement from Douala to Buea on the 1st of April 1901. Puttkamer - suffering from constant fever attacks - had rejoined to his steamer 'Nachtigal', where he lived and worked until 1901 (Puttkamer 1912:64).

Das Beamtenpersonal kann in dem angenehmen und zutraglichen Klima von Buea seine ganze Arbeitskraft ungestört durch Hitze und Krankheit entfalten. (Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und in der Südsee im Jahre 1900/1901:37)

While malaria and black water fever were the most feared sicknesses, the canon included: dysentery (the second most common sickness), sleeping sickness, tuberculosis, headache, sun and moon stroke, insomnia, toothache, skin rash ("troter Hund"), furuncle, ringworm, tetter at the feet, snakebite, guineaworm, and sand-fly (cf. Chamier 1925; Eckart 1997:187-192).

Hutter (1902) pointed out that the causality between an 'unhealthy' climate and the high mortality rates of Europeans was overestimated in the German hegemonic discourse. He differentiated four categories of Europeans going into the tropics: those too weak for life in Europe; adventurers who died out of carelessness, and those who died as a result of their untamed desires, namely alcohol and sexual excesses. All those - he wrote - were generally subsumed as 'martyrs of the climate', while only men from the fourth category (strong constitution, sensible, appropriate lifestyle) were the 'real fever victims' and the number of those would be considerably small. The lack of physically and morally strong men especially among the traders was noted by Hutter and remained a topos in the discourse of colonial administrators (cf. chapter 6.6.1. 'Lack of competence and moral:245). The topos of the unhealthiness of Kamerun was thus used as a discursive weapon against 'immorality'. In effect it served the reestablishment of class identity in the colonies (cf. Eckart 1997:192). Traders were often from the 'low classes', whereas military and civil officers often belonged to the aristocracy or intelligentsia. Although the traders - as morally and physically weak men - were identified as victims of most sicknesses, administrators, and even some of the 'heroes' of colonialism were often unable to pursue their duties because they suffered from a 'canonical' sickness:

Infolge meiner Erkrankung an Dysenterie mußte ich meine Absicht, die ca. 8-10 km betragende Lücke zwischen den Quellgebieten des Asua und des Akwa Yafe durch Routenaufnahme festzulegen, aufgeben. (Glauning to KGK, 30.07.1901:77-78)

Polizeimeister Wolff, der überhaupt viel an Fieber litt, ist gänzlich zusammengebrochen und eigentlich nur durch den englischen Arzt in Nsukamak, wohin ich Wolff schnell transportieren ließ, gerettet. Ich lasse ihn die nächsten Wochen in Ousidong zur Erholung. Ich selber habe in den letzten Wochen auch fortgesetztes Fieber gehabt. (Herrmann to AAKA, 18.02.1906:58)

The sicknesses of the forest, especially malaria, proved a real threat to the health of Europeans, even after the discovery of quinine as a prophylaxis.89

89 Preoccupation with malaria and prophylaxis remains one of the central topos in discussions amongst Europeans who travel to the tropics today.
3.7.4. Transport

Hausen (1970), following the established historic dichotomy between grassland and forest, added an economic aspect. She described the forest as 'hostile to transport' and 'cutting' the 'open' grassland off the coast (ibid:12). Hutter referred to this point, conveniently including the evolutionary 'below-above' metaphor, referring to altitude but evolving divergent stages of 'development':

Dort unten hausten die Stämme, ja deren einzelne Ansiedlungen für sich, der Urwald, durch den nur mühsam gehaltene Pfade führen, ist eine Völkergeselligkeit im weiteren Umkreis, mag sie nun in freundlichen oder gegenteiligen Beziehungen sich ändern, feind. Anders oben im Grasland mit seiner ungleich leichten Gangbarkeit (Hutter 1902:319)

Indeed transport through the forest area proved difficult, with the various streams and rivers representing a most serious impediment. Not only were Europeans often scared while crossing these bridges, for porters with their big loads it was at times impossible and other, and adventurous means had to be developed. The rivers also disallowed the use of animals as porters. An account of a trader transporting donkeys from the coast to the station in Bali in 1892 shortly before its closure illustrates the enormous difficulties. Even on the ordinary footpaths the donkeys were encountering serious problems, and the expedition could only proceed extremely slowly.

Wenn es nur auf die Träger angekommen wäre, so hätte ich den Weg ruhig fortsetzen können, trotzdem sie eigentlich nur schwach waren, kamen sie immerhin schneller vorwärts als die Tiere, denen sie meistens um zwei Stunden voraus waren. Die Tiere dagegen überwinden die Hindernisse auf diesen Pfaden nicht so leicht und schnell. Anders ist es allerdings, wenn jedes Tier am Kopfe von einem Schwarzen geführt wird, wie es sich ja auch gehört, doch hatte ich dafür keine Leute. (Balistrasse 1892:174)

The river Mbu – just after Nguti – proved a major obstacle for the donkeys; the hanging bridge was too fragile and impossible to pass over by donkeys, while the river itself was full and fast flowing.

In Nguti hieß es, daß der ein Kilometer nördlich fließende Mbia – Kalahar – infolge der vielen Gewittereregen stark angewachsen sei, der Fluß außerdem sehr steil abfallende, von 50 m hohe Ufer habe und der Abstieg in diese Schlucht darum nicht von Gefahr sei. Beide Ufer seien durch eine um diese Jahreszeit sehr schlechte Lianenbrücke verbunden. Die Umstände zwangen mich, die Lasttiere und mit ihnen die schweren Munition zurückzulassen, bis das Wasser gefallen, oder mit Hilfe von Ballonnete eine Brücke gebaut, oder sonst Hilfskräfte angekommen waren, die früher schon zugesagt, bisher aber nicht eingetroffen waren. (ibid.)

When a few days later the water level had dropped, the donkeys were crossed over the river. Its steep banks necessitated a rather risky and somewhat bizarre procedure.


Apparently this was the first and last experiment of its kind, since the donkeys were abandoned at Mibimb station and never reached the grassland.

Ich war zu der Einsicht gekommen, daß auf diesen Urwaldpfaden die Träger das einzige und unbedarfte Transportmittel bleiben, da sie Terrainschwierigkeiten leichter überwinden, während die Lasttiere im Morast stecken blieben, störrig sind, sich legen und selbst durch Prügel nicht zum Aufstellen zu bewegen sind. Man muß dann die Lasten abladen, die Tiere aufstellen und wieder beladen. Oft laufen sie vom Weg ab und sind schwer wiederzufinden. Dies wiederholte sich täglich und nahm viel Zeit in Anspruch. Kommt man auf eine Elefantenherde oder gar auf feindliche Eingeborene was man doch immer erwarten kann, so scheuen die Tiere und rücken mit den unentbehrlichsten Lasten aus oder laufen dem Feind geradezu entgegen. (ibid.)

Transport in the forest thus depended on human labour – at least until the Germans devised another alternative: the railroad. A Victoria-Mundamie-Cross River railroad was indeed envisaged but never realised (DKB 1899, no. 24:849; Schulte im Hofe 1901; K Gö to AAKA, 26.05.1901). Transport remained one of the key issues throughout the whole German colonial enterprise in Kamerun, and it became a fundamental problem for the GNK. In this respect Hausen's argument certainly applied to the forest area due to two factors: first, the difficult terrain and second, the lack of human labour (cf. chapter 6.6.2. Transport:249).

3.7.5. Between forest and grassland – the Banyang

While the forest-grassland dichotomy was acknowledged in all accounts, certain concessions were made with respect to differences within the forest area.

[Fast in einem gewissen fortlaufenden Verhältnis mit dieser [Besiedlungs-] Zunahme [from south to north] fand ich Steigerung der Kulturstufe (das Wort "Kultur" im weitläufigen Sinne genommen), die immer stärker werdenden Stämme einnehmen. (Hutter 1902:259)

The 'Banyang' as the northernmost forest people, closest to the grasslands, were therefore at times described quite sympatheticly.

99 Transport problems have been the dominating issue in discourses of the 'development' of Manyu Division (cf. chapter 1.2. Dancing a plot:25).
Der zurückgelegte Weg [Mbu river to etaw Defang/Mbang area] ist fast der schönste an der ganzen Straße von Kamerun bis Baliburg. Die Gegend ist reich bevölkert, man gewahrt ununterbrochen die schönsten Farmen, die mit Mais, Yam, Süßkartoffeln, Melonen, Tomaten, Bohnen und Tabak bestanden waren, aus denen sich Bananen, Bambus und Oelpalmen abholzen. Allenaltheit harrsch die größte Sauberkeit, durch welche sich die Banguas, soweit es den Landbau betrifft, vor allen anderen Völkerschaften auszeichnen. (Balistrasse 1892:174)

And even Zingtgraf elevated them from all people from 'Kamerun' to the Benue due to their 'clean' and 'healthy' houses:


Maybe he was appesessed because the lofty Upper Bangui area allowed him a view from above.


From the place where the station Tinto was later established, the view went as far as the southern Cameroon mountain range (C&R 2001:135; cf. chapter 3.7.2. Open grassland, confined forest, 134).

Hutter stated that the Bangui were undeniably the most advanced forest 'tribes' with respect to mental capabilities (Hutter 1902:263). They had an almost 'stately political structure', organised in districts; the best roads were found in their territory; the most extensive trade was carried out here and the farms were more organised (Hutter 1902:238-299). The Bangui were the forest people marching at the 'vanguard of civilisation' (Hutter 1902:293). They were perceived as 'more self-confident' than the other forest peoples, and 'outstandingly industrious' by von Stetten in 1892. He also praised the tidy compounds and the richness in desired resources, mainly palm oil and wild rubber (cf. Stetten 1893; C&R 2001:136).

Although the Bangui were thus lauded, their positive characteristics applied only within the forest area, and the contrast to the grassland people was always maintained. Conrau (1899) described the transition from Bangui (forest) to Bangwa (grassfields): "Man sah sofort, dass man das Land der trägen Bangui verlassen hatte" (ibid: 202).

3.8. Summary

Zingtgraf's journeys through the Cross River area fell into the first phase of the German colonial project in Kamerun. They stand in the tradition of the first explorations into unknown 'empty' virgin territory that is desired and imagined and then penetrated by the explorer and his entourage in a mixture of heroism and despair. Zingtgraf's and Hutter's accounts of their experiences comply to the genre criteria for travelogues and contain both ethnographic and geographic information as well as 'heroic' events. Both Zingtgraf and Hutter dwelled on the strain and self-denial experienced during these journeys, but both used these deprivations and liminal experiences as a cornerstone of their identities as 'Afrikaner', i.e. Europeans who 'knew' Africa. Their true 'heroism' was thus expressed to their readers at home in Europe, who participated in the exoticism and adventure as well as the national pride nurtured by the successes of German men in 'German Africa'.

Their actual success within the realm of German Africa was not as triumphant. Their plans were perceived as overambitious and impractical given the limited power Germany executed de facto over Kamerun. Scandals provoked by lack of policies and violent incidents finally led to the termination of Zingtgraf's projects and plans and even his exile from the colony.

In Upper Bangui the local population had encountered the first 'white man' in their territory as somebody who had 'made an impression' by the violence he was employing against them - fighting against them with his armed African carriers and superior weapons, kidnapping their women, and expecting them to comply to all his commands. The reaction of the population had not been uniform, however. The first leader encountered by Zingtgraf - Tafang Tikou of Mbang - had tried to calm matters but had not succeeded due to Zingtgraf's impatience and the conflicting views expressed by neighbouring leaders and 'community owners'. Minor leaders, like mfiaw Tabu of Mbang, had tried to use Zingtgraf to successfully challenge the leadership of Tafang Tikou. After the first violent encounters between Zingtgraf and the people in Upper Bangui, their immediate reaction had been the withdrawal and relocation from the road Zingtgraf was using to get to Bali. The Bali, who only penetrated the "Bangui forest" at the margins (market in Sabes) in pre-colonial days, obtained a new source for power vis-à-vis their southern neighbours as soldiers instructed and armed by Hutter, leading them on 'training campaigns' into Bangui villages.

As a result of Zingtgraf's journeys, the Cross River area had entered German colonial discourse as the last obstacle in the undesired and hostile forest area.
before reaching the craved grassfields, where the physical and human environment was judged most favourably. The station in Tinto and the trading post in Miyimbi had become visible signs for the strategic importance of Upper Banyang within the German colonial project of Kamerun. The subsequent closure of these stations on the other hand were an indication of Germany's chaotic policies, their overambition and consequential weakness.

By the end of the 20th century the dichotomy of forest and grassland with the following features had become well established in German discourses on Kamerun:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest</th>
<th>Grassland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hot, humid</td>
<td>cool, fresh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dark</td>
<td>light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confined</td>
<td>open, free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unhealthy</td>
<td>healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ugly</td>
<td>beautiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primitive</td>
<td>civilised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-hierarchical organisation; cannibalism)</td>
<td>(hierarchical political organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lazy</td>
<td>industrious (artefacts, architecture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hostile</td>
<td>friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treacherous</td>
<td>proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ugly</td>
<td>beautiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Urwald)</td>
<td>(Allgäte, Black Forest, Tyrol)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. 'New order' (1895-1903)

*Nur Gewalt kann hier helfen.*

*(J&T 1892:8)*

Das Hinterland von Kamerun ist aufgeschlossen; die deutsche Herrschaft ist von den Bewohnern anerkannt.

*(DKZ 1903, vol. 1:3)*

The two citations above frame the developments between the withdrawal of German presence from the grassfields in 1893 and the situation in 1903, in which German rule was perceived as acknowledged. The 'old order', in which the Germans had been weak, was replaced by a 'new order' and the demonstration of power, resting on force exerted by a colonial army. The Upper Cross River area that – except for Upper Banyang – had only marginally come into contact with the German efforts before 1895 was forced to 'acknowledge' German rule after they had seen the 'ugliest face' of the Germans' means of power.

The developments in the Upper Cross River area as described below have entered the general discourse only in a very condensed version:

Die im Herbst 1899 von dem damaligen Stationsleiter von Rio del Rey, Leutnant von Quets unternommene Expedition nach den Croßschnellen behufs Gründung einer Station in Nssakpe, rief bekanntlich Unruhen und schließlich auch offene Empörung unter den dort ansässigen Eingeborenen hervor, die dann die im November 1899 erfolgte Ernennung des Leutnants von Quets durch die Ekois zur Folge hatte.

Der zur Erkundung dieser Moräthe ausgesandte Forsher Conrau ging auf der Straße Mundame-Bali vor, wurde jedoch von den an dieser Straße ansässigen Bangwas gefangen und ersehbt sich nach einem mißglückten Fluchtvorsuch.

Im Februar 1900 brach ein Theil der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe unter Führung des Hauptmanns von Besser zur Bestrafung der schuldigen Stimme auf. Bis Ende Juli 1900 war dieselbe durchgeführt, die Station Nssakpe aufgebaut, ein Zollposten am Zusammenfluss von Croß-Nssakpe-Fluß errichtet. (Jahresbericht Kamerun 1899/1900:87)

Since Conrau's death along the Bali Road is connected to the efforts of a re-opening of it in 1896, I will treat these incidents alongside Besser's expedition in the Upper Banyang area in one chapter (4.2. 'Re-opening' of the Bali road:153) and Ques' and Besser's operations in the Njemaya ('Eko') area in the following chapter (4.3. 'German-Eko war' (1899-1900):161). By doing so the chronology is necessarily broken. Conrau's death is only relevant for this study insofar as it was the cause for Besser's actions against the Bangwa and some of their Banyang supporters. The incident itself will not be analysed – interesting as it would be.

4.1. 'Sufficient means of power'

In their vision of Cameroon as a colony based on trade and plantations, J&T (1892) had explicitly stated that the mise-en-valeur of Kamerun and its hinder-
land would not be achieved without sufficient 'means of power'. They even threatened that all German traders would have to withdraw from Kamerun if the German government did not provide the finances for the creation of an army (J&T 1892:47). The failure of Zinzendorf's plan for a line of stations from the coast to the grassfields served as proof of the weakness of the German colonial project in Kamerun. A colonial army that could employ force became the necessary precondition for a 'new order of things' (ibid.; cf. Hauser 1970:75-76). Gann and Duignan (1977) have effectively depicted the character and fate of the 'old system':

There was no organized colonial service, and its central administration was of the sketchiest character. The system was predicated on the assumption that Germany would not actually administer its overseas dependencies: the Reich would do no more than furnish consular and naval protection in order to safeguard traders, and it would interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of brown and black potentates, who would continue to rule under the German flag. The system broke down, however.

(ibid.:56)

J&T in 1892 described the breaking down 'old order', the ongoing trade with Central Africa as taking place exclusively at the coast, while the raw products came from the interior and the big markets for European products also laid in the interior. The 'natives' of the coast (mainly referring to the Duala) 'enjoyed an easy life', 'without much skill', they 'snatched off most of the profits (J&T 1892w8) - in this light the concept of 'middlemen' was invented. J&T complained about the dominance of these 'natives' whose monopolistic powers even allowed them to ban the trade with the European merchants. J&T then drew on the 'national' argument: since Kamerun had officially been annexed, this situation was 'disequitable' for Germany. They then went on to explicitly state that 'only force can help here' (ibid.). Here, they differed from Adolf Woermann's point of view, who believed in 'peaceful' advancement, the trader following the missionary (cf. Rudin 1938:90-91). But even force, J&T argued, would not imply bloodshed, since the 'natives' of the coast would lack the energy to put up any resistance. The 'means of power' needed were 'human material' and money. J&T called for the creation of a colonial army, a 'Schutztruppe'. It would 'break through the chain of middlemen', creating four to six stations which would be both trading and military posts. German traders would then enjoy the full profit and trade in general would boom (J&T 1892:8).

Plantations were perceived as a necessary prerequisite for 'sustainable development', to engage a fashionable term of today's hegemonic discourse: since trade necessarily led to depletion of the resource base, plantations guaranteed the continuous supply of raw products. Plantations depended on labourers. Human labour was in short supply in West Africa in general and it had been impossible for Germany to obtain voluntary labour within Cameroon. Till 1892 contract labourers had been employed (Vai and Kru), but there were also 'slaves' bought as 'indentured servants' (Dahoman) (cf. chapter 3.6.3. 'Terror' along Bali road (1892):126 and below:130; O'Neil 1996:91-92). These proved costly and 'unrealizable' and the 'utilisation' of the 'coastal tribes' themselves was envisaged as the only solution. Here, too, 'force was the only solution', and J&T justified the use of force, arguing that it was not only advantageous for the 'colonial power' but also for the 'natives':

The argument wound along two lines - the first was the indolence and carelessness of the indigenes (mainly due to their midlemen rents), while the second emphasised the value of work in its own right.

Man kann sich von der Indizien dieser wohlbeleibten Bevölkerung kaum einen Begriff machen. Daß die Niederwerfung des Zwischenhandels, [...] sie aus ihrer Sorglosigkeit bald aufschrecken wird, ist unumsichtig; kaum aber wird es genügen, dauernden Wandel zu schaffen. Es bedarf hier, wie eben in jeder Erziehung, vor allem sittlicher Faktoren, als niedeste Stufe derselben die Erkenntnis des Werthes der Arbeit zu künstlicher und geistigem Wohlbefinden. (J&T:8)

The most efficient of these ethical factors was the abolition of domestic slavery and thus the necessity for the former 'slave masters' to 'work' themselves. 'Work' was thus conceptualised as 'physical work'. 'Physical work' was the 'lowest step' towards 'corporate and mental well-being'. Their argument thus went: Force the 'natives' to abandon their profession as traders, force them to abandon their 'slaves' as labourers, force them to work and they will slowly start advancing morally. In the long run this enterprise was not judged to be viable without 'church and school' (10).

One of the central topoi (German) colonial discourse became the 'negro's disinclination to work', his 'laziness' and 'carelessness' (cf. Markmüller 1995: 23-44; Hassen 1970:47-48). Both the trade of the midlemen was perceived as being carried out easily, without much skill, and the same applied to the production of raw materials. Therefore the 'natives' had to be 'educated to work' (9).

Zunächst wird man ihnen dazu bringen müssen, daß er die rationelle Pflege der bisher fast arbeits- und müthelos von ihm erretteten in verhandelten Naturprodukte erlernen und so ihr Aasenverb verhindere. (ibid.)

J&T 'sold' these topoi to German politicians and the public, and they 'bought' it. They 'made' the Duala and other people of Kamerun into 'lazy negroes'. Discursively J&T exerted power over the local population by producing knowledge about them that became unquestionably 'true'. On the discursive level this worked a twofold exclusion: excluded were diverging versions but also the means by which this exclusion was achieved were inaccessible for the 'objects' of the discourse (cf. Hofmann 2001:47-48). This is a practice termed 'episeto-

108 Cf. for the extraversion of nationalism by 'colonial agitation' for the goals of colonialism; Hassen 1970:21, 43.
logical ethnocentrism' by Mudimbe (1988:69). The 'negroes' disinclination to work' was later also used to explain why the GNK was not able to make profits in their concession area (cf. chapter 6.6. Lack of success:241).

Der natürliche Reichthum des Landes macht es dem Neger eben zu leicht; kurze Tätigkeit im Wald zur Produktengewinnung genügt, ihm auf der nächsten Faktorei Zusprünge und Rätsche für längere Zeit sicherzustellen. (Herrmann, Sept. 1906:82)

J&T also exploited Germany's national complex, by threatening to withdraw from Kamerun and consequently achieved their aim. The improving macroeconomic situation of Germany after 1895 was a necessary precondition for any substantial investment in the colonies (cf. Hausen 1970:14). Germany changed its policies, granted funds for a 'Schutztruppe', and reverted to the use of force. German traders, like J&T, thus limited the supremacy of the Duala who had long started their own plantations and remained direct competitors throughout the German colonial era. The Duala never assumed the ideal position of the 'nero', never regarding the 'white man' as their 'master', as the 'stronger'. They were coined 'Hosennigger' who did not conform to the role they were to assume after having been 'educated' to the standard the Germans envisaged for them and all Africans:

Aufklärung tut also auch hier sehr Nutz, und sie wird dem Neger schon fleißig zugebracht, sei es durch die Beamten und Offiziere, sei es durch die Geschäftsleiter und Plantagenvorderleiter oder durch die Missionare und Lehrer. Jeder trägt an seinem Teile dazu bei, daß es in den Köpfen unserer Afrikaner ein wenig heller wird, daß sie – von religiösen Dingen ganz abgesehen – rechtschaffen arbeiten lernen, auf die kulturellen Leistungen der Weißen zu einer höheren Daseinsweise emporgreifen. Betonen möchten wir jedoch, daß unser Ideal aber keineswegs der auf angestellten Bürgerwesen einge- bildete und aufgeblasene 'Hosennigger' ist, wie er so häufig aus den ethnischen Missio- nen hervorgeht, sondern der bescheidene, zu ernster Tätigkeit erzogene Schwarze, der so weit gefördert ist, daß er als Handwerker oder als Unterbeamteter, als Kaufmannsgehilfe, Auserseher, Vorarbeiter oder was es sonst sei auf seinem jeweiligen Posten mit Nut- zen und Erfolg verwandt werden kann. (Seidel 1903:95)

They thus became the object of contempt and detestation throughout the German colonial era (cf. Dippold 1973:53-54).

Die Duala sind das Faulste, falscheste und niederstätzteste Geschöpf, welches die Sonne bestimmt, und es wäre sicher am besten gewesen, wenn sie bei Eroberung des Landes im Jahre 1884, wenn nicht ausgerottet, so doch ausser Landes verbracht worden wären. Leider ist das damals veräumt worden und jetzt ist es natürlich zu spät. (Puttkamer 1912:51-52)

The extinction of what did not fit the German vision of a 'native' was openly stated here by Puttkamer as a legitimate measure. It was not only envisaged on paper but formed an essential part of German 'colonial policies' and was also employed on many occasions in the Upper Cross River area (cf. chapters 4.3.3. Third phase - "Muthwillige Zerstörungen, grausame Misshandlungen und grundlose Tötungen" (June 1900):169 and 7.2 Mpawmanak wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzustellen":265).

The 'new order' demanded and envisaged by J&T was instituted and fell in a new phase of German colonialism in general that has been identified in retrospect as the 'period of conquest'. The willingness of the German state to invest in its colonies had become possible after the economic crisis eased in 1895 (cf. Bade 1982:3; Gründler 1995:241; Hausen 1970:14). Gründler attributed this second phase with the 'stabilisation of power', a putting in place of a more systematic administration and an economic mise-en-valoir (ibid.). 'Primary resistance' - according to him - mainly took place in the first phase of German colonialism, the 'experimental phase'. This periodisation of German colonialism perceives the 'colonies' as a homogenous unit, something that they never were. As described above, although by 1893 the rough boundaries of 'Kamerun' may have been traced on paper, actual 'occupation' was limited to Douala and a few other places at the coast and the 'solitary island station' 'Jaunde' in the interior that was easily cut off from a connection with the coast (Rudin 1938:82) (cf. chapter 3.2.2. Schutzgebiet Kamerun - river, town, and country:102). Prior to 1893 Germany executed hardly any power over 'Kamerun'; therefore it could not 'stabilise' what previously had not existed. Just as there was 'not one German colonial empire' (Gann and Duignan 1977:74), but many, 'Kamerun' was 'not one unit, but an area of highly differentiated German influence and colonial systems'. The Schutztruppe created in 1894 was engaged in constant warfare in numerous areas in Kamerun. In many places the first strategy adopted by the people who were to enter the German colonial project not only on paper, but also in practice, was military confrontation. Following Gründler (1995) these wars would not be termed 'primary resistance', implying a colonial logic in which each armed conflict within the territory marked on paper could then be called 'uprising'. The term 'uprising' implies a preceding submission. For much of Kamerun and for most of the Upper Cross River area (apart from Upper Banyang) this had not taken place by 1894. The armed confrontations between the German colonial army and the local population occurring in the Upper Cross River area between 1899 and 1904 should therefore neither be referred to as 'uprisings' nor as 'secondary resistance', but simply as 'wars' (cf. chapters 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900):161 and 7.2 Mpawmanak wars (1904-1906): 265).

In Cameroon the second phase of German colonialism encompassed the years 1895-1906. These 21 years comprised the era of Gouverneur Jesko von Puttkamer, who embodied many characteristics of the 'new order', that in addition to territorial conquest, included the establishment of big plantations in the south and the granting of big concessions in the southeast and west. Puttkamer himself held shares in the WAPV and shaped his policies to the liking of the big plantations and the big concession companies (cf. Puttkamer 1912:47-48; Stoecker 1977b:61). Hausen referred to Puttkamer as the embodiment of as-
sumed interest identity between administration and private entrepreneurs (Hausen 1970:278). Mise en valeur by means of private investment in areas 'opened up' by colonial armies financed by the German Reich were the foundations of the 'System Puttkamer' (cf. Rohde 1997:67-68, 79). The era saw a conquering of much of Cameroon's hinterland, by the 'imperial protectorate troops', that Stoecker described as 'organised units of incendiaries' (Stoecker 1968:7).

The creation of a colonial army, the 'Schutztruppe', marked the beginning of 'aggressive colonial politics' (Hausen 1970:76). In 1891 Hptm. v. Gravenreuth had 'bought' 370 slaves from Dahomey and formed them into the 'Polizeitruppe' which were first used in 1891 to fight against the Abo to the south of Douala (Stoecker 1977b:53, Strümpell 1926:8; Puttkamer 1912:25; Dresky, 02.07.1891). After the rebellion of these police in December 1893 and their subsequent execution or escape (cf. Puttkamer 1912:53-54; Rüger 1960; Stoecker 1977b:53-54; Rudin 1938:210-212) an infantry was created. It was named 'Kaiserliche Schutztruppe' (ibid.:54). The recruited mercenaries initially were Hausa and Vai from West Africa and some Sudanese from Egypt (who also serviced in German East Africa) (Puttkamer 1912:23). In 1895/6 four commissioned and 12 non-commissioned officers were sent to Kamerun from Germany.

Difficulties in the recruitment of mercenaries persisted, but in 1897 255 'coloured soldiers' constituted the 'Schutztruppe'. The number was judged far too small by Puttkamer for the ambitious tasks he intended to tackle and the 'protection' of Douala that could not remain 'occupied' without military aid (Puttkamer 1912:44). In 1898 the troops were substantially increased, and in 1900 a staff was created with one commander, one "Adjutant", three physicians and three non-commissioned officers. This staff was in charge of two company squadrons with nine commissioned, 17 non-commissioned German officers and 568 coloured soldiers. Only from 1901 did Puttkamer consider the might of the 'Schutztruppe' as sufficient (Puttkamer 1912:44). In 1901 (1905) the Schutztruppe numbered 40 (60) German commissioned officers, 53 (70) non-commissioned officers and 900 (1150) African soldiers and consisted of staff, six field company squadrons, one artillery squadron and one permanent squadron in Douala, which trained new recruits (Stoecker 1977b:65; Hausen 1970:25, 93, 95; Puttkamer 1912:44). Each company squadron usually consisted of 125 African soldiers and non-commissioned officers, three to five German non-commissioned officers, one to two physicians, and about three commissioned officers. The commander of the squadron usually had the rank "Hauptmann". In the 'military districts' the commander served as the administrator of the district and was thus in direct contact with the colonial administration (Hausen 1970:95). Such a military district was 'created' by opening a 'military station'. In 1899 Lt. von Queis was sent to the Western Cross River area with the order to found a station there – although he was officially not employed by the Schutz-
The Gouverneur was the supreme commander of the 'Schutztruppe'; he was at the same time the only link between civil and military apparatus in the colony. Local civil administractors had no rights of instruction over squadrons stationed in their districts. The commanding officers thus boasted considerable unobstructed authority. Clashes between military and civil spheres frequently occurred and the co-existence of 'real soldiers' and 'woman soldiers' (R F 1905:190), i.e. police soldiers proved a cause for constant competition and accusations. The police troops, less well trained, often had to perform many of the same deeds as the Schutztruppe and officers of the latter called for a merging of the two troops every time such accusations occurred, e.g. after the Mpawmanku wars in the Upper Cross area (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpawmanku wars (1904-1906): 265; generally: Rudin 1938:192-197). In areas that were officially 'pacified', police troops and so-called 'police soldiers' took over the duty of 'maintaining colonial order'. Therefore their numbers slowly rose until by 1914 the Schutztruppe and the Polizeituppe were about equal in number: (1914: 1,200 police soldiers with 30 Germans, and 1,550 soldiers of the army with 185 Germans) (Rudin 1938:195).

4.2. 'Re-opening' of the Bali road

When in 1895 Jesko von Puttkamer assumed his position as Gouverneur of Kamerun, the 're-opening' of the Bali road in the North and the creation of 'order' at the Anglo-German boundary in the West were among his primary concerns (Puttkamer 1912:42-43).

4.2.1. Zintgraff, Esser, Conrau (1896-1899)

In 1896 - after Puttkamer's first year in office had been spent mostly in fever attacks - he remained in Germany for most of the year. Here he was introduced to the 'fallen' Dr. Eugen Zintgraff by Max Esser (cf. chapter 3.6.4. Zintgraff expelled (1893):130). Esser, Zintgraff, Hoesch and Puttkamer agreed on a planta-
tion project around Victoria (the WAPV) for which the labour was to be provided by Zintgraff's old 'friend' Galega of Bali (Röschenthaler 2001:9; Puttkamer 1912:68-69). Zintgraff had envisaged and advocated the population of the grassfields as the 'solution' to the 'labour question' since his first journeys (cf. DKZ 1893: no. 9:125). In 1896 Zintgraff and Esser set out for Bali. To make an 'impression on the natives', they wore 'yellow boots reaching to their thighs, huge grey felt hats, buckled-on bush-knives and tall bamboo walking staves' (Esser/C&R 2001:63, fn 1). Von Besser who saw them, recorded in his diary: "they looked as if they were about to go on the whole of Cameroon" (ibid.). When Esser and Zintgraff entered Banyang country no hostilities occurred. Esser remarked solely that "they [the Banyang] always walked around armed with Dane guns and a large machete" (76). Mbaye Mbi had died six weeks prior to their passing.

In Bali Esser was successful in striking a deal with Galega. He would send a few hundred labourers a year and each Bali "would have the right to take to the coast with him five men free of tax from the tribes which were subject to the Bali" (Esser/C&R 2001:94), the status of these men has to be assumed as that of 'slaves' (cf. O'Neil 1996:89). Esser and Hoesch left back to the coast before the peak of the rainy season, while Zintgraff rested in Bali till after the rainy season, when he was to lead the first bunch of labourers to the coast (Esser/C&R 2001:95).

On their way back, Esser and his men, took the time to "bring the enemies of Bali" to judgment. These were the "Tayo" people100, who lived in the "fever-impregnated jungles" and had so far been shrouded in darkness because of their fierce character and the marauding spirit of its inhabitants, who live cut off in their crags. Their reputation for cruelty so frightens the Blacks, travelling on the trade routes, that they only dare to cross the forest of Sahi in large units and armed to the teeth, and they march for up to eleven hours a day in order not to have to spend the night there and to avoid contact with the land and people of Tayo. (Esser/C&R 2001:96-97)

These 'Tayo' people had supposedly captured eight Bali passing through the forest and sold them as slaves. Therefore they had become the 'enemies of Bali'.

The men of Tayo awaited the expedition but did not attack. They remained invisible, except for their 'warning cries', while the women and children packed their belongings and hid in the forest. Esser managed to 'capture' one man from Tayo and got him to call his 'chiefs', after Esser had assured him he just wanted compensation for the captured Bali. Two chiefs appeared and were willing to settle the issue 'peacefully', but of course under pressure of the guns pointed at them by Esser's men.

Soon the two chiefs of Tayo, called Tanyan and Atyan, appeared, surrounded by a body of about 30 warriors armed with guns; the hammers of the guns were cocked. We met on the open space. I walked up to them without any weapon: on one side were the people of Tayo in a semicircle, on the other side 25 of my Bali men, also with loaded guns. (Esser/C&R 2001:98)

The Bali received five elephant tusks as compensation and the two parties 'sealed' their 'friendship' by feasting together. Chief Ntaribo of Taiyor in 2000 recalled:

The chief was a first class elephant hunter, he dashed the Germans elephant tusks, so there could not be a problem [...] They took some people from Taiyor to Bali. (CN, 29.09.2000)

The Taiyor people had agreed to the 'friendship' with Bali only because they feared the action of the white man and his guns. The forest people along the Bali road had witnessed their actions long enough. But when Esser did not come back, they believed he had died and they continued capturing and selling people from Bali (cf. Esser/C&R 2001:100).

Conrau had become the leader of the trading expedition (Kamerun-Hinterland-Handels-Expedition) attached to Zintgraff's second mission to Bali in 1892. Conrau was known in the Banyang area as 'Tanjock' (R&A 1929:5). 'Nock' is 'elephant' in Kenyang, "Ta" the title of a respected person (lit.: 'father'). It is certainly a reference to Conrau's strength and power as perceived by the people.

In 1897 Conrau, then employed by J&T — and inspired by the Bangwa traders he had encountered in the market of Tali (Upper Banyang) — decided to 'explore' a new route, from Tali to the east into the Bangwa area. From Tali he proceeded with a few Bangwa, Bali, Babesong and Banyang and reached the settlement of 'Chief Fonot' on the second day. The chief — a blacksmith — was a young man of not more than 30 years. Conrau was the first European in the area. He asked the 'chief' whether he did not want to send men as labourers to the coast and become the friend of the white men. According to Conrau he agreed at once (Conrau 1899a:205) and later proposed to send 300 men (208). Conrau's account of his encounter with the chief of Bangwa closely paralleled Zintgraff's encounter with the Fon on Bali. Both couples 'mixed blood' and thus became 'brothers' (Conrau 1899a:206-209). The chief of Bangwa displayed his regalia to Conrau and was judged approvingly, especially as compared with the 'indolent coastal chiefs':

Es schien ein recht thätiger Mann zu sein. Alle seine Bewegungen zeugten von Kraft und Geselmschaftigkeit. Er war so ganz anders wie die trüge Küstenhauptlinge. Er bat mich, bis zum Markt zu bleiben, damit mich all sein Volk sehen könne. (Conrau 1899a:207)
The 'Chief of Bangwa' also wished that Conrau open a station in his place (208). He had agreed to send 50 men to the plantations at the coast and these were at once put to work at the WAPV. Conrau had left most of his luggage in Fontem's place as a token and with a promise to return with the 50 men. In October 1899 Conrau returned to Bangwa from the west, where he had investigated the murder of Lt. Queis (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900):161) in order to retrieve his luggage and enlist more labourers.

From the 1st of January 1900, Conrau was to be on the payroll of the GNK and to assist the 'Crossschnellenexpedition' of Lt. Besser to avenge Queis' death and found a military and trading station at the Cross River (cf. chapter 4.3.1. First phase – Queis 1899:162). But Conrau was never to assume these duties. 102 Fontem and his people had heard rumours about the alleged death of some of their people at the coast. As a response, they took Conrau hostage and demanded the immediate return of the remaining Bangwa people and threatened to hold Conrau personally responsible for any casualties. The clash between Conrau and the Bangwa cannot be investigated here, since the Bangwa do not fall into the scope of this study (cf. BAB R1001/3298; Strümpe111; 18.12.1900:143; DKB 1901, no. 9:314; reference to Conrau's death is infrequently made in contemporary, as well as later academic literature, especially Chilvers 1967; also Ballhaus 1968:133; Esser/C&R 2001:47–48, 146, fn 2; P.N. 1901; MFGdS 1902; Strümpell 1926:34–39; E&B 1974:73; Ngoh 1988:56–57).

Conrau had tried to escape his confinement in Fontem and reached Upper Banyang, when he was overpowered by Bangwa men. His last 'heroic' act was to fight, saving only the last bullet to kill himself (Kroßigk, 03.01.1900:31–32). Conrau hence died a few days before he would have entered the service of the GNK. He had established trade relations in Upper Banyang and with the Bangwa, the latter proving disastrous. He failed to enquire the circumstances of Queis’ death. Instead of joining Besser in 'punishing' the Ekoi for the murder of Queis and the extinction of his expedition, his own death and the 'punishment' of the Bangwa were added to the agenda of von Besser's 'Crossschnellenexpedition' (cf. chapter 4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900):157).

The imprisonment of Conrau by the Bangwa expressed a clash between German and local interests. Initially the Bangwa people had been willing to seek the new possibilities and advantages offered by Conrau. They had been keen on trading transactions with the German trader, they had agreed to send contract labourers to work on the plantations. Yet, the conditions on these plantations had proved unacceptable. Inspectors from Germany had also criticised the deplorable conditions on the plantations by 1900 (Hausen 1970:278). Fontem, who had

102 It was often assumed that Conrau had in fact started working for the GNK, since the DKN had stated that he had entered their services and started erecting a trading post in the Cross area, which was envisaged, but never carried out by him (cf. DKB 1899, no. 24:849).

4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900)

'A punitive expedition' against the 'Ekoi' under commander von Besser accompanied by Conrau had already been envisaged (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900):161). Conrau's death, about two to three months later, was now quickly included in the 'vengeance' agenda (Puttkamer 1912:222). Von Besser and his expedition thus 'started' against the Bangwa, making their way through Upper Banyang and the 'Keaka' area before eventually reaching the 'Ekoi', i.e. the Njemaya area.

The so-called "Crossschnellenexpedition" consisted of three German officers, one physician, two German non-commissioned officers, one company squadron of the 'Schuttruppe' and nearly 300 carriers. The soldiers and most of the carriers had been recruited in the "Jaunde" area – at times referred to as "Buli". Von Besser complained about their 'uselessness' – possibly an indication of the element of force that had led them to join the expedition. Besser consequently depended on additional carriers who had to be 'recruited' locally. Since Besser reported that the Bafaw and Banyang whose areas he had to pass through advancing from the coast were rather reluctant to cooperate with the Germans, obviously hoping for a victory in the impending war in the Bangwa area, people were captured by the soldiers and forced to carry the loads. While doing so, they were beaten by the soldiers (cf. Volks-Zeitung, 19.09.1900). Although Besser had ordered that any fugitive was to be shot, the 'local carriers' continued escaping. Besser then decided to change them – even while carrying the loads. At times they were not given food for two days (ibid.). The Bafaw and Banyang had turned into 'unreliable tribes' due to their non-cooperation. Besser judged their 'unreliability' to be a result of the influence of 'Fontem', the 'chief of the Bangwa'. Although the expedition's 'order' was to 'punish' the Bangwa and 'Ekoi', the Germans used violent means in the Bafaw area (Besser, 03.03.1900:222).

The actions of neither the population (deserting the settlements, non-cooperation), nor the German expedition (killing, even of chiefs; taking prisoners; forceful recruitment of carriers; chaining) differed from the 'face' of a 'colonial war'. Even the language Besser employed suggests this: The population refused to 'surrender' (s.a.). The entire population north of Mundum challenged the German claim to hegemonic power. Although the killing of Quesis and Conraw had been single events in specific areas, the general feeling in the population was uniform. The reasons for this uniform behaviour was probably the result of continuous violence and terror by the Germans and their 'brokers', rather than the 'influence' of 'chief Fontem' (cf. chapter 3.6.3. 'Terror' along Bull road (1892): 126 and 4.2.1. Zinggraf, Esser, Conraw (1896:153).

The expedition reached Tali on the 25th of February 1900 (cf. map 6) about three months after Conraw's death. The 'punishment' did not come unexpectedly, the terrain had been well-prepared by the population, fences and trenches erected and the civil population had gone into hiding – not only in the Bangwa area, but also in Upper Banyang, where the roads had not been cleared and bridges abandoned (Besser, 05.03.1900:23). Tali and its Defang (Mbaye Mbi), where the German trading post had been up to 1893, was seemingly willing to cooperate with the Germans (cf. Ruel 1969:305). The Tali people had thus chosen a different tactic than the Mbanga group to the south under Tafang Tiku and the Takwai people to the east who had formed an alliance with the Bangwa and the Kebu (Mbo) to fight against the Germans (ibid.; Besser, 13.03.1900:25; Strümpell, 18.12.1900:143; DTAM, 11.08.2000). The settlement of Takwai had been burnt down by its inhabitants and the people had left the area. Mambo – a small settlement nearby – was deserted but intact and occupied by Besser and his troops. Apart from the German, the Mambo had not yet encountered their enemies. They were attacked when they tried to cross the river Bago in order to enter the heartland of 'chief Fontem' (Besser to KGK, no date; Strümpell 1926:34-39).

The German troops suffered several casualties: all the German officers were wounded, some seriously. Dr. Ditmer, the physician, died of his wounds in Douala on the 27th of March, 1900 (Köhler to AAKA, 27.03.1900). The 'unreliable' Upper Banyang people were 'forced to obedience' by the German soldiers (Besser, 13.03.1900:26; MFGDS 1903, no. 16:2). The people of Defang Eyonga' (Tafang Tiku) were 'punished', because they had refused to supply porters (ibid.). All together 23 settlements in Upper Banyang were burnt down, people who were found in hiding were taken prisoner and confined in Tali, among them the 'chiefs' of Tinto, Fotabe, and Eiwengang (ibid.; Besser, 20.03.1900:40). The Germans however did not succeed in 'capturing' the 'chief' of 'Defang Eyonga' (Tafang Tiku) (ibid.).
4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900):157. The WAPV pressured the Government for a military post in Upper Banyang along the road to Bali to secure their access to the labour recruitment areas. The 'tribes of the primordial forest' had once more demonstrated their ability to harm German colonial interests and to 'cut off' the economic areas at the coast from their most desired resource: human labour. Tinto was envisaged as the most appropriate place for a post due to the 'transitory' nature of the area and population (cf. WAPV to AAKA, 21.07.1900 and chapter 3.7.5. Between forest and grassland – the Banyang:141). The AAKA suggested adding the creation of a military post in Tinto to the budget of 1902 (AAKA to WAPV, 18.08.1900). Tinto would have been the northernmost post at the road to Bali and when chief Galega died in 1901, the situation was judged uncontrollable by the local administration. In 1901 the station at Bali was re-opened and the road to 'secured' by the 'Schutztruppe' who were soon followed by larger contingents under Lt. Pavel who achieved the final 'submission' of the 'Bangwa' and Fontem (cf. O'Neil 1996:91; KST to KKG, 25.11.1901).

On the 1⁴ of April 1901 Lt. Strümpell was thus sent to Tinto and started re-establishing the station, which was staffed by two German non-commissioned officers and 50 soldiers (KGG to AAKA, 05.05.1901, KGG to AAKA, 24.05.1901; DKB 1901, no. 13:487). Non-commissioned officer Kaltenbach became station leader and the construction of buildings commenced. Strümpell was in charge of overseeing payment reparations and after the "Krochelliemen-expedition" had been recalled in 1901 he undertook military expeditions as far west as Ndekwai, Nfainchang, and Bachuo, at times using violence (cf. chapter 4.4 Summary:178). The area of Fontem was not penetrated until two companies of the Schutztruppe – about 300 soldiers – were assigned the renewed task to 'subdue' the Bangwa (Strümpell 1926:39-41). Strümpell and his 'excellent relations with the chiefs of Upper Banyang' were praised by Lt. Pavel, who arrived in Tinto on the 5⁴ of November 1901 – as the visual sign of these good relations he took the good roads that were four metres wide (Pavel, 05.11.1901; Strümpell 1926:40). The "Bangwa" had ceased being enemies.

4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900)

_Ane jama a yim yim ahbo ko ikom_ The German does his thing with power

In official contemporary German sources the violent events taking place in the Njema and Ngonaya areas between 1899 and 1900 were not called 'war'. Rather, they are called 'riots' and the killing of Lt. Queis as single event was 'punished' by a German expedition, the latter achieving what the first had failed

---

1⁴3. Here, the speaker demonstrated a torture practice known as 'swaying' – the person's hands are tied to the back and then to a branch. This torture practice was demonstrated to me in always the same manner in a number of places in the Cross area.

1⁴⁴ SOO, 19.10.2001 in Inokun.
to do: building a military post in the area and 'opening' the area up.\textsuperscript{105} The participants of the military operations, the German officers, however, in their correspondences during the operations, did call it 'war':

Falls das Abschießen von Leuten [...] weiter so gelingt, hoffe ich den Krieg bald beendig zu haben, ich rechne etwa 3 Wochen. (Mersenski to Besser, 06.07.1900)

Ich halte es für unmöglich, daß ein Weißer anders als mit einer starken Truppe den Kriegsschauplatz erreicht, da der Umstand, daß die Ekois überall neue Buscherstecke haben [...] beweist, daß die Ekois bisher nicht gebrochen sind. (Kaschke to Besser, 06.07.1900)

'War' is defined as hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state; the employment of armed forces against a foreign power, or against an opposing party in the state. (OED 1989:887)

According to this definition, the 'German-Eko war' certainly deserves being termed 'war'. The term 'German-Eko war' is taken from Anene (1961) and employed here to highlight that two adversaries were actively involved, rather than one superior party exerting force and the other passively accepting 'punishment'. The term 'Eko war here represents all the African people involved in the war, which was effectively carried out almost at the full west to east extension of the Upper Cross area - from the Anglo-German border zone to Upper Banyang. According to Anene (1961) the 'German Eko war [...] euphemistically called the 'Eko struggle for independence' (193), took place from 1899-1904, while according to the German perception it had been won by the Germans in 1900. Anene seems to have relied on oral history or oral tradition in the area, and interestingly, the terminating point of the struggle for independence coincides with the Mpwamwanku wars, indicating that during the period of 1900-1904 the population in the Njemaya area continuously experienced a 'state of war'. This perception nurses doubts about the German perception of the Mpwamwanku wars as an 'uprising' (cf chapter 7.2 Mpwamwanku wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzustehen":265).

4.3.1. First phase – Quies +1899

Ballhaus (1968) has noted the connection between the expedition of Lt. von Quies towards the Cross River in 1899 with the order of opening a military station there, immediately after the granting of the concession for the GNK (133; cf chapter)

\textsuperscript{105} In 1901 the 'expedition against the Bangwa and Keaka' was officially recognised as a 'military campaign' ("Feldzug") and the German participants could thus charge the time they served during the campaign as 'war years' for their pension (cf. Allerhöchste Kabinett-Orde, betreffend Anrechnung von Kriegsjahren, 29.08.1901).

6. GKN – concession, claims, and chaos:203). But the exact orders of Quies and the circumstances of his death remain blurred.

The murder of Quies and all the soldiers, porters, and workers he had with him took place between Otu and Ekohamen, in the so-called 'Eko area.\textsuperscript{106} These villages close to the Nigerian border had been visited by von Besser and the Anglo-German boundary expedition in 1895 (cf. chapter 5. Making colonial boundaries:181). Nsakpe (Nche skeptic) had then been the base of the boundary commission and von Besser and Close had spent a couple of days in Otu, where Close had been attacked by fever. Von Besser had stressed the friendly relations and cooperations with the population throughout, e.g. when the population in Otu had helped them cross a river. Otu itself then was a medium-sized settlement of about 500 inhabitants (Besser, 30.11.1895:40).

Putkamer in his memoirs did not devote much space to Lt. Quies, who – unlike Conrad – did not become a 'colonial hero'. Von Quies' father was member of parliament, his son had travelled to Kamerun as a friend and companion of Camp-Quermheim, "Stationsleiter in Jaunde" officially employed by the Schutztruppe (KK 1900; Kaeselitz 1968:34), who had had to leave the colony due to an illness. Obviously Quies did not want to accompany him back to Germany and asked Putkamer, whom he was full extended in to Kamerun, for a role. Putkamer employed von Quies provisionally and had finance director Kund teach him book-keeping. In 1900 von Quies was the "Stationsleiter" in Rio del Rey and expedition leader in the services of the government (KK 1900; Jahresbericht Kamerun 1899/1900:87).\textsuperscript{107} The order to build a station in the Cross River region barely featured in Putkamer's memoirs and could not be traced in the official records:

[Ich] schickte ihn später mit einigen Polizisten und einer Anzahl Arbeitern an die Schnellen des Crossflusses, um dort eine Station anzulegen, Beziehungen mit den Einwohnern anzuknüpfen und Vorbereitungen für eine deutsch-englische Grenzkommision zu treffen. (Putkamer 1912:192)

\textsuperscript{106} While C&R (2001) identify the site of his death "near Otu" (fn 2:146), contemporary sources always located it close to Ekohamen (also 'Ekoroman') (MFGDS 1903, no. 16:2; Putkamer 1912:204). Only Mansfeld (1908) states that Quies was punishing the 'Otu people' and was shot in the chest and died between Inokun and Mbeban (17). The expedition reports by Besser on where the various places where Quies' belongings were found were mentioned, seem to confirm that the 'battle' took place between Ekohamen and Otu (cf. Besser, 21.04.1903). Eye witnesses claimed Quies was killed south of Ekohamen, not far from the village (Besser, 08.06.1900:72). 'Quies' is frequently spelled 'Quiesis' (C&R 2001; MFGDS; Ballhaus 1968, Nuha 2000, Mansfeld 1908) or 'Quieis' (Ramsay 1904), which does not seem to be correct (cf. Putkamer 1912; P.N. 1901; KK 1900; Seidel 1899; GNK, 1903b; KGR to AAKA, 04.08.1910; DKB 1899, no. 22:763).

\textsuperscript{107} NB: not as an officer in the colonial army!
Puttkamer was rather vague about the force of Queis' expedition. Given that his murder received considerable attention in the contemporary press in Germany (cf. DKZ 1899:404, 457, 526) and led to the most severe German revenge, the bland profile given to Queis by Puttkamer is rather surprising and may be an indication that the silence covers a more unpleasing story. According to C&R (2001), Queis was accompanied by "soldiers and 120 carriers" (fn. 21:46). The only indication I could trace in the records that related to the actual numbers of soldiers and workers accompanying Queis remains a bit obscure, since they appear in the 'report about the station of the interior' of May 1901, when Queis' original expedition had long been exterminated, the station Nsakpe re-erected and occupied with at least 30 'new' soldiers. But in the report six police soldiers and 16 workers account for the garrison of the station – possibly these might refer to the original size of Queis' expedition (Bericht über die Außenstationen 1901). The number of police soldiers and workers mentioned here is surprisingly small and might correspond to Puttkamer's statement ('some police men and a number of workers' – Puttkamer 1912:192). Puttkamer might have tried to prevent accusations blaming him for Queis' death by supplying him with insufficient numbers of armed men – not even soldiers of the Schutztruppe, but police soldiers.

In August 1899 the first disturbing news about Queis reached the coast, but were soon calmed by the message that Queis had succeeded in erecting his station:


The news of Queis' death itself shared the same sentence in Puttkamer's memoirs with the visit of the missionaries Dietrich and Bizer with their wives:


This event has maintained a low profile throughout the colonial and even post-colonial era (cf. C&R 2001:144; Ballhaus 1968:133, fn 33). Puttkamer's memoirs and a few references in the records (KGG to AAKA, 01.01.1900; Bericht über die Außenstationen 1901; Besser, 08.06.1900) remained the only official information about Queis and his expedition and their content was more than meagre, especially when compared to the vast correspondences concerning Conrads death (BAB R1001/3298). The conditions surrounding Queis' death were 'never clarified', according to Puttkamer's statement, and this conception is repeated almost literally by Ballhaus almost 70 years later ("Die näheren Umstände sind nie geklärten worden", Ballhaus 1968:133, fn 33). Conrads' and Queis' deaths were 'tragic incidents'; they were 'shot by the savages' without the reason being 'entirely known' (Puttkamer 1912:207). The insistence on the 'miraculous aura' of these events on the part of contemporaries is all the more surprising, as the 'punitive expedition' of von Besser in June 1900 found several of Queis' diaries, which were sent to the Gouvernement (Besser, 08.06.1900:72). The Gouvernement was probably not keen on evoking any more 'colonial scandals' that the German press and colonial opposition would eagerly take up. In Queis' case they succeeded; in the case of Queis' avenger, Lt. von Besser, they did not (cf. chapter 4.3.3. Third phase – "Muthwillige Zerstörungen, grausame Mißhandlungen und grundlose Tödtungen" (June 1900):169).

The news meticulously gathered by the DKZ from various other newspapers, who in turn drew on private letters and the diary of Queis' companion Lohmeyer who had separated from him on the 15th of September 1899 and the reports of the Crossnchnellenexpedition to the KGG, allow a glimpse on the conduct responsible for the death of Queis and his expedition.

While Lohmeyer had still been with Queis in the Cross River area, the population had 'presented difficulties', on one occasion attacking a platoon of police soldiers and porters, killing two soldiers and one porter. Upon this event, Queis had decided to display fierceness and had 'deposed' one chief, arrested him, and had burnt down one village. There were obviously rumours that Queis had executed one chief, but the source of the DKZ, the Kölnische Zeitung, citing Lohmeyer's diary, denied this, but Besser later confirmed that Queis had shot one chief of Ndeabi (Besser to KGG, 16.08.1900). By the end of October 1899 it had become impossible by the colonial administration to reach Queis' expedition in the Cross area (DKZ 1899, no. 51:526). The military station in Nsakpe was destroyed (Bericht über die Außenstationen, 1901:95), half of the inhabitants had moved across the river into British territory, but were forced to return by the British later (Besser, 04.06.1900:78). Besser, who questioned eye-witnesses in June 1900, reported that Queis had been wounded north of Mbeban and had to be carried in a hammock. He was killed south of Ekonoman by three bullets, the hammock carriers and one soldier dying with him. While clearing the area around Ekonoman and Anom in preparation for a battle, Besser's men found some of Queis' belongings, among them his diaries. Besser also reported they found the scalp of a white man that had been prepared as a mask and artistically painted (Besser, 08.06.1900:72). In the course of the war numerous items of Queis' expedition were found, mainly
around Otu and Ebharesi, such as pots, bowls, suitcases, journals, and buttons. On the 5th of July, 1900, Dr. Kaschke, operating in the Ekonman area, was presented the 'whitemanhead' by the chief of Mbenyan, Okpa, who acted as an intermediary between the Germans and the people of Otu, who 'surrendered' the head as the beginning of peace negotiations:

Am 5.7.00 wurden 2 Ekois geföbert und außer 2 Ziegen und Juuaartikeln eine v. Queispiele Bratpfanne gebracht, enthaltend sorgfältig verpackt den Schädel eines untermittelgroßen Mannes, dessen Gesichtsteil fehlt, zusammen mit dem Stück eines Schreibheftes (Querformat, dessen anderer Teil später erwähnt werden wird) und 5 großen Hosenknöpfen mit Firma 'D. Tippelskirch', 2 kleinen Hosenknöpfen mit je 6 Sternen, einer Hosenschnur mit 'Solde'. (Kaschke to Besser, 13.07.1900:96)

Die Otu-Leute scheinen hierdurch erreichen zu wollen, daß ihnen mildere Friedensbedingungen gestellt werden, wovon gerade diesen Leuten gegenüber nicht die Rede sein kann. (Mersensky to Besser, 06.07.1900)

The 'chief' of Mbenyan confirmed that Queis had been killed by a shot into the face. In August the lower jaw of Queis was surrendered and the fillings of the teeth proved that it was unmistakably the jaw of a European (Besser to KGK, 26.08.1900). Three pieces of Queis' skull had thus been gathered by the Germans: the scalp, the back of the skull and the lower jaws -- only the lower jaws belonged to Queis without any doubt (cf. Besser to KGK, 26.08.1900).

In 1910 the KGK informed the AAKA that a man with the name Orok had been sentenced to death for the murder of Queis and been executed in June 1910 by the Bezirksamts Ossindeng. No further information is provided on how Orok had been identified as Queis' murderer, and the AAKA seemed surprised about this late punishment and jotted down by the side of the letter: "An Orok also nach 11 Jahren" (KGK to AAKA, 04.08.1910). Still, the avengement of Queis' death was regarded as a success by the AAKA and the information was to be published in the press:


The preparation of the skull in a pan can be read as a reference to cannibalism, and it did not remain the only one. A dead soldier who had been buried by the Germans in Kembong when trying to advance from the Bali road, had later been dug up by the population and two of his toes fixed to a pole. Besser was convinced that this man had been eaten (Besser, 23.04.1900:53). Additionally the Germans assumed the population had eaten their own victims, and took this as a sign that they were starving. The proof for this were substantial amounts of smoked meat found in the hiding places, which the physician had identified as human (Besser, 26.07.1900:92).

EXCURSUS: It became a 'truth' established within colonial discourse that Queis had been 'eaten' (cf. Strumpell 1926:35). The topos of cannibalism was popular in German colonial discourse; it was repeated for Pückler in Basho and Schmidt in Mann's in 1904 (DKB 1904:61; Spellenberg 1914, EV), and ascribed to various 'tribes', among them at times the Banyang, but especially the Anyang and the Baminge living to the east at the border towards the grassland. Germans infrequently described having seen parts of the human body on display or being smoked -- at times distributed between villages. In later phases of the German colonial era in the Cross River area, people were at times accused of cannibalism which was an offence punished by the German courts. Haase held that the filing of the front teeth identified the people as cannibals (Haase 1915:16). Haufer, who countered many of the established topos in German discourses, opposed the view that 'cannibals' actually ate the flesh of the enemies they had killed and pointed to the symbolic appropriation of the dead enemies body (Haufer 1898:352). Currently discourses about cannibalism exist in the Cross River area, but they exclusively ascribe cannibalism to strangers, most prominently Nigerians, people from equatorial Guinea, but also Europeans. The topic of cutting parts of killed enemies was extremely difficult and at most times impossible to discuss. From ethnographic objects we know that human skulls were made into masks of certain associations (e.g. Musée des Arts d'Afrique et d'Océanie, Paris) and in Takwai skulls and human forearm bones were displayed to me and it was revealed that the forearm bones were scraped and the powder was used in the preparation of a war medicine. Among the 'things of the palace' in Takwai were also a number of human skulls, three of which were presented to me as the heads of 'German officers'.

The local population had won the first phase of the German-Ekois war. The general comportment of the 'colonizers' had obviously been regarded as presumptuous by the local population. Lt. Queis had felt safe enough with his soldiers to undertake fundamental violent acts -- depowering and arresting, possibly killing one 'chief', burning down a village -- that the population felt he was not entitled to. They had identified the German expedition, their soldiers and workers as unwanted elements in their territory and had exterminated them and destroyed their base.

4.3.2. Second phase -- from Bali road (March 1900)

Conrad had been sent by Puttkamer to the 'Ekois area' in 1899, on his way to Fontem, but he, too, did not succeed in entering the area, since he was moving without soldiers (DKZ 1899, no. 51:526).

In March 1900 von Besser directed his attention from Upper Banyang to the 'Ekois area' and entered the 'transition zone' to the Ngonaya area, around the Apium hill and a village he called 'Ali' (Mfainchang). The operations in Upper Banyang were well known to the people and the village was completely deserted. Von Besser's so called "Chop Patrouille" ('food patrol'), was ordered to
organise food and 'catch' some people who were needed as guides. The patrol
was attacked with guns and knives, and one soldier was stabbed and died. The
expedition finally succeeded in 'catching' one man, evidently from the 'slave
quarter'. When questioned about the location of Nsakpe and the Cross River he
claimed not to have information, but he knew the market, from where the 'Keaka
salt' was bought and led Lt. Buddeberg with 43 soldiers and 20 carriers to
Ndekwai, across the Badi river into the Ngonaya area. Ndekwai, too, was des-
terted, but two captives were taken. The bulk of the expedition followed Budde-
berg to Ndekwai, while only a patrol of eight soldiers was left in Mfinachang
to wait for reinforcement from Mundame. This patrol was praised by Besser in his
report, because they discovered the hide-out of the local population and killed
six of them, wounded many more, 'captivated' two women and burnt about 20
villages.

In the Ngonaya (Keaka) area around Kembong, where Lt. Buddeberg and
Romberg operated in the end of March 1900, the local population practiced
guerrilla tactics. Each day minor attacks on the invaders were carried out, often
when they were most vulnerable, i.e. when fetching water or at night. The Ger-
man's and their soldiers advanced mainly in columns of 40 to 60 soldiers, plus
porters, and these were rarely attacked, although typically the unarmed porters
were the ones attacked. When they entered the deserted villages, they searched
the houses and burnt down all the settlements that they did not use as their bases.
The Germans depended on guides to find out their way in a territory completely
unknown to them. These guides, often women, were in all cases forcefully re-
cruited, and in most instances eventually killed, because the Germans felt they
were being misled (e.g. Besser, 23.04.1900:47). The last female guide of the ex-
pedition had escaped during a fight in Mbatang. The column had to find their
way to Nsakpe without any guides, using only their compass and with a vague
idea of the rivers they were crossing. The numbers of wounded soldiers and por-
ters had increased considerably and the advancement was extremely slow, since
the columns had to be protected by side patrols moving through forest and farms
at a distance from the paths. Without guides they could not find adequate cross-
ing points over the rivers and instead of paths they eventually followed elephant
tracks along a river, probably the Munaya. They did not succeed in finding a
settlement, and had to camp in the forest, without any possibility of obtaining
food. When they finally reached a farm where they captured one man and two
women, they were told that all the hammock bridges over the river had been de-
stroyed because of the war. The expedition had to return southeast, being guided
by the captives. They returned to the Bali road via Kembong, where a minor bat-
tle took place against men guarding the village. Passing through the farms, in-
frequent battles occurred, resulting in several casualties and further captives. In
Eyang (Upper Banyak), where the chiefs had previously 'surrendered' and re-
ceived the German flag, the war area ended and the population was not in hid-
ing, but present in their houses.

Von Besser had again not succeeded in reaching Nsakpe and judged it impos-
sible to do so from the Bali road in the east. He was short of porters and sug-
gested to return to Rio del Rey, recruit new porters and try another advance from
the South (Besser 23.04.1900:45-58). According to the information gathered by
British officers in 1929 the population had perceived his forceful return as their
victory (R&A 1929:6).

4.33. Third phase – "Muthwillige Zerstörungen, grausame Mißhandlungen
und grundlose Tötungen"109 (June 1900)

Von Besser's expedition reached Rio del Rey on the 4th of May, 1900. It was en-
forced by one officer, three non-commissioned officers, one physician, one hos-
pital orderly, and 25 soldiers. On the 6th of June the expedition left for Okuri.
The war tactic of the population was different than in March, where casualties
had occurred infrequently and the civil population, livestock, farms and houses
had been affected. From Okuri up to Ekoneman, not a single person was encoun-
tered, and no fighting occurred. An accumulated force of combatants awaited the expedition at a rise, where the head of the file was attacked, one sol-
dier killed and von Besser wounded. The site of attack had been carefully pre-
bored by the population who had constructed well-camouflaged, 100 metres
wide hide-outs and equipped them with ample food supplies (Besser, 17.06.1900:73). The expedition nevertheless managed to advance slowly while
constant under attack, and the fighting continued inside the village of Ekon-
eman. Von Besser's expedition did not suffer any more casualties, although the
terminology favoured the adversaries, whose hide-outs were hardly detectable for
Besser's men.

In Ekoneman von Besser complained about the 'unusefulness' of the Buli por-
ters. One German officer had to return to Okuri with soldiers and porters to ad-

and was covered with numerous pitfalls with sharpened spikes beyond the river and hidden in smaller streams (Besser to KGK, May 1900). In spite of all these difficulties the expedition reached the ruins of the station in Nsakpe on the 14th of June, and immediately cleared the area for a wider range of fire. The territory surrounding the site of the station in Nsakpe had been completely abandoned by the population, the food on the farms had been harvested and taken away - the people had crossed into Nigerian territory. The food-supply for Besser's expedition became exceedingly bad, and Besser himself could not take part in any military actions, due to the wounds he suffered in the left hand and right arm. He nevertheless ordered one officer to 'clear' the area to the west towards Okun. Obviously the failure of the population to resist the German force before Ekoneman in spite of all preparation had done much to 'break' the will to violent resistance within the population. Lt. Merensky, who advanced to the east, met a number of people in their settlements, most notably one chief of Mbenyan called Okpa. This man acted as a mediator between the Germans and the population and arbitrated between the people around Okun and Ayaoko. They assured that they were not willing to fight against the Germans and assisted them by passing on messages. The area east of Nsakpe thus remained 'peaceful'. It is likely that people from the Ayaoko and other areas had taken part in the battle of Ekoneman (EPNE, 18.10.2002), but had decided to change their strategy after all the concerted efforts to obstruct the Germans had failed.

Another column of the 'Croseschnellenexpedition' under officer Ritberg and customs agent Romberg had been sent to the south with the order to acquire provisions. Although they succeeded, they encountered continuous violent resistance and suffered one casualty and four injuries (one soldier, four Buli porters). Besser ordered Rittberg's detachment to join Merensky in the southeast, locate the hiding places, and 'demoralise' the population and lead them to refrain from all future resistance. Extermination was judged as the suitable means to achieve this goal:

Wenn anglingig sollen auch Gefangene gemacht werden, jedoch bleibt das Abschießen in erster Linie die Hauptsache. (Besser, 26.07.1900:90)

This is a clear order to exterminate the population and Besser's 'punitive expedition' was therefore an extermination expedition, like those in the concession area of the GSK around the military station Sangha-Ngoko (cf. Stecker 1977b:55). Patrols of about fifteen soldiers were to systematically search the area. More and more settlements signalled their willingness to surrender. Von Besser had boasted that 82 heads had been brought before him and estimated that many more 'Bush people' - as they were frequently called - were 'shot down' or must have died from their injuries (Besser, 24.07.1900:84). The 'heads' were obviously presented by the soldiers to their respective commanders as the visible token of the number of enemies they had killed - a practice that was banned by von Puttkamer only in 1903 (ANY FA 1/75:63-64).

While the settlements in the east had refrained from fighting, the Ekoneman area continued battling and was thus subject to serious attacks and damages. On the 4th of July Dr. Kaschke still judged the might of the opponents as difficult to overthrow, since the number of hiding places was enormous and difficult to locate (Kaschke to Besser, 04.07.1900). The sex of the killed victims was rarely stated, but women and children were named among the 'captive'. In Ekoneman Awa people still remember the killing of a woman at a stream, that even now the population does not use for drinking water (OBS, 03.11.2001). But the general tendency in the transmitted personal recollections in the Njemaya area in 2000/1 was that 'they killed the men, but spared the women, they only slept with them' and 'did a lot of bad things with the women' (SOO, 19.10.2001).

The various combat reports from the German officers to von Besser so undermine the willful method of extermination employed that what occurred can hardly be called 'war'. Even the German officers refer to it as 'the war handled in a certain manner' (Kaschke to Besser, 13.07.1900:97). The tactic obviously drew on the fact that a professional army 'fought' against civilians who had left their settlements and abandoned their farms. The rains increased and the temporary shelters did not offer much protection. Personal belongings were hidden at various places. Women and children were constantly threatened by the German soldiers. Time was on the side of the Germans and their soldiers. The following combat report - cited at full length - by Lt. Merensky gives a feeling for the impact the incessant patrols must have had on the population:

Abschrift
J. No. 153
Nsakpe, den 26. Juli 1900
Am 7.7. Häuserbau in Ekoroman.
Am 8.7. 2 Patrouillen. Kein Erfolg. - Sia übernachtet im Buch.
Am 11.7. Patrouille brinigt 4 Köpfe, 4 Gewehre, darunter ein Infanteriegewehr M 71, meldet 8 getötet.
Am 15.7. Marsch nach Nfunrun. - Patrouille ohne Erfolg zurück.
Am 17.7. kein Erfolg.
Am 22.7. Kein Erfolg. Patrouille nach Ekoroman geschickt mit Befehl an Assistentarzt Dr. Kaschke, sich am folgenden Tage mit mir in Ebarezi zu vereinigen. - Inzwischen
war der Befehl in Ekoroman eingetroffen, daß die Feindseligkeiten einzustellen sein, und Dr. Kaschke abmarschiert.
Am 23.7. Rückmarsch über Ajauke zur Station.
Am 24.7. Rückkehr der an Assistentarzt Dr. Kaschke gesendeten Patrouille. – Der Weg Nkame – Nfürume, Itu, Ajauke, ist aufgenommen worden. Weg Mbeum – Bovarin – Nfürume ½ Std. west Weg Nfürume – Nkame 1 Stunde 20 Minuten
(General) Merensky
Leutnant.
(Merensky, 26.07.1900)
The excerpts of the register of punishments for soldiers and carriers taking part in Besser's expedition further underline the general climate of brutality, both undertaken by the German (the harsh punishment) and his charges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Jaunde</th>
<th>25 Hiebe</th>
<th>wegen Diebstahl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ngambo</td>
<td>25 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Diebstahl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 S.L. [Sierra Leone]</td>
<td>25 Hiebe</td>
<td>weil er ohne Befehl im Busch schoß</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jaunde</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen unverschämt bemahlen gegen Sg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jaunde</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Ungehorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jaunde</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Nachläßigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Weybo</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Nachläßigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ngambo</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Nachläßigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Weybo</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Nachläßigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ngambo</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>wegen Nachläßigkeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jaunde</td>
<td>15 Hiebe</td>
<td>weil er auf Befragen von Hptm. v. Besser gegenüber keine Antwort gab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Monat Juni)

The 'war' ended when the respective 'chiefs' accepted the 'conditions of peace', mainly the payment of tribute and the provision of labourers (cf. Besser, 18.09.1900:108, 114). But Besser did not always accept the capitulations of the people. In a report to the KGK he stated:

Die Ouleute bitten schon jetzt um Frieden, ich will aber die Ekois erst ganz und gar kampfunfähig machen, damit sie gezwungen sind, die schweren Bedingungen zu erfüllen. (Besser to KGK, May 1900)

In July Besser finally judged that the impact of the military operations had been sufficient enough to force the people to accept the 'peace conditions':

1) Bezahlung von Elfenbein
2) Stellung von Strafarbeitern
3) Herausgabe einer Anzahl v. Gewehren u. Munition
4) Herausgabe sämtlicher dem Lt. v. Queis gehörigen Gegenstände
5) Schädel des Lt. v. Queis

6) Ansiedelung und Neuaufbau von Dörfern. Platz wird angewiesen
7) Rechne sämtlicher Wege auf 3 m. Breite und Herstellen von Übergängen über Flüsse und Bäche
8) Stellung von Groß- und Kleinvieh. (Besser to KGK, 06.07.1900)

Most people started returning to their settlements:

During the war various quarters migrated to different directions: Ehaberesi, Nehemimba, Obutong, Ndengane. Tata Aghor [nisimfum] reassembled them when the fighting was over – this was over a century ago. (SOO, 19.10.2001,)

In 1929 British officers recorded how and why the people of Ossing, Talangaye, and Ndekewai 'surrendered':

Ebot Are [Arrey], the village head of Ossing, was taken prisoner. However, Atem Engash of Talangayi [Talangvay] took ivory, and a cow on behalf of Ossing, Talangaye and Ndekewai [Ndekewai], to the column at Mbabon on its way to Eko and ransomed Ebot Are. (R&A 1929:6)

According to Besser, the chief of Otu had masterminded the operations against the Germans, either by involving them in the actual fighting or by convincing them to desert their settlements. Actively involved in the hostilities were Ekobesan, Naretin, Ekonayep, Mbeum, Bavarim, Nfürume, Otu, Ehaberesi, Itu, and Ekang (all these in the Njema area), as well as Kembong, Tsitako, Ayukidep, Ebobi, Fambaying, Mbakang, Ossing (of the Ngonay area). Passively involved were Anom, Nkame, Ndebbiji, and Nkape (Njema), also Mbakum, Ekojge, Ewuri, and Ndijigge (Ngonaya), but they were also 'punished' by Besser, since they had deserted their settlements, burnt them and had not sent peace envoys to the station. The penal labourers and the instigators of the war, especially the chief of Otu, were sent to the coast (Besser to KGK, 18.06.1900).

Just as Queis had done, Besser too deposed chiefs and replaced them with more suitable personalities. The Germans depended on allies, since they acted as intermediaries between the population and the Germans, and were decisive in persuading the population to return to their settlements and stop all violent acts. These 'German enthroned chiefs' also betrayed the leaders of the resistance who were then arrested and sentenced for forced labour up to two years (Besser, 04.06.1900:77). A number of people who had burnt their settlements moved across the border to Nigeria permanently, e.g. Ndibiji (78). Among the people who fought against the Germans at Ekoneman were quite a few whose residences lay in the British territory (Nfürume, Ekang).

It is difficult to assess the exact number of victims on both sides. During the first phase Queis and all his men had been killed – at least 23 people. In the second phase the numbers explicitly mentioned by Besser add up to 27 deaths among the local population and ten on the German side (two soldiers, one soldier boy, seven porters). The impact of the German-EkoI war on the African side was substantial. Besser himself had boasted that 82 heads were brought to him during the third phase, and he reports only one soldier and one porter dead (plus
one soldier who died of illness). The GNK which opened a trading post in Nsake on the 14th of September 1900 reported that the population had been severely decimated as a result of the war (GNK to AAKA, 21.12.1900), be it due to death or migration (cf. chapter 8.4. Evading power:358). The DWGH complained that the supply of rubber and ivory from the Upper Cross area to the north of their trading posts declined considerably (Ballhaus 1968:133). Besser, too, reported that the direct effect of Queis' death was a substantial increase in the 'smuggling' of ivory from German to British territory by 'Calabar traders' and that all guns and gunpowder in the Upper Cross River area stemmed from the British side. Besser indirectly blamed the British government and the 'Calabar traders' for the killing of Queis and his men (Besser, 04.06.1900:78). He therefore used an argument well-established in German colonial discourse and a scapegoat — Calabar traders — that aroused bitter feelings on the German side. Competition and confrontation with 'real' Calabar traders had been a topic in the Rio del Rey area to the south. The accusation against the Calabar traders were repeated during the Mpanamanku wars of 1904 (cf. chapter 7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation — A barrel of gunpowder:268; for the notion of the Calabar traders see chapter 6.2.3. The Calabar conundrum — a discussion:225).

The "Crossßchnellenexpedition" of von Besser was to turn into one of the 'colonial scandals' that received much attention in the contemporary German press (Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 19.09.1900; Volkszeitung, 19. and 20.09.1900; Freisinnige Zeitung, 19.09.1900; Berliner Tageblatt, 19.09.1900. Deutsche Tageszeitung, 10.10.1900, cf. BAB R1001/4373:25-28, 32) and the extremely violent nature of German 'vengeance' has been noted by Ballhaus (1968:133-134). Ballhaus cited von Besser's report and his inclination to 'shoot down' as many 'bushmen' as possible, counting the heads of the enemies brought before him. The 'extermination tactics' and the sadistic nature of the German expedition leader von Besser aroused disgust even among the German members of the expedition and in July 1900 customs agent Romberg demanded the removal of von Besser because of his general comportment and a famine deliberately caused by him that had resulted in the death of 53 carriers in Nsake (Dietl to AAKA, 28.8.1900). The report of Romberg reads as follows:

Abschrift Feldlager Nsakpe den 7.7.1900
Ohne Vorgang
The second and third phases of the German-Ekoí war was a war that desired the physical extermination of the population to achieve their unconditional surrender. The aim of this war was to make an impression and reinstate 'regard' by displaying superior power. The extremely brutal and even sadistic advances of the expedition have been depicted in some detail here in order to estimate the 'impression' the local population was developing. The "Crossschnellenexpedition" is extraordinarily well documented in the German records, where even the orders exchanged between von Besser and the other officers during the operations themselves are preserved (cf. BAB R1001/3348). It thus presents one of the rare occasions where the German 'method' became evident in its details that were normally concealed before the colonial opposition and the public, as in the case of Queis. Besser's mild 'punishment' did not deter him from continuing his career in the military, yet still stood in contrast to the 'colonial scandal' he had provoked and the 'impression' he had made in the German public. The press had speculated whether 'Germany was not yet mature enough for colonies', feared the negative impact of the continuous scandals on other European nations as well as the 'natives' (Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 19.09.1900) and mocked the 'latest German deed of culture' (Volks-Zeitung, 19.09.1900). Even after von Besser had been recalled, arrested and charged in Berlin, the 'men on the spot' sought to emphasise the 'positive influence' his 'vigorous actions' had on the development of the Cross River area from Upper Banyang in the east to the Nigerian boundary and the Korup area in the south.


Besonders auffällend ist die Übereinstimmung, mit der alle Kenner des Landes, hier Ramsay wie schon vorher Dr. Esser, die Tätigkeit des Hauptmanns von Besser nicht nur günstig beurteilen, sondern als eine ganz ungewöhnliche Leistung bezeichnen. Ich selbst kenne ja seit lange in Hauptmann von Besser den leistungsfähigsten Offizier, der im Schutzgebiet war, höchstens Dominik ausgenommen. (Puttkamer to AAKA, 03.01.1901)

Puttkamer thus sanctioned Besser's extermination strategy amongst the population of the Upper Cross River area. The depopulation of the areas close to the British boundary ('Ododop'/Korup and 'Ekoí'/Njemaya) was solely blamed on the Calabar traders and their slave trade (ibid.; Ramsay, Dec. 1900:13 similar; cf. chapter 8.4. Evading power:358).

4.3.4. Military station Nsakpe (1899-1901)

The military post erected by Lt. Queis in 1899 had been completely destroyed by the inhabitants of the area during the German-Ekoí war. Besser's "Cross-Schnellen Expedition" re-built it in July 1900. For the site a small hill was chosen close to the Awa River, called "Nsakpe-Flüß" by Besser. The Awa, which was later to become the boundary with Nigeria, was navigable by canoes and launched in the rainy season – at Nsakpe it was 20 to 30 metres wide and merged with the Cross River about 1.5 hours away on foot. At this confluence a customs post was envisaged (Besser, 30.07.1900:13-14). The station was to consist of two barracks, one house for 'whites', one kitchen, one 'boy's house' and one sick ward (KGK to AAKA, 04.09.1900). When Besser was recalled in September 1900, commander Guse became interim "Stationsleiter" in Nsakpe (MFDS 1903, no. 16:3).

By July 1900 the German-Ekoí war was officially over, the 'peace conditions' had been announced to all the settlements and some had started payment and sending forced labourers to the station in Nsakpe (ibid.; Besser, 24.07.1900:82; Besser, 18.09.1900). De facto, the German-Ekoí war did not have a definite end. Even after the majority of the people surrendered and started 'reparation payments', others continued disobeying German orders and minor military operations persisted, especially in the Ngonya area that had not received the full blow of German military actions like the Njemaya area (cf. Strümpell, 18.12.1900:138-139). As a result of the war, a number of settlements had preferred to move into British territory (Nsakpe, Ndebiji). The Nsakpe people returned upon British pressure (Besser, 24.07.1900:83; Besser, 18.09.1900:108-109). Their refusal to settle anywhere near the German station in Nsakpe was the main incentive to abandon the site in 1901 both as the government station and the GNK trading post (cf. Ramsay 1904:198-199).

The boundary dispute between Britain and Germany had not been finalised when the station in Nsakpe was established. The British government quickly protested against its location, claiming it was on their territory. Therefore Gouverneur Puttkamer decided to settle the dispute himself and undertook an expedition to the Cross River rapidly, with eleven police soldiers (reinforced in the Cross River area by nine soldiers), about 170 carriers and servants, two German police officers and ObI. Glauning, the future Stationschef in Nsakpe (Puttkamer, 13.01.1901:10; Puttkamer 1912:224-225; Puttkamer to Glauning; cf. chapter 5.2. Flags and signs – Nsakang 1900-1901:190).

In February 1901, when the "Crossschnellenexpedition" under Hptm. Guse was officially recalled, ObI. Glauning became head of the station, which was staffed with two German officer, one physician (Dr. Kuschke), one medical assistant, one non-commissioned officer, 40 soldiers (soon augmented to 70) and
40 Buli carriers, additionally about 130 'workers', 'forced labourers' from the 'submitted population' (Puttkamer to AAKA, 01.02.1901; Puttkamer to Guse, 29.01.1901). The area around the station in Nsakpe comprised the 'Eko and Keaka tribes', whose boundary was placed in the south at Nkurru, south of Nkurru the Ododop (Korup) were 'administered' by the station Rio del Rey. One of the prime tasks of the station in Nsakpe was to 'extend its influence' up to the Bali road in the east from a point north of Manyemen. The Bali road south of Manyemen fell into the district of Johann-Albrechts-Höhe. The station in Nsakpe further had to 'guarantee order and peace' and to protect the German trading interests, 'guarantee the maintenance of roads and bridges by the natives', 'explore the area west of Keaka at the British boundary', 'make suggestions for the further demarcation of the boundary', and 'exploration of the Cross River and its tributaries'. The relocation of the station and a customs post were planned (Puttkamer to Glauning, 30.01.1901) after Puttkamer had settled the boundary problem with Nigeria in situ (cf. chapter 5.2. Bottles and flags – Nsakpe 1900-1901:190). In July 1901 the station had been moved to 'Ossidinge' at the southern bank of the Cross River in the Ngonaya area close to the villages Agborkem ('Abokum' or 'Obokum' in German comprehension) and Oban Nsakpe was transformed into a subsidiary post under one black 'Gefreiter' (KGK to AAKA, 01.09.1901; Glauning to KGK, 01.08.1901; MFGDS 1903, no. 16:5; Mansfeld 1908:18).

The establishment of the station in Nsakpe, at the Awa, had been inspired by political considerations and can only be apprised when placed in the wider diplomatic context about the boundary issue between Kamerun and Nigeria and the dispute over free navigation on the Cross River that had been pending since 1895 (cf. Puttkamer 31.01.1900:12; cf. chapter 5. Making colonial boundaries:178).

4.4. Summary

Dans l'impatience du colonisé, le fait qu'il brandisse à bout de bras la menace de la violence, prouve qu'il est conscient du caractère exceptionnel de la situation contemporaine [...] Fanon 1961:36.

The people in the areas south of the river, especially in the Njemaya and Ngonaya area, had confronted Queis, who had not been equipped with sufficient 'means of power' to withstand the deaths of himself and his followers. The population had correctly expected their actions not to go unrevered by the Germans and had united their forces, and prepared the ground for a military confrontation, a war, against German penetration which certainly had the aim to keep their area clear of any German intervention. The merciless war tactics of the German soldiers and officers against both military and civil population and property led to the eventual surrender of the people, except for those who decided to withdraw beyond the realm of German power – into British territory. After the first military setbacks of the local population a number of local leaders decided to abandon the strategy of confrontation and cooperated with the Germans – namely Okpa from Mbenyan. Mbenyan was a very small settlement of only eight houses and Okpa – a middle-aged man – very likely tried to aggrandise his respect and influence by cooperating with the Germans, just like Tabe in Upper Banyang had done. In fact, Okpa was later praised and judged by Besser to be 'a useful man' (cf. Besser, 18.09.1900:109).111

Dieser Häftling hat später als Friedensvermittler während des Gefechts und nach der Expedition hervorragende Dienste geleistet und sich sowohl durch persönlichen Mut – beim Durchmarsch durch die fechende Truppe – als auch durch Intelligenz besonders hervorgetan. (Besser, 26.07.1900:87-88)

In the Upper Banyang area, which had a longer history of contact with the Germans, extraversion strategies of local people were already integrated in the repertoire of the population in 1900. While Germany's 'old enemies', like Tafang Tiku of Mbang, cooperated with Fontem and Takai against the Germans, Mbye Mbi, the defang of Tali – succeeded in proving his pro-German stand. He seems to have used his access to information about German intentions as a new source of power vis-à-vis his neighbours:


Antagonistic personalities like Defang Tale [Mbye Mbi], Tabe and Ako of Mbang, and Okpa of Mbenyan had recognised the Germans as a new source for power and decided to extravert it to their own advantages, instead of resisting it. The effect of Besser's expedition was appraised positively by each German who travelled through both Upper Banyang (Tinto) and the Njemaya (Nsakpe) area.

111 This Okpa of Mbenyan was possibly identical with the "Eko-Häuptling Ogba-Bomajou" (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905), who became a confidential agent to Mansfeld in 1905 and provided information about the organisation of the Mpawanku war (ibid).
In German publications his main achievement was perceived as the 'opening' of these areas for trade and especially for linking the stations Tinto and Nsakpe via "Ali" (Mtainchang) and Ossing (Globus 1902, vol. LXXIX, no. 5:84; Puttkamer to AAKA, 03.01.1901; Ramsay, Dec. 1900:13; Ramsay 1904:25; Besser, 18.09.1900:115). 'Extermination' was thus acknowledged as a useful instrument in the interest of the German colonial project 'on the spot', by the military (Strümpell), administration (Puttkamer), and agents of concession companies (Ramsay).

The military operations of 1900 had concentrated on Upper Banyang and the Njemaya area. A relatively large area south of the Cross River in-between remained untouched and when it was first passed through by Lt. Strümpell at the end of 1900 a number of people still confronted German penetration by refusing to receive them and cutting down of bridges, e.g. across the river Manyu close to Mbiu (Toko). Military operations and 'punitive actions' thus continued (cf. Strümpell, 18.12.1900:141).

The year 1900 marks the beginning of a new phase of German intervention in the Cross River area: Both the population and the Germans displayed their power through violent actions. The at times genocidal character of the German operations had led to the 'submission' of most of the people directly involved. Some decided to withdraw from the German influence zone, some started evading this new source of power. German 'success' rested entirely on violence directe and those people who had not been confronted with it did not voluntarily accept German demands. In Upper Banyang cessation of violence directe between 1893 and 1900 had again stirred the urge for militant confrontation, but the front was not as homogeneous as initially in the Njemaya area, where the first encounter with German colonial ambitions had been in 1899.

Although the force of the Schutztruppe had been increased considerably, it was still judged far too small to achieve continuous success. The 'Crosseschnellennexpedition' had to be recalled in February 1901, because the Schutztruppe squadrons were needed against the Ngolo. Doubts were raised as to whether the 'success' in the Upper Cross River area could last; given the insufficient means of power, i.e. soldiers, available to the stations Nsakpe and Tinto (cf. Deutsche Tageszeitung, 05.05.1901).

5. Making colonial boundaries

Now that the Cameroons was bounded on all sides, there remained the task of exploring the colony and of establishing German rule.

(Rudin 1938:90)

In 1884 German traders in collaboration with the German consul Nachtigal claimed a number of places at the coast as their colonies, often in overt competition with the British (cf. chapter 3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – land and people under the German flag:95). The "indefinite character of all boundaries and the overlapping claims' (Rudin 1938:51) were in due course clarified by various treaties between Germany, Great Britain and France, in the case of the latter without much complications, but between Germany and Great Britain involving friction (50-73; Owona 1973; Grünender 1995:83). In May 1885 the British had ceded their 'rights' up to the Rio del Rey. Calabar at the mouth of the Cross River remained British. Straight demarcation lines running from the mouth of the Rio del Rey to the Cross River rapids at 9° 8' longitude and from there to Yola were established by mid 1886 (84; Rudin 1938:66-68; Anene 1961:191). The Cross River rapids ("Crossschneiden") had been a geographic point known to Europeans since 1844, when Jamieson had travelled up the Cross River from Old Calabar to this point and it was assumed that its navigability ended there (cf. Rudin 1938:60-61).

In 1890 the 'race for Lake Chad' that 'exerted a mysterious attraction on European powers' (Rudin 1938:85) began and was settled in 1893 by treaty with Great Britain and in 1894 with France, without any treaties signed between a representative of Germany and the local population (cf. 84-90). The mainly straight boundary lines, however, were ideally to be replaced by more 'natural' boundaries by the European powers. The Anglo-German boundary commission of 1895 was awarded to refine the boundary from the coast to the Cross River rapids – it would take 18 years before the boundary line was finally ratified and demarcated.

5.1. The silent scramble – from friendly to unfriendly rivalry (1895-1900)

The Anglo-German boundary commission of 1895 was assigned the task of establishing an exact boundary between the British Niger Coast protectorate and the German colony of Kamerun up to the Cross River rapids. It was headed by Captain Close and Lt. von Besser respectively and set off from Old Calabar on

---

112 These passages were cancelled before Ramsay's report was published in the DKB.

113 Ambas Bay and the settlement of Victoria [Limbe] remained British until 1887 (Fröhlich 1990:50).
the 9th of October 1895 at the end of the rainy season when the water level of the Cross River started falling. The German expedition consisted of non-commissioned officer Heinthaler, ten soldiers of the 'Schatztruppe', and 50 porters (23 'Jaunde' and 27 Vai). The British delegation was considerably larger: apart from Captain Close, Captain Roupell, and Mr. Bellington - director of the botanical garden in Old-Calabar, a black physician, one interpreter, two cooks, fifteen black soldiers and about 80 porters. All in all the expedition numbered about 160 men. It used two medium-size steam launches, one for the porters, cooks, and soldiers and one for the Europeans, a lighter for the loads as well as a number of smaller boats and canoes (Besser, 30.11.1895:19-20; Besser 1898:177). A primary concern of the expedition was the exact geographic location of the rapids that were contested between Germany and Britain (cf. Westgrenze des deutschen Schutzgebietes Kameruns 1889:72).

The 'Cross River rapids', as they were called since 1844, marked a stretch of about 1,200 metres where the River narrowed and had cut its way ten to twelve metres deep through solid rock, its current increasing considerably. Although not 'rapids' in the strict sense, it proved a barrier for the advancement of bigger ships, especially in the dry season (November to April). The consul for the Niger Coast protectorate Sir Ralph Moor had travelled on the Cross River up to the rapids frequently - the area beyond the rapids had probably never been visited by a European. Since the boundary line had not been fixed, much speculation accompanied the expedition as to which villages were 'ours' (Besser, 30.11.1895:5).

On the 28th of October the expedition reached the confluence of the Awa ('Cross creek', later named 'Nsakpé-Flusses') with the Cross River, just before the rapids. Here they had to disembark from their ships, one of which had been damaged on the Njemakera and transferred the loads to a village by name 'Nsakpé' (Besser, 30.11.1895:21). 'Nsakpé' thus became the first post on the Njemaya area named and utilised by a German colonial officer. 'Nsakpé' featured again as the name for the first station in the area. The name seems to refer to 'Nacha-pit', a settlement site of people today amalgamated in Ekok, the official boundary post between Cameroon and Nigeria at the Cross River (NJ. 15.10.2000; cf. Bessong 1986:41 likewise) - referred to as 'Nsakpit' by the British officer Gallwey (Gallwey to KGK, 10.05.1900). In 1895 'Nsakpé' was a settlement with 400 to 500 inhabitants (Besser, 30.11.1895:38) - its prominent place in the contacts with the Germans was to prove fatal (cf. chapter 4.3.4. Military station Nsakpe (1899-1901):177).

Although Besser in his report concentrated on describing his geographic and strategic tasks, an idea about his encounter with the local population can be gathered. The expedition seems to have made quite an impression in the area, as delegations from villages a day's walk away met with them and volunteered information about the size of their settlements, the language they spoke, the nature of their trade and general geographical features, like roads and rivers. The reception by the population was described by Besser as cooperative and welcoming (Besser, 30.11.1895:40).

The key role of the interpreter was acknowledged by Besser, although in a much more impersonal manner than in Zinggraf's account (cf. chapter 3.1. Crossing into the Cross area:93). The fact that Besser decided to stress the dependence of the expedition upon the skill and respect of the interpreter further emphasised this. He judged that the 'whole success' of the expedition had depended on the interpreter (Besser, 30.11.1895:23). It seems quite possible that this interpreter, whose name Besser does not mention, was a 'slave' of the trading houses of Old Calabar originating from the Upper Cross River area. Besser mentioned that he had authority vis-à-vis the inhabitants of the Cross area because of the respect for his 'father'. This 'father' could possibly be one of the big traders in Old Calabar of whom the people might have heard from their trade partners. Zinggraf had noted the respect for those traders even in the Upper Banyang area in 1888 - the connection in the Njemaya area is thus very likely. The Anglo-German expedition relied on only one common interpreter. Besser could not find a separate interpreter for the German party in Calabar. Considering the ongoing long distance trade from the Cross River area to Old Calabar, this is puzzling. The British possibly deliberately concealed suitable persons, making the Germans dependent on their own interpreter and keeping them from splitting off and following their own agenda. If not the British, then the people of Old Calabar themselves must have denied cooperation with the expedition - and drawing on the 'middleman argument' popular at the time this may even seem likely. Besser however did not employ this argument himself. Through the interpreter the expedition's 'success' had depended - of course - on the local population, not only for information about the geomorphologic conditions, also for crossing of rivers, e.g. the Artekam at Otu, and most prominently the guiding and carrying of loads (cf. Besser, 30.11.1895:24).

The expedition was interested in identifying the shortest road connecting settlements, but because the surveying done solely with a bearing-compass, a prism-compass, a watch and measuring steps, it was very time-consuming. Inside the settlements the people were asked to point with their hand towards the

---

114 From the area of the station 'Jaunde' in the Ewondo-speaking area.
115 Although there are some indications that British had indeed crossed the rapids with boats and had reached Mammfe (cf. 5.2. Bottles and flags - Nsakape 1900-1901:190).
116 Nsakang, close to the place where they disembarked, is still remembered as "the place where the Germans first landed" (SOO, 19.10.2001).
next settlement. This direction was then assessed by means of a bearing-compass. When drawing the map, Besser confirmed that the designated direction had always been in compliance with the location of the next settlement; only for settlements further away (two to three day's walk), did the direction indicated by the population deviate from the geographic direction of the map (cf. Besser, 30.11.1895:35-36). The expedition also included a number of places in their map that they had not been to themselves but which depended on information on name, direction and distance, entirely on the local population (36). The process of gathering this information was almost certainly quite complicated and had to be carried out by the surveying officers themselves – it was probably during these investigations that the role of the interpreter became crucial. Besser trusted the results of these investigations and stated that the position of the places they had not been to themselves be certainly accurate.

Die Entfernung wurde uns auf annähernd richtig angegeben, natürlich nicht nach Stunden sondern nach dem Stand der Sonne, resp. konnten wir durch Hin- und Herfragen und Vergleichung die Entfernung uns bekannter Orte die Länge der Stocke entnehmen; deshalb kann man wohl auch die Entfernung der nicht passierten Ortschaften als richtig annehmen, so daß die Lage eine annähernd richtige ist. (Besser, 30.11.1895:36)

Besser's detailed account of his encounter with the 'chief' of Nsan who had visited him in Naakpê vividly demonstrates the extent of participation of the local population in the survey:

Wir zeichneten mit dem Stock den Lauf des Crossfluss in den Sand und bezeichneten auch die Strömrichtung desselben und unseren Standpunkt, ebenfalls das Dorf Ajasog; der Chief müßte uns wiederholentlich die Lage der anderen Orte zeigen, so daß wohl eine Ververeinverwechslung nicht möglich ist, zumal er sich nicht durch Zwischenfragen beirren ließ. (Besser, 30.11.1895:39)

Here, the map later drawn by Besser and Close was preceded – at least partly – by a map drawn by a 'chief' from Nsan. The 'original' map in this case was the one drawn into the sand of Naakpê, Besser just produced a copy.

Although the relations between the expedition and the local population thus seem to have been characterised by mutual interest, Besser in his report points to some strain, when complaining about the patience he had to summon while gathering the information he required and blamed the nature of 'the blacks' for it:

So einfach alle diese Informationen erscheinen, so nahmen sie doch viel Zeit und tamsentlich viel Geduld in Anspruch, denn jedermann, der mit Schwarzen zu thun gehabt hat, weiß wie schwer es ist, den Leuten das klar zu machen, was man erfahren will. – Der Dolmetscher, der viele Sprachen beherrscht und der uns im Allgemeinen gute Dienste geleistet hat, verstand auch nur mangelfull englisch, so daß man schon eine Menge Zeit gebrauchte, um letzteren klar zu machen, was für uns wissenswerth war. (Besser, 30.11.1895:45)

We cannot now know the agenda of the people who helped the Anglo-German expedition, but certainly they concealed information. The 'Lake Ejgaham', for example, which was not at all far from the boundary area surveyed, was only 'discovered' in 1907 (KRS Osidge 1907/1908; cf. Mansfeld 1908).

The 'porter problem' and the methods of recruiting local 'porters' employed by German officers and their African employees have already been discussed with reference to the road to Bali. The Anglo-German expedition, too, relied on the local population to act as porters. The porters recruited beforehand were not sufficient for the loads they had to carry and proceeded extremely slowly. Besser continuously complained of the unsuitability of the people, especially from the Yaaundé area.

Viele Träger, allerdings von den englischen bedeutend mehr, wie von den meinten konnten nicht so schnell folgen, die jaundeute haben sich mit wenigen Ausnahmen als Träger schlecht bewährt. (Besser, 30.11.1895:24)

While the Vai were professional porters with contracts and long-standing relations with Europeans (cf. complaint of Bai Tabai against Zingtgraf, chapter 3.6.3. Terror along Bali road (1892):126), the recruitment of the "Jaundeute" very likely depended upon an element of force.

The expedition thus adopted a new method: they divided the loads and sent them ahead, carried by local people. Whether they used force or paid for these services remains obscure. The porter problem was connected to a constraint that evolved as a major problem of all further expeditions, namely the question of food. The Anglo-German expedition of 1895 seems to have solely relied on provisions they had taken along from Old Calabar. The time they could spend surveying the area thus depended on the amount of food taken along. These in turn depended on the number of porters. Since for each porter additional food was required, feeding an expedition from imported food was extremely ineffective and especially unsuited to lengthy journeys. Zingtgraf therefore had travelled with goods that he used to exchange for food, e.g. cloth and tobacco. Whether this was judged too risky by the Anglo-German expedition of 1895 can only be assumed.

The 'unhealthiness' of the area was proven by the illnesses the Europeans suffered from. Roupell and Bellington caught fever and stayed in Naakpê with the physician, while Besser and Close continued to Otu, where Close fell ill. The work of the expedition had to be suspended due to these illnesses shortly after it had begun. No villages in the border area of Otu were visited and surveyed and Besser alone recorded the area between Otu and Itu (Besser, 30.11.1895:37).

The expedition worked their way southward to Rio del Rey and came up with a joint suggestion for a boundary line which was presented to the respective governments.

The boundary of 1885 had been a straight line running from Rio del Rey to the Cross River rapids. For the Germans and the British, the joint expedition of

---

118 A procedure obviously common, cf. maps in Zingtgraf (1895), Hutter (1902).
1895 from the Cross River rapids to Rio del Rey constituted a new phase. The 'scramble' in the stricter sense, where the de facto occupation by the fastest 'man on the spot' decided the status of a territory formerly ownerless under international law, the 'politics of hoisting flags' was replaced in favour of joint expeditions, travelling, surveying, drawing the map and a joint boundary proposal. In this respect Bismarck's policies of evading overt or 'unfriendly' rivalry in the colonies was continued by Reichskanzler Caprivi who had succeeded Bismarck in 1890 (cf. Frohlich 1990:102). Still, both nations jealously guarded what they perceived as their respective 'national' interests. The 'men on the spot', however, were more willing to compromise and arrived at a joint proposition in 1895 that was never ratified by either government. Besser, Close and the other Europeans who undertook the expedition together, had relied on each other's help, and were united by their shared aim vis-à-vis the local population and the unknown and often dangerous environment. When Close suffered from fever in Otu, Besser stayed by his side until he recovered.119

For both the British and the Germans, the surveying activities and the subsequent constructing of maps and demarcation lines marked the appropriation of the land as 'ours'. British and Germans played in the same game, in which the local population was only marginally able to join, since they did not apply the rules. Contrary to prior German concern to negotiate a treaty with the local people and stage possession of the area by displaying the flag (as in Douala 1884 or Balli 1891) for the boundary commission of 1895 this was not deemed necessary, although Lt. von Besser and his soldiers were the first Germans to enter these areas. The sole opponent and the sole ally was Britain; from the local population they took what they offered and left the rest for a later point.

The physical demarcation of the boundary was tentatively begun by deforesting the peak of a mountain close to the village 'Okuri' ('Okuri Berg'). The symbolic appropriation was expressed by naming geographic features, e.g. the 'Nsakpe-Fluss' or 'Okuri Berg'. The fact that the explicit invention of new names was the exception rather than the rule, points to the active part the local population had played in the construction process by the Europeans. Although equipped with technical instruments, porters, soldiers, and their own provisions, without the knowledge and cooperation of the local population the area could not have been successfully surveyed. We do not know the extent of force employed to maintain this cooperation, but given the delicate diplomatic tensions within the expedition and the competition over people and settlements by Germans and British, it was probably not excessive. The local population seems to have been very interested in the expedition, and assisted in any possible way, mainly by willingly sharing their knowledge.

The Anglo-German boundary commission in their official report introduced new knowledge about the Upper Cross River area that was quickly taken up in various discourses. Most important was the fact that the 'rapids' had proved to be passable for medium-sized steamlaunches in the rainy season from May to October/November, especially when the Upper Cross area had become part of the concession of the GNK (cf. chapter 6.6.2, Transport:249). Secondly, trade was identified as being directed towards Old Calabar, via the Cross River, via Oban and via Ekonku/Korup area (Besser and Close 1895:48) (cf. chapter 2.3, 'Trade routes' and 'market places':60).

The expedition proposed a boundary line along the Awa to the peak of Okuri-Berg, to the peak of Mount Hewett to the confluence of the Urifian and Ikankan at the coast. The total area that was to become British was bigger than the German compensation, but Besser assured that quality had to count, not quantity. He also explicitly stated that a 'natural' boundary, geographic, economic or ethnic, did not exist (Besser, 30.11.1895:30). At the time, the Cross River trade was directed towards Old Calabar - was not yet of any interest to German colonial class. Trading houses had only been established further south in the Rio del Rey and Ndan area. The pinning down of the exact location of the 'rapids' further to the west than on previous maps, made the 'German' territory bigger - the German delegation 'on the spot' thus felt they should not press further on disputed issues and even considered the British trading interest in the Upper Cross River area. They did not succeed in establishing the exact position of the Cross River rapids, and so the endpoint of the boundary remained uncertain in 1895. The subsequent controversies over the boundary line referred mainly to the area south of the Cross River area. The status of the border area thus remained obscure and was cause for diplomatic confusion between the administrations of the Niger Coast protectorate and the German protectorate of Kamerun, at times amounting to diplomatic strain between the respective governments. The complaints that the German state was losing much potential benefits from trade, especially with rubber, because of the undetermined and unexecuted boundary to the British area, were aggravated in due course. The trader Conrad, establishing trade relations with the 'Bangari' in 1898 on his return from Bali, fuelled German preoccupations on this issue. The Germans also disliked the fact that the major trade item in exchange for the rubber were guns.

'Boundary violations' were an offence most easily committed in this situation and both parties in turn were accused of such (cf. Seitz to AAKA 27.12.1898; Puttkamer to AAKA, 24.06.1899). By 1898 chancellor Seitz expressed the pressing need to resolve the uncertain boundary issue and to enforce a customs post at the Cross River rapids (cf. Seitz to AAKA, 27.12.1898). The British government then stated that they had by 1895 expressed their disapproval of the

119 Cf. for the relationship of British and German 'men on the spot' in general Frohlich 1990. ('Während sich das Gesamtverhältnis in dem hier betrachteten Zeitraum [1884-1914...] von Koexistenz bzw. "bilateraler Normalität" zur Konfrontation entwickelte, trifft für die Begegnung der men on the spot wohl eher Gegenteiliges zu" (327).
proposed boundary line and had since awaited further suggestions by the German government (cf. British ambassador in Berlin to AAKA, 14.03.1899). In the British proposal of 1899 they employed the argument that their most recently suggested boundary line followed the 'Ekoib tribal boundary' (85) south of the Cross River. The German side did not view such a procedure as desirable, viewing it as an attempt to deter the Germans from access to the Cross River.

[Die Stammesgrenze des Ekoib-Stammes als politische Grenze zu wählen, ist ohne weiteres gar nicht annehmbar, da dies ein sehr dehnbarem Begriff ist und wir zunächst gar nichts über die Ausdehnung des Nachsitzes dieses Stammes wissen. Es ist zu vermuten, daß wir damit den Zugang zum Groß River überhaupt verlieren sollen. (Dankelman, 28.3.1899:87)]

By June 1899 the accusations and the menacing consequences had become more sinister. Romberg, commander of the station Rio del Rey, reported serious 'boundary violations' by British officers and their soldiers, including open contempt for the German flag and instigation of local authorities in the Cross River area against the Germans (February 1899).


Puttkamer demanded an apology from consul Moor and in his note to the AAKA suggested the maintenance of the straight boundary line of 1886, unless fundamental advantages might otherwise occur (ibid.; Puttkamer to AAKA, 28.06.1899). Puttkamer stressed that the straight line made all important trading places (Okuri, Ekonaku, Ndebidji) 'German', likewise the salt ponds of the Upper Cross River area and also an important stretch of the Cross River itself (112). Puttkamer dismissed the territories offered by Britain in exchange along the Akwa Yafo as 'difficult bite of mangroves' that the British tried to entice the Germans to 'swallow', but without any real value (ibid.), while the British actually intended to 'beat' the Germans at the 'waterfalls of the Cross' (ibid.). For Puttkamer the most 'natural' boundary always was the 'straight line'.

Die Stammesgrenze des Ekoib-Stammes ist vollkommen unbekannt, sie würde jedenfalls weit in unser jetztes Gebiet hinein führen und kann um so weniger als politische Grenze jemals in Betracht gezogen werden, als hierdurch der Zugang an den Cross-River bei Nsakpi für uns verloren ginge, wo gerade eine deutsche Station den Händler der Calabar-Leute in unserem Hinterland vollkommen beherrschen wird. (ibid.:114)

Puttkamer for the first time connected the German claim to the Cross River to trading competition between Germany and the 'Calabar people'. In earlier letters to the AAKA he had nursed the impression that British officers and 'Calabar traders' were openly conniving against German interests (see Puttkamer to AAKA, 24.06.1899 cited above). Previous 'boundary violations' were described as having been committed by 'Calabar people' armed with guns given to them by British colonial officers officially for hunting purposes. The alleged accomplice between 'Calabar traders' and British officers was never put forward openly, but the attentive reader well accustomed to contemporary discourses could not have missed the point (cf. chapter 6.2.3. The Calabar comandra - a discussio:225).

Romberg and Puttkamer had certainly crossed the boundary between 'friendly' and 'unfriendly rivalry' (cf. Fröhlich 1990:30-31). The alleged anti-German acts of the British were used as a pretext for Puttkamer to constitute new boundary policies and a less cooperative and less 'friendly' course towards the British neighbours. His hardliner politics were probably driven by the changed political macroclimate concerning Germany's colonies in general and Cameroon in particular.

In 1894 the 'Schutztruppe' had been formed out of the 'Polizeitruppe' and constituted the instruments of power needed for an advancement into the 'hinterland' (cf. chapter 4.1. Sufficient means of power:145). The year 1895 marked the beginning of investment of large capital companies, mainly in plantations between Mount Cameroon and the coast. One of the biggest of these was the WAPV (Westafrikanische Pflanzungsgesellschaften in Victoria) in which Puttkamer himself held shares, and to the founder of which – Max Esser – he was connected by intimate friendship (cf. Hausen 1970:219, fn 65; Röschenthaler 2000:9). Puttkamer's 'era' as Gouverneur (1895-1907) was marked by an uncompromising, unsparing, and overt fulfilling of the interests of these big plantation companies (cf. Gründer 1995:147; Hausen 1970:216, 278, cf. chapter 3.8. Summary:143). He extended his policy of protection to the Gesellschaft Nordwest Kamerun (GNK) that had been granted a concession of an area of 90,000 square kilometres in 1899 (see chapter 6. GNK – concession, claims, and chaos:203). The Cross River area in the south-western corner of the GNK's concession constituted the most valuable portion, given the presumed richness in forest products, such as rubber, palm oil, ivory, and ebony (Ballhaus 1968:130). German perceptions of the Cross River area were thus transformed from the "corrugated forest country" needed only as an area of safe passage between the grasslands and its "major source of labour" for the plantations in the south (C&R 2001:xv) into a rich resource base, especially after the navigability of the Cross.

---

River beyond the rapids – at least during the rainy season – was ascertained by Ramsay in 1900 (Seidel 1901:346) (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?:206). The exhibition of newly gained strength in the colonial arenas was also in line with the general diplomatic climate since the mid 1890s (cf. Fröhlich 1990:112-164). Both parties had become quick-tempered in a general 'unfriendly' atmosphere.

Die englische Note enthält nichts anderes als wörtlich einen Vorschlag, den Sir R. Moor gelegentlich eines persönlichen Besuchs in Buea vor 2 Jahren mit harmloser Miene machte und den ich selbstverständlich damals kurzerhand abtrieb. (Puttkamer an AKA, 28.06.1899:113)

Puttkamer's anti-British course and the exhibition of 'politics of power' and 'national pride' represented one possible reaction to the otherwise model character of British colonialism (cf. Fröhlich 1990:30) and was rooted in a specifically German 'minority complex'. The 'scramble' for Nsanakang 1900-1901 exemplifies these differing sensitivities.

5.2. Bottles and flags – Nsanakang 1900-1901

By 1900, when the Acting High Commissioner for the Cross River Division of the Niger Coast Protectorate Gallwey met von Besser, who was constructing the station Nsakpe and a customs post at the confluence of the Awa and the Cross River, the boundary issue had still not been settled between Britain and Germany (cf. chapter 4.3.4. Military station Nsakpe (1899-1901):17). In the end Gallwey could not prevent Besser from erecting the customs station since it was on German territory whatever boundary line was executed, but he strongly protested against the map Besser was using as an 'official map'.

I cannot for a moment accept Captain von Besser's map as defining the boundary between the British and German territories. That officer is not correct in stating that his map has been accepted by both Governments. The British Government has always protested against the boundary line as defined by the German Government, and it being different to that laid down by Captain Close, in 1895, when he and Captain von Besser represented the two Governments on the Boundary Commission. Captain von Besser's ruling as to the correct boundary is a most unreasonable one, and if accepted by the British Government it would mean that the water communication between the British territory above and below the Rapids would be cut off. I contend that the boundary line strikes the junction of the Cross and Nsakpe rivers from which point it runs roughly north-east, thereby allowing free after communication throughout British territory. (Gallwey to KGG, 15.08.1900:120)

On the maps the British were using Nsanakang fell into their territory, and they had tried to demonstrate their claim by numerous acts involving the local population. They had practiced firing on the Cross River beyond the 'rapids' with their gun boats, and they had tried to prevent the people from allowing Germans to erect stations in the area (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:15). The Nsan people got involved into the scramble for their territory not as active participants, but as receivers of orders:

If what the Nsan people say is correct as to German officers telling them that the country was divided into two parts that below the Rapids belonging to Great Britain and that above to Germany, I can only say that they have been grossly misled. Even taking Captain von Besser's definition of the boundary, a great part of the Nsan country lies in British territory, and consequently the information given to the Nsan people is incorrect. I am quite ready to believe though that these people may have misunderstood what they were told. (Gallwey to KGG, 15.08.1900:121)

The "magic bottle incident" may illustrate the way the local population got involved in the Anglo-German rivalry and brings into light an arena for the European scramble that has rarely been described.121

The further away from the coast, the rarer and costlier glass bottles of European origin became. For Zingtgraff on his journey to Adamawa in 1889 the appearance of glass bottles on people's houses was a sign of a nearby British trading post:


Bottles were prized items before the physical appearance of the Europeans. They were traded over long distances, praised as "magic solid water" and their value was high:

Mit noch heute flammender Erstürfung erzählten die Neger, wie in den Zeiten, in denen sie noch nichts vom Weißen und von europäischen Waren wußten, die Haussa, auf ihre Dummheit spekulierend, ihnen die wertvollsten europäischen Sachen von den englischen Hafenplätzen brachten, sie als fabelhafte Zauberdinge anpriesen und sich die unglaublichen Preise dafür zahlen ließen: [...] eine leere Flasche, die als verzauberetes festes Wasser angepriesen wurde, war für zwei besonders kräftige Sklaven. (Thorbecke 1912:882-883)

In the pre-colonial Cross River region these bottles served as special purpose currency, just like slaves and brass rods, mainly used to acquire prestigious goods and most prominently used for bride price payments (cf. Besong 1990:75; Staschewski 1917; Talbot 1912).

121 The 'bottle-topos' in the Upper Cross area in general is a salient example for the way oral and written sources complement each other.
Look at their own money [he brought out a square green empty bottle of whisky]. It was these types of bottles. This is the money which the white man came and showed us black men. You take it and give for the head of a girl you want to get married to. Bottles which had three corners. (NNF, 12.10.2001)

These empty liquor bottles were prestigious objects in themselves, and prominently displayed by the wealthy and respected.122

Besonders fielen uns in allen Dörfern [in the Njema area around Nsankang] riesige Pyramiden von vierkantigen holländischen Ginflaschen und Schnapsflaschen auf, die meist vor den Fetischhütern oder vor Häuptlingen sehr geschickt aufgetürmt waren. (Ramsay 1904:200)

When the population came into direct contact with the Germans they immediately noted not only that they possessed glass bottles, but also that they could afford to dispose of them freely:

Und dann zog nach wenigen Jahren der weiße Kaufmann durch das Land, gab den Spiegel für ein Huhn und schenkte die leere Flasche einem Boy. (Thorbecke 1912:883)

Europeans and bottles became a topos in the Cross River Area: in 1929 the British officers recorded that "[t]he first European known to the clan [Ta Nfiet, i.e. Eham, Mkpot, Ntenko] was the man who 'buried a bottle at Mamfe'" (R&A 1929:5, 20). He had travelled the Cross River from the west to the east and ended at the meeting of the Badi and the Manyu Rivers at the present site of Mamfe town (5). Whether this 'European' was a German or a British is difficult to ascertain, but the story related by Ramsay in 1904 about the act of obtaining land on which to erect the GNK's main trading post in Nsankang would suggest that he was British.

In 1900, when the British and the Germans were both claiming Nsankang as their territory, an empty liquor bottle played a prominent part and has entered the collective memory in the Upper Cross River region as such. Prior to Ramsay's visit to Nsankang, its inhabitants had been called on by the British - whether they were traders or officers is not certain - the people referred to them as "Inglezi" (cf. Ramsay 1904:199). These had prohibited the chiefs of Nsankang to sell land to the Germans, and they had given them a 'strong medicine' that would kill them immediately if they did. How Ramsay got the people to present the 'big medicine' to him and whether he used force is not clear; he himself solely mentions 'a lot of palaver'. The 'medicine' turned out to be an 'old, empty, sealed bottle of whisky' (ibid.). Ramsay then took the bottle, dropped it, and it shattered to pieces before the chief's feet. Ramsay was quite content about the impression he had made on the population, mainly because they were now willing to grant land to him:

122 By 1914 the prestige and value attached to these bottles had been shattered, and they were used as measurements for liquids or traded to the grassfields (Staschewski 1917:37-38).

[E] und alle Umstehenden waren starr vor Schreck, als die 'starke Medizin' vor seinen Füßen in Trümmer ging, ohne sichtbaren Schaden anzurichten – und der sofortige Erfolg war, daß die Leute mir das Grundstück verkauften. (Ramsay 1904:199)

When Puttkamer tried to settle the boundary dispute 'on the spot' with the British officer Morrissey, the weapons they used were a pen, paper and compass. They could however not agree on the angle of the boundary line and the dispute was therefore not ultimately solved (Puttkamer, 31.01.1900:13-14). A separate survey by Morrissey and Gauning assisted by Ramsay finally agreed that Nsankang was indeed on German territory, about four kilometres from the border. This agreement brought an end to ongoing speculations about the exact point of the boundary in favour of the Germans. British and Germans had fought about Nsankang with sextant, compass, calculations, pen and paper - the Germans won. The highest representative of the winner – Gouverneur Puttkamer – could now proceed to announce his victory to the passive subjects, which was mis-en-scène on the 6th of March 1901 in Nsankang. The German flag was hoisted accompanied by the 'usual honours' (Puttkamer, 13.01.1901:15; Puttkamer 1912:231), most probably gun salutations. Puttkamer mentions some gathered chiefs without specifically indicating whether they were all from Nsankang or had been summoned from neighbouring villages. Most probably the 'owners of the community' were the ones gathered. Puttkamer further stated that they were informed about the implications of this act and that they 'quite approved' of it (ibid.). The description of the reaction of the 'chiefs' is quite weak and shallow. Puttkamer seems to have detected their 'approval' of the implications, which were also not elaborated in his report, not from any active positive reactions but from their refraining of any active negative reactions. Both should have been mentioned, especially the positive ones. Since the role of the 'notables' during the act of hoisting the flag was reduced to supernumeraries in the background of the scene, it thus reproduced the famous first hoisting of the German flag at the plateau of Joss by Nachtital (cf. chapter 3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – land and people under the German flag:95). But the demonstration of power was not reduced to symbolic acts. First orders were given at the spot (ibid.). Puttkamer did not explicitly mention at whom those orders were directed, but since they were given on the spot in front of the 'chiefs', they were most likely the ones concerned. In Puttkamer's report they remained completely mute. A reaction by them was not necessary, their following the orders unquestionable. The Europeans - British and German - own all the activity; nothing is left for the local population but to stand and watch. This scene – especially in contrast to the first flag hoistings at the coast which were always preceded by negotiations with the population – underlines Stengel's assumptions (1886), as elaborated in chapter 3.2.1. 'Schutzgebiet Kamerun' – land and people under the German flag:95. The local population was by definition not able to enter into any internationally binding relation with the German Reich. These judicial questions could only be solved
by nation states, in this case the British and the Germans. The agreement signed with the British established the territory designed as 'German', the hoisting of the German flag remained an unnecessary formality that was enacted in the tradition of the hoistings of flags along the coast, as a visible manifestation of Germany's victory and pride, and also as a spectacle to impress the local population.

The assertion of power over Nsanakang to the British is explicitly and at length described by Puttkamer. The fact that Germany had 'secured' Nsanakang for its interests was perceived as all the more important since it was deemed valuable because of its salt springs (Seidel 1902:257; DKZ 1902, no. 9:87). He informed the High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria, Sir Ralph Moor, in a note that from the 1st of April 1901 a "Zollstation" was to be erected, to collect customs duties and to suppress smuggling across the borders. The customs house had been demanded by the GNK since 1900, in case the British would not grant them free transit on the Cross River, so as to create 'equal conditions' between British traders and the GNK (cf. chapter 5.4. Effecting the boundary: customs posts and boundary pillars:196).

5.3. Small steps¹²³ – from the Cross River to Yola 1904-1913

In 1904, in connection with the Mpawmanku wars and subsequent German demands for reparation, confusion arose between British and Germans concerning the status of a number of places both south and north of the rapids: Ndebji, Ekang (both Ejaghman-speaking), and Danali (Boki speaking) (cf. Jahresbericht Kamerun 1904/1905:38 and chapter 7.2 Mpawmanku wars (1904-1906); "Angst, die Wahlheit einzugestehen":265). The population had taken part in the Mpawmanku wars and the Germans had fought a severe battle in Danali (Müller to KST, 09.05.1904) and the village sent reparations to the station. British and German maps differed as to the position of these places vis-à-vis the boundary (Mansfeld to KRG, 04.04.1905:148). In September 1904 the British authorities in Old Calabar protested to the KRG that in the course of the Mpawmanku wars the Germans had burnt four villages situated in British territory (KRG to AAKA, 12.09.1904:131). The operations carried out under company commander Schlosser along the Anglo-German boundary in the aftermath of the Mpawmanku wars was also regarded suspiciously both by the British and German civil authorities. The Germans feared its counterproductive effect, namely, the dislocation of the population into British territory. The uncertain position of the exact boundary line added to the doubts in the KRG about the sense of these operations (ibid.). The British reacted to the violence in the Upper Cross River area by withdrawing their presence along the Anglo-German boundary, e.g. the customs post at Agborkem (waterfalls) was pushed back to Okuni. The German D.O.

Mansfeld and the British High Commissioner both suggested a renewed Anglo-German boundary expedition to those areas where the boundary was uncertain and that had taken part in the Mpawmanku wars (Mansfeld to KRG, 22.08.1904). The urgency to finalise the boundary disputes led to the British consenting to free transit on the Cross River by German vessels. The Germans quickly put together an expedition and in 1905 the second joint Anglo-German boundary commission established the boundary line along the Awa and north of the Cross River up to 40 miles northeast of Agborkem waterfalls (British). Three German officers¹²⁴ and 60 workers and carriers were to be engaged for a period of four months (AAKA to RSA, 16.09.1905). The British contributed four Europeans, including one physician (Herrmann to AAKA, 19.12.1905).

The relevant boundary line ran from the middle of the Cross River rapids to the town Yola. Minor corrections had to be made when the exact geographic position of Yola changed after new surveys, but the effect on the boundary line north of the Cross River was minimal and did not pose any problems for the demarcation (Richtofen to British Ambassador, 25.09.1905, 15.12.1905; cf. Schaeé 1906:65-66).

The British wanted the river Bashu (Ofong) as a natural boundary in the Boki area, but the Germans stated that it would make compensation difficult and insisted on the straight line, especially since most of the area divided by this line was categorised as 'uninhabited wilderness'. The commission decided that Bodam and Dadi were 'German', while Danali and Bashu (all four Boki-speaking with close kinship ties), fell on the British side (Herrmann to AAKA, 16.03.1905:60; Herrmann, Sept. 1906).

The commission was a success – it had agreed upon the boundary line, erected the boundary pillars and had even adhered to their time limit of four months (Herrmann to AAKA, 02.06.1906; cf Southern Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Commission Protocol: 386 in the appendix). But in 1909 both the GNK and the KRS Ossidenge strongly objected the Cross River forming the boundary between the confluence with the Awa and Badjé. The GNK stressed that the relatively long stretch of which the southern bank was German and the northern British would make the control of smuggling extremely difficult if not impossible, especially since the German customs post in Nsanakang and the British one in Agborkem waterfalls did not lay opposite each other. The British also acknowledged these difficulties (GNK to RKA, 23.02.1909; KRG to RKA, 18.06.1909; KRS Ossidenge to KRG, 20.03.1909; KRS Ossidenge to KRG, 04.05.1909).

In 1908 a third boundary commission set out to survey the boundary from Bashu, where the commission of 1905 had ended, up to Yola (FR, 04.04.1907). The work and effects of this boundary commission, which met considerable

¹²³ 'Politik der kleinen Schritte' (Fröhlich 1990:314).

¹²⁴ Hptm. Herrmann from East Africa, ObI. Röbel, and Police Master Wolff of the station in Ossidenge (AAKA to KRG, 03.10.1905).
armed resistance, will not be investigated here in any detail, since most of the area they touched does not fall within the scope of this study (cf. BAB R1001/3767-3770). The territory north of Bashu was "terra incognita" for the Germans in 1907 and had withstood German attempts to penetrate it with the 'fiercest resistance'. It had been declared 'closed territory' by the KKG, prohibiting access to any German civilians (KGG to AAKA, 12.10.1907:58). This area began north of the post in Basho and included the Bachama, who had not surrendered after the Mpawmaniku wars. A strong military expedition ("Basho-Muntshi-Chi-Expedition") under Major Puder, five additional German officers and 215 soldiers was sent into the boundary area on the German side before the boundary commission began its work to submit the 'hostile tribes' (KGG to AAKA, 12.10.1907; Glauning to KGG, 15.08.1907; cf. chapter 7.2.2. Operations north of the river: military post Basho (1904-1906):298 and 8.2. Extending marginal power:351). It suggested the straight line as the boundary (Morning Post, 12.06.1909; KRS Oosidinge to KGG, 04.05.1909). In 1913 a joint Anglo-German demarcation commission finalised the boundary, by visually displaying it 'on the spot' at its full length.

5.4. Effecting the boundary: customs posts and boundary pillars

Boundary pillars were erected to mark the boundary in places without a 'natural boundary'. Prior to the erection of these pillars, the boundary was at times provisionally marked by removing the bark of trees, or cutting down trees (cf. chapter 5.2. Bottles and flags – Nsankang 1900-1901:190; Glauning, 30.07.1901). The seven pillars put up in 1906 consisted of a mount of pyramidal stones which were cemented together. In 1913, when the full length of the boundary line between Yola and Cross River was finally demarcated, the pillars of 1906 were partly decayed and replaced by iron poles, which were cemented into the ground. Each pillar was marked with a number, the date of its erection and arrows pointing into the direction of the next pillars (Detzner, 31.03.1913:169; Detzner, April 1913; Agreement concerning the Demarcation, 1913; cf. DCK 1913, no. 19:317 and no. 21:352). Between the first pillar and the Cross River, where the boundary was a straight line, the demarcation commission of 1913 cleared the area and constructed a road of stones (Detzner, April 1913). Most of these pillars have remained in their place up to date. One pillar – possibly 'Pillar one' – was crushed by a falling tree and is now kept by the village of Badje in their ekpe hall (JOA, 12.07.2000). The pillars are perceived by the population today as a symbol of superior German power, especially vis-à-vis the British:

The Germans were hardworking, while the English were selfish and lazy. The Nigerians have tried to remove the pillars between Cameroon and Nigeria built by the Germans, but they could not succeed. (Kajifu, 07.07.2000)

Since the drawing of the border line between German and British spheres, 'smuggling' had become an issue. 'Smuggling' is the practice of "illegal transport of goods and/or persons in or out of a country to avoid taxation" (Niger-Thomas 2000:107). The border cut through well-established trade routes (cf. chapter 2.3 'Trade routes' and 'market places':60). As a result, "[t]he erstwhile free traders of Mamfe area now became smugglers" (120). Up to today 'smuggling' along the Cameroon-Nigerian boundary is perceived as a legitimate special trade activity (109). Ever since the Upper Cross River area had been penetrated by the Germans, the undesired direction of the trade towards the British sphere had been lamented (cf. chapter 3. Making the road to Bali – Upper Banyang 1888-1893:93). In 1896 Esser observed:

All of the palm kernels they bear are carried to the English factories at Bakun near the German border. The entire quantity of palm oil to which the trade of the English protectorate, centred on the Calabar river, owes its prosperity, originates here and gave the Cross River its other name, the Oil river. (Esser/C&R 2001:79)

At first directly detectable only in the accessible areas in the south around the Rio del Rey, a station and a customs post enforced the boundary by 1898. It was intended to erect customs posts in Okuri, from where the 'Calabar traders' directly got their produce (Bericht der Außenstationen 1898). The 'closure' of the boundary area and the deterring of the 'Calabar canoes' to use the Akwa Yafe directed the trade from the Upper Cross River area via the Cross River itself to Ndjiby by 1899. A steamer by 'King William' of Calabar went up the Cross River to just before the 'rapids'. The 'slaves', 'rubber' and 'ivory' that he 'smuggled' from the 'German' Cross River were most unfortunately noted by the German administration. The administration in alliance with the trading companies tried to establish alternative trade routes lined with trading posts along the east of the boundary to Rio del Rey at the coast (Bericht der Außenstationen 1899). After the erection of a military station in the German Cross River area in 1900 and the first trading post of the GNK, they immediately started calling for a customs post. On the 1st of April 1901 – after the boundary disputes with Britain had been settled by Puttkammer himself on the spot (cf. chapter 5.2. Bottles and flags – Nsankang 1900-1901:190) the "Zollstation" was functioning and staffed with a German customs assistant and two African clerks. All canoes passing these stations on the Cross River had to disembark and pay duties (Gutzeit, 24.04.1901).

A number of soldiers were engaged by the customs clerk and patrolled the banks of the Cross River because the Germans suspected that "Calabar traders" would discharge the canoes before crossing the boundary and carry the goods over land (Glauning, 27.04.1901). The boundary commission of 1905/6 had envisaged six customs posts: Okuri, Ekan, Naakpe, Nsaranagati, Badje, and Bodam (from south to north). Mansfeld in 1906 suggested they be staffed with six black customs clerks and no soldiers (Mansfeld to KGG, 14.12.1906). Smuggling across the boundary at the Cross River still continued. In 1906 Mansfeld caught 'smug-
Sir Ralph Moor was invited by Puttkamer to Buea to finalise the boundary disputes which was effected on the 16th of April, 1901 (AAKA, 09.12.1901-99). When Puttkamer had asked the AAKA to ratify the agreement, they refused on the grounds that custom free transit on the Cross River was not granted and that the compensation territory was too small and worthless (Bakassy) (100). The AAKA stated that free transit on the Cross River was Germany's main aim in the arbitration of the boundary and since Germany could bar all river transport at the Cross River bend, they suggested, that Germany use this power to get the British to submit to the German demand of free transit on the Cross.

The AAKA desired a system in which the German traders, namely the GNK, did not have to pay customs duties nor transit charges, by sealing the goods at the beginning of the journey in Calabar up to the boundary (ibid.; cf. chapter 6.6.2 Transport:249). Upon the AAKA's refusal to ratify the proclamation of 16th April 1901, Puttkamer informed the AAKA that, de facto, a similar system as the one envisaged by the AAKA was already being practiced and that the free transit was by no means cancelled by the April proclamation. The full British import duty was levied on goods at the port in Old Calabar. They were then transported via the Cross River to the customs station at the boundary, where the import duty was reimbursed and only two percent transit charges as well as an export duty were subtracted. Puttkamer stated that only the export duty could be an object of dispute but he was of the opinion that the British would give in easily (Puttkamer to AAKA, 19.01.1902).

This dispute was temporarily 'won' by the Germans in 1905 (British Ambassador to AAKA, 07.09.1905; cf. chapter 5.3. Small steps – from the Cross River to Yola 1904-1913:194). Germany – because of the prior British denial of their demands - had refused an Anglo-German demarcation expedition which was to mark the boundary in situ (cf. AAKA to RSA, 16.09.1905). The British had, by 1905 decided to prioritise a clearly defined boundary over their power to seriously damage German trade and prestige in the area, by denying the Germans free navigation and transit on the Cross River. As the AAKA noted, the British decision was inspired by a number of 'boundary violations' (BAB R1001/3476/6). These probably refer to the incidents during the Mpawmanku wars. Whether voluntarily or involuntarily - they were only possible because the Germans willingly

---

125 In Bodam the name Nyonge was also mentioned with regard to the clerk stationed in Bodam "with his labourers and workers", but he was held to be a white (Bodam, 10.07.2000).
kept delaying the erection of boundary pillars after the agreement of the boundary between coast and Cross River. The boundary expedition of 1895 never resulted in the signing of a boundary agreement, thus the straight lines of 1890 were still in effect. The line from the rapids to Yola cut across the Cross River in such a way that a stretch on the northern bank became German, offering the Germans the possibility to 'block' the river for British vessels by erecting two customs posts (cf. BAB R1001/3467B:184; GNK to AAKA, 21.12.1900; GNK to AAKA, 26.01.1901). The urgency with which - after the British agreement to allow free navigation and transit on the Cross - the AAKA pressed the Schatzamt (treasury) for 43,000 M. (Mark) for the expedition within one month (!) clearly demonstrates that the Germans had played for time - and won - and were not willing to let this moment pass. While free navigation and free transit were granted by the British, an export duty of five percent remained in place until 1913, when all transit charges and export duties were abolished (BNKG to RKA, 01.07.1913; RKA to BNKG, 10.07.1913).

However, the boundary fundamentally affected German trading interests, and became one of the main reasons for the lack of success of the GNK (cf. chapter 6.6. Lack of success:241). Local pre-existing trade networks continued to function, since neither the boundary pillars nor the customs posts could control 'smuggling'. On the contrary, the boundary created the opportunity for the local population to control the traffic of the respective colonial powers and temporary or permanent migrations became one of the most effective tools for the people in ascertaining their power vis-à-vis colonial demands.

5.5. Control over land or people?

Migration and relocation were strategies employed by the people in the Upper Cross River area in order to achieve numerous ends (cf. Rösechenthaler 2000). The Anglo-German boundary provided a means to evade the sphere of undesirable German influence. While the British assured the Germans that they would cooperate in extraditing 'criminals' who were seeking refuge in their territory, they did not feel it necessary to curtail the people's right of free and voluntary movement into their colony. The Anglo-German scramble was thus staged not only over land, but also over people.

[In the case of ordinary fugitives who have not offended against the law I do not see how it could be expected that the British Government should force those to return to German territory. Any natives in British territory are not in any way debarred from crossing into German territory provided they have not left in order to escape the law, consequently natives in German territory who have not offended would be perfectly at liberty to settle wherever they liked [...] Referring to Captain von Besser's request that you should assist him in making the Ndebi people settle in German territory, I really can see no necessity for any action on your part. This Government will not prevent the Ndebi people from going anywhere they like. All natives in British territory are at liberty to settle where they like and when they like. (Gallwey to KGK, 15.08.1900:120, 123)]

The European powers thus had to acknowledge that 'scrambling' for territory did not necessarily entail control over its inhabitants.

While in 1900 Besser had tried to prevent the people from fleeing across the border by using military force (Besser to KGK, 06.07.1900), this proved ineffective. Both the British and the Germans accepted that the people had to be enticed to remain in the respective territories voluntarily.

In the agreements about the second boundary commission of 1905, they explicitly assured each other that people living on 'compensation territory' that was to be exchanged would be granted six months to decide on which side of the boundary they chose to settle (British Ambassador to AAKA, 06.11.1905:30; AAKA to British Ambassador, 09.11.1905:32-33; cf. Southern Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Commission Protocol 386 in the appendix). The settlement of Bashu (200-300 people) was divided. In 1907 Mansfeld found that the main settlement was five kilometres away from the boundary on the German side (Mansfeld to KGK, 07.05.1907). He reported that he had successfully convinced all of them to move onto German territory (KRS Ossidinge 1907/08). In 1909 the British and the German administration agreed that Bashu was regarded as neutral, but by 1912 it had decided to transfer onto British territory (cf. Moisels's map 1912, F.I. "Ossidinge''), where it has remained. Similarly, Danali had expressed its desire to move into German territory in 1909, it likewise changed its attitude and remained British. Nsamaramati on the other hand moved into German territory (Mansfeld, 13.06.1909; PCCO, 27.05.1909). After the boundary had officially and finally been demarcated at its full length up to Yola, the Germans complained that a British political officer had undergone a journey along the newly established boundary between the Cross River and Yola in order to persuade the population to move onto British territory. The Germans on the other hand had failed to take such measures and assumed that a large number of people had indeed left their territory (KGK to RKA, 05.09.1913).

Mansfeld continuously tried to 'convince' villages who had crossed the border to return - mainly by giving presents to the chiefs - and in some cases, e.g. Ekoreman and Mbabong in 1906, he was successful, while in others not (Mansfeld to KGK, 07.01.1907). These presents had the value of 300 M. and the negotiators Mansfeld relied on were awarded an additional 50 M. reward (Mansfeld to KGK, 08.02.1907-99). Both the Germans and the British engaged in competition for the communities in the borderland, each bribing the 'owners of the community' with presents to entice them to move onto their respective territory. When the neighbouring British D.O. had gone on vacation, and a deputy unfamiliar with the area was in command of the station, Mansfeld reinforced his ef-

126 In the Njemaya area, today in Nigeria.
6. GNK – concession, claims, and chaos

In 1899 the GNK was granted a concession for a territory of 90,000 to 100,000 square kilometres for economic exploitation by the AARA (for its financial base and shareholders see Ballhaus 1968, C&R 2001:142, 'Konzessionsurkunde' in: BAB R80247275:7-8; Radin 1938:292-296). The concessions were made to entice private capital into the colony by promising fast profits due to the monopolistic powers of the concession company within its area. Germany followed the example of French and Belgian chartered companies, in DSWA and Kamerun, where two land concessions were granted (to the GSK and GNK). The concession policies were fiercely disputed, especially by trading companies, but also by the DKG, the Alideutscher Verband, in the Reichstag, and in the press. The legitimacy of the concessions remained contested and the 'father' of the concession policies, colonial director von Buchka, was forced to resign in 1900, after his opponents had launched a press campaign against colonial concessions (cf. Meinecke 1899; Kölnische Zeitung 20.04.1900; Ballhaus 1968:122-127; Schnee 1964:22). The GSK had been granted the first concession in Kamerun in 1898 and the subsequent protests about the scope of its concession led to a restricted concession for the GNK in 1899 (cf. ibid.:105-127). The land concession companies, and especially the GNK, was regarded as an 'accident' by great parts of the German public, the colonial circles, and especially the colonial opponents. From the beginning the AAKA offered only lukewarm support while the KGK, especially Puttkamer, supported the GNK wholeheartedly. The diverging interests led to an at times anarchic situation regarding the operations of the GNK in Kamerun. The wording of the concession became of prime importance in the course of disputing conceptions over its content and shall therefore be presented here in some detail.

The concession stated that the GNK had the right to own all potential 'crownland' in the concession area (§1 and 2), and the right of pre-emption on all other land for 20 years (§3). Land owned by the GNK but needed for public works was defined by the KVO as land without any 'proof of effective possession', i.e. 'ownerless' or 'herrenlos' land (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?: 206).

The wording of §1 and 2 is confusing and the basis for the ensuing disputes about the land issue between administration and GNK. The 'potential crownland' is explicitly referred to in §1, while §2 stated that the GNK could 'take land into possession' after having negotiated with 'possible owners' and other concerned parties. The practice in the following years suggests that the 'possible owner' was the German state, since §1 and 2 referred to 'crownland'. The concession charter refers to the KVO and therefore need not explicitly refer to the status of the land as 'ownerless', since 'crownland' was by definition 'ownerless' (Rohde 1997 points to this as a striking detail, while Ballhaus 1968 simply concludes as I have done above) (cf. Rohde 1997:88-89; Ballhaus 1966:117).

---

127 Mansfeld actually used the word "bestechen", i.e. 'bribing' (Mansfeld to KGK, 02.01.1907-99).
lic interests', namely the building of roads, railroads, stations, and missions, had to be granted free of charge (§4). It had to respect the freedom of trade (§5) and develop the territory (§6). The 'development' demanded from the GNK was further specified as the:

a) exploration of natural resources;

b) construction of public roads, railroads, canals, steamship lines, and other means of transport;

c) fostering of economic activities, such as farming and mining by establishing plantations and trading posts;

d) pursuit of 'sustainable development' rather than overexploitation\(^\text{10}\) (25% of the forested area had to be preserved, §7).

A certain share of their profits had to be redirected to the state (§8). The GNK further had to spend 100,000 M. each year for the fulfillment of its duties, three million M. within ten years (§9). 100,000 M. had to be granted for the proposed expedition to Lake Chad (§10). The concession was limited to 50 years, but automatically extended to 60 years if a railroad was constructed from the coast into the concession area within the first 12 years (§11).

Since the shares of the GNK were never offered on the stock exchange like those of the earlier GSK, the initial profit was thus not achieved.\(^\text{11}\) The founders, Fürst Christian Kraft von Hobenlohe-Oehringen, Max Schoeller, and Max Hilger, had never actually been willing to invest the millions they had signed into the GNK. They had instead wanted to obtain their profits through speculation - an endeavour that failed completely. The lack of finances became one of the acutest problems of the GNK. It never made any profits and was practically bankrupt since 1904 (cf. Ballhaus 1968:118-120).

The controversies about the concession, the rights and obligations connected to it, vividly demonstrate the lack of competence and conceptual planning in German colonial policies. The only detailed study of the activities of the GNK in the Upper Cross River area is up to date Ballhaus (1968, esp.:130-137, 149-179). Ballhaus focused on the disputes about the concession policies within the German colonial project. Her study remains valuable, but with regard to the specific situation in the Cross area, especially in connection with the so-called 'Anyang-Aufstand', i.e. the Mpawmaniku wars, the gaps in the sources available to her are at times too readily filled with explanations that rely on colonial and contemporary east-German discourses (cf. Ballhaus 1968:149-162).

Since the activities of the GNK, its relationship with the administration and the local population occupied a central place in the German colonial enterprise in the Upper Cross River area due to Ballhaus' study also in academic discourses, I will try to assemble the most detailed picture possible. The political and diplomatic contentions generally follow Ballhaus, but my focus will be 'on the spot', which leads to a somewhat different assessment of the causes and the nature of the so-called 'Anyang-uprising' (chapter 7.2 Mpawmaniku wars (1904-1906): 263).

The activities of the GNK in the Upper Cross River area started with the founding of a trading post in Nsakpe [Naakpe] and Mbabon by Waldau and Graf Pückler-Limpurg on the 14\(^{th}\) of September 1900 (GNK to AAKA, 30.11.1900; Puttkamer, 13.01.1901:12; Besser, 18.09.1900:115), in the aftermath of the German-Ekoi war (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900:161). In the same year, Ramsay, former commander of the Schutztruppe in DOA who had become the general agent for the GNK in Kamerun on the 10\(^{th}\) of January 1900 (DBK 1899, no. 24:849; cf. ANY FA 1/80)\(^\text{12}\), explored the area east of Nsakpe and undertook an expedition to the north of the Cross River into the grassland that was later to become the basis for all GNK claims of ownership over these territories (cf. chapter 6.1. 'Who commands the land?':206). Subsequent joint expeditions by traders and administrators in the Upper Cross River area resulted in the opening of trading posts south and north of the Cross: the main trading post was in Nsanakang at the southern bank of the Cross River, close to the British border, and subsidiary trading posts were in Mbabon, Agborkem (both 1901), Mamfe, Badje, Kesham, Takpe and Basho (all 1903). In Ijito a trading post, receiving supplies via Mundume, existed. A rubber plantation was opened in Abonando at the northern bank of the Cross River just opposite the site of the administrative station Otsoondinge in 1901. In 1908 a palm oil factory was opened in Mompé and a palm oil plantation in Okoyong (cf. chapter 6.4. Salt, plantations, and industries:238).

In the course of the unfolding activities of the GNK, diverging opinions became the sources of ongoing conflicts between the GNK and the administration with regard to the rights the GNK had acquired in the concession area and the 'effective possession' of land executed by the GNK itself. Serious conflicts ensued with other European trading companies, notably the British company John Holt (JH), as well as private labour recruiters. These disputes eventually culminated in the withdrawal of the concession by the RKA in 1910 and an appeal in court by the GNK, and most of its infrastructure was taken over by Bremer Nordwest-Kamerun, Ltd. (BNKG) (cf. chapter 6.7. Withdrawal of concession:251).

\(^{10}\) This condition was a direct reaction to the unfavourable experiences of the developments in Belgian Congo.

\(^{11}\) The going public of the GSK earlier had aroused suspicion in the German public and the AAKA had asked the GNK to refrain from a direct emission at the stock exchange and the Deutsche Bank, with which the GNK negotiated an emission of participation certificates worth four million M. withdrew when they received reports about the bad prospects of the GNK. All subsequent efforts failed likewise (Ballhaus 1968:120-121).

\(^{12}\) Born on the 18\(^{th}\) of May, 1862; member of the 'Wissmanntruppe' 1889-1891, then of the Schutztruppe in DOA, not married (ANY FA 1/80).
6.1. Who commands the land?


(§1 of concession charter)


(§2 of concession charter)

The concession of the GNK encompassed two different areas: the forested Cross River basin in the southeast and the grassland plateaus in the north and west (for the activities in the Bamileké grasslands, see Rohde 1997; for the boundaries, see §1 of the concession). In the concession charter the GNK was entitled to the ownership of all 'crownland' within their concession area, to negotiate with 'possible owners' (can only refer to the 'crown' here, i.e. the German state), and to provisionally take possession of any land, that had not been surveyed yet by a land commission. According to the KVO of 1896 'crownland' was all 'ownerless' territory. All land without any 'proof of effective possession' was regarded as 'ownerless' (cf. Fisiy 1996:226-230; Rohde 1997:87-89). These 'effective proofs' were only those directly visible to the Germans, i.e. land cultivated or settled on. Other land rights, such as hunting and gathering, land under fallow, access to water, etc. were 'invisible' for them. But such 'ownerless' land did not exist, neither in Kamerun as a whole, nor in the Upper Cross River area (cf. Eckert 1995:241; Puttkamer 1912:103; Ballhaus 1968:134; see below). The administration according to the KVO held that all 'ownerless', i.e. unoccupied land, automatically belonged to the 'crown' (cf. Fisiy 1996:233-234). The concession charter of the GNK now gave this potential crownland to the GNK for the next 50 years (§ 1). The idea behind this clause and of the whole concession had indeed been to grant the GNK a 'land monopoly' (Ballhaus 1968:117). This 'land monopoly' was, of course, only significant if the natural resources, found in and on this land, were included. At first attention was mainly on rubber, ivory and ebony, although after the rubber crisis, palm kernels and nuts became more important. Since the 'land monopoly' was only effected after the GNK had visited and 'taken possession' of the territories, the activities of the GNK started with extensive journeys through their concession area, forcing its employees into areas completely unknown to Europeans.

In 1900 general agent Ramsay led an expedition from the station Nsakpe south of the Cross River through the 'overside' area to the north-western grass-

Map 7 Ramsay's journey

fields. This expedition was at the base of some of the most eminent events and disputes in the Cross River area: it laid the ground for the GNK's claim for ownership of the territory travelled through and as such became part of the lengthy dispute between GNK and the German state. It later also served as a pretext for military actions in relation to the 'Mpumamku wages' of 1904 (cf. chapter 7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation – 'a barrel of gunpowder':268). It shall therefore be inspected in more detail here – unfortunately I have to mainly rely on the report prepared by Ramsay, since it is the only document available (Ramsay, Dec. 1906). Ramsay's expedition was the first undertaken by a German in the areas north of the Cross River.

123 It is also an example of the trader advancing the soldier, as the whole history of the area north of the Cross River in general – a notion contested by Ballhaus (1968:132-133).
The areas south of the Cross River were at that point still the scene of the so-called German-Ekoi war (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900):153). Ramsay praised Besser's 'beneficial influence' on the 'natives' in this area (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:13), with regard to their construction of roads and their 'obedience' and 'respect' towards his wishes. Ramsay blamed their 'cheekiness' on British influence (cf. chapter 4.3.3. Third phase - "Muthwillige Zerstörungen, grausame Mißhandlungen und grundlose Tötungen" (June 1900):176). Ramsay's expedition, including 81 porters armed with M/71 guns and 25 bullets each, was perceived by the people as a war party and Ramsay found the 'Ossidinge villages' (today Agbokkem) south of the Cross River deserted. Armed men inquired towards the aims of the expedition and when the peaceful intent was ascertained, women and children returned (17).

In Agbokkem in 2000 the first encounter with the 'white men' was similarly described as passing from a stage of fear, in which the atifam — the 'leaders' — were assembled, to a situation where the 'white' 'entertained' the population with drinks, food, and tobacco and explained that he was a trader (i.e. ogem = person of market) and that he had come for trade (ogem) (DMA, PAO, 12.10.2000).

The white man now came, they landed their ship, they were white in colour, when they saw them, the people were afraid of the difference in colour, since they were blacks, they wanted to run away from the white men, so the whites called on them to come closer and that they should not be afraid. The white man ordered that they should bring forth drinks, that they should sit down, they should not run away from them. So, they brought out drinks of assorted types and gave them to the people and said they should sit down and drink. They brought out tobacco with pipes. They sat down and they started entertaining the blacks, i.e. the people of Agbokkem [Ossidinge]. So actually the white man told a story about how he heard that the blacks had tails, he said his motive of coming was to see for himself, if the blacks actually have tails. So he begged that the people should get up so that he could inspect them and see whether they had tails. The next morning he re-iterated and said that he had not actually come to see whether the blacks had tails, but that there was another motive. The people should not be afraid of him, he had come to trade with the people and to establish a market here. So he now told the people the type of goods he was to be dealing with: kernels, coconut, rubber, ebony — all things found in our forests. He later told them that he would like to trade with them if they would buy all things that they needed from him, and that next time he would come with a bigger ship, so they should get prepared to supply him with the goods he needed. He greeted the people and left. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

Ramsay's position north of the Cross River, where no European had yet penetrated, became much more critical. Ramsay's report of his journey gave the impression that he had constantly been menaced by the population and that he pressed forward speedily, finally being able to rest only in Bali, which he entered from the north (Ballhaus 1968:135). This stance was also taken by the German state during the litigation with the GNK:

Diese Reisen [Ramsay] hätten allerdings einzigen geographischen und kartographischen Wert gehabt, seien aber im übrigen Einmärsche an den Rändern des Konzessionsgebietes gewesen ohne bleibende wirtschaftliche Bedeutung. Sie seien wohl nur unternommen worden, damit die Klägerin das ganze Konzessionsgebiet als in Besitz genommen bezeichnen könne. (Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914)

Ramsay himself acknowledged that he met substantial and constant difficulties north of the Cross River and that in spite of interpreters and guides communication with the population was practically impossible, and even the names of villages and their chiefs could at times not be recorded (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:18-19). The northern forest area he travelled through was described as densely populated. The villages he passed were not deserted, and the expedition was usually 'accompanied' by armed men, who occasionally attacked some of the porters and took some of their loads. Ramsay described the people as 'annoying flies' and he admitted beating some of them. These beatings were euphemistically called 'slaps in the face', which caused the remaining companions to flee. Ramsay placed his experience in 'overseas' in the forest-grassland dichotomy, since the grassland became the safe-haven he craved. In his report the descriptions of the forest as 'miserable' and its population as 'vicious' were erased in preparation for its publication in the DKB (19; cf. DKB 1901, no. 7:234-238). The 'respect' the population south of the Cross River had exhibited towards Ramsay was absolutely lacking in the northern area, where no German military

---

134 The M/71 (Mauser) was the gun of the black German soldiers in Togo, Kamerun and DOA. It was a breechloading with a single shot. It had been used in the German army since 1874. In 1887 a magazine rifle was introduced in the German army. The German officers in Kamerun and possibly also certain Africans, e.g. the non-commissioned officers, used such a gun, the M 88 (7.9 mm calibre) (cf. Pfugk-Hartung and Zepelin 1896:140, 144-145, 311).

135 Ramsay did not come via the Cross River. Possibly the oral tradition has amalgamated two different events: the first whites who were the joint Anglo-German boundary expedition of 1895 who did come via the Cross and a ship and the first trader coming to Agbokkem, or they have later ascribed the usual path the traders took — via the river — to their first encounter.

136 Ramsay reported his encounters with the people in Ossidinge thus: "Alle Ortschaften waren vollkommen verlassen, erst nach einiger Zeit erschienen zuerst die bewaffneten Männer und dann, als die Männer sich von dem absolut freundlichen Charakter der Expedition überzeugt hatten kamen auch die Weber und Kinder zum Vorschein" (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:17). This passage was cancelled before publication in the DKB, probably because it pointed to the population's resentment of the Germans.

137 In the oral traditions there are numerous references to the Germans 'taking the blacks as monkeys in the forest'. Whether the Germans actually used this metaphor, or whether it was invented by the people is uncertain. The reference to the 'inspection' of the body of the people may also allude to 'inspections' having taken place later, e.g. the extensive anthropological measuring carried out by Mansfeld (cf. Mansfeld 1908:249-259), or the assessment of a person's liability to pay taxes by the growth public hair (Rudin 1938:342).
patrol had yet made 'an impression'. Ramsay's judgment on the population was thus most unfavourable:

[E]s ist das verlogenste und gemeinsten Deibs Volk, das ich jemals in Afrika getroffen habe, sie stellen alles, und zwar in der unverschämtesten Weise, Stoffe etc. etc. meines Trägers mußten höllisch auf ihre Karabiner und Patronen aufpassen, in einer Nacht wurden z.B. trotz der Wachen von meinem Zeit alle Karabiner Haken abgeschnitten, und meine schöne Beobachtungsrampe wurde gestohlen. (Ibid:20)

The 'beautiful observation lamp' later became the stumbling block between the station leader Pückler and Mpawmanku, chief of Bachama (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpawmanku wars (1904-1906): 265).

Bachama had been the last settlement in the low-lying forest that Ramsay contacted. Ramsay registered 'Pomaku' as the 'chief of Bassoma'. This individuality was to become the most pronounced and successful leader of resistance four years later. Northeast of Bachama, Ramsay climbed the escarpment towards the grassfields. The farmer Rudatis, who accompanied Ramsay, and who usually marched at the rear of the expedition was attacked at this point and one load was captured. Ramsay and Rudatis then decided to meet the next attack and shot some men, who were probably from Bachama.

In Ramsay's report this remained the sole incident in the forest when guns were used, but the description of it was also cancelled, before publication (21). Although Ramsay had reached the grassfields and thus left the 'miserable' forest with its 'vicious' population behind, the situation remained tense. The open terrain did not render the expedition as vulnerable as the forest area, where defense had been much more difficult. Ramsay could feel much safer in the grassland, where he could detect the movement of his enemies early enough (26; cf. chapter 3.7.2. Open grassland, confined forest:134). From Bali Ramsay took the well-established Bali road through Sabes and Tinto and reached Mundamie nine days later. He had intended taking a 'new' road, but the porters accompanying him had refused after the dangerous experiences they had already made (29).

This journey, during which the interaction with the population had been limited to escape and defense on Ramsay's part, laid the grounds for the claim that Ramsay had 'taken into possession' the areas travelled through - although he had hardly been able to get the names of villages and their 'chiefs'. Ramsay himself was doomed to be deposed shortly after this journey, because the directors of the GNN judged him unfit for the commercial aspects of his post, and he was replaced as general agent by Jäger (GNN, 20.05.1901). But the GNN decided that he was to continue working for the GNN and prove his effectiveness (GNN, 04.10.1901). In August 1901 he was again sent to the 'Banyang rubber area' by the GNN (Schoeller, 09.08.1901).

By then the AAKA had actually acknowledged the transfer of ownership as claimed by the GNN. The AAKA had ordered the transfer to be attached to the same conditions applicable under the KVO. The proclamation signed by Puttkamer on the 12th of October, 1901 contained the following:

1.) Das in dem in der Anlage bezeichneten Gebiete als "herrenlos" angesprochene Land wird zwar im Allgemeinen als solches anerkannt; doch ist gegen die Anerkennung im Einzelfalle der Rechtsweg zulässig.
3.) Durch die Ueberlassung bleiben die bestehenden oder noch zu errassenden bergrechtlichen Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der Verfügung über die unterirdischen Bodenschätze unberührt.
4.) Schiffbare Flüsse und Ströme sind von der Überlassung ausgeschlossen. (Puttkamer to GNN, 12.10.1901)

The area was generally accepted to be 'ownerless land'. Two hectares per 'hut' were to be assigned for farming of the local population. Two hectares per hut had been the standard to calculate the size of the 'natives reservations' at the Mount Cameroon in the south. The KVO, however, foresaw six hectares per 'hut' (Fisit 1996:237). The GNN thus had been approved ownership rights even over cultivated land, if it exceeded two hectares per 'hut' (Ballhaus 1968:135). The proclamation was vague and contradictory. Obviously Puttkamer was of the opinion that two hectare per 'hut' was more land than actually used by the population, since it should also be sufficient for 'future population growth'. On the other hand, population growth would surely entail an increase in the number of 'hus'. Would, therefore, the land reserved for the population not constantly increase? Judging from the practice at Mount Cameroon, the two hectares per 'hut' referred to the status quo and even if the actual area under cultivation by the population was larger, it became the property of the GNN, while the population was restricted to their 'reservations' (cf. Ballhaus 1968:134; Fisit 1996:234-237). The proclamation made no provisions for a demarcation of the territory in 'ownerless', i.e. GNN-owned land, and 'native reservations'. It generally leaves
the impression that Puttkamer's intention was to 'give' the land to the GNK, so that it could start exploiting the land as quickly as possible. The second paragraph was only inserted in the concession to appease the AAKA — it was absolutely impracticable.

The transfer of ownership in 1901 and the subsequent inclusion of the trees and their products (KGK, 29.11.1902; KGG to station Ossindinge, 07.03.1902, cit. in GNK to AAKA, 05.04.1905) were the basis for the perceived monopoly of the GNK and the later conflicts with private labour recruiters and competing trading companies, namely JH (cf. chapter 6.2.1. Monopoly or competition: 220). When the discord had entered the arena of national and international politics, the AAKA reverted to the legal status of the land in the concession area. On the 25th of June 1902 the expert opinion of the AAKA had come to the conclusion that the transfer of ownership of 1901 had not been valid (Ballhaus 1968:144). It demanded proof of actual possession and 'ownerlessness', as well as demarcation of 'sufficient' reservations for the indigenous population (cf. Ballhaus 1968:139-140). These provisions were mainly motivated by clashes between local population, missions, and plantation companies around Mount Cameroon and the coast.

The 'interests of the chiefs and communities' were thus to be taken into account by the GNK. The AAKA proposed that the transfer of land ownership be effected only if the natural resources remained in the possession of the local population. This point was debated heatedly in the colonial council on the 27th of June 1902. Representatives of the GNK argued that without the effective ownership right of all natural resources, the concession was worthless. They were opposed by those who saw a future for Germany's colonies only if the local production of export crops increased, e.g. Volken and Victor with reference to Britain's West African colonies and Togo (140-142). While the former were interested in the acquisition of fast wealth by overexploitation of the people and the natural resource base, the latter envisaged a 'sustainable exploitation' through the population's own production (ibid.).

By 1902 confusion over the status of the land 'owned' by the GNK arose 'on the spot'. The station Ossindinge explicitly stated that most of the land within the district of Ossindinge had become the property of the GNK by the decision of the AAKA of 1901 and that therefore it could no more become 'crownland' (Militäristation Ossindinge, 17.05.1902).

In June 1902, Lt. Gellhorn, head of the military station in Tinto, complained to the KGK about the way Ramsay — general agent of the GNK — presented himself to the population:

Mitte Januar 1902 kam der Generalbevollmächtigte der G.N.K. in den Tinto Bezirk und sagte den Häuptlingen an, daß er Gouverneur von Banjanga sei. Er hätte ganz Banjanga gekauft, und er allein hätte hier etwas zu sagen, kein anderer Weiße. Darauf befahl er allen Angestellten der G.N.K., Weißen wie Schwarzen, sämtliche vorbeiziehende Leute anzuhalten eventl. mit Gewalt um zu untersuchen, ob sie Gummi mit sich führen. Durch diese Befehle entstehen der Station die unglaublichsten Schwierigkeiten. Die Hauptspranger werden verwirrt gemacht und wissen überhaupt nicht mehr, wie sie zu folgen haben. Hätte Herr Hauptmann a. d. Ramsay nur irgend etwas der Station mitgeteilt und durch diese Hauptspranger es ansagen lassen, so wäre das Ansehen der Station nicht geschädigt, so aber trott die Station an II. Stelle und sieht sich genötigt mit Strafen vorzu- gehen und entgegengesetzte Befehle zu erteilen, wodurch die Verwirrung nur eine größer wird. (Gellhorn, 12.06.1902b; emphasis original)

The conflict between the colonial government and the GNK originated in the opposing views as to the rights and duties of their concession and continued to be a serious source of friction between the two parties. Gellhorn claimed that the GNK would not need to employ force if they provided their trading post with sufficient trade articles at cheaper rates (55). This reproach was to be repeated over and over by government officials on the spot. Often competition was advocated and encouraged as a solution to the inefficient methods of the GNK (cf. Rohe 1997:94, fn 72; cf. chapter 6.6. Lack of success: 241).

The GNK however insisted on the monopolistic rights they had obtained in their concession area and asked the AAKA to order the KGK to support their procedure:

Die letzte Post brachte uns die Nachricht, dass die Kaiserl. Station Tinto Beschwerden über unserm Generalbevollmächtigten, Herrn Hauptmann Ramsay, geführt habe; gleichzeitig habe die Station seine Anordnungen in dem uns als Eigentum zugesprochenen Gebiet als ungültig hingestellt & den Eingeborenen eröffnet, das Land gehören nicht der Gesellschaft sondern der Regierung & die Eingeborenen könnten den Gummi hintragen, wohin sie wollten. Wir werden durch das Vorgehen der Station schwer geschädigt & alle unsere Rechte werden illusorisch. Wir bitten die Kolonial-Abteilung ergebenst, das Gouvernement anweisen zu wollen, die Stationen zu instruieren, den Eingeborenen klar zu machen, dass das betreffende Gebiet unser Eigentum ist und der Kautschuk uns gehört & an uns abzuliefern ist. (GNK to AAKA, 05.01.1903)

The GNK in turn demanded the explicit approval of their rights of ownership by the AAKA (Hohenlohe to AAKA, 14.01.1903). The law department of the AAKA concluded that rights of definite ownership could only be granted to the GNK over those territories within their 'effective possession' (Lobe, 13.01.1902:82). The 'effective possession' of the GNK was also difficult to prove. The GNK claimed that the proof was to be found in the signboards put up by them along the routes Ramsay had travelled on, the existence of which was confirmed by the heads of the stations Tinto and Ossindinge (Ramsay to KGK, 05.10.1902; GNK to AAKA, 05.04.1905:76-77).

On the first of July, 1904 GNK general agent Jäger had demanded replacement of the 'provisional' ownership rights with 'full' rights of ownership over the areas 'taken into possession' by Ramsay in 1900 (GNK to AAKA, 05.04.1905:78). In 1905, when the GNK had still not received an answer from the AAKA, the GNK threatened to take legal actions in order to solve the dispute over the status of the land within their concession area (GNK to AAKA,
07.04.1905:55; GNK to AAKA, 05.04.1905:78). The AAKA was not impressed by this threat and continued plying for time. They informed the Reichskanzler:

Die Konzession ist ein Messer ohne Heft und ohne Klinge. Es ist jedenfalls nicht leicht, etwas damit anzufangen. [...] Die von der Gesellschaft in Aussicht gestellte Klage kann ruhig abgewertet werden. Ein Erfolg für die Gesellschaft ist unwahrscheinlich. (AAKA to Reichskanzler, 06.06.1905:88)

At the same time the Reichstag had formed a commission auditing the rights and obligations of the concession companies in Kamerun. The Reichskanzler 'consented' to bring the case before a court of arbitration. In 1906 the proceedings of the court of arbitration to which each party appointed two arbitrators began and on the 28th of May, 1906 it ruled in favour of the German state. The main argument against the GNK was that it had not fulfilled its duty in 'developing' its concession area, with reference to the construction of roads and bridges (cf. GNK 1913, where all the 'developmental activities' of the GNK are listed, esp.31). The transfer of ownership rights of 1901 was rebuked on the grounds that the 'effective possession' of all the land by the GNK was not sufficient (88-89; cf. Ballhaus 1968:164-168).

The GNK could not simply claim the large forest area of the Cross River. It had to acquire property plot by plot and buy it from the KKG, if it was 'crownland', or the people, if it was not 'ownerless'. The German land policies had undergone a re-interpretation by 1907. The administration, both central and local, ceased relying on the notion of 'ownerless' land and the KVO, but started acknowledging the fact that if not all land was 'owned' by the local population. Plantation owners in the south now claimed they had bought the land from local authorities (Fisy 1996:237), and in the concession area of the GNK the effect was that the land 'owned' by the GNK diminished considerably. This new interpretation of land law thus abolished the 'land monopoly' of the GNK. After discussions of the KR and the GR, Gouverneur Seitz decided in 1907 that crownland should be 'leased' rather than sold. In 1910, the purchase of up to three hectares of crownland was made possible, but only when needed for buildings (Rudin 1938:404-405). According to the land register of the KRS Ossidinge, the GNK 'leased' the plots in Nsanakang from the 'crown', while all their other plots were 'leased' from the local population: eight hectares on the southern bank of the Cross River from the Mamfe people since 1907, seven hectares from the Egbekew people since 1909, 50 hectares from the Abonando people since 1911 (land register KRS Ossidinge 1912: ANY FA 1/306).

The GNK had assumed that 'effective possession' and thus ownership rights had at least been obtained over land upon which they had erected buildings or plantations, i.e. Abonando and Mamfe (GNK to RKA, 28.01.1908), but the RKA still held that the KRS Ossidinge had to acknowledge the state of the land, before the GNK could obtain official ownership titles (Dernburg, no date). In 1909 the GNK decided to demand the transfer of ownership rights of the planta-

tion in Abonando (GNK, 13.10.1909:143). The KRS Ossidinge then ascertained that the land was not actually 'ownerless', but belonged to the people of Abonando (GNK, 1913:27). In Puttkamer's era the KKG had supported the strict concept of the concessions and the KVO, but clashed with the views of the local administrators (Ossidinge, Tinto; similar Rohde 1997 for Fontem/Dschang and Bamenda, 92-94) and finally with the AAKA and the Reichstag.

As Fisy states, "[t]his is a classic example of the instrumentalist conception of the German state [... a mere resource at the disposal of the powerful" (Fisy 1996:237). In the Upper Cross River area, this change in land appropriation policy allowed competitors to buy land from the population to erect their stations. Such competition had been called for ever since Mansfeld had taken over the district after the Mpwarmanku wars in 1904 and the GNK's activities had almost come to a standstill (cf. chapter 6.6. Lack of success:241).

The second phase in the land appropriation policies and the general stance of the administration towards the concession of the GNK was only begun in 1907 after Puttkamer had left his office. Between 1905 and 1907, the legal uncertainty and the diverging practices and wishes of the local and the central administrations resulted in lengthy correspondences and pending decisions. JH had bought a plot in Tal in 1905 for a small trading shop to be run by black clerks, in 1906 it expanded to Tinto, where it erected a main trading post that was to service the districts Tinto, Ossidinge, Fontem and Bamenda (MS Fontemdorf to KGG, 17.10.1906). In 1908 these had still not been ratified by the KGG, but it started that it was inclined to do so, given that a new contract with additional provisions was signed (KGG to KRS Ossidinge, 01.12.1908). Such a contract was signed between Raven of JH and the 'sub-chief' Foto-Akko of Tinto in 1909, but by then JH had decided to close its post in Tinto and the contract was thus never registered, although JH had used the area for four years (KRS Ossidinge to KGG, 23.02.1909; KGG to KBA Ossidinge, 17.08.1909).

The local administration then started calling for competition, and in 1907 the former GNK employee Paul Bieger became a JH agent - after having spent some time in a prison in Douala - and sought to establish JH trading posts in the heartland of the GNK: Basha and Ohan, close to Agboromak.

In Basha he even planned to open a rubber plantation. To this effect he sought to lease a plot next to the station in Basha. The Stationsleiter in Basha, Adamek, was of the opinion that although the area was 'probably' native land', the opening of a plantation was not advisable due to a shortage of labourers. The population of Basha and its environs was still small as a consequence of the Mpwarmanku wars, and the GNK generally had difficulties finding enough carriers. Adamek sympathised with Bieger and had allowed him to start construction even before the KGK had approved Bieger's demand to lease the land. Crownland could not have been leased to him, since the GNK had the right of pre-emption on this land, but by 1907 the GNK had not made any move in this
direction (KRS Ossidinge to GK, 01.04.1906:175; Schulz, 31.03.1906:168; Kröger to GK 1909, "Auf das Schreiben des KGK vom 23.11.09". In: ANY FA I/356). Due to these legal and political complications, it took two years, before Bieger was officially allowed to open a trading post in Basho – by then he had already disappeared from the district.\footnote{199}

For Bieger’s wish to buy a plot south of the Cross River, the head of station in Ossidinge, Mansfeld directed him to an area of 70 square metres close to the village Oban just south of the Cross River, which belonged to the ‘natives’. Mansfeld argued that since this land was not ownerless, it could not be appropriated by the GNK and was thus free for anybody to whom the ‘natives’ were willing to sell:

Kaiserliche Station Ossidinge, den 7. Mai 1907

Befritt. Landerverb im Konzessionsgebiet der GNK

Mit Bezug auf dieselbe J. No. 556/07, betreffend Gummimankauf im Konzessionsgebiet

1) der Kaufmann Bieger, engagiert von der Firma John Holt als Wanderhändler, hat das in Abschrift als Anlage beigefügte Schreiben an die Station gerichtet.

2) Das Kaiserliche Gouvernements hat gemäß Erlass No. 22443 (Dez. 155) vom 25.01 an die Station Nsakpe verfügt: "Bezüglich der Errichtung einer Faktorei der D.W.H. in Nsanakang bemerke ich, daß im Konzessionsgebiet der GNK anderen Firmen jeder Landerverb grundsätzlich zu verweigern ist.

3) Ich frage daher an, ob die Firma John Holt in Okwa [eit Akwa, or an area at the border to Nigeria], cirka 25 km von Bascho entfernt, ein Grundstück pachten darf, fern in Ossidinge auf einem Platz, der dem Dorf Ober (100 m von der Station entfernt) gehört, ein Grundstück kaufen darf.

Meines Erachtens nach sind die Reservate der Eingeborenen, obwohl innerhalb des Konzessionsgebiets gelegen, nicht eigentlich zu letzterem zu rechnen, und könnte daher die D.W.H. sowohl in Nsanakang (Grund und Boden gehört den Nsanakang Leuten) wie eine andere Firma an irgend einem anderen Platze, der den Eingeborenen zuzuschreiben wäre, ein Grundstück erwerben.

Dr. Mansfeld

Bezirksamtsmann.

(Mansfeld to GK, 07.05.1907)

The plot in Oban was ‘sold’ to Bieger by ‘Häuptling Obi’ of Oban, in the presence of the elders of Oban: Njok, Ncu-Njok, Bissong, Obi-Aku and a number of other inhabitants of Oban (Verlautbarung, 14.04.1908).

Den unter no. 2 bis no. 4 genannten [people of Oban, including chief and elders] wurde eröffnet, daß der unter no. 1 aufgeführte Paul Bieger beabsichtigte, das auf der anliegenden Skizze ersichtliche Grundstücke zu kaufen. Die sämtlichen Erschienenen wurden auf die tatsächlichen und rechtlichen Folgen dieses Rechtsgeschäfts hingewiesen. [...] Der kaiserliche stv. Stationsleiter Gehrs stellt hierauf fest:

A) daß nach dem Verkauf noch genügend Land für den ferneren Unterhalt der Dorfbevölkerung verbliebe,

B) daß das zu verkaufende Grundstück im Eigentum des Dorfes Oban steht, daß andere Mitbürger nicht vorhanden sind und daß der Häuptling berechtigt ist, über das genannte Grundstück zu verfügen.

C) daß die sämtlichen Erschienenen mit der Veräußerung des Grundstücks durch den Häuptling Obi an den Paul Bieger einverstanden sind. (Verlautbarung, Oban bei Ossi-

Rohde described the first years after the GNK was granted its concession as ‘grotesque’, since nobody knew who controlled the land: the administration, according to the KVO, or the GNK due to its concession – and the question was not resolved until the concession was dissolved in 1910 (cf. Rohde 1997:95-96). ‘Grotesque’ was also that the local population was hardly a party to consider. During my interviews I did not once hear anybody mention that the Germans had owned their lands, their forests, or their natural resources. It was always implicitly assumed that it had been the village that had granted the Germans a place to build and that rubber, ebony, ivory and other resources were ‘sold’ to the traders and were not the property of the traders that was just harvested by the population (cf. also the ‘magic bottle incident’ in Nsanakang 1900:191).

When the Germans came to Bagre, they were given a piece of land and built their stores and houses. (Joa, 11.07.2000)

In one case, Ramsay had reportedly ‘bought’ land from the ‘father of chief’ Ndip of Agborkem in 1901 (GNK, 1913:27). The western concept of this ‘purchase’ had almost certainly not been intended by the people in Agborkem, who claimed to have shown a place, collectively as a community, rather than the ‘chief’ having entered a contract of sale with the German trader:

As he [the first German trader] begged them that they should show him a place to build, they showed him a place across the other side of the river, i.e. opposite Agborkem, where up till today, there are still traces of the foundations of what he built in those days. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

Only late in their colonial project did the Germans become interested in local conceptions of land ownership and land tenure and these emerging views were considerably difficult to accept for them. Generally speaking the local land ten-
ure systems remained invisible and incomprehensible for the Germans (cf. Rudin 1938:396-397). Land did in itself represent no real value in pre-colonial days in most areas of West Africa. It became valuable only after man had cultivated it, i.e. by clearing and planting. The rights people held over the land they cultivated were thus usufruct and at times differentiated according to various needs (access, hunting, farming, grazing, water, etc.). A ‘land distributing authority’ assigned and supervised the use of these usufructuary rights. This authority did however not ‘own’ the land – in the western conception of ownership – and any remuneration it received was mainly symbolic. The land could thus not be disposed. Although the GNK held that Ramsay had ‘bought’ land from the father of chief Ndop in 1901, who seemingly acted as the ‘land distributing authority’, the people themselves did not perceive this as a permanent transfer of exclusive ownership rights. This impression is also nursed by the complications concerning the ‘sale’ of land in Oban to Bieger in 1908. The ‘sale’s contract’ consisted of a printed form provided by the KGK which was generally used for all land transactions in Cameroon. It stated that ‘all the people present consented to the legal and actual consequences of the sale’. Present were ‘chief’ Obi, four elders specified by name and ‘a couple of inhabitants of the village Oban’. Parties to the contract were Bieger and ‘chief’ Obi, who acted with the consent of those present. The land was transferred when Obi reportedly said:


When Bieger had occupied more land than specified in the sale’s contract, he claimed that he had leased the land from ‘chief Obi’, whereupon Obi stated that ‘alone he was not entitled to enter such an agreement’ (Mansfeld to KGK, March 1909:41).

Decisions had been taken with regard to the status of their land and forests, but the local population was not properly informed about them. While in many parts of the concession area the colonial concepts never actually caused any effect, in other areas the population was forced to get involved in these concepts.

In the Upper Cross River area, these fundamentally diverging conceptions did not lead to a serious conflict as in the plantation areas to the south, because the demands of the concession companies did not upset the economic activities of the local population to the same extent. The ‘dual ownership of land’ existed side by side and did not have any consequences for people’s lives, maybe until recently, when the Cameroonian state – the successor of the colonial state, as the

‘guardian of all lands’ (cf. Fisit 1996:244) backed by European funding and organisations, started enforcing the ‘protection’ of huge areas that have been circled with a green line on their maps and termed ‘Takamanda Forest Reserve’, ‘Mawe Forest Reserve’, or ‘Korup Park’.142

6.2. Trading posts or points of payment

The Germans were trading in barter. This is why they brought things like cutlasses, salt, gun powder and cloth in exchange for palm kernels, rubber, and ebony. (Dadi, 10.07.2000)

The people were happy with the trade, because German goods were scarce. (Beteme, 04.07.2000)

Trade was one of the most remembered features of German colonialism in 2000/2001. In more than half of the testimonies trade was mentioned and was even more of a prominent topic than forced labour. In contrast to the ‘labour question’ that was almost entirely connected to the use of force, trade was mainly perceived as having been carried out voluntarily. It remained one of the few characteristics of German colonialism that was regarded as ‘desired’ by the people. German goods were described as inexpensive, and of good quality. The people even complained that in some areas, the Germans closed down their trading posts after the Mpawmanku wars and people had to carry their goods over long distances, e.g. Beteme to Mamfe (Beteme, 04.07.2000).142

In only one testimony was trade connected to the use of force and the following quotation highlights two crucial aspects of trade relations in the Upper Cross River area that will be elaborated in the two chapters below:

In those days if you do not sell your goods to them, and they happen to meet you anywhere, you will be caught and maybe they sell you down to Okuni [a village in Nigeria at the Cross River] into slavery. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

First, it indicates that the ‘crime’ the population was committing, when not selling resources from the forest to the GNK (and the reference here is almost certainly to the GNK), was known to the people and some kind of punishment was

142 It may seem cynical that the ‘return’ of the Germans into the Cross River area in the form of the ‘development’ agency GTZ (German Technical Assistance) in PROFA (Protection of the Forests in Akwaya) brings to an end what was started over 100 years ago. The ‘encroachment’ of the ‘Mount Cameroon forest reserve’ onto land occupied by the Bakweri after they had been ‘relocated’ from land claimed by German plantations is a similar story (cf. Fisit 1996:234, fn. 7).

143 The discourses on German trade and the attitude of the people towards it stand in stark contrast to the hegemonic contemporary and even later academic discourses, which regarded the protection of trading interests and middlemen monopolies as the main incentives of the population to ‘resist’ German colonialism (cf. chapter 7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation – ‘a barrel of gunpowder’;268; Ballhaus 1968, E&B 1974, Nuhn 2000).
enforced; here it seems to have been imprisonment, or ‘forced labour’ at the coast\textsuperscript{144} (cf. chapter 6.2. Trading posts or points of payment:219). Secondly, it also indicates that people did evade the German (GNK) claim to only sell their goods to them. Punishment happened only if "they happen to meet you". So, all you had to do was try for them not to meet you, i.e. evade them. In this manner the slave trade went on well into the British colonial period, the slave routes were changed and the slaves disguised as family members. The question with whom those who "did not sell their goods to them" traded will be treated in chapter 6.2.3. ’Non-European trade’:224; the reference towards trans-border trade in the above statement – although here ascribed to the Germans – became an obsession in German discourses, and ‘Calabar traders’ were constructed as Germany’s fiercest competitors and adversaries in the boundary area, at least in the earlier periods. Later Hausa took over their role as ‘English traders’. Since the German-constructed ‘Calabar traders’ still haunt present Cameroonian historiography (E&B 1974:73; C&F 1995:193) and are omnipresent in German contemporary sources, I will discuss the ‘Calabar conundrum’ at some length in chapter 6.2.3. The Calabar conundrum – a discussion:225.

6.2.1. Monopoly or competition

Die ‘Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun’ verpflichtet sich, alle ihre konzessionsmäßigen Rechte nicht beeinträchtigenden Unternehmen innerhalb des Vertragsgebiets zu dulden und vor allem die Freiheit des Handels zu respektieren. (§ 3 of concession charter)

The GNK’s ‘land monopoly’ was inseparable from their ‘trade monopoly’ (cf. Ballhaus 1968:124). The original rationale was that if the GNK executed exclusive rights of ownership over the land and resources of its concession area, no other company could trade these products. The freedom of trade, as referred to in the concession charter, was thus limited to goods that did not originate from the ‘property’ of the GNK.

The GNK had initially tried to extend their sphere of monopolistic or hegemonic influence to the coast by buying the pre-existing trading posts operating there in 1900. However, they did not wholly succeed and soon chased with the DWHG, who were exploiting the rubber in the Rio del Rey and Ndian area. The DWHG also claimed to have established trade relations with the Upper Cross River area through black clerks prior to 1899 (DWHG to DKB, 15.04.1901). In 1901 the two companies agreed on a demarcation line of their respective interest zones. The GNK more easily complied as soon as it was discovered that the Cross River was navigable for steamships even beyond the ‘rapids’ in the rainy season from May to October (cf. Ballhaus 1968:131-132; cf. chapter 6.6.2. Transport:249).

The GNK had assumed that all natural resources in its ‘zone of interest’ would become their property. The ownership rights in land received by the KKG in October 1901 were extended by the GNK to all natural resources within this area. The GNK thus argued that any other trading company buying natural resources from the population, as well as people selling these products, especially rubber, could and would be prosecuted. Ramsay had announced to the population of Upper Banyang that all rubber in the area belonged to the GNK and that anybody selling it to other companies would be punished (Gellhorn, 02.06.1902). Puttkamer accepted the GNK’s view and in March 1902 announced that all trees on the land were ‘owned’ by the GNK. The ‘trading posts’ of the GNK were thus regarded as ‘points of payment’, where the population was remunerated for the labour they had invested when harvesting resources ‘belonging’ to the GNK (cf. Stoecker 1977:63; Steer 1939:163). The GNK thus enjoyed a de facto trade monopoly, since the natural resources were the only major trade products of the population (cf. Ballhaus 1968:135-136).

Before the GNK had received the concession in 1899, only the eastern part of the Cross River (Upper Banyang) had extensive and established trade relations with European traders. J&T had established a trading post in Talii as early as 1890 (cf. chapter 3.6.2. Stations in Miyimbi (1891) and Tinto (1892) – ‘mutiny’ and ‘irregularities’:123). A number of trading companies operated south of the concession area and bought products from the Upper Cross River area through indigenes networks and native peddler traders, e.g. DWHG in Abat, ABTC in Ekoneman. The most serious competitor of the GNK was to become the British company JH, that was established in Nguti and continuously sought to extend its networks. In 1902 it was trading from Tinto into the Mamfe overside area. The GNK accused JH of buying rubber that had been ‘stolen’ from ‘their forest’ (GNK to AAKA, 05.04.1905:67-68; Ballhaus 1968:137). The company JH was not willing to accept the GNK’s monopoly in the Upper Cross River area and protested to the KKG. While JH acknowledged that the GNK had become the owner of the ‘ownerless land’, it pressed for the respect of the freedom of trade. Meanwhile JH continued buying rubber from the people in the Upper Cross River area. The clashing views of the ‘disposition rights’ of natural resources resulted in violent acts by the GNK against the population. JH compared the engagement of the GNK to ‘armed robbery’ and demanded the station in Tinto to control the actions of the GNK’s agents that were causing resentment among the population (Mittelbachert to KKG, 21.04.1902). Hetebrügge, an agent of the GNK, had arrested a man who had sold rubber to the JH trading post in Nguti, claiming to act on orders of the general agent Ramsay. The Stationschef in Tinto, Ozodowski, then filed a complaint against Ramsay’s orders (Ozodowski to KGK, 28.07.1902).

\textsuperscript{144} In DMA’s testimony two elements are connected: German punishment for ‘stealing’ from their forest and smuggling on the one hand and the pre-colonial punishment of selling people who were guilty of certain crimes, e.g. murder or adultery, into slavery.
More effective was JH's complaint presented at the colonial council of the German embassy in London. The conflict in the Upper Cross River area between GNK and JH thus became politicised and placed within the complex Anglo-German relations (cf. chapter 5. Making colonial boundaries: 181). Since German trading interests in British colonies were substantial, colonial director Zimmermann guaranteed JH the continuous freedom of trade within the concession area of the GNK (cf. Bullhaus 1968:138).

The GNK then stated, probably pressured by the AAKA, that people selling to other trading companies were not to be punished because the origin of the rubber could not be ascertained (GKG, 29.11.1902). The produce from outside of the GNK's concession area and from the 'reservations' of the population could thus be sold to any trading company. Since it was impossible to trace the origin of the produce, the GNK's monopoly on trade had thus been undermined. The views held by the GNK and the administration were diverging, but the GNK had to accept the general practice, which had an impact only on the southern and eastern margins of the concession area, where other trading companies were established. The vast territory in the southwest and northern Cross River area were explored jointly by the GNK and the government officers. Up to the Mpawmanku wars in 1904 under the regime of Puttkamer, the GNK was favoured and protected by the local colonial officials to the extent that it was practically impossible for any other trading company to establish itself in the 'heartland' of the concession area. But after the Mpawmanku wars this situation changed rapidly— the new head of the district, Mansfeld, became one of the fiercest critics of the GNK and their manner of operating. By 1906 the local administration overtly lamented the GNK's de facto monopoly on trade in the Upper Cross area and called for competition, namely by JH, in order to force the GNK to work more efficiently, i.e. to better equip their trading posts with goods, pay higher prices for the products they bought, as well as sending their agents on more substantial trading journeys (cf. chapter 6.6. Lack of success: 241). The practices of JH and the GNK differed in the respect that JH employed intermediate traders who moved into more distant areas, established temporary trading posts there and exchanged goods through barter (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905: 154-155).

When Puttkamer was succeeded by Seitz in 1907, the GNK and its concession was openly regarded as a nuisance, and policy measures were sought to undermine their concessionary rights.

In 1907 confusion arose whether JH agent Bieger should be allowed to buy rubber in the overseas area, since the post in Basho argued that it presumed the rubber did not originate from the 'reservations' of the population. However, since it was judged impossible to prove the origin of the rubber, Mansfeld was of the opinion that the GNK had no grounds for any complaint. The GKG later stated that if the GNK wanted to launch an official complaint against Bieger they should do so at the court of Victoria ('where they would never be able to win'— was what the GKG certainly had in mind, but did not write). The population who harvested rubber on land that was later to become 'crowland' and then sold it to trading companies other than the GNK had officially committed a crime. The GKG however assumed that they must have been informed about the legal situation before and suggested the KRS Ossidinge to do so (Ossidinge to KGK, 24.04.1907; Bieger to KGK, 06.02.1907; ANY FA 1/356:199; KGK to KRS Ossidinge, 13.07.1907). The KGK supported Bieger even at the risk of protecting a crime. Bieger was then popular among local German officials, because he was 'agile'. The GNK had at times not even enough stock for the supply of the white population, in contrast to Bieger, who had supplied the Munchi-Basho expedition with provisions (KRS Ossidinge to KGK, 1907; sale's contract in ANY FA 1/356).

The direct competition with JH north and south of the Cross River, in addition to the establishment of the Nigeria Rubber Syndicate along the Cross River in the border area, forced the GNK to double the prices paid for rubber (from 1.5 M. to 3 M.) in 1907. Another company, Woodin, which operated in the southwestern corner of the district in Ekoneman, and had profited from the low prices paid by the GNK, reacted accordingly and raised their prices to 4.5 M. (KRS Ossidinge 1907/1908: 267). The fact that the establishment of a trading company across the border, and a subsequent increase in prices on the German side of the Cross River area had also led to a reaction as far south as Ekoneman indicates that the population still used their original trade networks. By clandestine transport, by canoes and carriers (possibly slaves), they evaded direct trading contacts with the GNK and profited from the higher prices in Ndian and Rio del Rey (DWHIG) but also at trading points on British territory (Mansfeld to KGK, 25.11.1913). This 'evasion strategy' of the population greatly contributed to the GNK's lack of success. It was early on identified as a threat to the rationale of the concession, and the foundation for the contempt of the so-called 'Calabar traders' and the preoccupation with the 'middleman monopoly'. The employment of force was not politically viable, the atrocities of the Congo had recently caused public indignation throughout Europe, and economic incentives were difficult for the GNK to offer, due to its meagre financial basis, which was aggravated by the high costs of transport. Thus the GNK even had to compete with trading companies that were not operating in their concession area.
6.2.2. 'Non-European trade'

Da wir nicht nach dem System des Congo-Staates arbeiten können oder wollen, bleibt nichts anderes übrig als den unerwünschten Handel in der ausgiebigsten Weise in diesem reichen Gebiete zu engagieren. (Pückler, 24.10.1903:168)

This passage was deleted from Pückler's report about his first journey into the Bitiekut area\(^{145}\) in the north-eastern Cross area by the AAKA before it was published in the DKB.

The term 'non-European trade' that Pückler employed is vague and uncertain. It probably referred to trade networks and relations already existing in the area. The fact that Pückler wanted to 'engage' this trade is all the more surprising, since in the same report he painted the gloomiest picture of local traders and their detrimental influence on the population's attitude towards the Germans (Pückler, 24.10.1903).

Since the beginning of the GNK's operations in the Cross River area, 'Calabar traders' had been identified as an undesired element in the Cross River region. In 1900 a large canoe of Calabar traders was detected on the Cross River (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:16) and the presence of 'Calabar people' was also noted in Ossidinge (17).

The term 'Calabar trader' had attained a highly negative connotation by the Germans through confrontations in the southern areas around Rio del Rey, close to the coast and the port of trade - Calabar. Here the 'Calabar traders' were people who set off in a boat in Old Calabar and steered it along the numerous small waterways through the mangrove area and further upstream. Trade of this sort had been going on since the late 18\(^{th}\) century and was mainly carried out by 'slaves' of the big trading houses of Old Calabar (cf. Ante Đuke). When the Germans appeared on the scene in the late 19\(^{th}\) century, these 'Calabar traders' enjoyed a trade monopoly with 'Cameroonians' villages and safeguarded it by employing force, mainly against the local people. In these areas, clashes with 'German' trading companies were direct and fierce. The 'Calabar traders' provoked the local population and the European traders directly. In order to understand the emotions involved in the German attitude towards these 'Calabar traders', I will insert a short excursion on their 'discursive construction' prior to their appearance in discourses on the Upper Cross River area. I will then try to ascertain the relationship between German 'imagination' and the 'reality' they claimed to describe. In so doing, I have had to go beyond the Upper Cross River area and beyond the colonial era.

---

\(^{145}\) One of the most important markets at the transition between forest and grassland (cf. chapter 2.3., 'Trade routes' and 'market places':60).

6.2.3. The Calabar conundrum – a discussion

In an early report, Waldau - a Swedish trader in the Rio del Rey area bordering Nigeria at the coast — constructed the image of the Calabar traders into the way it later became stereotypical in German discourses. He described the local population's fear and their suffering under the 'Calabar traders' monopoly, and their potential willingness to cooperate with the European trading companies.

Er [a local 'chief'] hatte anfangs große Abgeneizigkeit gezeigt, uns als Wegweiser zu dienen, weil er Furcht vor Calabar hegte, aber alle seine Bedenkenlichkeiten mußten bald dem Versprechen einer guten Belohnung und der Ehre weichen, welche er sich dadurch erwerben würde, daß er die ersten Weißer den Fluß [Meme] hinauf zu den großen und reichen Dörfern auf seinen Ufern führte. [...] Er war in großer Sorge darüber, daß die Calabarleute von seinem Vorhaben Kenntnis bekommen könnten. Wenn bei einer Biegung des Flusses sich einige Kanus zeigten, legte er sich schnell mit dem Rufe, 'Calabar, Calabar' auf den Boden des Bootes und spannte seinen Regenschirm über sich aus. (Waldau\(^{146}\) 1890:123)

Some Balundu villages in the Rio del Rey area actively sought the protection of the European traders, Waldau and Knutsen, against the Calabar people — an early example of the 'extraversion' of German power:

Jenbi, welcher der älteste Häuptling war, führte im Namen der Übrigen das Wort und hält eine von den lebhaftesten Geberden [sic!] begleitete Rede, worin er in der gewöhnlichen umständlichen Weise der Neger über alles Bericht erstattete, das sich seit Knutsens Besuch bei Balundu-Ba-Ba zugetragen hatte, wie sie das Calabarvolk verjagt und einige Männer ausgeschickt hätten, um uns zu holen, wie wir aber, anstatt zu ihnen zu kommen, vorbeigefahren wären und einige Dörfer oben am Meme gekauft hätten. Dies hätte die Absendung der Deputation veranlaßt, mit dem strengen Befehl, alles aufzubie- ten, um die Weißer zu vermögen, zu ihnen zu kommen und Handel mit ihnen zu treiben, sowie ihr Land zu kaufen, wodurch sie gegen das Calabarvolk geschützt sein wür- den. [...] Gebt uns Schutz gegen Calabar, kauft das ganze Land; es soll euch gehören, unsere Häuser sollen zu Eurer Verfügung stehen, werdet unsere Herren und tut alles, was ihr wollt." (Ibid.)

The local people portrayed the men of Calabar, notably the 'slaves' of the infamous 'Yellow Duke', as the curse of the land and themselves as the innocent victims.


\(^{146}\) His name is 'Waldau', but in many articles, the spelling of his name is changed to 'Val-

dau'.


Waldau judged the Calabar traders and their system of trade most unfavourably for the morals of the local population and the general 'economic development' of Africa:

Hiermit sind wir auf den verderblichen Kommissionshandel gekommen, dem Krebschaden, an dem aller Handel und Wandel in Afrika leidet, dem Hemmsuch für das Eindringen des Europäers in das Land, dessen, was die Küstenbevölkerung demoralisiert, sie faul und improduktiv macht und niederdrückend auf die Bevölkerung des inneren Landes einwirkt: Zufolge dieses Handels bekommen die inneren Stämme für ihre Arbeit so wenig bezahlt, daß sie nicht dazu ermutigt werden, mehr zu produzieren als unbedingt notwendig ist, um sich mit dem Allerinentwiegsten, wie Salz, Gewehren und Pulver, zu versehen, wohingegen sie sich Graszeug, Eisenwerkzeuge, Thongefäße u. dgl., welche Gegenstände zu kaufen für sie zu teuer ist, selbst verfertigen. (Valdau 1890:161)

The trade described here rests on 'trust-dash' system and the local people had probably accrued high debts, resulting in their dependency (cf. Valdau 1890:161; Simmons 1956:5-7; Partridge 1905; chapter 2.3. 'Trade routes' and 'market places': 60). The Calabar traders jealously kept the people from direct contact with Calabar, e.g. by denying them the possession of canoes (Valdau 1890:159). The local people saw an opportunity to escape the dependence on the Calabar traders by advancing the European traders. The complaints of the people were probably exaggerated, and the looting and kidnapping of women were certainly a way of collecting outstanding debts (172).

Waldau described a direct encounter between a Calabar and a European trader during which both parties faced each other from their respective canoes with pointed guns. The Calabar traders eventually yielded to the demand of the European trader to give up the gin that, under customs regulations established by the Germans, they were not allowed to 'import into Cameroon'. They also complied with the demand by the European to release the women they had taken to satisfy the arrests from the local people (ibid.). The colonial boundary that transected established trade networks had thus turned 'traders' into 'smugglers' and had given debtors the opportunity to avoid repayment (cf. chapter 5.4. Effecting the boundary: customs posts and boundary pillars: 196). Whether the Calabar traders operated within an ekpe polity in these southern areas is uncertain. Long-distance traders depended on security, which was facilitated by the creation of the 'ekpe polity' (cf. chapter 2.4. ekpe polity: 64). Ekpe obviously existed in the Rio del Rey area in the late 19th century – it is thus likely that it was used to safeguard debts in trade with Calabar. From Waldau's report I gather that the 'power relations' between Calabar traders and local population were asymmetrical, although whether by rule of economics or force, remains uncertain.

The image of the 'Calabar trader' as established by traders like Waldau, encompassed their domination of the local population, their aggressive attitude towards German traders, the will to employ force in order to protect their trade monopoly, and their 'smuggling' of goods across the Anglo-German border to the detriment of German interests. This image was taken up as the Germans shifted their frontier northwards and 'Calabar traders' started surfacing in the Upper Cross River area around 1900.

Who were these 'Calabar traders'? Two alternatives are imaginable. The implicit and dominant conception is the Efik hypothesis, while I favour the network hypothesis.

1) Efik hypothesis
They were professional traders, making trips from Calabar to the Upper Cross River area and back and would thus have established direct trade without middlemen from the coast to the Upper Cross area. They would then be exactly the same people Waldau had encountered in the Rio del Rey area – 'slaves' of Calabar trading houses. These Calabar trading houses spoke 'Efik' and were thus often referred to as 'Efik traders' in the literature (Forde 1956). The Efik trading dominion would thus have expanded to the Upper Cross and even the grasslands by the end of the 19th century (cf. O'Neill 1991:33).

Initially the Calabar traders conducted themselves with buying slaves from the Manfe slave traders. But, in the second half of the nineteenth century, they tried to extend their visits from the Manfe entrepôt to the source of the slaves in the Central Grasslands in order to reap more profits from the business (C&F 1995:190).

Although C&F (1995) do not state the evidence which induced them to this statement, I assume they must be referring to the report prepared by Pücker about his first journey to Brikue in 1903. Here Pücker laid the ground for all further discussions about 'Calabar traders' in the Upper Cross River area.

Mbakum war der letzte Hort und Schlußpunkt der Calabar-Händler und ein berüchtigter Sklavenmarkt; kein Fremdler konnte früher Mbakum betreten, ohne nicht gefangen genommen und verkauft zu werden. – Die Calabar-Händler haben wie überall im ganzen Crossgebiet, so besonders hier die Eingeborenen gegen die Europäer ungläublich verteuert, um möglichst lange ihr Handelsmonopol zu wahren, gegen diesen verdorbenen Einfluß haben wir heute noch zu kämpfen, und, wie das Beispiel von Mbakum zeigt, ist das Misstrauen und die Argwohn gegen uns noch lange nicht geschwunden. (Pücker, 24.10.1903:167-168)

The place referred to here as Mbakum is present-day Eshobi, situated north of the Cross River, and not far from the Brikue area (cf. Moisels's map 1912).

2) Network hypothesis
The people called 'Calabar traders' by the Germans were professional traders who traded with Calabar and not directly from Calabar. The Cross River was in pre-colonial trade not used as a means for direct long-distance trade from Calabar into the Upper Cross River area beyond the rapids. Its generous bend made the journey too lengthy, dangerous and – in especially the rainy season upriver – impossible. The fastest route towards Calabar from the Upper Cross area was via Obang to the Korup area. The direct trading contacts with Efik-speaking traders was the Korup area, from where the rivers flowing directly south to the
coast (Akwa Yafé) were navigable for canoes. Direct contact of an Efik trader with the Upper Cross River area via a steamlaunch was an occasional and recent phenomenon.

I will now present and assess evidence and testimonies for both sides:

Germans had reported that 'Calabar traders' went all over Banyang country and even entered Bali in the grasslands itself (Bericht über die Außenstationen 1899:76; cf. Valdau 1890; Partridge 1905; Pückler, 24.10.1903:167-168). The forest/grassland transition zone was first visited by Germans in 1903 (D.O. Pückler and GNK agent Willhöft). They recorded the presence of the following traders in Bitiekou: Kendem, Teko, Mbakum (Eshobi), Manfe, and Tako (Pückler, 24.10.1903:160). Except for the traders from Teko and Manfe, all the other areas immediately border Bitiekou. During the same journey they visited Mbakum (Eshobi) itself and noted the presence of 'Calabar traders' there and their extreme hostility towards the Germans. In the villages of Mfato and Eyang Nui neighbouring 'Mbakum' Pückler met 'Banyang traders' (ibid.). Here he differentiated between 'Calabar traders' and 'Banyang traders'. The German trader Staschewski, who lived in the area between 1905 and 1910, published a detailed ethnographic account of the region and obviously maintained courteous and relaxed relations with the population, mentions 'Bakum traders' who were traders of the Banyang trying to establish trade relations with the Germans travelling to Ndian (Rio del Rey), in 1900, Nsanakang 1901 and Mamfe 1902 (Staschewski 1917:37). 'Bakum' or 'Mbakum' feature as names of villages in early German records, and can be identified as 'Eshobi' in the Mamfe overside area in one case (cf. Moisels map 1912) and as a village at the Munaya south of the Cross River in the Njema area between Inokun and Tawo in the other (cf. Besser, 18.09.1900:109, probably 'Mbaakum' on Moisels map 1912, F.I. 'Oxidinge'). Both villages were identified by the Germans as trading places. The British later identified the 'Baku-Clan' as the only 'clan' of the Banyang living north of the Cross River, namely in Eshobi, Nyang, Kesham, Faitok, and Eyang (Anderson 1929:4). In the case of the Njema-Mbamse Besser noted in 1900 that during the rainy season traders from villages in the British territory travelled on the river in their canoes up to "Mbakum". These people were explicitly not Calabar traders, since people held that 'Calabar traders' were not allowed to directly enter their territory (Besser, 18.09.1900:113). 'Calabar traders' were reported to have come by steamlaunch direct from Calabar up to the Cross River rapids (Bericht über die Außenstationen 1899:76) and from there reputedly continued by canoe (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:16-18). The British, on the other hand, stressed the local nature of the trade between Nsan and Okuni (the former on the German, the latter on the English part of the Cross River) (Gallwey to KKG, 20.08.1900:166). Okuni was the final destination of steamlaunches from Old Calabar on the British side — and steamlaunches servicing Calabar-Okuni were a colonial phenomenon. In Agborkem (DMA, 12.08.2000) at the Cross River close to the border to Nigeria the slave trade network before and during the German period was described as market-to-market instead of direct trade:

You will be caught and maybe they sell you down to Okune [Okuni at the Cross River in present Nigeria], from Okune you will be sold to Akunakuna and so they continue right to Calabar. (DMA, 12.08.2000)

Ford held that some groups that migrated into the 'Yakó' territory to the west from the Ejagham-Oban area acted as middlemen in the long-distance trade from coast to the interior, while the majority of the Yakó groups "appear to have taken little direct part as traders in the Cross River traffic" (Ford 1961:310).

Talbot suggested that the influence of Efik in the Ejagham area was considerable (cf. Ottenberg and Knudsen 1985:38). 'Efik' and 'chiefs' of the hinterland were engaged in trade relations within an ekpe polity, employing the 'trust-dash system' without any political subordinance (Anene 1961:190, Jones 1956). If the Efik were so prominent in the Upper Cross River area, this should have made an imprint on the lingua franca. I have not found any evidence for Efik as a means of communication in the pre-colonial Upper Cross River area. According to Simmons (1956) Efik had become the lingua franca in the lower Upper Cross River area due to the trading activities of the Efik (3). Efik was also the lingua franca in Okuri in the transition zone between Ejagham-speaking and the Korup area (Besser, 30.11.1895:42). In 1916 the British observed the prevalence of English:

It is spoken and understood by men, boys, and even women and girls to an extent that I have not experienced before, although I have had charge of seven Districts in Nigeria and passed through as many more. It is said to be handed down from the times when the English were first in the country, and no other solution seems possible seeing that the Germans discouraged the use of English and the Missions did not include it in their curriculum. (Hunt 1916:11)

Clearly English — probably Pidgin — was a lingua franca in the area. Does the fact that even children spoke it point to English-speaking traders coming to the area itself? Pidgin English had developed on the coast of West Africa as the means of communication between European merchants, their African employees and local traders. By the eighteenth century a fairly standardised form of Pidgin English had emerged (Ford 1956b:viii). Might the Calabar traders have spoken Pidgin English with other local people? Given the fact that in the areas in which the Efik had direct trade relations the lingua franca was Efik, this seems unlikely. The prevalence of Pidgin English thus probably stemmed from the German time, when the people communicated in English (Pidgin) with the black clerks of the GNK and the black German soldiers who came from Lagos, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but also from the coast and other areas of Kamerun.147

147 It is general knowledge in the Upper Cross River area and in the grassfields, that 'Pidgin was introduced by the Germans' (cf. Todd 1991:5; Wolf 2001:55).
The frequency of (Pidgin) English in 1916 is thus no indication of people from Calabar travelling to the Upper Cross area. Even in the year 2000 people claimed that 'Pidgin' had been introduced by the Germans.

Besong (1990), relying on interviews conducted in the Banyang area in 1990, confirms that by the end of the 19th century trade in the Upper Cross Region was mainly trade between neighbouring communities with "strong trading relations especially through marriage", since distant trade included many risks, among them robbery and kidnapping (40). In 1900 a British officer explicitly stated that the only trade between the Anglo-German boundary was happening between the Okuni and their neighbours, the Nsan-group (both Ejagham-speaking) (Gallwey to KGK, 15.08.1900:121).

In 1929 35% of the active male population of the "Keaka" area were full time traders. "Big traders" went to Ikom, Calabar and Mamfe themselves to buy and sell, while petty traders went from village to village (R&A 1929:31; D.O. Ossidding 1921:5). Traders from "overseas" also went to Calabar with their canoes, stopping in various places to sell and purchase along the way.

On arriving at Calabar the farm produce is sold on the beach for cash. The money thus gained is used to purchase clothing that is sold at a profit when the trader returns to his native village. The trip to Calabar takes about one month. (Gregg 1925:29a)

The fact that direct trade existed between the Upper Cross River area and Calabar in 1929 is no indication of the pre-colonial situation. Bali, for example, had been engaged in trade with the coast solely through the middlemen network prior to the 'opening' of the Bali road. But once the road had been opened and passage had become possible, these opportunities were sought out quickly by people from the grassfields. Both Mansfeld (1908) and Besser (1900) held that people from the Njemaya area went to Calabar to sell rubber and buy European goods.

The first Germans entering Upper Banyang, Zintgraff (1888-1891) and Conrâu (1899), were told that the rivers of the area flowed towards the factories of the British and the area where slaves were bought (Zintgraff 1888, 1895; Conrâu 1899). This seems an indication that they were in contact with people who knew about those factories and traders. The factories and traders themselves were perceived as static, and the rivers led towards them. People from Calabar, i.e. Efik or other strangers, do not feature in the collective memory about pre-colonial trade networks in Upper Banyang. "Keaka" are mentioned to have come and bought slaves and sold salt. It is - of course - possible that "Keaka" encompassed any people living to the west. One man in Akiriba mentioned that his father went to Calabar to trade. Although his father had lived during the time of the Kebu wars, the exact dates of these long-distance trading journeys was impossible to ascertain. If specialised long-distance traders from Calabar had shown up in Upper Banyang, they were at least not perceived as such, but as 'neighbour-traders' like the 'Keaka'. A conflict between stranger traders and local traders is not remembered.

Chilver does not mention 'Calabar traders' in the grassfields. All specialised long-distance traders she names came from the North (Jukun, Hausa) (cf. Chilver 1961:240; C&R 2001:137). Hutter visited a market of "Miyimb" (Tali) in Upper Banyang in 1892 and there the only non-Banyang traders came from the east (the Bangwa area) (Hutter 1902:267). And Conrâu always presented the "Keaka" as trading between "Banyang" and the British trading posts at the Cross River.

The first report on trade activities in the southern Njemaya region by Besser, dated 30.11.1895, also does not refer to any such conflict. The trade networks described were mainly located in character, easily interlocked with wider networks. Otu was a trading centre with direct trading contacts to Calabar via Itaka on the Cross River. Besser met the 'King of Archibong' who had come to buy rubber here, indicating trade to the south, "Ododop" (Korup) and Rio del Rey or Calabar (40-41). From Otu southwards direct contact with 'Calabar people' was taking place (Otu and Mben), while the Ododop area still served as an intermediate area. Okuri marked the transition zone between Njemaya (Ejagham-speaking) and Korup, and the lingua franca in the village was Efik. Although 'direct trading' contact was reported by Besser for the area south of Otu, this is no indication to 'Efik-speaking' traders entered the villages themselves. Besser made reference to 'Mbinda' close to Okuri as the last village entered by the "Calabarhändler" (42). A big slave market used to exist in Mbinokum (according to Besser identical with 'Marakom'). In 1895 Mbinokum, Mbinda, and Abong still were the places frequented directly by Efik-speaking Calabar traders. The long-distance trade journeys undertaken by the Calabar traders thus did not directly penetrate into the Ejagham-speaking Njemaya area of the Cross River by the end of the 19th century. At the end of the 18th century the Calabar trading houses sent trading expeditions along the Cross and Calabar rivers towards Ododop (Korup). These trading expeditions also went on land and the one-way journey took at least two days. They were usually carried out by 'slaves' of the big trading houses (Antero Duke 1956:30, 62, 64). Between the late 18th and the late 19th century, the organisation of the trade had not changed, but a shift had taken place in the commodities demanded, with slaves starting to be replaced by rubber. The long-distance trade journeys of the Efik-speaking traders were seemingly executed along rivers navigable by their big canoes. The Korup area was connected to the coast by the rivers Akwa-Korup and Akwa-Yafé. The picture evolving for trade relations between the Upper Cross River area and Calabar shows Efik-speaking traders - 'slaves' of the big trading houses in Old Calabar - undergoing journeys by canoe some days' journey inland. Direct trade contacts existed not far from the last 'bechees' were the commodities were loaded onboard the canoes. The trade up to these points was organised in the relay sys-
tem that was multidirectional and multifunctional, i.e. not discriminating between commodities entering local or long-distance trade (cf. chapter 2.3, ‘Trade routes’ and ‘market places’: 60).

‘Calabar traders’ existed at both ends of these trade networks and ‘Calabar’ or trading with ‘Calabar’ did not only refer to the place Old Calabar but to every Efik-speaking trader coming from Calabar. Thus even people trading with these ‘Calabar traders’ had direct trading contact with ‘Calabar’ as described by Besser for Otu and Mbeban, although they themselves never set foot into Old Calabar. The Korup area marked the transition zone between the Upper Cross River area and the coast, i.e. Calabar. Further south, the influence of the Calabar traders was considerable: Efik was the lingua franca starting from Okuri; Ekon and the villages further south were under direct influence of ‘Yellow Duke’, obliged to pay tribute (Besser, 30.11.1895:43).

‘Calabar’ as both the origin and destination of commodities was known in the whole Upper Cross River area by the end of the 19th century. The information people in Upper Banyang had at the end of the 19th century about the organisation of the trade was diffuse and left room for speculation. A ‘myth’ recorded by Hutter about the ‘invisible trader’ draws a most interesting picture of the local people’s perception of trans-Atlantic trade:

Im Urwald zwischen Mi-Yimbi [Tali] und Tinto ist ein freier, lichter Platz neben einem kleinen Weiher; auf ihm befindet sich eine Säule aus Holz, daran hängt eine Trommel. Will nun ein Neger etwas verkaufen, so geht er damit an diesen freien Platz, legt die Sachen oder bindet sie an die Säule und trommelt. Hierauf muss er wieder abgewandert sein. Die Säule bleibt stehen, die Trommel fortgeht und darf überhaupt nicht mehr hinsehen. Dann kommt hinzuweilen ein Mann aus dem Wasser, aber unsichtbar, schaut die Sachen an und trommelt, was er dafür gibt. Nach einer Weile geht der Verkäufer, aber fortwährend zu Boden schend, wieder hin und bricht gleichfalls mit der Trommel Antwort, ob ihm der Preis recht ist bezw. was er dafür verlangt; sodann entfernt er sich wieder. Führt nun dieses Handeln zum gegenseitigen Einverständnis, so findet der Verkäufer, wenn er zum Schluss wieder hingegangen ist, den Kaufpreis an der Säule liegen; die Gegenstände sind verschwunden. Jetzt darf er auch wieder frei umhergehen. Tät er das, während der ganze Handel noch im Gang ist, so würde er von dem Manne erwürgt. Hier und da hat ein Jäger den Mann auch schon gesehen; er hat lange Haare und ist ganz hell. (Hutter 1902:298)

Evidently, the ‘invisible man’ is a European (light skin, long hair). The Europeans were known to ‘come out of the water’ throughout the hinterland. Esser in 1896 was confronted with this connection of ‘white man’ and ‘water’:

‘In their view, the water was the element, the home country, of the White men, believing, as they did, that they came up from the depths of the sea, via the shore, to encounter them. They claimed that the White man was a fish-being, because he had white flesh like that of a fish. (Esser/C&R 2001:74)

‘Germans’, ‘water’, and river transport were still a natural correspondence for many people in the Upper Cross River area in 2000/2001, some claiming the Germans were ‘mermaids’ (“belopya”) (NNF, 12.10.2001). The ‘man coming out of the water’, with ‘long hair and fair’ is thus unmistakably a European. But he is also ‘invisible’. This points to the fact that people in Upper Banyang had no direct trading interactions with Europeans neither in Calabar nor in the trading posts at the Cross River. The ‘invisible trader’ was desired as a trading partner, but at the same time he threatened to strangle his trading partner in case he watched him. This may indeed be an indication that the direct trading partners of the people in Upper Banyang tried to guard their ‘middleman’ position. The ‘free, cleared’ space between Tali and Tinto most certainly was the official market place in which actual trade with ‘visible’ non-European traders took place every eight days. Upper Banyang people themselves did not trade directly with ‘Calabar’ or any Europeans.

In 1900 Besser met Ogba of Mbnyan of the salt group – the man who was to become a German intermediary and confidant. According to Besser he had encountered many German white men in Old Calabar (Besser 26.07.1900:87). What Ogba had done in Old Calabar, whether he traded or not, is not stated. However, it seems unlikely that he was a ‘Calabar trader’, since he was from the salt producing group (mfookum) and generally the salt producers did not engage in trans-local trade (cf. chapter 2.2, Regional specialisation:58). Even if he was trading with Calabar, he was not Efik.

The Germans themselves might have used the term ‘Calabar trader’ in the Upper Cross River area for a person who traded indirectly with Calabar. Whether the person actually came from Calabar and belonged to the Efik trading houses was probably not of interest to them. ‘Calabar’ was the final destination of the trade, the ‘port of trade’, and as such in direct competition to the German ‘port of trade’ in Douala. The label ‘Calabar’ was thus possibly only used to identify the final destination of the trade. This view is supported by the fact that at times – but not often – the Germans deployed the ‘flooding’ of the Upper Cross River area with ‘English traders’ – and quite evidently they were not referring to people born and bred in Great Britain, but to Africans who sold what they bought in the Upper Cross River area to English trading companies (GNK to AAKA, 30.11.1900; GNK to AKA, 21.12.1900).

From this discussion, I conclude that the people called ‘Calabar traders’ in German colonial texts were not traders belonging to the Efik trading houses of Calabar. [NB: This refers only to the ‘Calabarhändler’ of the Upper Cross River area. South of it, the term of course does refer to members of the Calabar trading houses. These ‘real Calabar traders’ extended as far as Okuri in the Obang/Korup transition area and travelled on the Cross River up to the rapids. The people the Germans perceived as ‘Calabar traders’ in the Upper Cross River area were professional traders, powerful and rich. Their trade was safeguarded through cultural (ekpe) and social (intermarriage) ties, they were not considered ‘foreign’ in the Cross River area.]
What is more difficult to ascertain is what the Germans had in mind when they used the term 'Calabar trader'. Whether the Germans took them to be delegates of 'Erik trading houses' or 'middlemen' on the way to Calabar remains thus a conundrum still to be solved. The notion of the 'Calabar trader' as it existed in German colonial discourse was, however, applied to the Upper Cross River area. The 'Calabar trader' of the Upper Cross River area – as constructed within German colonial discourse – was a 'smuggler', an instigator, an adversary, and a competitor. They were primarily blamed for the 'uprising' in the area against the Germans in 1904, because they allegedly aroused hatred towards the Germans (cf. chapter 7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation – 'a barrel of gunpowder', 268). One might suspect that the Germans were roasting a scapegoat that would readily be swallowed.

What has become evident from the above discussion is that the local trade networks were changing under colonialism. Generally the trade networks became longer and stretched further. Bali trading parties went as far south as Kumba mainly to sell slaves (O'Neil 1996:93). Foreigners of African origin but transplanted far from their homes through colonialism started penetrating the Upper Cross River area by 1900, before it had been officially included into the German colonial order. Ramsay reported that he met seemingly independent Vai and traders from Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the Njemaya area (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:11). They might have worked for Dualla, who had started to construct their trade network into the southern Cross area by 1900 (ibid.). In 1904, the Dualla Manga Bell executed trading posts as far north as Abat in the Obong area, where he competed with JH and the GNK (Langheli, 09.03.1904:36).

The classic 'non-European' trade the Germans tried to engage in Kamerun were the Hausa caravans and peddlers. The German administration actively encouraged direct trade with the Hausa from the north and coast. In 1902 the first 'Hausa caravan' reached Yaoundé; in 1903 Hausa dealt ivory between Bambenda and the coast (DKZ 1903, vol. 30:308). German traders were not, however, always pleased with this competition, mainly because the Hausa caravans did not have to respect the carrier decree of 1908, which restricting the loads to 30 kg among other limitations (Rudin 1938:331-332; cf. GR, 26–29.11.1913:68-70), but also because their networks extended into the British sphere and the colonial border, especially in the northern area (beginning from Mamfe overside), had none or relatively little importance for them.

The appearance of Hausa in the Upper Cross River area was a phenomenon connected to colonialism. The first Muslim Hausa had entered the area in 1905 and had officially come to hunt elephants (Mansfeld to KGG, 06.07.1905:87; Herrmann, Sept. 1906:84). Mansfeld gave them land to settle at the station in Ossidinge, and they engaged in elephant hunting and started cotton and rice cultivation. The community consisted of thirty men and one woman and built five houses (Mansfeld to KGG, 06.07.1905:87). In 1906/07 33 male Hausa lived in the district and worked as peddlers traders (ANY FA 1/69:144). In 1908 they had still not received the licence to hunt elephants that they desired (Revisionskommission 1908:126). In the Upper Cross River area the 'uncontrolled presence' of Hausa was regarded suspiciously. In 1912 Schipper had noted the existence of a large Hausa colony in Obudu in Nigeria, but close to the Anglo-German border and their presence in Assumbo in Kamerun (Schipper to KGK, 12.12.1912:17). They had thus extended their trade network from Obudu well into German territory. As traders with networks on both sides of the boundary, they became smugglers, and they could also be subsumed as 'English traders', since they were trading with the English trading posts in Nigeria. The German presence in the northern Cross area was too weak to mingle into these developments and the situation persisted.118

'Non-European' trade was never successfully 'engaged' by the Germans, as Packler had envisaged in 1903. On the contrary, both existing as well as newly developed trade networks redirected trade from the GNK trading posts, mostly to shops on the British side, but also to companies that paid higher prices south of the Upper Cross area.

6.3. Labour

Labour shortage had been a topos in mise-en-valeur discourses in Kamerun from the beginning of the colony's 'creation' (cf. chapter 3.7.4. Transport:140; Hausen 1970:274-290; Rudin 1938:315-337). Human labour was needed in the form of porters, soldiers and, since the creation of the big plantations in the south, especially the WAPV, as plantation labourers. Zintgraff's vision of the grasslands as the source of labour had been enacted since 1896, but the labour supply of the Bali had been overestimated by Zintgraff, and the Bali reverted to their dependents and neighbours, e.g. the Mokhama speaking groups of the Wukum area, for forceful 'recruitment' (cf. O'Neil 1996:92; Kaberry and Chilver 1961:370; chapter 4.2.1. Zintgraff, Esser, Conrath (1896):153).

With the granting of the concessions to the GNK, serious competition arose between 'private' labour recruiters for the plantations and the labour demands of the GNK. Ramsay stated in 1900 after his first visit to Bali and the opening of a GNK trading post there that he regarded labour recruitment as the sole business of the GNK. He claimed that he certainly did not want to damage the interests of the plantations in the south, but 'labour recruitment' should become a source of income for the GNK. These passages were cancelled before publication, and the issue was subject to ongoing dispute (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:32; cf. C&R 2001:141-146 for the dispute between WAPV and GNK in Bali). In the Nje-

---

118 In these areas, economic networks still ignore the international boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon in 2000/2001.

Neither the messenger Ajo nor the chief of Kepelle Ashu reveal that they received 25 strokes, but Gebhardt claimed. The element of force used in the 're-cruitment' of labourers by Strauss is evident, but still Gebhardt of the GKN exaggerate the incident, in attempt to convince the KGK of the brutality with which 'private impresarios' proceed, probably hoping to achieve a monopoly for labour recruitment for the GKN. In 1906 the military station of Fontem extradited two labour recruiters from Upper Banyang who had tied up chiefs in order to press for the needed amount of labourers. The Upper Banyang area was at that time burdened with the demand for labour both for carriers by the GKN and labour recruiters, and people had reverted to the tactic of escaping from the village upon the arrival of German envoys (Schmierinz, 01.04.1906).

In 1904, in connection with the compensation charges for the Mpbwamkwa wars (cf. chapter 6.5. Damages 1904-240), the GKN demanded the AAKA acknowledge the GKNs monopoly to export workers from their concession area (GKN to AAKA, 04.05.1904:20).

After 1906 the labour demands of the GKN, the plantations in the south, the station, and the railroad were shared and supervised by the Bezirksamt. Quota were fixed and the recruiters needed the consent and cooperation of both the KGK and the KRS. The conditions for private labour recruiters again became stricter in 1909, but the system continued until 1913, when the government as-
sumed the sole responsibility for the labour domain (Rudin 1938:325; cf. chapter 8.1.5 Njokomansi - 'work without pay':345).

Schipper also stated that the people in the Upper Cross area were willing to work for money, but they had to be forced if the expected working conditions were fatal. Work within the district seems to have been most favoured, and so the GNK thus did not have to revert to employ force for the recruitment of labourers (Schipper to KGK, 07.02.1913:247). In 1911 and 1912 the GNK was assigned 250 workers p.a. (KGK, 05.08.1911; Mansfeld to KGK, 11.07.1911; KGK, 26.04.1912).

6.4. Salt, plantations, and industries

Before a representative of the GNK had ever set foot into the concession area, the director of the GNK in Berlin had enquired from the AAKA whether the salt springs would fall into their area (GNK to AAKA, 06.12.1899). The location of their first trading post was chosen accordingly and the GNK planned to erect a station for salt production immediately after establishing themselves in the Upper Cross area (cf. AAKA, 31.03.1900; DKB 1899, no. 24:849; Puttkamer, 13.01.1901:16; chapter 2.2. Regional specialisation:58 for the importance of salt in the Cross River area).

Im Bereich der kaiserlichen Station Nissake besuchte Ramsay mehrere Solquellen, die sich durch erheblichen Salzgehalt auszeichnen. Ihre rationale Ausbeutung wird vermutlich nur wenige Mühe und Kosten verursachen, sofern die Eingeborenen nicht Widerstand leisten. (Seidel 1901:346)

The salt springs feature prominently in the early reports about the concession areas and were perceived as a huge economic gain for which competition with the British was likely (Seidel 1901, 1902). The Germans celebrated their 'victory' over the 'scramble for Naamakang' in terms of its economic potential with regard to the salt ponds (Ramsay 1904:199; DKZ 1902, no. 9:87).

In 1905 the Stationsleiter Mansfeld sent a detailed report to the KGK, suggesting the commercial exploitation of the salt ponds and the introduction of a tax on salt. Since the ownership rights of land and resources of the GNK were at the time seriously disputed, the question arose of what kind of rights the GNK held over the salt springs. The legal department of the AAKA stated that salt springs were not minerals in the strict sense and as such not part of the concession of the GNK. Since by 1905 the GNK executed the provisional ownership rights over the areas of the salt springs in the Njemaya and Ngomaya area, the AAKA nonetheless concluded that the GNK had the sole rights of exploitation over these springs. The AAKA in their internal correspondences stressed, however, that the property rights were currently under review by a court of arbitration. The AAKA expected that after the ruling of the court of arbitration, the area of the salt ponds would fall under the ownership of the local population, since they were executing the effective ownership rights. These ownership rights would cease to be applicable, if a new decree was passed that made salt into a non-minable mineral. The AAKA then deplored that an exploitation of the springs by the GNK was not expected (BAB R1001/3470:113-115). The inertia of the GNK with regard to the Cross River salt became one of the main arguments for the withdrawal of the concession after 1911 (GNK 1913:55).

This project was never realised149, but after the Mpawmanku wars, the GNK erected a palm oil factory in Mamfe - actually the first such industry in Kamerun at the time (DKZ 1905:641). This factory consisted of a hulling machine, a seeding machine and a hydraulic press (Revisionskommission, 02.11.1908:125; cf. DKZ 1910, no. 48:805). In 1911 it employed 70 workers (Mansfeld to KGK, 30.03.1911). A plantation in Okoyong - close to Mamfe - was connected to the oil palm factory in 1909 (GNK 1913:35). In 1911 it employed 109 workers, with the bulk of the labour provided by the local population (78), while a smaller percentage came from Bali (26), and the headmen were from Bali (3) or Sierra Leone (Vai) (2) (Scheidewind to KGK, 01.09.1911). The greater part of the palm nuts and kernels for the factory was bought from the population. In 1911 'beaches', i.e. depots along the river, where established in Badje, Abonando, and Agborkem (GNK, 1913:35).

While the oil palm factory was incessantly praised by the GNK as a certain indication for their success in 'developing' their concession area,150 its operation was extremely difficult due to constant technical faults (ibid.). Grievances among the employees further hindered an efficient use of the factory (Rausch, 2603.1914). The GNK failed to sell at the price they desired after their concession had been withdrawn and had to consider shutting it down (GNK, 12.03.1913:34; cf. DKZ 1911, no. 45:752). The problem was solved when the factory was destroyed by a fire of unknown causes in 1913. Since the losses were covered by an insurance, it may be suggested that the GNK had destroyed the factory on purpose in order to retrieve at least some benefits. The ruins of the factory were sold to the BNKNG at a very low price (GNK, 19.05.1913:37; cf. DKZ 1913, no. 49:819).

In March 1901 the GNK had opened an experimental farm in Abonando with Kizia rubber trees, and also Hevea, Castilla and Ramie. In 1902 30,000 Kizia trees were planted (GNK 1913:31). The rubber trees survived the Mpawmanku wars.151 In 1902 it covered 35 ha and numbered 10,400 Kizia trees. It was super-

149 Although in effect the salt industry was never actively mise-en-valor by the German colonial project, but merely declined as an effect of the imported salt from Europe, it constituted an essential part of German knowledge about the Upper Cross area. As such it has been maintained, cf. Hausen 1970:12.


151 Some still exist at the former site of the plantation.
vised by one German and maintained by 30 'workers' from the area around Abonando and Tinto (GNK, 1903a:20; GNK, 1913:31-32). In 1904/05 coffee was planted alongside the Kixia trees, and the plantation area was reduced to 25 ha (Jahresbericht Kamerun 1904/05:152-153). In 1907 the plantation was run by one German who employed 40 to 50 workers (ANY FA 1/69:400).

**Figure 8 The plantation in Abonando 1907**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>crops</th>
<th>total cultivated area (ha)</th>
<th>cultivated productive area (ha)</th>
<th>total trees</th>
<th>total productive trees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>coffee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kixia (rubber)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manihot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaziaus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coconut trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sisal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>4,067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ANY FA 1/69:400*

In 1913, when the GNK's concession had been withdrawn, and its infrastructure was taken over by the BNGO, the GNK admitted that the experiments with the Kixia trees had failed and the plantation was abandoned (GNK, 12.03.1913; Mansfeld to KGK, 09.09.1913; cf. DKZ 111, no. 45:752).

The fact that the GNK had not inspected the district for mineral resources was included in their shortcomings as a precondition for the withdrawal of the concession (cf. Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914).

6.5. Damages 1904

During the Mpawmanku wars all the GNK stations were destroyed and looted, and five of their agents lost their lives. The GNK took this opportunity to demand reparations from the German Reich by blaming D.O. Pückler-Limpurg for the outbreak of the war (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpawmanku wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzusehen".265; Ballhaus 1968:161-162; Michels 2002). Ballhaus argued that the GNK, having accrued considerable losses due to their ineffective management, had tried to stabilise their financial base with these claims (Ballhaus 1968:161). The German state prepared a legal expertise, stating that in the German colonies the German state was not liable for any actions provoked accidentally by its administrators and furthermore stating that Pückler had not been careless, even if he had been warned by the GNK agents. Had Pückler done so with the consent of the KGK, all claims would fall to the KGK. The expertise was only used by the AAKA for internal purposes, since some of the assumptions, especially about Pückler's behaviour, the nature of his expedition and the KGK's stance towards it, did not suit AAKA's policies. However, its general conclusion became the imperative for the AAKA's treatment of the claims: it was judged that the 'natives' were the original provokers of the hostilities and thus ultimately liable for the damages caused. Compensation had thus to be sought from them (AAKA-Gutachten no date). The GNK was informed about the AAKA's conclusion:

Wean nun auch weder ein Rechtsanspruch auf Entschädigung durch den Fiskus anerkannt noch auf eine Entschädigung aus Billigkeitsgründen durch die Regierung gerech- net werden kann, so bin ich doch mit Rücksicht auf die schwierige Lage der Gesell- schaft geneigt, der Ersatzfrage näher zu treten u. den Versuch zu machen, die aufständi- schen Eingeborenen zur Deckung des tatsächlich entstandene Schadens anzuhalten. (AAKA to GNK, 24.03.1904:8, 9)

In this letter the AAKA even pointed out that 'uprisings' such as the one in the Cross area in 1904 (the Mpawmanku wars) and the subsequent military operations were usually beneficial for trade, since they 'opened up' previously inaccessible areas (ibid:10; also: AAKA to GNK, 09.06.1904:24).

Although the GNK disagreed with the AAKA about the Pückler's alleged guilt or innocence, they had to accept the decision (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904; cf. chapter 7.2.3. Pückler and Küster f.:289). The GNK then demanded the population be compelled to deliver 25,000 kg rubber and 60 elephant tusks each year for a duration of ten years free of charge plus 200 workers each year (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:20). Ballhaus has rightly judged that the GNK thus sought to establish a trading system based upon force, not dissimilar to the 'Congo system' that it had previously not been able to establish (Ballhaus 1968:162).

The AAKA acknowledged a total damage of 404,744.65 M. - roughly half of the initial compensation demanded by the GNK and their employees (cf. BAB R100/4454). The KGK established a fund for the compensation claims of the GNK (Pöttkenamer to AAKA, 13.11.1905:71-86), but the GNK never received the full amount. 6,000 M. were used for the personal demands of the GNK employees, and only 4,851.52 M. remained for the GNK (Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914).

6.6. Lack of success

The GNK never yielded any financial success. From the beginning of its operations, they could not present positive reports (Seidel 1903-94). The main reasons were the high costs for administration, its meagre financial base, the consequent low prices paid for the products, and the insufficient trade items available in their trading posts (KRS Ossingede to KGK, 01.04.1906:175; Schulz, 31.03.1906:168; Mansfeld to KGK, 04.04.1907:98; Mansfeld to KGK 25.11.1913, including copies of such complaints from the files of Ossingede in the years 1906-1908; Rausch, 25.05.1914; Ballhaus 1968:144-145; Rohde
1997:94 for similar complaints in the district of Dechang). The low morals of the GNK's staff, the low population density and the 'negro’s laziness' were noted by Herrmann in 1906 as the reasons why the GNK was not able to establish a profitable trade with the abundant natural resources (Herrmann, Sept., 1906:82-83). Mansfeld later stated that the GNK agents never left their trading posts and often had no idea where the produce brought to them was coming from (RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914); indeed some of it came from British territory north of the Cross River and thus the GNK's claims that smuggling over the border into British territory was detrimental for their trade, became obsolete. They did not employ clerks who toured the region in order to arouse the interest of the people to trade with them (Mansfeld to KGK, 25.11.1913). The administration of the GNK never sent a delegation to the concession area to enquire the trade practices of its agents (RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914).

The indolence of the GNK staff rather than the 'indolence of the natives' was the reason for the GNK’s lack of success, at least according to Mansfeld:

Auf der unglaublichen Indolenz basieren auch die sämtlichen Klagen, die die Direktion in ihren Jahresberichten ständig zum Ausdruck gebracht hat und die sich immer auf die Faulheit der Eingeborenen und auf mangende Unterstüzung seitens der Regierung erstrecken; dass die Ossindigeneger nicht faul sondern regenmüter als viele andere sind, geht aus den vielen Nachfragen nach Haupersonal von allen Kostenplätzen hervor.
(Mansfeld to KGK, 25.11.1913)

While Mansfeld’s opinion about the GNK, their 'indolence', 'incompetence', and 'low morals' has mainly coloured the picture of this company, his colleague in Bamenda, Bezirksamtmann Schiper, judged them with more sympathy:


The GNK regretted that they could not employ 'the manner of the Kongocompanie', namely force (145).

Daß die Eingeborenen bei ihrer angeborenen Faulheit überhaupt Landesprodukte für den Handel mit den Faktoreien gewinnen, ist in erster Linie dem Schimpfton zuzuschreiben, und so sehr man auch vom rein menschlichen Standpunkte das allgemeine verbreitete Laster des Schnupperdungs verurteilen muß, eine ist klar, ohne Schnups würde der Export sich auf ein Minimum reduzieren. (Herrmann, Sept. 1906:80)

According to Rudin, liquor and guns were the most desired articles, and demand for other European goods was rather negligible (Rudin 1938:222; cf. Herrmann, Sept. 1906:83 for trade with flint-lock guns in the Upper Cross area). For early trade at the coast he stated the "trading was accompanied by a good deal of palaverings, with the white man offering drinks of cheap liquor to make the natives see his offers advantages not clearly evident at the beginning of the bargaining" (ibid.). The account of the first contact with a German trader and the people of Nianakang describes a similar procedure:

The white man now came, they landed their ship, they were white in colour, when they saw them, the people were afraid of the difference in colour, since they are blacks, they wanted to run away from the white men, so the whites called on them to come closer and that they should not be afraid. The white man ordered that they should bring forth drinks, that they should sit down, they should not run away from them. So, they brought our drinks of assorted types and gave them to the people and said they should sit down and drink. They brought out tobacco with pipes. They sat down and they started entertaining the blacks, i.e. the people of Agborkem German [Ossindine]. So actually he just started telling a story about how he heard that the blacks have tails, he said his motive of coming was to see for himself, if the blacks actually have tails. So he begged that the people should get up so that he could inspect them and see whether they had tails. The next morning he re-iterated and said that he had not actually come to see whether the blacks had tails, but that there was another motive. The people should not be afraid of him, he had come to trade with the people and to establish a market here. So he now told the people the type of goods he was to be dealing with: kernels, coconut, rubber, ebony — all things found in our forests. He later told them that he would like to trade with them if they would buy all things that they needed from him, and that next time he would come with a bigger ship, so they should get prepared to supply him with the goods he needed. He greeted the people and left and when he came back with a different boat he had gun powder, ammunition and other goods with him. He now had his own private ship that he used for his business trips. As they landed with the ship, he now informed the elders of the village to inform their neighbouring villages of Kajfu, Assam, Betene etc. that he has come with his goods so they should come and buy. He invited the chiefs and he gave them drinks, he gave them certain food, like rice, sardines, etc. to cook, so that they should eat a meal together. He presented drinks again and they continued drinking [...] The neighbouring villages, Assam, Badje, etc. brought their goods of kernels, coconuts, ebony on their head to come and sell, Agborkem was the central market. Whatever you needed it was always found in Agborkem at that time. For the Germans to satisfy his customers in those days, they offered free gifts of rice, sardines, boxes of matches. [...] Why the people say or believed that the white man was actually a good man was because of the free gift which he always offered to his numerous customers. So, the best of it was the red wine, which in those days they offer you in a very long glass of which you drink. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

152 This "free gift" or 'dash' was a general characteristic of trade in Cameroon. Whether it had been explicitly asked for by the people in the Cross River area because it was part of their trading practices or transplanted by the European trader from the coast is impossible to ascertain (cf. Rudin 1938:225, chapter 2.3, 'Trade routes' and 'market places':60).
The memories of the trade during the German time in the Upper Cross River area perceive trade as a legitimate means to obtain money that was "scarce" in those days. Trade was the only means for the people to acquire money and desired goods, mainly guns and liquor but also tobacco, soap, matches and rice (KRS Ossidinge to KGG, 01.04.1906:175).

In those days of the Germans there was scarcity of money and so we have a stick that produces latex. Our parents used to climb up these trees to harvest this liquid. They suffered to get a small quantity. They used to shape it into a rectangular form and then take it to Mamfe. That was how they could get money. After that they will buy their small cloth for themselves. Then you were a rich man. (EN, 07.07.2000)

We loved their products very much, because they were very hard. Their products like shoes and cloth lasted for a very long time. (AO, 06.07.2000)

The "trade by barter" was partly blamed for the lack of success of the GNK. The government tried to introduce the German mark as a medium of standardised exchange, but was itself forced to accept payment in kind or labour as a means of payment of taxes and thus entered into competition with the traders (Rudin 1938:224).

The 'trust' system established at the coast for centuries was extended to the trading system of the interior, and was met with similar criticism there:

Der Eingeborene geht, wenn er Geld braucht, zum Kaufmann, lässt sich Geld geben und verspricht dann, wenn er gemacht wird, Kerner oder Oel zu bringen, ohne daß diese Lieferung für ihn von Anfang an wesentlicher Zweck des Geschäfts war. (Legationsrat Ohlschäfer, in GR, 26.-29.11.1911:380)

Es ist bekannt, daß Eingeborenen, die Geld zum Bezahlung der Steuern, für Gerichtsgebühren oder zum Kaufbrauch brauchen, sich Darlehen vom schwarzen Händler geben lassen, mit dem Versprechen, dafür Kerner und Palmöl zu bringen. Vielmehr werden dar für das erste geringe Darlehen auch Landeszeugnisse geliefert, vielleicht auch noch für das zweite oder dritte grösseries Darlehen. Dann aber bei einem großen Vorschuss von 500 oder mehr Mark verschwindet der Schuldner im Busch und dann geben die Mißstände an. (Bezirksamtmann Berger, Edea, in GR, 26.-29.11.1911:380)

Der farbige Händler ist der Bankier der Eingeborenen geworden. Der Händler geht mit Waren und Geld in den Busch und verteilt diese Sachen an jeden, der sie von ihm verlangt; an den Mann, der sich eine Frau kaufen will; an den Häuptling, der noch nicht alle Steuern bezahlt hat usw. (Bezirksamtmann Krobhe, Yabassi, in GR, 26.-29.11.1911:381)

The practice was banned for rubber by the Gouvernement in 1912, but it was later judged detrimental for the trade and the ban was removed (83).

The GNK was constantly criticised for their price policies and the insufficient amount of trade articles they offered in their shops (Revisionskommission 1908; Gelhorn, 02.06.1902; cf. Ballhaus 1968:169). This was systematically caused by the meagre finances available and aggravated when the fleet stopped functioning in 1907 (Mansfeld to KGG, 04.04.1907:98).

It could not withstand the direct competition with the trading posts on British territory. Most of the rubber found along the Anglo-German boundary was evacuated to the British side – mainly on canoes – because the prices obtained were three times higher than the prices paid by the GNK and the goods of European origin were 50 percent cheaper (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:152-153; Mansfeld to KGG, 14.12.1906; Schulz, 31.03.1906; Mansfeld to KGG, 04.04.1907:98; Ballhaus 1968:169). When the Nigeria Rubber Syndicate established trading posts all along the Cross River up to the boundary in 1907, the amounts of rubber and palm kernels sold to the GNK dropped dramatically (ibid.; Mansfeld to KGG, 07.06.1907), although Mansfeld had forced them to increase the prices paid for rubber by 100% (Mansfeld to KGG, 02.01.1907). German firms operating south of the GNK concession area (DWHG and Woodin), also profited from the unfavourable prices of the GNK. Products from the whole Upper Cross River area were traded to these areas using previously established trade relations (ibid.). Since 1907 the GNK had to considerably reduce its activities due to serious underfunding. Its activities almost came to a standstill in 1909, when the rubber crisis aggravated the situation. The situation was worsened further because the rubber of the Cross River area was of inferior quality (Mansfeld to KGG, 06.07.1905:89). The wild rubber could not withstand the competition with the plantation rubber and by 1916 it was no longer in demand (Hunt 1916:4). The total amount of debt accumulated amounted to 2,56 million M. (ibid.). When the GNK had turned to the exploitation of ebony, it was soon accused of overexploitation' and Mansfeld passed an order prohibiting the filling of ebony trees (RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914).

In 1910 the RKA had withdrawn the concession, litigation in court ensued and the BNKG took over most of the GNK's activities and infrastructure. It may seem unfair to blame the decreasing trade of the Upper Cross River area – as recorded by the customs post Nsukang – on the GNK/BNKG in this situation, as the RKA was doing (RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914), but given the unfavourable conditions of trade it is open to speculation whether the situation would have been different had the GNK operated under full protection of the German administration.

6.6.1. 'Lack of competence and morals'

There can be no question that some of the acts of brutality and impatience in the colony were due to the effect that the climate had on Europeans [...]. The physical strain caused by the heat and the humidity and deadly monotony of life at a post in the mangrove swamps or a similar place and by the endless palaverings of natives over matters of little or no interest to the white man may well explain why officers at isolated posts had native mistresses and turned to drink. (Rudin 1938:208)

Although the climate had to be endured by government employees and private Germans alike (and Rudin explicitly refers to Government officials in the quota-
tion above), the traders were systematically singled out as the worst examples — usually as members of the 'lower classes', they were represented as more perceptible for the detrimental influence of the climate and indolence. Alcohol and 'native mistresses' were consumed by government officials135, traders, and planters alike, but in hegemonic colonial discourse the traders were represented as excessive and decayed.

Es ist wirklich kein erhebender Anblick, wenn man einzelnen Faktoristen beim Einnehmen der Mahlzeiten beobachtet, und das — gelinde gesagt — ungenierte Benehmen dabei trägt keineswegs zur Hube des afrikanischen Kaufmannstandes bei. Was in erster Linie verlangt werden muß, sind wirklliche Kaufleute als Faktoristen, die neben einer gestigten Beherrschung der rein kaufmännischen Technik eine gewisse Kinderstube-Erziehung genossen haben […] Es ist eine vollständig verkehrte Ansicht, daß Afrika für jedweden gerade gut genug ist. (Schlopp 1903b: 279)

Man muß kein Antialkoholiker sein, um zu der Ueberzeugung zu kommen, daß übermäßig Trinken den Körper ruiniert. Diese Unzulässigkeiten dürfen zum Teil ebenfalls auf diejenigen zurückzuführen sein, die eine bessere Erziehung nicht genossen haben und denen jede Selbstbeherrschung in der Zügelung ihrer Begierde fehlt. Die sogenannte 'Löwenkiste' von Kamerun ist, was übermäßig Trinken anbelangt, geradezu berüchtigt. (Schlopp 1903b)

Allerdings sind die Weißen auf den Faktoreien meist auch nicht dazu prädestiniert, den Neger die Superiorität der weißen Rasse vor Augen zu führen. (Hermann, Sept. 1906:84)

It was recorded that the GNK agent Broll of the trading post in Mamfe had frequently lashed people while he was drunk, which was regarded as one factor leading to the Mpwamkulo war of 1904 (Seidel, 16.03.1904; cf. chapter 7.2.1). "Causes for a militant confrontation — A barrel of gunpowder" 1268


135 Puttkamer himself had a local mistress and 'in his frank way' praised the positive effects of such a liaison and also officially protected the 'provision of local women for Europeans' ("Zuführen einheimischer Weber an Europäer") (cf. Puttkamer to RK, 07.12.1896) § 2 of the order no. 86 of 1896 reads: "Weibliche Missions-Züglinge dürfen nur nach zuvor eingehobener Zustimmung des Gouverneurs zu Dienstleistungen an Europäer vermietet werden" (Puttkamer, 07.12.1896).
Bieger, who had been in the services of the GNK before he entered the JH, was an extremely interesting example of the kind of people who entered the services of trading companies and the way they behaved in the colonies. For reasons unknown, Bieger had been imprisoned in Douala before entering the service of the JH in 1907. At first he was judged favourably by the administration and he pursued the interests of the JH energetically, erecting trading posts in Basho and pledging to open one in Oban (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?: 209). The local administration had supported him in his endeavours, but six months after the signing of the contract in Oban, Bieger had not paid the price of 30 M., and had also not paid the population for the construction of the trading post the agreed sum of 800 M. — work which had taken them several months. Bieger had also occupied an area 20 times bigger than specified in the contract, stating that he had agreed with chief Obi to lease the plot for additional 5 M. per year, while 'chief Obi' denied this and stated that he — Obi — did not have the right to do this alone. Bieger also tore two houses of Oban people down, without their consent and without their being on his own land. For all these charges, the people of Oban sued Bieger in the district court of Victoria. Mansfield, who intervened on their behalf, suggested the nullification of the contract with Bieger and a strict denial of all possible further requests by Bieger to obtain land (Mansfield to KKG, 28.02.1909). The KKG however, was not willing to dissolve the JH trading post in Oban (KKG to KBA Ossindigde, 19.04.1909). In July 1909 Bieger had still not paid and also not opened the trading post, because he was 'elephant hunting' in a village in the overside area. He had also closed the trading post in Basho and his two clerks had sued him for non-payment of their wages for ten to eleven months. Mansfield stated that Bieger was sued in twelve cases and was obviously absolutely destitute. He summed up the situation as follows:

Ein Weißer, ohne Beschäftigung und somit ohne Nutzen für das Schutzgebiet, darf im Bezirk herumziehen, der Elefantenjagd nachgehen, obwohl er in allen Teilen des Bezirkes Schuld hat (es sind über 1000 M.), obwohl er sich von Eingeborenen in Gestalt von Zeugen das unbefugte Schlachten von Zivilstreitigkeiten bezahlen läßt. (Mansfield to KKG, 10.07.1909)

Mansfield asked for the withdrawal of Bieger's hunting license, but the Government remained hesitant. Bieger finally disappeared without meeting any of his obligations (Mansfield to KKG, 09.09.1913). In 1913 he was still resident in Kamerun, in Ndumba district of Yaoundé, and the KKG still tried to settle the charges against him (KKG to KBA Ossindigde, 01.11.1913).

Bieger had grasped the opportunities that the colonial system in Kamerun offered to him as a 'whiteman': he got employment although he had a criminal record, he was entrusted with cash, credit, and power over employees, he had a hunting license, and he was regarded by the local population as an authority, who judged their cases against payment, and he could disappear from undesired obligations. He thus oscillated between extraversion and evasion of power in much the same way as the local population did (cf. chapter 8.3. Extraversion of power — "so that their fellow blackmen should be afraid of them": 353 and 8.4. Evasion of power: 358).

6.6.2. Transport

Transport of goods proved to be one of the crucial problems of the GNK from the beginning to the end.


All transport via land was extremely costly and slow (GNK to AAKA, 30.11.1900; Erschliessungsarbeiten der GNK, 1899-1903:127-128). The GNK's plan to proceed along the Rio del Rey and Ndom from the South was soon shattered, because of non-cooperation with the DWHG which operated in these areas (cf. Ballhaus 1968:131-132; GNK to AAKA, 30.11.1900; chapter 6.2:219). Since 1895 the Cross River was known to be navigable beyond the rapids from May to November. In 1901 its navigability up to Mambé was ascertained (Puttkamer to AAKA, 02.10.1901; Erschliessungsarbeiten im Konzessionsgebiete der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun 1899 – 1903:123).

Between May and October 1901 the GNK started supplying its main trading post at the Cross River - Nsanangk - with goods by means of the steam launch 'Herta' via Calabar (Puttkamer to AAKA, 02.10.1901; Puttkamer to AAKA, 26.02.1901). The journey lasted six to seven days upriver from Calabar to Nsanangk and one and a half to two days downriver (Ramsay 1904:201). In 1903 the GNK owned one steam launch, two launches, one paddle steamer, and five lighters (Erschliessungsarbeiten im Konzessionsgebiete der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun 1899 – 1903:128). The German local government therefore pressed for free transit of German vessels on the Cross River and finally succeeded in 1905 (cf. chapter 5.1. The silent scramble — from friendly to unfriendly rivalry (1895-1900):181).

In 1905 the GNK closed their annex in Calabar and transferred all business transactions taking place in Nigeria onto their agents, the British company Alex. Miller, Brother and Co (GNK to AAKA, 05.01.1905). They later also aban-
doned their own fleet because the costs for maintaining the staff and fleet throughout the year, while they were only needed about half the year, had become too high. The British company Elder, Dempster & Co. was then chartered for the transport (GNK, 1913:24) and later blamed for part of the supply difficulties (Mansfeld to KGG, 09.10.1911). In fact, in 1907, 3000-4000 loads that had already arrived in Calabar could not be transported on the Cross, and had to be transferred to Douala, from there via Mundame to Ossidenge over land (KRS Ossidenge 1907/1908:266).

The depots for all goods and produce to be evacuated from or transported to the Cross River area were in Mamfe and Mundame, the endpoints of river bome transport. From these points onward, carriers were the sole means of transportation. On the Upper Banyang area was not well connected to these depots, and the construction of a railroad would have facilitated the mise-en-ville of these areas, as well as relieving the carrier problem (cf. Rausch, 01.04.1905:52-53).

In 1902 the construction of a railroad from the coast to the concession area of the GNK was first envisaged. When in 1904 the actual route from Bonaberi (Douala) to Nkongsamba in the Manenguba mountains was surveyed, the GNK could not support the project due to lack of funds (Ballhaus 1906:163-164; Rudin 1938:239-240). The project was realised after a bill guaranteeing investment against loss finally passed the Reichstag in 1906. The Nkongsamba railroad, the "Nordbahn" was constructed between 1907 and 1911 and operated successfully (Rudin 1938:240). The impact of the Nkongsamba railroad with respect to transportation was only marginally felt in the very eastern part of the concession area, close to Fontem. Here people actually carried produce to Nkongsamba (NAT, 31.07.2000). But the railroad construction has left the deepest imprint in the collective memory of the people in the Upper Cross River area, because the demand for labourers that had to construct it hit the area heavily. The work was remembered as extremely rough, food rations were insufficient, and resulted in many deaths. The name 'Njokmanis' - reportedly a hill along the Douala-Nkongsamba railroad - became a synonym for 'forced labour', i.e. 'work without pay' in the Upper Cross River area as well as other areas in Cameroon (cf. chapter 8.1.5 Njokmanis - 'work without pay':345).

The BNKG used the railroad to supply its eastern areas, i.e. Dschang and Upper Banyang (Rausch, 25.04.1914). By 1913 about 500 km of motorable roads had been constructed in the southern districts of Kamerun and motor transport came into the focus. The construction of a motorable road to Ossidenge was envisaged in 1913 (GR, 06.-09.06.1913:36).

---

6.7. Withdrawal of concession

The controversies which eventually led to the withdrawal of the concession were initiated by a report about the GNK prepared by Erzberger, a member of the Reichstag and of the Zentrum party, in 1907. This report aimed at proving that the GNK had not complied with their obligation to invest in the 'development' of the area and demanded the GNK pay compensation for its failure to do so. This procedure was connected to the construction of the Douala-Nkongsamba railroad that was expected to have considerable impact on the south-western part of the GNK's concession area, i.e. Upper Banyang. The German state thus sought to redirect potential profits (Ballhaus 1968:170-171). The GNK refused to pay any compensation or share the costs for the construction of roads. The RKA then threatened to reconsider the concession. The GNK tried to reach a compromise by offering to reduce its concession area by two thirds, maintaining only the most valued Cross River area. At the same time the GNK demanded reimbursement for the development of the areas it sought to abandon. The RKA's reaction under the newly installed secretary von Lindequist was uncompromising: they withdrew from the concession contract in 1910, stating that the GNK had refused to fulfill their obligations to invest in infrastructure, exploration, and inspection (172-173; cf. DKZ 1910, no. 45:753). The GNK took the case to court and the proceedings lasted four years. The RKA sought information about the GNK's activities from all the Districts of its operation (Ossidenge, Dschang, Bameka, Johann-Albrechtshöhe), but Mansfeld was the one who had gathered most material against the GNK and the eventual harsh judgment of the GNK relied mainly on him (cf. Mansfeld to KGG, 19.01.1914; Baer to KGG, 31.01.1914; Michaelis to KGG, 29.12.1913; Unruh to KGG, 12.01.1914; KGG to RKA, 1914; RKA to KLG, 26.03.1914). The attorneys of the GNK therefore tried to present Mansfeld as bearing a personal grudge against the GNK:

Es ist in der menschlichen Natur begründet, daß sich ehrgeizige Beamte, die in unbefriedigendem Empfängen sich sagen mußten, daß ihr Wirken und ihre Tätigkeit hauptsächlich nur der Klägerin zu Gute kommen solle, nicht in das richtige Verhältnis zu den Angestellten der Klägerin zu finden wußten [...]. Der Bezirksamtmann Dr. Mansfeld gibt als besonders unverträglich und unfähig. Er hat sich auch mit den Beamten der Beklagten nicht zu stellen vermocht. (Lobe, 27.04.1914)

Der Hauptvorwurf, den der Beklagte [the German state] der Klägerin [GNK] macht, der Ausgangspunkt des ganzen Streits, ist der, daß die Klägerin der Verpflichtung in § 6 der 'Konzession' nicht nachgekommen sei, daß sie Wege oder andere Verkehrsanlagen im Konzessionsgebiet so gut wie gar nicht geschaffen habe, daß sie sich auch an den Wegebauten der Regierung nicht nur beteiligt, daß sie sogar die Beteiligung anderer Unternehmen, ihrer Verpflichtung ausdrücklich verweigert habe. [...]. Der Beklagte stellt schließlich die Behauptung auf, die Klägerin sei aus Mangeln an Mitteln überhaupt
nicht mehr in der Lage, das Konzessionsgebiet zu erschließen. (Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914)

The GNK, on the other hand, claimed that what the German state demanded was the result of a misunderstanding in the concession document. The GNK could not be held eligible to construct roads on territory that was not in their possession:


The court indeed decided that equating of the terms 'concession area' and 'land owned by the GNK' rested on the tacit assumption that these would be more or less congruent. The fact that only a small portion of the concession area was 'ownerless' and thus eligible to become 'crownland' that could be taken into possession by the GNK, only became evident after the concession contract had been signed in 1899. The court therefore judged that the GNK had met all of its obligations, also the ones of § 6, concerning the construction of roads.

Die Klägerin hat, wenn man insbesondere an die Ramsay'schen Reisen denkt: eine umfangreiche Forschungstätigkeit ausgeübt; sie hat Handel betrieben und betreibt ihn noch; sie hat auch einige Pflanzungen und die Ölfabrik angelegt; sie hat, wenn auch in sehr bescheidenem Maße, sogar Verkehrsanlagen für allgemeine Zwecke geschaffen. Wenn sie nicht mehr erreicht hat, so liegt das eben in erster Reihe an ihnen noch heutigen Anschauungen unzulänglichen Mitteln, dazu kommen dann noch die von dem Beklagten anerkannten Verluste im Anyang-Aufstande. [...] Die Verpflichtung zum Wegebau bezog sich danach außerordentlich auf solche Gebiete, in denen die Klägerin wenigstens wirtschaftliche Interessen hatte, die von ihr erschlossen waren. (Ibid.)

The court ruled that the retraction of the RKA entailed a withdrawal of the concession, but the GNK was found eligible for compensation charges. The RKA appealed against this ruling (Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914). By that time the Upper Cross area had already been taken over by the Allied Forces in the course of WWI. The GNK still continued litigating against the RKA (Ballhaus 1968:173).

The disastrous financial situation of the GNK resulted in a clandestine bankruptcy. After the retraction of the RKA in 1910, most of the property of the GNK was leased to the BNKG. The BNKG was founded in 1911 – the GNK had almost half of the shares (Ballhaus 1968:173). In the same year the BNKG had taken over the trading posts of the GNK (Mansfeld to KGK, 25.11.1913; cf. DKZ 1911, no. 45:752). In 1913 the BNKG bought the following infrastructure from the GNK: all the trading posts, ruins of the factory in Mamfe, plantation in Okoyong, the whole fleet, the premises in Mundam and Douala at a total price of 200,000 M.154 payable in instalments of 20,000 M. p.a. plus an interest of five percent p.a. (GNK, 08.12.1913:73).

The BNKG continued trade in the same inefficient manner as the GNK, and the complaints about insufficient equipment with goods in their trading posts prevailed (cf. Mansfeld to KGK, 09.10.1911). Otto Born became general agent of the BNKG (RBA Ossidinge, 17.04.1912), and continued operating in the area after WWI. The former plot of the GNK/BNKG in Mamfe today bears his name 'Otebon beach'. Some people who knew him as children described him to me as a "small man with a big belly"; he was then operating in the whole Upper Cross River area, up to Talli.

6.8. Summary

The position of the Cross River area within the German colonial project was fundamentally altered due to the concession given to the GNK. Previously only the area through which the 'Bali road' passed had been of importance, it had been the last forest stage before entering the craved grasslands, where the most valued resource, labour, was to be found. The forest areas to the west and the Cross River itself had not aroused much interest. As the 'rubber area', the forests, where additionally ebony, ivory and oil palm products were 'found', the Upper Cross River area not only became the valuable part of their concession area, but also a valuable part of Kamerun. Puttkamer was a personal friend not only of the idea of concession companies, but particularly of the GNK and its agents. Therefore, as Ballhaus rightly suggests, it is no coincidence that Puttkamer decided to open a station in the Cross River area in the same year the GNK was granted its charter – in this case the trader followed the soldier (cf. Ballhaus 1968:132-133).

There are, however, numerous cases where the trader preempted the soldier, especially in the 'overside' area – a practice that the administration tried to obviate by 'closing' territories for all private persons, a policy only introduced in 1907.

Ever since the concession was granted to the GNK, it had been politically undesirable in Germany and the founders of the GNK had been mainly interested in speculation profits rather than in investment and exploitation in the colony. In the beginning, the GNK agents on the spot, with the unreserved and energetic support of the administration, had, however, been hopeful and proud as to the important role the GNK was to play in the north and west of Kamerun. Ramsay's

154 In most cases the prices finally agreed upon were well below book value (GNK, 08.12.1913).
journey of 1900, which was costly, dangerous, even reckless, with which he had taken possession of an enormous territory, its resources, including the population, displays the feeling of predestination just as much as his declaration to the people in Upper Banyang that he had bought all their territory and that he was the 'governor' and the sole white man whose orders they had to follow.

The contrast between the GNK's conception of their rights and role and the one of the administration led to clashes in the local arena that enacted the 'grotesqueness', chaos, and instability of the German colonial project. The dispute over rights of land, labour and trade was seemingly settled a number of times, but due to political considerations the AAKA and later the RKA wilfully protracted the matter. Since the concessions were regarded as an undesired policy instrument, the AAKA/RKA first tried to undermine it and de facto abolish any privileges the GNK could possibly derive from it. Most of the land was declared 'native land', and the population could dispose of it and all the products it produced to whoever they decided. Competitors, especially JH, were thus free to trade in the area, and could lease and even purchase land. They were however not obliged to invest in infrastructure nor redirect part of their profit to the German state, like the GNK was. The GNK therefore wondered why it should have 'no advantage over third parties, but an essential disadvantage' (GNK to AAKA, 07.04.1905:60) and litigation in court ensued. While the GNK and the German administration clashed in different courts in Berlin, the GNK agents and the administrator of Osaidinge Mansfeld clashed on the spot. Mansfeld presented the GNK agents as indolent, incompetent, and immoral, who were detrimental for the well-being of both the population in the Cross River area and the 'development for exploitation'. He thus ascribed them with characteristics generally reserved for the 'negro' in colonial discourse. Personal grudges between Mansfeld and the GNK employees even entered the court in Berlin, where Mansfeld provided most of the material against the GNK. Even though the GNK won their case, the fact that all administrative institutions from bottom to top were eventually opposed to the idea of land concessions did not leave them much space to manoeuvre. The basis for their failure was the meagre financial base and their high transport costs that made it impossible for them to compete with firms operating in- and outside their concession area. The local population grasped onto the economic incentives and evaded the GNK (cf. Haase 1915:25) by maintaining their established trade networks. These networks were partly invisible to the Europeans and could therefore transect the Anglo-German boundary. Hausa from northern Nigeria even took advantage of these opportunities and extended their trans-border networks. By the time the Nkongsamba railroad alleviated the transport problem - at least in Upper Banyang - the concession had already been withdrawn.

Although it had taken a long time for the RKA to 'correct' the 'mistake' of the concession politics (cf. Rohde 1997:109), the activities of the GNK played a ma-
7. Military into civil administration – "dem Schwert muß der Pfleg folgen"155

Die Perle Kamerun ist aus ihrer häßlichen, unscheinbaren Schale herausgelöst, jetzt kommt es darauf an, ihren Wert zu erhöhen, indem man der leuchtenden Perle eine edle, schöne Fassung gibt. (Bartenwerfer 1903)

Until 1902 certain parts of the Upper Cross River area continued to be the scene of violence directe as the German troops led a 'war of extinction' – if not as their endgoal, then as their method: burning villages, destroying farms and killing and capturing men, women and children alike. The Njemaya area, where resistance was fiercest, suffered most. In the Ngonaya area the people tried to evade the fate of their neighbours and were keen in demonstrating their 'friendliness' (cf. 4.2.3. Military post Tinto (1901):160). Between 1900 and 1902, when the initial military station was moved from Nsakpe to Ossidinje at the Cross River and the customs post in Nsankang as well as various trading posts of the GNK were opened, the newly created 'district of Ossidinje' was officially not yet 'pacified', and the stations were 'military stations' with the head of station the army officer in command. One company squadron of the Schutztruppe continued its notorious activities. The agents of the GNK bitterly complained about the unnecessary and counterproductive brutality these soldiers exhibited towards the population, accusing them of rape, the burning of villages, and the desertion of the areas closest to the station in Ossidinje (Jäger to KGK, 18.04.1904). Upon their demands, the station was transformed into a 'civil' or 'government' station in 1902 and Graf Pückler-Limpurg, formerly in the services of the GNK, became its first head (cf. Ballhaus 1968:149).156

In 1903 the DKZ boasted that German power in the Upper Cross River area was manifest in the Regierungstation Ossidinje and the military post Tinto as well as the customs post Nsakang (DKZ 1903, vol. 1:3). In 1904, Ramsay – general agent of the GNK – judged that the transition of Ossidinje from a military to a civil district had 'seemingly been a bit early' (Ramsay 1904:199; cf. KGK to AAKA, 10.10.1904:161).

7.1. Premature transition – Ossidinje (1901-1903)

Jeder Kenner der Kameruner Urwirbeltiere weiß, daß seine Bäume und hinterstehig, wohl in den seltensten Fällen durch Güte und Milde zu unterwerfen sind, und als vor einem Jahre die Kompanie der Schutztruppe aus Ossidinje, der Regierungstation am Großfluß fortgenommen und dort eine Zivilverwaltung eingerichtet wurde, da hat man sich von Colonialfreunden den Kopf geschüttelt und sich wohl fragen müssen, ob angezogen des damals noch so gut wir gar nicht erfahrenen rechten Großflußflusses diese Maßnahme zum mindesten nicht sehr verfrüht sei. (DKZ 1904, no. 14:133)

The station in Ossidinje had been built only in 1901 alongside brutal and lengthy military operations (cf. chapter 4.3.4. Military station Nsakpe (1899-1901):177). It became known to the local population as "their execution centre at Agborkem German" (MJA, 06.07.2000).

The site was chosen mainly due to its favourable terrain and transport facilities, although a more subtle reason might have been the demonstration of German superpower to the population. The place where the Germans built their station was an old settlement site that had been abandoned by the population due to illnesses' (Glauning to KGK, 01.08.1901). The occurrence of 'illnesses' was almost certainly connected to those beliefs cumulatively termed 'witchcraft' (cf. chapter 2.6. Levelling and accumulating:83). Whether the Germans were aware of local discourses of witchcraft when choosing the site or not, they willfully settled where the local population had failed and thus assumed to be more successful and more powerful than the population.157 Reports about the unhealthiness of the terrain and the infestation with mosquitoes and sandflies (Jahresbericht 1904/1905:151; Mansfeld to KGK, 06.09.1904) and the death of two Police Masters of blackwater fever158 were eventually a major incentive to move the station from its site near Agborkem to Mamfe in 1908 (Revisionskommission, 02.11.1908).

Even though unsuccessful in the long run, the explicit counter-position of local practices marks the beginning of a new phase of colonial relations in the western Cross River area. Whereas previous encounters between colonisers and

155 Bartenwerfer 1903.
156 Ballhaus mistakenly places the establishment of the 'government station' Ossidinje in the year 1903 (Ballhaus 1968:149), when it officially came into being by the governmental order of 15th November 1902 (Puttkamer, 15.11.1902).

157 An early example of a German entering local discourses on power and witchcraft was Zingraf in 1891 (cf. chapter 3.6.1. Zingraf transforms into an elephant – discourses of witchcraft:122).
158 Otto Kolscher and Albert Bruder (Revisionskommission, 02.11.1908). Kolscher's grave was to be found at the colonial cemetery in Mamfe, before it was destroyed in 2002. He had a white marble tombstone, with his date of birth: 30.01.1880 and death: 30.10.1907 (cf. BAB R1001/6789:131-132). A photograph of Kolscher is printed in Mansfeld 1908:181. Albert Bruder died within one year of his arrival in the Cross River area. He was buried in Nsankang, but his grave was no longer traceable in 2000. He was born on the 31.01.1878 and died on the 17.07.1905 (cf. BAB R1001/6789:71).
the population mainly took on the form of violence directe, the Germans now entered the contest for material and cultural power (cf. Engels and Marks 1994:2). As will be elaborated below, they had seen fit to enter this phase prematurely and both violence directe and violence douce continued to determine the colonial encounters in the Upper Cross River region (cf. also Michels 2002).

When Oblt. Glauning built the station Ossidinge on a plateau 200 metres above the Cross River, force was not only represented by the soldiers present but also by those squadrons that could be called on demand to 'restore order'. In this sense the station 'commanded' the 'Ekoi, Boki, and Anyang areas' within the neatly ordered 'colonial mindscapes'.

In politischer Beziehung liegt die Station sehr günstig: nahe der deutsch-englischen Grenze gelegen beherrscht sie das ganze Keaka-Gebiet und die Boki- und Anyangländer, die den Zugang zum Grasland bilden. Die Entfernung von Tinto/Baistrasse beträgt nur 20 Stunden, von Mamfe, dem Endpunkt der Schifffahrt auf dem Crossfluss, 12 und von der Zollstation Nisperakang über 6 Stunden. (Glauning, 03.10.1901:83)

Although the station in Ossidinge could not boast a view as far and magnificent as the one in Tinto, the Germans tried to extend the view as far as possible (cf. chapter 3.7.2. Open grassland, confined forest:166). By choosing the steep bank of the Cross River, they had – at least – a free view over the river and onto the opposite bank. The frightening and uncanny forest was cut down around the station and the erection of fences around the station planned. Here, the intention was the protection against attackers.

Zur Abwehr feindlicher Angriffe wird die Station späterhin mit Palisaden und 4 Bastionen umgeben werden. Geschütze sind beabsichtigt. Das Schussfeld ist freigeflagen. Der Höhenrücken, auf dem die Station liegt, fällt nach allen Seiten ab. Der einzige im Südosten die Station überbietende Hügel, auf dem das Soldaten-dorf angelegt ist, kann leicht zur Verteidigung eingerichtet werden. (Glauning, 03.10.1901:53)

The first German military post in the Upper Cross River area and its Garrison had been exterminated in 1899 and hostilities between German troops and the population had never ceased since then (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekoi war' (1899-1900):160). Glauing's preoccupation with the strategic defence situation of the military station Ossidinge therefore seemed rational and expressed a tacit acknowledgement of the ability of the population to harm the German project. The colonialists therefore strove to protect themselves against the potential power of the people. They could not yet perceive their situation as powerful, ordered, or controlled where they had previously experienced weakness, destruction and chaos.

159 He corrected these assertions after his journeys in the southern Cross area: 25 hours from Ossidinge to Tinto via Ouass, 24 hours via Bachuo – a journey of three days (Glauning, 03.10.1901:169).

7.1.1. 'A peaceful situation' and hostilities (1901)

After Glauning's journey into the areas south of the Cross River that had previously been the scene of the 'German-Ekoi war' in October 1901, these areas were officially declared 'pacified', and the exploration of the northern and northeastern areas planned (Glauning, 03.10.1901; Puttkamer to AAKA, 02.10.1901). These journeys of Glauning were undertaken in the company of GfK agents Ramsay, Waldau, and Hetebrügge respectively (GfK, 1913:31). In his report Glauning connected the peaceful intentions of the population to the following indications: repaired bridges, cleared roads, and sufficient provision of food. Those positive signs were mentioned in his report only for the Ejagham-speaking western areas, where the German-Ekoi war had been fought. Non-cooperation or tangible reluctance of cooperation in the areas further east (central Cross River) were played down in Glauning's report and simply ignored by the GfK when declaring the area 'fully pacified':

Da ich von Ali aus durch die Crossflusslandschaften zur Station zueckerzischen wollte, so bat mich der Vorsteher der Ali Fastorei [GfK], Herr Hetebrügge, sich mir anschließen zu dürfen. Er hatte die Absicht, eine Verbindung der Banye-Faktoreien mit dem Schiffbahnen Crossfluss herzustellen, war aber von den Eingeborenen durch diese noch unbekannten Gebiete bisher nicht durchgesehenen. Von den Eingeborenen mehr oder weniger freudempfangend, durchzog ich ohne irgendwo auf Feindseligkeiten zu stoßen die sturck [sic!] bevölkerten und fruchtbarsten Landschaften Baudu [Bachuo], Baudu Nai [Bachuo Nai], Ekojony [Okojony], Mamfe, Evuko [Evogbeko], Ntsang [Ntang], Esefe [Esugem]. (Glauning, 03.10.1901:166)

The area between Fainchang, Bachuo and Nchang (Lower Kenyang speaking) had previously been in little direct contact with the Germans. Besser had passed through Fainchang in 1900 and the people suffered casualties (cf. chapter 4.3.2. Second phase – from Bali road (March 1900):167).

In Besongbang - a settlement area east of Mamfe – Glauning even encountered a 'Defang', probably the 'war leader', and the people had refused to clear the roads, whereupon Glauning sentenced 'Defang, the chief of Besongbang' to the payment of a fine (167). During a second visit to Besongbang a few weeks later, he found the road cleared to his satisfaction (168). The areas south of the river were then declared completely 'pacified' (cf. DKZ 1902, no. 2:12).

Shortly thereafter, Glauning advanced into the area north of the Cross River that had previously been visited only by GfK agents, e.g. Ramsay in 1900, and Diehl (Boki-area 1901) (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?:206). Ramsay's journey had resembled a chase rather than an expedition and he had cosigned the most negative image of the people north of the Cross River. Glauning undertook two journeys, from the 5th to the 15th of October following Ramsay's route (Aborando, Kajifu, Assam, Mfakwe, Basho) and from the 28th October to the 3rd
of November he visited the Boki-speaking area (Oyi, Boka, Kekukisem, Kajifu, Dadi, Bodam, Danali, Abonandu) (Glauning, 11.11.1901). The first journey was undertaken with 25 soldiers, six of them with breechloaders. GNK agent Pückler joined Glauning with a couple of his own armed men (Erschliessungsarbeiten im Konzessionsgebiete der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun 1899-1903:123). Glauning described the population in the area he passed through as 'shy' and 'suspicious', but not altogether 'hostile', until they reached Basho. In Basho they were awaited by the men in full war array:

Während sich die Eingeborenen der durchzogenen Dörfer zwar scheu und mißtrauisch, aber doch nicht gerade feindselig gezeigt hatten, benahmen sich die Bassoleute in geradezu herausfordernder Weise. Alle hatten ihren Kriegsschmuck, Lederhelme mit Behängen aus Affenfell, angelegt und trugen Gewehre, manche auch Speere und Bogen oder angespritzte Holzstäbe. (Glauning, 11.11.1901 130-131)

They refused to lead the Germans into the neighbouring territory and threatened to kill the guides from Mfakwe who had lead the Europeans into their country. Communication between the groups was difficult and the situation got out of hand:


Glauning estimated that ten people had been killed in Basho, while the people later spoke of 25 dead, and on the German side one soldier was wounded. The next morning the expedition returned to Ossidinge, just as they had planned without any further hostilities taking place (Glauning, 11.11.1901:132).

The violent incidents in Basho had seemingly convinced the people of the surrounding villages to try and establish peaceful relations with the Germans. Envos of different settlements, including Basho, came to the Ossidinge station shortly after Glauning's expedition, and were awarded a 'letter of protection' and the German flag (ibid.).

7.1.2. "Schreckensherrschaft der Houben'schen Soldateska" (1902)

Later Glauning's efforts in the Cross River area were appraised positively (Pückler, 30.11.1903), but a general problem in Kamerun was that military personnel was not controlled by the civil administration and could thus be transferred whenever they were needed at a different location. Glauning, for example, was withdrawn in November 1901, and joined the 'punitive expedition' against the Bafut in the grassland (MFGDS 1903, no. 167). He was replaced by Obit. Houben on the 27th of August 1902 (Mansfeld 1908:18). The records do not contain much on Houben and his time as head of station in Ossidinge. The 'reign' of his 'Soldateska' was judged most unfavourably by agents of the GNK and his successor Count Pückler-Limpurg (Pückler, 30.11.1903:155; Jäger to KGG, 18.04.1904; KGG to AAKA, 10.10.1904:161; cf. Balhau 1968:149).

Im ganzen Bezirk ist es seit den Ereignissen des vergangenen Jahres bei den Eingeborenen feststehende Tatsache, daß ein Europäer mit Soldaten nur in feindlicher Absicht kommen kann; [...] Was Hauptmann Glauning im Zeitraum eines Jahres in mühevoller und systematischer Arbeit verwässert gebratzen ist, ist durch Oberleutnant Houben in weniger Wochen derartig in Grund und Boden zerstört worden, daß der Bezirk, insbesondere die Verwaltung, noch Jahre lang darunter zu leiden haben wird. (Pückler, 30.11.1903:155-156)

In 1902 he undertook a military campaign against Mamfe, during which 'a number' of people were killed and 'a great number' was sent as penal labourers to the plantations on the coast. The reason for the 'punitive expedition' had been the refusal to supply 'voluntary' labourers (Diehl to GNK, 08.03.1904). Houben did not seem to have had any prior 'colonial' experience and his 'colonial adventure' in the Cross River area remained a short episode in his biography. He had entered the Schutztruppe Kamerun in 1902 from infantry squadron no. 29 (DKZ 1902, no. 2:12) and returned to the Prussian army in 1903 (DKZ 1903, no. 59:507). In 1903 he was decorated with the "Königlicher Kronen-Orden 4. Klasse mit Schwertern" (DKB 1903, no. 8:202), probably after having taken part in the war against the Bangwa (cf. Langheld 1903:392). As outlined above, the

160 This area had been visited by GNK agent Diehl three months earlier (Badje, Mkpot, Bodam, Boka) (GNK 1913:31).
161 In GNK 1913 Pückler's journey is dated 18.11.1901 – 01.12.1901 (Abonando, Basheo, Asso, Badchama, Ntaku, Baha, Barretta, Bali, Tingto). Either the date in GNK 1913 is not correct, or Glauning went on a second expedition towards Basho after October. Since the GNK in 1903 stated that the expedition by Glauning/Pückler took place in autumn I am inclined to suggest that the date in GNK 1913 is incorrect.
162 Glauning, Hans Franz Ludwig Heinrich Wilhelm; born 29.01.1868, died 05.03.1908. From 1905 till his death head of station in Bamenda, buried there (BAB R1001/6789:131-132).
complaints from GNK agents led to his replacement and the transformation of the military into a government station.

7.1.3. Pückler-Limpurg – 'young' and 'inexperienced'

The civil head of station was considered a most instrumental personality for the 'cultural development' of the district, since – in contrast to the army officers – he was supposed to become an expert on his district, someone well acquainted with its people, its environment, its potentials and constraints.

Eine Militärstation soll den territorialen Besitz sichern; der Zivilverwaltung fällt aber die Aufgabe zu, kulturell zu wirken; sie soll regieren, und zwar nach den Bedürfnissen, nach den Mitteln und den Fähigkeiten der Bewohner [...] Könnten die Oberleutnants als Stationsvorsteher diese Aufgaben erfüllen? Sie, die bei jeder Veränderung in der Verwendung der Schutztruppe ihren Standort wechseln, oft schon, ehe sie mit Verhältnissen und Persönlichkeiten bekannt geworden sind [...] Wir bedürfen in Kamerun dringend der Vermehrung und Abgrenzung der Bezirkämter, wir brauchen überhaupt eine Neuorganisation der Zivilverwaltung; wir bedürfen der besten Verwaltungsbeamten, möglichst solcher, die aus dem praktischen Leben herwachsgangen sind, offenen Blick haben und bürokratischem Schematismus fernstehen; letzterer ist in Kamerun bei der Verschiedenartigkeit der Bevölkerung ganz besonders verwirrflich. (Bartenwerffer 1903:4)

Bartenwerffer's words echo those of Puttkamer in his correspondence with the AAKA with regard to the first civil Stationsleiter in the Upper Cross area:

Recht erwünscht wäre die Entsendung eines Fachmannes für astronomische Beobachtungen und dergleichen für die Station zur Fortführung der seit Abgang des Hauptmanns Glauking unterbrochenen Grenz- und Landesaufnahmen. Wenn Offizier müßte derselbe aber unter allen Umständen zum Auswärtigen Amt kommandiert sein und in keiner Weise dem Kommando [of the Schutztruppe'] unterstehen anderenfalls die absichtliche oder unabsichtliche Verwendung des Betreffenden in sicherer Ausicht steht, wie im Fall Glauking. Ich kann dies nie verhindern, da die betreffenden Maßnahmen seitens des Kommandeurs regelmäßig ohne mein Vorwissen, womöglich in meiner Abwesenheit getroffen werden, so daß ein Gegenbefehl sicher zu spät kommt. (Puttkamer to AAKA, 30.11.1902)

Interestingly enough, the AAKA did not agree with Puttkamer's suggestion to choose a specialist for astronomical observations. They indicated that a potential candidate should be militarily trained, since the population north of the Cross River could not safely be assumed to be 'altogether pacified'.

Einen Fachgelehrten auf diesen Posten zu stellen, halte ich aber für ein zu gewagtes Experiment, da die Völker in dem Norden des Crossflusses doch noch nicht so pazifiziert sind, daß sich da ein militärisch nicht geschulter Posten, ohne Gefahr bewegen könnte. (Comment below Puttkamer to AAKA, 30.11.1902)

Considering the hostilities that occurred in Basho in 1901 the above assessment still seems much too optimistic. The area was not 'still not pacified' in such a way that a militarily untrained post could move without danger, but in no way 'pacified'; any 'movement' in the area had led to fighting and casualties.

It did not seem to have been easy to find a suitable candidate for the post. In February 1903 a number of people were consulted and candidates suggested, e.g. Hptm. Döring, Rigler (BAB R1001/4373/60-61). Unfortunately no further correspondences about the considerations for the first civil head of station are found in the records.

Eventually Count von Pückler-Limpurg assumed these duties on the 12th of January 1903. Pückler was born on the 28th October 1875 in Munich and had served in the Prussian army from 1896 to 1900 as Leutnant (DKZ 1904, no. 7:66). From 1900 to 1902 he had been in the services of the GNK and had undertaken several journeys in its concession area and had taken part in Ramsay's journey of Dec. 1900 (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?: 206). In 1901 he had been characterised by Puttkamer as 'young' (he was then 26 years of age), 'inexperienced', 'inept', and 'nervous'.


Pückler's temporary 'imprudence' had almost cost him and his African companions their lives in 1901. Pückler had been searching a new route to the Cross River from Bali and had advanced from Bali to Bamilongi, where the GNK had already established a trading post, accompanied by armed Vai and Bali carriers. Relations between the new Fon of Bali – Fonyonga – and the Germans were extremely strained at this point, and Lt. Strümpell had just left the area after severe military action that had aroused anti-German feelings throughout the area. The chief of Bamilongi consequently did not feel obliged to satisfy Pückler's demand for carriers. Pückler waited in vain and eventually decided to 'get' the chief with the aid of two Vai. Obviously the way these Vai proceeded aroused the impression that they were arresting the chief, who resisted. Other people immediately joined the resistance, and the Vai were stabbed with knives and fired at, resulting in three wounded. Pückler was left alone and without any weapon, since his cook and some other servants had fled. He was opposed by a crowd of 200 an-
gry people. Eventually agreement was reached, and the expedition was allowed to return to Bali (Pückler to KGK, 18.05.1901). Pückler himself did not feel he had acted inappropriately, blaming the 'raw' and 'cheeky' 'natives', presuming he had been in a 'dungeon of thieves and murderers' (ibid.:127). With his report, he wanted to 'punish' the Baminti, but Puttkamer blandly stated:

Die Regierung hätte viel zu tun, wenn sie an jedem Ort, wo durch Angestellte einer Gesellschaft und hervorgerufen durch diese Unruhen entstehen, mit Soldaten auftreten wollte. (Puttkamer to AAK, 01.09.1901:171)

Two and a half years later this same Pückler became the first civil head of station in Ossindige. Most probably his previous knowledge of the area and his ties with the GNK had been his decisive qualifications. He was 29 years of age when he assumed the post – although still 'young', he was not younger than the majority of the German officials in Cameroon (cf. Rudin 1938:208).

Pückler initiated a shift towards less coercive policies in the areas south of the river, that had suffered from the reign of Houben's 'soldateska' and boasted calm and peaceful relations with the 'Keaka' by November 1903 (Pückler, 30.11.1903). Silently and unnoticed by the German colonial authorities and enthusiasts in Germany, a military campaign had been carried out in the Manfe central and Ngonaya areas (Keaka). These areas had only marginally been touched during the 'punitive actions' of the Crossschneellenexpedition, but since they were 'recalcitrant' they were 'punished' quickly. The decision process had remained within the local realm. The areas south of the Cross River had thus been the scene of military operations up to the transformation of the Ossindige district into a civil district. The areas north of the Cross River had hardly had any contact with German colonialism and, if so, had in many cases displayed an unwillingness to accept German penetration or presence. The task of integrating these areas into the civil district Ossindige fell to its first D.O., the then 28 year-old Pückler-Limpurg.

He did not waste time in undertaking journeys into 'previously unexplored' territory, and underwent two such expeditions in 1903 in the 'overside' areas (cf. Pückler, 24.10.1903; Pückler 1904; Pückler 25.05.1903; Michels 2002; chapter 7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation – 'A barrel of gunpowder',268). The main aim of these journeys was the 'opening up' of the areas for trade. In fact, both were joint expeditions, consisting of Pückler and a GNK agent, police soldiers, armed clerks of the GNK and locally recruited carriers as well as local intermediaries, e.g. Ata Ndëp Ebah of Agborkem. In the area north of the Cross River the trader's frontier had well advanced the administrative frontier (cf. Ballhaus 1968:149). The first journey into the overside territory up to Basho and Bachama had been undertaken by the then GNK general agent Ramsay in 1900, and trading posts had been erected north of the river in 1903 in Abonando and Takpe, with subsidiary trading posts staffed by black GNK clerks in Basho (Pückler, 30.11.1903:156). Characteristic of the first encounters with the German people were the divergent attitudes and strategies adopted by the people. While some tried to entice the German expedition to visit their settlement, e.g. Bobo of Babë, others concealed their location and hid from them, e.g. Ebue, Tshinda (Pückler, 24.10.1903:163, 166). One year after his appointment, Pückler was to display a similar method as in Baminti 1901 without being as lucky (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpwamanku wars (1904-1906): 263).

At a time when German colonial enthusiasts were preoccupied with mounting the 'raw pearl' Kamerun into a 'precious jewel', the transformation of the military post Ossindige into government station was celebrated and welcomed as a step towards 'order' in Kamerun (DKZ 1903, vol. 36:367).


The fast supplanting of military by civil administration was perceived as imperative but also obligatory. It was, on the one hand, celebrated as a great success for German colonialism – mainly in Germany itself, but on the other hand perceived as a burden – in the colony, where the shortcomings of the administration and its personnel could not easily be brushed aside.

7.2 Mpwamanku wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzustehen"269

Der Stationschef von Ossindige, Graf von Pückler-Limpurg, ist im Kampfe mit Eingeborenen bei Basso gefallen. (DKZ 1904, no. 7, 18.02.1904:60)

Die inzwischen eingetroffenen Ereignisse deuten darauf hin, daß Graf von Pückler die kriegerischen Fähigkeiten der Anjags entschieden unterschätzt hat und daß er diesem Irrtum jetzt zum Opfer gefallen ist. (Moisès, 1904a:91)

In 1904 the first civil head of the district of Ossindige, Count Pückler-Limpurg, died. His death was generally perceived as the signal for the general 'uprising' in the Upper Cross River area that lasted from January to September 1904, both in contemporary as well as in later discourses (Ballhaus 1968; Hausen 1970; E&B 1974:72-73; O'Neil 1996; C&R 2001; Nuhn 2000). Ballhaus' study on the concession companies remains the most detailed study on the events in the Upper Cross River area of 1904 (Ballhaus 1968; cf. also Ebai 2001 and Michels 2002).

269 Berliner Tagblatt v. 13.9.04 N. 466.
I will just very briefly reiterate what has become regarded as the 'facts', in order to 'frame' the detailed discussion that follows:

Pückler had gone on an 'expedition' towards Bacham on the 14th of January 1904 with the majority of the police soldiers of the station Ossingde, which was left with Police Master Wolff and ten police soldiers. GNK agent Küster joined the expedition in Takpe – 'oversee' – and they proceeded towards Basho, finding most of the villages deserted. While advancing towards Bacham they met fierce resistance and were forced to retreat. Shortly after Basho the expedition was attacked while crossing a river, and Pückler and one third of his men died. The rest tried to make their way back to the station. Küster, too, met his death on the way. Twelve police soldiers managed to reach the station Ossingde, with many seriously wounded. Attacks on the other German satellite posts followed: the GNK trading posts Kesham, Badje, Oboyni, Mfakwe, Takpe, Mamfe and Bitieku were destroyed, the agents killed. Abandonu was attacked, and the staff was forced to retreat to the other bank of the river to the station in Ossingde. Due to the shortage of staff and ammunition the Germans had to abandon Ossingde after a few days and flee to Nsankang, the main trading post of the GNK, only to enter the remaining canoes and escape down the Cross River into British territory. The first soldiers of the Schutztruppe reached the area in February, just a couple of days after the remaining Germans had cleared their posts. Reinforcements came from Bamenda but were too weak to achieve any results. Serious military operations began at the end of March 1904 the commander-in-chief of the Schutztruppe Müller arrived with 370 soldiers, ten German officers, two physicians and 13 non-commissioned officers. 'Pacification' operations lasted almost six months. In August 1904 the new head of the district, Dr. Alfred Mansfeld, arrived and started rebuilding the station and 'ordering' the district. The areas south of the river had been declared pacified, while the Schutztruppe continued operations north of the river. A military station was erected in Basho and soldiers of the Schutztruppe remained stationed there until 1906. While in the areas south of the river Mansfeld established his unique 'colonial order' (cf. chapter 8. New "Eingeborenenpolitik" – "Gebrauchtes Kind schaut das Feuer" (1904-1914:32)), in the northern area the German control remained marginal (cf. Michels 2002).

I hope to present a detailed account below but will first point to some assumptions on which previous studies about the 1904 incidents rest:

The particular 'uprising' in the Upper Cross River area of 1904 has been termed 'Anyang uprising' or 'Cross River uprising' and as one of its peculiarities has been noted the fact that it 'united' the different tribes of 'the Anyang', 'the Boki', 'the Keaka' and 'the Banyang' (cf. Ballhaus 1968:158; Hausen 1970:154; Mansfeld 1908:8). The 'tribal units' seemingly referred to with the terms Anyang, Boki, Keaka, and Banyang were groups imagined by the Germans. Therefor the war did not 'unite' previously separated people, but utilised pre-existing networks, namely the associations, but also trade and kinship networks.

The 'uprising' officially lasted from January to September 1904 (Mansfeld to KGK, 04.04.1905), while within Cameroonian discourses the duration of the Mpawmanku wars is often much longer: 1904 to 1906 (Ebabu 2001); 1904-1908 (Ngoh 1988:61). The reason for this dating is never explicitly stated. In 1908 Obili Glumming, former head of the military station in Ossingde and at the time head of station in Bamenda was killed in the 'Munshi', i.e. Tiv area in 1908 (cf. Ngoh 1988:61; E&B 1974:73). Ebabu's dates (1904-1906) differ from the 'official dating', because he focussed on the 'oversee' area, where Mpawmanku's war against the Germans did not lead to a German 'victory' prior to 1906. As Ebabu points out, most previous studies about the Mpawmanku wars 'consciously or unconsciously [...] dwelled on the Banyang and Ejaghama ethnic groups' (Ebabu 2001:vi).

So far I have also followed general conventions and referred to the events of 1904 as an 'uprising', because they have so entered colonial and historical discourses (Moisiel 1904a; Mansfeld 1908; Ballhaus 1968; Hausen 1970; C&R 2001; O'Neil 1996; Nkwi 1987:33). In Cameroonian historical discourses, both oral and written, the terms 'resistance' (Ngoh 1988:61) and 'war' (E&B 1974:60) are used. I will speak of the 'Mpawmanku wars' as they are locally known, since the term 'uprising' can only be valid within a colonial order that has assumed full control over a region and faced an 'uprising' by those who had previously been 'subdued' and could then be punished for their 'misbehaviour', i.e. doing something that they were not entitled to. Many parts in the Upper Cross River area had not yet 'submitted' nor 'surrendered' to the Germans, especially not 'oversee', where the first confrontation occurred in 1904. Even within the colonial order, the events in the Upper Cross River area could only have been an 'uprising' on the assumption that by defining boundaries on a map, the people living within this territory had by that definition become part of the colonial order – whether they had been informed or not. The term 'uprising' also implies a sense of below/above, the weaker presumptuously claiming to overpower the stronger, the servant disobeying the master. For those reasons it is not appropriate to employ the term (cf. chapter 4.3. 'German-Ekol war' (1899-1900):161).
7.2.1. Causes for a militant confrontation – 'a barrel of gunpowder'

Ballhaus' main argument for the causes of this 'uprising' and my contentions shall be expanded briefly, before I present my own interpretation (cf. Ballhaus 1968:149-162: "Das Vorgehen der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun am Crossfluss und der Anyang-Aufstand Anfang 1904"). As indicated above, she claimed that the 'uprising' was a reaction to the practices of the GNK. All subsequent studies referring to this 'uprising' revert to her judgement, generally without explicitly mentioning her, so that the view portrayed below has come to be accepted as 'conventional knowledge', the 'truth' (e.g. Austen 1996:125):

The revolt, of 1904 in which Boki, Anyang, Keaka-Ejagham and lower Banyak combined to loot the GNK factories at Bascha, Badje, Abokum and Mamfe, the Government Station at Ossidinge and the customs post at Nsanakang, and in which five GNK traders and the District Officer Graf Pückler lost their lives, was partly a reaction to such methods, which included the supply of recalitrants as labour to the coastal plantations. Endless recriminations followed it, with the GNK seeking damages for its losses and shifting the blame for the rising on the provocative actions of the soldiers. (C&R 2001:145)


Die Skepsis der Regierung gegenüber der GNWK wuchs, als deren Vorgehen 1903/04 einen Aufstand im Konzessionsgebiet provozierte. (ibid:225-224)

The causality assumed by Ballhaus and taken up in academic discourses suffers from a double bias: first, the bias inherent in the sources that she used, namely the official German records then available in the archives in Potsdam and, secondly, the ideological framework in which she operated. A third impediment to her judgement was the fact that she knew the region she wrote about only from documents she consulted and did not possess a solid geo- and ethnographical knowledge of the place.

Her judgement about the connection between 'the practices' of the GNK and the 'uprising' actually rely on two main claims: firstly, on the correspondences between the GNK, the KGG and the AAKA about the question who was 'guilty' and thus responsible for the 'uprising' – these centre around the advance of traders and government troops in the Basho/Bachama area (overside). Although

---

166 She did not have access to the German files left in Cameroon (part of which are today available on microfilm in the national archives in Berlin – unfortunately mostly out of focus), nor to British records and did also not use any oral sources.

167 The GNK was especially interested in the 'penal labourers', and the exact numbers and days they worked for the GNK were accurately recorded and converted into German Mark (cf. ANY FA 1/85:197-199).

168 Although Ballhaus draws on the middleman argument, she does not adopt the German colonial view that 'Calabar traders' instigated the 'uprising' and does not even mention the term 'Calabar trader', as Cameroonians historians do: "The rising of the Anyang was blamed on Calabar traders whose middleman monopoly had been broken by the new route which had been opened to the coast" (E&B 1974:60). "La fin des avantages d'intermédiaire dont jouissaient les commerçants de Calabar à la suite de la construction d'une nouvelle route menant jusqu'à la côte. Cette nouvelle route facilita un contact éroit entre les autochtones de l'intérieur et ceux de la côte. Les commerçants de Calabar décidèrent d'inciter les autochtones de Mamfe à se soulever contre les Allemands" (Ngb 1988:61). University students have picked up E&B's terminology and the 'Calabar trader' middlemen argument is transformed thus: "They [the Germans] stepped on the toes of the Calabar traders. The middleman advantages enjoyed by them was ended. They then incited the Mamfe natives to revolt against the Germans" (Oru 1996:31).
Denn es ist und bleibt unwichtig, daß der Ausbruch des Aufstandes mit der für das laufende Rechnungsjahr in Aussicht genommenen Verminderung der Schutztruppe in irgendeinem unzweckmäßigen Zusammenhang steht die zum 1. April dieses Jahres geplante Verminderung ist – wie bereits erwähnt – bis heute noch nicht durchgeführt, sie kann also auch unmöglich die Haltung der Eingeborenen irgendwie berührt haben. –

Anders vielleicht liegt es mit der Ende 1902 erfolgten Zurückziehung der Kompagnie Houben aus dem Ossingdey-Bezirke – Inwieweit diese notwendig und schon damals geboten war, vermag ich für meine Person nicht zu beurteilen. – 

Ich darf aber vielleicht ehrerbietigst darauf hinweisen, daß gerade die Vertreter der Kaufmannschaft es waren, die unablängig darauf drängten, der den Handel fahrenden und die Bevölkerung angehoben stark bedrängenden Soldaten-Herrschaft ein Ende zu machen. – 

Im übrigen bin ich – wie bereits mehrfach betont – auch heute noch der Überzeugung, daß der Aufstand vermieden worden wäre oder doch jedenfalls nicht annähernd den Umfang hätte annehmen können, den er erreicht hat, wenn nicht Graf Pückler in geradezu unbegreiflicher Verbundenheit und obwohl mehrmals ernstlich gewarnt, so völlig ungenügend voreilte, gegen Badshauma vorgestoßen wäre. (KGK to AAKA, 10.10.1904:161-162)

The second indication of the people's reaction to the practices of the GNK found in the records and used by Ballhaus for her argument consists of the individual comportment of the GNK agents. Concretely, Ballhaus refers to the report by the planter Picht who travelled the Bali road in January 1904, when he heard about the 'uprising' and sought to enquire possible reasons. He came up with four concrete occurrences:

At the GNK trading post in Mamfe, people were beaten when they had sought to increase the weight of ivory tusks with banana leaves, and one agent had even tried to burn down one person's house. At the GNK trading post in Tali, agent Norden had ordered one chief to be beaten and in Manyemen a former 'laundry man' had shown him the scars on his back that resulted from the lashing by a GNK employee in Tali (Picht to KGK, 19.02.1904; cf. Ballhaus 1968:158). The KGK forwarded Picht's statements to the AAKA as a part of the dispute about 'guilt'. In the accompanying letter, Puttkamer wrote:

Einmal haben sich die Anyangs, als ausgesprochene Europäerfeinde und dem blindesten Fetschdienst ergeben, von Anfang an gegen Anlage von Faktoreien in ihren Lande strebt. Ein vorsichtiger Kaufmann hätte eine so verlorene und fast in Feindselig liegende Faktorei wie zum Beispiel Dasho überhaupt nie anlegen dürfen. Sodann aber haben diese isolierten Faktoreienversteher, wie sich nach und nach herausstellte, zum Teil in ganz unerhörter Weise gehaust und damit die Erschließung des an sich widersinnlichen und müßtrauschen Volkes auf höchste gesteigert. (Puttkamer to AAKA, 24.03.1904)

Regarding Mamfe, GNK employee Seidel was later questioned about the alleged beating by his fellow agent in court. Ballhaus did not refer to Seidel's statement, which stressed that the beatings were explicitly known, acknowledged and allowed by Pückler (Seidel, 16.03.1904). In fact, as Ballhaus concedes, 'nothing is known' about the behaviour of GNK agents in most areas of the 'uprising'. She assumes that since later such complaints were frequent, their general conduct had been marked by brutality. However, of the four incidents cited by Picht only one took place within the area of the Mpaawmanku war (Mamfe). The laundry man' beaten by Norden was not an indigene of the Cross River area or Cameroon but a Vai, who formerly worked as a 'soldier boy' in Bamenda (Norden, 07.04.1904). The whole of Upper Banyang, where the factory of Tali (former Miyimb) was situated, remained peaceful. Ballhaus does not offer any explanation, as to why no violence took place in these places.

Ballhaus also acknowledges that the 'regne of Houben's Soldateska' in the south-western and central areas must have laid the ground for possible violent resistance in these areas. She does not, however, expand similar accusations of traders against soldiers, that had led to the transformation of Ossingdey into a civil district in 1902 and the displacement of the 'Schutztruppe' from the area (cf. chapter 7.1.2, "Schreckensherrschaft der Houben'schen Soldateska" (1902):261). The comportment of Schutztruppe soldiers along the Bali road was similarly deployed, and before 1905 complaints about the 'undisciplined and haughty manner' of the soldiers had become a general contention (cf. R.E. 1905:190). In 1906 the KRS Ossingdey admitted that unaccompanied soldiers, messengers, and interpreters in the services of the administration, but also black clerks of the trading companies, misused their powers on a regular basis without the government being able to suppress this grievance (KRS Ossingdey to KGK, 01.04.1906:166; likewise Schulz, 31.03.1906:174; Schnierinz, 01.04.1906:185).

Ballhaus' propositions about the causes for the 'uprising' derive from arguments on different grounds: on the one hand she refers to concrete incidents connected to both the 'practices' of the GNK traders and the 'soldiers'; on the other hand, she discusses the more abstract issue of the local organisation of trade that presumably clashed with German interests. As far as the concrete causes are concerned, these and similar incidents certainly played a decisive part in the decision to resist the Germans, since in most villages they are remembered up to date.

In the end Ballhaus concludes:


Her judgment was thus not as one-sided as 'conventional knowledge' purports.

She had to rely on the written documents available to her. While some of the material she used certainly contained information on the basis of which assumptions about the causes for the war seemed possible, the sources proved extremely patchy, biased, and - most importantly - clueless. I propose that the
Germans in 1904 were not able to comment on the causes of the violent actions because they lacked not only access to concrete information, but were also unable or unwilling to grasp the heterogeneity of the 'natives' point of view'.

This dominant [colonial] model fails to see the pre-existing social spaces as contested arenas where different normative complexes are produced, generating interactive processes between normative systems which are, by their very nature, dialogical, irrespective of the asymmetries in the power relations. (Fissky 1996:228)

The causes that the Germans did come up with — namely the protection of trading interests — were derived from their own model. To give just one example of the speculative nature of their claims: in the course of the correspondences between GNK and AAKA concerning reparation payments and the 'guilt' of Pückler, the GNK, who always claimed to have lived and worked on excellent terms with the population and held that their agents were experts in the area, stated with regard to the spreading of the war:

Graf Pückler musste sich auf Basho zurückziehen und fand dort seinen Tod als die Badhama nachdrängten, denen sich vielleicht die durch das Beispiel der Badhama angesteckten Basho anschlossen. (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904, emphasis SM)

Ob Mannhe ebenfalls durch Badshamas gefallen ist, entzieht sich heute noch meiner Beurteilung; möglich ist es. (Diehl, 08.03.1904)

And even Pückler's successor Dr. Alfred Mansfeld, generally held to have been a man with considerable ethnographic expertise on the Cross River area, could only solve the puzzle of the events of 1904 by reverting to a metaphor:

Obzwar die [...] Bokis fast ganz isoliert leben, obzwar die Anjangs des rechten Ufers mit allen Stämmen des linken Ufers fast nie in Friedenszeiten in Berührung gekommen, auch heute noch nicht, hat doch der Funke, der das Pulverflasche 1904 zum Explodieren brachte, als mein Vorgänger, Graf von Pückler sich im Anjangingland ermuterte, mit einem Schlag binnen zwei Tagen nicht nur die verschiedenen Bantu-Stämme vereinigt, sondern auch die Bokis veranlaßt, gemeinsame Sache mit den Übrigen gegen die Weißen zu machen. (Mansfeld 1908:8)

Mansfeld thus countered the conventional view that 'uprisings' in Africa could only be of a local nature where disparate 'tribes' with different languages lived (ibid.). Implicitly he assumed that people of different 'races', like the Bantu (Anjang, Keeka, Eko, Banjang) on the one hand, and the 'Sudanic tribes' (Boki) (cf. ibid.: 7; Mansfeld, 07.08.1907) on the other, were even more unlikely to act uniformly and explicitly he noted that the Boki lived 'almost completely isolated' from the rest. Therefore the 'unity' of these different 'tribes' and 'races' — that under 'normal' circumstances 'observed' the 'racial boundaries' between them — was remarkable for him, but still perceived as an ad-hoc, rather haphazard, occurrence.169 In 1910 he praised the binding authority of the association "Ewi-ngbe", that had — according to him — been instrumental in the planning of the resistance network (ASK, 15.03.1910).

Im Osidingebezirk wohnten 8 Stämme, bestehend aus je 20-40 Dorfgemeinden. Jede Dorfgemeinde hat ihren Häuptling; kein Stamm kennt einen eigentlichen Oberhauptling. Bei oberflächlicher Beobachtung kann es aber den Anschein gewinnen, als ob der Stamm nur eine zusammengefaßte ist. Die hier während des Aufstandsjahres 1904 stattgehabten Vornehmungen von Häuptlingen etc., die des Landesvaters und Mordes beschuldigt waren, haben jedoch ergeben, daß der Zusammenhalt innerhalb des Stammes durch die Einrichtung der Jaju- (religiösen)-Gemeinden ganz entschieden gewährleistet ist. (ibid.)

Although he had discovered the importance of the associations ("juju"), he did not assume that they could build networks crossing perceived 'tribal' boundaries. Mansfeld pictured the situation as a 'barrel of gun powder', in which any stray spark sufficed to blow it up.

The written documents — accessible in archives — with their biases and 'blind spots' have largely been exploited for the reconstruction of the causes, course and consequences of the Mpawanku wars. But the Mpawanku wars have also entered the 'archives' of the people in the Upper Cross River area. The comparison of numerous testimonies and their hypotheses will be the basis of my interpretation. Perhaps the written sources will provide the carbohydrates to the dish I am preparing — the absolute chronology, numbers, and names — while the spices and the flavour are added only through the hypotheses provided in the oral testimonies. Careful assessment of hidden references in the oral traditions contrasted with concealed information, gaps and controversies in the written documents has at several points led to a radical criticism of the respective stories told.

One of the most detailed accounts of the Mpawanku wars was told to me in Ketuya, one of the quarters of Basho, close to the spot where Pückler had been killed and where the 'barrel of gun powder blew up'. It is a personal tradition, told to the speaker by his father, whose own father had been killed for the murder of Pückler.170

When they [the Germans] came, I was not yet born. My father saw them and told me the story about the Germans: [...] They came to Ketuya in the land of Basho that is in five quarters. You saw the place where the Germans built. After having looked all over the place, they decided to built here in Ketuya.171 The people of the village accepted and

169 Ballhaus principally repeats his position and only considers the possibility of a prior agreement of different 'Anyang chiefs' (Ballhaus 1968:156).

170 My meeting with the speaker took place in the village hall of Ketuya in the presence of the village leaders and my assistant. The atmosphere was extremely friendly, since my appearance in the village, that could only be reached by eight hours trekking on footpaths, and my interest in 'our common history' was perceived by the people as a sign of respect.

171 The name 'Ketuya' refers to the 'area around Victoria', which is where the plantations in the south were. Since this particular 'quarter' of Basho was closest to the 'whiteman', it was termed 'Ketuya', just like the 'white man's land' in the south.
said that they also wanted the whiteman. You can see the house of the whiteman at the beginning of the road, where you passed already. All the people of the village came and went to the head of the road and cleared the place. The white built a house there and stayed inside. They built a trading post, inside which he put things. He said he was going to open a school. The people accepted that he should stay. They cleared a place and built a school. When the Germans were here, we had a school. The people of Aso [i.e. Basho] were in peace with the Germans. What caused trouble here in this village were the soldiers that the Germans had. They stayed in the station, and carne and said they are going to visit us here. They wore bright red caps. The people in their houses were always warned that the soldiers are coming. If you have meat inside your house, the soldiers come and take it away and eat it without any compensation. If you have a wife which is still young, you will never sleep with her again. The soldiers will take her and rape her. The woman will cry a lot but without avail. When they see her husband, they will beat him until he starts bleeding. Really, you know, in our own culture, anything that involves the raping of somebody's wife is extremely painful. Even the bible forbids this act. Since the people were unable to do anything, they communicated with their fellow brothers around that they should fight either spiritually or physically to send out the Germans and their soldiers. That was when trouble started. We drove him and said he should go. But before he went, he too started problems with us. The Germans killed our people, and we in turn killed their people. But because the

The stone foundations at the road from Basho I to Ketuya are probably not the remains of the store of the GNK that was built there in 1903 (which was most probably a thatched house), but of the military station which was erected only after the Mpawumauk war in 1904. The site might have been the same.

When the GNK opened their store in Basho in 1903, it was staffed with a black clerk, but Germans — both GNK agents, officers and government officials, visited the post a number of times. Still, here the reference is most likely to the German head of the military station Basho with his black soldiers, erected in 1904.

Missionary activities never started in Basho during the German time, and no school was established there. This detail was probably added to demonstrate the positive aspects of the German times compared to the present situation in Basho — which although having a primary school, remains at the margins of modern communication networks, such as motorable roads, electricity, markets, etc. AJG added later that if the Germans would have stayed, Ketuya would have been like Limbe, Kumba and even Mambé (the urban centers in the South-West province and Manyu Division).

These visits of soldiers staying in the station can only refer to the time after 1904.

Incidentally red caps were a symbol of great power in the Cross River area and were worn by respected male members of the community. The black German soldiers wore red caps with a blue tassel (Lehnh 1905:56). Tafang Tiku in 1888 was said to have worn a red cap, so I presume it was a pre-German phenomenon (cf. chapter 2.5. Owners of the community:70).

The chronology has been altered here: before the Mpawumauk wars there was no government or military station in Basho, only a GNK trading post. Their agents and employees were also armed, but reference here is clearly to official German soldiers (red caps). Soldiers had entered Basho at least two times before the Mpawumauk wars, but the account clearly refers to soldiers permanently stationed in Basho, making short ‘patrols’ into the village — this can only have taken place during and after the Mpawumauk war.

whiteman was stronger, he sent a message to his people at the coast to come. Many came — many more than us. We saw that we could not withstand the whites and decided to surrender. The Germans called us and asked whether we loved them or not. We agreed that we loved them. We wanted then that they should stay here. The Germans said, if that is so, we will stop the war. Then the Germans asked: who is the chief of this village? And they were directed at the person that delivered my father. They called him Ula Njwa. The Germans said that even if villagers from all over were fighting, it is in your village that they killed the white. You are going. My grandfather accepted. They took him and killed him here in the head of the road. They hanged him. The Germans said they should give a cow and a cock. The villagers gave. The German said, now the problem is over. My brother is dead, your own too is dead, the war should end. Let us make peace, the problem should be over. (AJG, 05.11.2000)

From this account we gather that the German (Pückler) was not killed spontaneously, but that people had communicated with their "fellow brothers" that they should try to get rid of him. The immediate reasons mentioned are the stealing of food, beating, and rape, with the latter described most elaborately. Blamed for the stealing, beating, and raping are the German soldiers. No reference is made to trade or the protection of trade interests. Possibly the imminent causes were replaced in the recollection by secondary causes for dislike of the Germans — the behaviour of the soldiers, but the story of AJG is paralleled by the following account from GNK general agent Diehl to GNK directors of 1903:

Er [the chief of Basho] erklärte Herr Küster [the GNK’s agent], daß er mit der Einführung eines Ladens in seiner Hauptstadt sehr zufrieden sei, ebenso seine Leute, daß sie aber die Anwesenheit eines Europäers nicht dulden würden, denn sei erst einmal einer, dann kämen rasch mehr und mehr, und schließlich würden die Soldaten kommen, und dann gäbe es nur Palaver. (Diehl to GNK, 23.04.1903:164; also cit. in Ballhaus 1968:150; C&R 2001:145)

How had the people of Basho, far into ‘overside’, developed such strong opinions about the ‘German soldiers’ by 1903? Two ways are possible: they might have heard about the wars and general violence in the areas south of the river, especially of ‘Houben’s soldateska’; or they might have had their own experiences during the few incidents when they encountered German soldiers. I propose that both are viable. In 1900 Ramsay had used guns to defend himself just east of Bachama, and Glauing had started fighting in Basho, killing up to 25 men (cf. chapter 6.1: Who commands the land?:207, and 7.1. ‘A peaceful situation’ and hostilities (1901):239).

In the area north of the Cross River, traders had either been the first Germans to enter a territory or they had joined the army on an expedition into ‘unknown’ territory. Although the GNK emphasised that the establishment of the trading posts in Takpe and Basho in 1903 had been a ‘wish’ of the respective populations, it seems odd that all the places where the GNK had established trading
posts or had started negotiations about trading posts, i.e. in Assam and Mfakwe, had started negotiations about trading posts, i.e. in Assam and Mfakwe, actively took part in the alliance against the Germans.

Resentment of the German presence in their territory could also have been derived from the impact that was indirectly felt in their area. In 1903, when the GNK had started establishing shops in Takpe, Kesham, and Eshobi, the people had also started clearing the roads (Pückler, 25.05.1903:67). Most of the population had gone into hiding when Pückler and Willhöft arrived in their settlements – an indication of their fear and a response they had not deployed during the first journey of a German through their territory, i.e. Ramsay in 1900 (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?:206). Even Pückler judged that their fear of soldiers was not totally without reason (Pückler, 25.05.1903). The trade networks seem to have been dramatically altered because people in the southern pacified areas were already 'carrying the German load'. Pückler, during the first journey into the Bitieku area, noted that 'Banyang' traders had stopped visiting the market because they 'devoted' their labour to being carriers for the stations in Tinto and Bamenda (Pückler, 24.10.1903:163). The station in Ossidinge was also using 'penal labour' as carriers before 1904. Mansfeld, who became D.O. in 1904, and who tried to establish good relations with the population, obviously identified the labour problem, be it out of the district or for road construction or carrying within the district, as one of the prime sources of bitterness and resistance on the people's side. He scrupulously tried to avoid any tensions connected to the 'labour problem' until the KGG threatened to remove him from his post because his policies were too 'native-friendly' (cf. chapter 8. New 'Eingeborenenpolitik' – "Gebrannte Kinder scheut das Feuer" (1904-1914):321). The fact that 'forced labour' remained the most remembered and detested feature of German colonialism in 1918 (cf. D.O. Ossidinge 1918) and 2000/2001 may be a further indication of its negative impact on the local population. Quite possibly German contemporaries willingly downplayed the 'carrier problem', since it was unavoidable for them to revert to 'forced labour' when bringing order and development to their colony (cf. Rudin 1938:331-333). It was one of the contradictions of the German colonial project and was as such not easily set into discourse.

Such contradictions were usually passed over in silence – at times they surfaced in texts and were smoothed out before being transmitted. Typically the KGG altered the texts they were sending to the AAKA, and the AAKA then further altered them before publishing them in the DKB. Pückler's report about his journey to Bitieku was such a case and the cancelled passages provide an invaluable glimpse at the conscious process of constructing the colonial reality in the Upper Cross River area.

Es ist dies [no hostile actions of the people during the expedition, no need for military intervention by the expedition] ebenso sehr ein gutes Zeichen für die an und für sich harmlose Gesinnung der dortigen Bevölkerung, welche da und dort eine vielleicht verkehrte und nicht immer unbegrenzte Angst vor Europäern und Soldaten vorzuwenden ist, als auch das Polizeiregime gezeigt, daß sie nicht nur für den bequemen und geregelten Kabinettdienst, sondern auch für die schwierigeren Aufgaben, die an sie im Innen gestellt werden, vollständig gewachsen und diszipliniert ist. (Pückler, 24.10.1903:169)

This passage was cancelled before publication in 1904, because by that time, the population had proved not to be harmless and the police soldiers had proved not have been able to cope with their tasks. By cancelling Pückler's statement, the authorities admitted that the transformation of Ossidinge into a civil district had been premature and that Pückler had fatally misjudged the situation and his power in the area (cf. Michels 2002). The withdrawal of the people were not a sign for their fear, but for their anger, for their "hot hearts".

While in Bason-Ketuya the general comportment of German soldiers was given as the cause for the war, in a great number of villages I visited very specific incidents were remembered that "made the hearts of the people hot".

One man was killed when they were transporting the Germans to Akwaya. This man was hungry and decided to rest. The Germans forced him. When he refused, he was shot and killed. This was one of the major factors that made the people to revolt against the Germans. (AE, 05.11.2000, in Bascho) 180

One of the aunts had a beautiful daughter, who was kidnapped by the German army. The daughter went and never came back. The name of the daughter was Awu. (Boka, 09.07.2000)

It started that women had problems with the Germans. One woman called Anpka was seized from the husband because she was beautiful. The white who took her some of them were killed. [...] Anpka, Abang Baju were all arrested while they were sleeping. They got to Kajifu, Edem and Abang escaped and came back to Kekukism I and the other woman only returned after a very long time. [...] The father of my mother, by name Lakan, was the chief, as the Germans were coming, everybody escaped to the bush and only chief Lakan was around. The Germans took him hostage and held him responsible for the escaping of the people. He was seriously beaten until he became blind (A00, 07.07.2000, in Kekukism I) 181

The [black German] clerk in charge of ebony arrested some girls. They were called Abage from Dadi and Ngong from Bodan. The German representative arrested these girls because they wanted to marry them. The Dadi representative called Amsugaparat 178

178 GNK agent Diehl had completed a journey to Takpe, Mfakwe, Assam and Basho just two weeks before Pückler was killed, and in all these places he had 'negotiated' with the chiefs (cf. GNK, 1913:32).

179 Probably during one of the early expeditions of Ramsay or Glaving. 'Akwaya' certainly does not refer to the present town 'Akwaya', but generally to the area north of Basho.

180 This woman was alive during the German period.

181 The woman who related this story to me was alive during the German period.
went to Badjie [another GNK trading post at the Cross River] to see that those girls who were arrested should come back. He succeeded in bringing Abagya back. He charmed the Germans into a deep sleep and rescued his daughter Abagya. When the Germans realised the girl's absence, they came back to Dadi, arrested the man and executed him in Agbokem German [Ossidinge]. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

In all these places there was at least one incident that is specifically remembered by the people as the cause for the resistance, mainly women who were abducted or raped, or carriers, possibly guides, who were killed (cf. Eba 2001:28 similar, esp. on the question of rape). Mansfeld, who enquired after the reasons for the resistance of the people in 1904, especially mentioned the actions of one GNK clerk and the first interpreter of Pückler, who had blackmailed the population without their complaints being recognised by the station (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:148).

At times these incidents were perceived as single events or as a war of the Germans with people from just one community and not placed in the context of a general war.

The darker part of the Germans started when the store keeper of Badjie committed adultery with a woman from here called Njong Kekung. The husband was called Elem. When Elem went to ask for adultery, the German clerk shot him and he died. When the news got to Bodam, the people joined together and went to Badjie for revenge. When they got there, they said they had come from Bodam for revenge. The clerk heard the name Bodam. The people shot him, but he did not die. He fell into the river and crossed it to Nsanakang, where he reported that the Bodam people had attacked him and had looted his store. When the Germans came back and saw the store empty, they took their own forces and went to Bodam. They killed everybody in a certain farm called Nko Bekwya. (BL, 10.07.2000 in Bodam)

Even where the suffering of individuals was not remembered, the causes of local discontent remain uniform:

My father told me that the Germans came and were hunting and frightening people. They were raping people's wives. The people - due to the German hostility - decided to stand up and fight against the Germans. [...] The Germans when they got to any village, they will take any goat that comes their way, harvest any plantain that they see or rape any woman in the street that they see. (MJA, 06.07.2009)

What I want to say is that the Germans were very hostile to us. When they came to the house, they arrested the father, seized the wife and ate everything in the house. All those attitudes annoyed the people and they decided to revolt against them [...] The Germans always caught people and beat them until all of us usually ran to the bush. (AEn, 06.07.2000)

The German soldiers always caught people's wives and raped them. They started complaining. At times the Germans took some people on a journey, but these people never came back. All this provoked a fight. (SE, 03.11.2000)

The people had decided to fight the Germans because of their hostility and brutality. They did not respect people's lives, their honour, nor their property. In that respect Mansfeld was quite right when comparing the situation before the Mpawmanku wars to a 'barrel of gunpowder', for there was not a single reason or incident which can be identified to have caused the people to take up arms. Rather it was the sum of a number of events and incidents. Additionally it is surprising that no reference is made to trade competition with the local population.

Traders' behaviour was only mentioned as direct causes for resistance when they induced violent acts against the population, most prominently the raping and kidnapping of women. In this the trading clerks did not differ much from the soldiers, just as there was no differentiation between a German who was a trader and a German who was an administrator. "He" was perceived just as one person: "He" was the German (cf. AJG above). In fact, many expeditions and journeys were undertaken jointly by the administrators and traders: Glauning and Ramsay south of the river 1902; Glauning and Pückler north of the river 1902; Pückler and Waldu to Bitieku 1903; Pückler and Küster to Bachama 1904. Installation of the resistance by 'Calabar traders' is completely absent from the oral traditions. Trade is predominantly perceived as something good, since it was a way to obtain scarce German goods, and the people generally remember their encounters with German traders as pleasant. References to feasts and the sharing of drinks are abundant. Still, an element of force connected to trade has survived in oral traditions:

In those days if you do not sell your goods to them, and they happen to meet you anywhere, you will be caught and maybe they sell you down to Okuni [a village in Nigeria at the Cross River] into slavery. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

In the very detailed account of DMA in Agbokem (where a GNK trading post and the station Ossidinge were at that time) we find the only reference to trade and resistance to the activities of the GNK as an incentive to resist.

When the whites came they sent one white German all the way to Basoho where he started buying. They came from there carrying loads on their head with the white and they had written with a cutlass on a calabash, selected gun powder that they gave to Nuifam Att Ndep Ehlu who was here, but he said that he would not join them, the white man settled here first, he should remain here. The Kenyang people from Basoho 184

182 I.e. for 'adultery charges', i.e. compensation. In 1907 the normal amount was 100 M. - the equivalent of 'one slave'. In pre-colonial days the man committing adultery had generally been sold into slavery, e.g. Koelle's informant Ashu from Besengbang (cf. Mansfeld 1908:172, Koelle 1854).

183 This man was the grandson of the chief executed by the Germans after the Mpawmanku wars.

184 Probably referring to forced labourers going to the plantations in the south - probably more an effect than a cause of the Mpawmanku war.
Chief of Agborkem were involved in trading activities with the areas north of the river and had accompanied Pückler on his first journey into the areas north of the river (Pückler, 25.05.1903:65). DMA insisted that Ndep Ebha himself never joined the resistance, but was deceived by people from other places who identified some of his "children", Mbi Nde and Etta Nkongho, as having taken part in the fighting. To the Germans Ata Ndepb Ehba\(^\text{185}\) was one of the 'leaders' of the revolt (cf. Ballhaus 1968:157), who had first offered his help and then turned against them (Wolff, 29.02.1904:55). In a letter by GKN general agent Diehl to the GKN directors in Berlin, in which Diehl tried to prove that Pückler's individual actions had caused the violence, I found the only reference in a written source that Pückler had deposed the chief of Agborkem, prior to 1904, which had caused 'dislike and discontent' among the population (Diehl to GKN, 08.03.1904:195). According to oral accounts, Pückler had disrespected \(ekpe\) and thrown its insignia into the Cross River, an action that preceded the Mpwamanku wars (Ebai 2001:45). It is more likely that the deposed chief was not Ata Ndepb Ebha, but Ata Ojage. In the genealogical table of the British assessment report, "Ogaga" is listed before the present chief of the time "Atiyomassin" (R&A 1929:15). Very likely "Ogaga" corresponds to "Atajaka", "chief of Abokom", who was "hanged or shot" with three elders during the 1904 rebellion (6). Ebai also listed four leaders who prepared the anti-German resistance in 1904: "Ata Ndepb Ebha, Ntui Njock, Mbi Ndepb, and Ata Ojage, chief of Agborkem (Ebai 2001:45). While Ata Ndepb Ebha and Mbi Ndepb were also mentioned to me, Ntui Njock and Ata Ojage were not. Additionally Etta Nkongho was mentioned. Given the prominent role of Ata Ojage, the fact that his name was concealed from me, points to his problematic relationship with the Germans (DMA, 12.10.2000). Since Ata Ndepb Ebha's name features in the German records, I assume that he was the officially appointed chief. The account by DMA, which stressed that Ata Ndepb Ebha had tried to cooperate with the Germans, but his "children" had joined or allegedly joined the rebellion, gives further weight to this assumption. Since the Germans held that Ata Ndepb Ebha became one of the leaders in the war and subsequently executed him, he had obviously decided to abandon his pro-German stand. An incentive to do so might have been the fate of his fellow "warrant chief" in Tawo, who was killed by his opponents. In this case, I believe that Diehl's reference to Pückler and the chief of Agborkem, pointing to Ata Ndepb Ebha's and his people's personal interest in getting rid of the German presence close to his own village, is more 'trustworthy' than the oral tradition recounted in my presence, that put the blame on the neighbour---ing people, making Ata Ndepb Ebha into a German friend, innocent of any crime (the people in Abonumu certainly altered their stories likewise).

Bessong suspects that the Tawo people who had held a key position as specialist traders with long-distance goods such as ivory, slaves, salt, cotton products, liquor and gun powder, participated in the resistance because they wanted to protect the backbone of their economy - to them the 'middlemen' argument has been applied (cf. Bessong 1986:103). Indeed, the prominent role and the fierce resistance displayed by Tawo during the Mpwamanku war is striking. Rather than the 'middleman' argument used by Bessong, it seems that the German colonial intervention had introduced considerable friction into the community itself. The Germans had - for unknown reasons - appointed a chief. During the Mpwamanku wars, the Tawo people had killed this chief (cf. Langheld, 09.03.1904:36). It does not seem too far fetched to assume that the 'German appointed chief' was one of those socially younger men who used the Germans as a source of authority denied him from within the community. His claims to authority and respect were probably perceived as illegitimate by the leaders of the community and possibly he used the powers conferred on him. In some oral testimonies I gathered, greed for German goods in the shops is named as an incentive for the violence. This motivation was fervently put forward in the villages Akwa, Nyang and Mukonyong, where all pledged that they did not take part in the fighting and that they were angry with the Basha people for killing the white man and thus driving out the Germans (TE, 06.11.2000; MM and AG, 08.11.2000; ET, 07.11.2000; also AOO, 07.07.2000). Although not evident at a first level of analysis, I am quite certain that the 'stealing of German goods by Basha-people' is a reference to a specific incident that represented the beginning of open friction between the population and the Germans that quickly got out of hand and culminated in the Mpwamanku war (cf. chapter 7.2.1. "Pückler and Küster § 389").

The discussion so far has concentrated on the 'overside' area, the 'Anyang' area of colonial mindscapes, where the epicentre of the resistance is usually located. In other areas the same canon of causes was repeated (Oru 1995:29 in Mfaiok). The causes of the violent confrontations in Mamfe and Besongbang have been preserved with much detail in the oral testimonies. In Mamfe, where a GKN trading post with two German agents was operated, the reasons transmitted by German and local historiography are divergent.

Ballhaus' verdict on the 'practices' of the GNK that caused the hostilities explicitly rests on events taking place in Mamfe (s.a.). Agent Schmidt had had bad relations with the people, and his fellow agent Seidel even complained about him. While the beating of customers and threats to burn one person's house feature in the records, local historiography refers to 'women palaver':

A 'cook steward' in the services of the Germans had committed adultery with a woman from Bachuo Nai and her husband, Ata Ebge Ngui, asked for compensation for the

\(^{185}\) "Ndeveba" or "Tandep" in the German sources (Ballhaus 1968:157; Diehl to GKN, 08.03.1904:195).
The people of Nsamakang also initially assured the Germans of their aid (Willhöft 1904:186).

In its unique mixture of German colonial discursive elements and local oral historiography, Ngoh (1988) presents three causes of the "resistance Mamfé", "connue localement sous l'appellation de Mpaawnmanku" (61): instigation by Calabar traders, opposition to forced labour and German prohibition of cutting down palm trees for palm wine. This prohibition was presumably meant to increase the production of palm oil. Resistance to this prohibition was — according to Ngoh — one of the immediate causes for violent action:

"La cause immédiate de la révolte fut l'appel du chef Tambe de Besongbang demandant à ses sujets d'ignorer l'interdiction. Les indigènes pillèrent la station allemande de Mamfé et le chef du district de Mamfé, Graf von Puckler Limburg [sic] qui était responsable de l'arrêt d'interdiction fut assassiné (ibid:61)"

Ngoh, although unfortunately not citing any of his sources, neither written nor oral, relies on the local tradition about the Mpaawnmanku wars as relegated by people in Besongbang (JT, 04.06.2000) that has as such entered many studies by University students from the area who conducted interviews in their home area:

Also the Germans by this time, had prohibited the indigènes from felling palm trees for palm wine. Instead they should grow them for the production of palm oil. Palm wine or 'mirabo' (now popularly known as 'Matongo'), was an industrial item to the Banyang people. It was equally used in invoking spirits for blessing. This liquor is produced in the greater part of the Konyang by uprooting the oil palm tree and draining the sap from the top of the trunk. The industry is principally a dry season one but continues in reduced quantities in the rainy seasons [...] Telling the people therefore not to produce palm wine, was just an indirect way of infringing into their tradition and customs. As such they had to fight tooth and nail to keep their traditional norms intact. Their resistance to the German administration therefore, had fertile grounds. (Oru 1996:31-32)

As the Germans tried to effect an economic advantage for themselves, the people perceived it as curtailing their culture.

One possible contributing cause never mentioned in the oral testimonies was the German attitude towards slavery. Mansfeld referred to the abrupt and stem measures undertaken to abolish slavery as a main factor for the hatred against the German presence (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:148; cf. Ebai 2001:26). Slavery had officially been abolished in 1902 (Rudin 1938). The station in Ossidinge had declared every slave who 'ran away' from their master and sought refuge at the station a free man and had additionally punished the master for every single such case (ibid.). Mansfeld's statement remains the only reference to the German attitude towards slavery as a possible cause for resistance. Slavery is a contentious issue in the Upper Cross River area today, so the fact

---

186 His staff might have taken the warning more seriously, since according to Gorges (1930) they had left the station when the looting took place and had taken the firearms with them (9).

187 According to Gorges (1930) he had tried to embark on a canoe (9).

188 "Mbiaio-Eta" (Pückler, 25.05.1903:67).

189 Gorges (1930) talking to people who had witnessed the scene reports an identical story: "The subsequent orgy is still well remembered. Some are supposed to have died through mistaking kerosene for gin, and others drank themselves to death" (9).
that it was not elaborated upon in the interviews may have been caused by diplomatic and tactful considerations. Although the 'illegitimate' slave trading had been replaced by 'legitimate trade' – both notions a "Western ideological concept" (Austen 1996:97) – as the most important aspect of long-distance trade, slaves were still valuable resources and the prohibition of dealing with slaves must be regarded as a fundamental break with existing economic organisation (cf. chapter 2.3. 'Trade routes' and 'market places': 60). The now 'illegitimate' trade forced the slave traders to withdraw into clandestine arenas, move their trade routes, and change their transition practices (A0O, 07.07.2000; Besong 1990:86; Ebai 2001:26). It also gave the slaves an opportunity to negotiate their status. Zintgraff, for example, was warned of the locals' plans by slaves. Acts of slaves disclosing information to the Germans are also remembered in the Mpawmanku wars (see below).

Certainly, the immediate reasons for violent resistance against the German colonial project were divergent, ranging from rape, kidnapping, adultery, blackmail, and brutality to interference in the people's social and economic activities (slavery, trade, felling of palm trees). All this led to "einer im Lande herrschenden Misstimmung und lang verhaltenem Groß" (Diehl, 08.03.1904:194). AMA expressed the people's bitterness thus: the whole village consulted and came to the conclusion that the Germans had come to 'climb on our heads'. What could we do? Those who said they had come to develop us had come to destroy us only. We started planning a resistance [...]. The people of Eyo Ekye [leader of Basho] sent a bag of stones to the white men with the message: 'Mpaw Manku wants to fight with you to see who is stronger!' (AMA, 14.10.2001).

7.2.2. 'Sending a whisper'

As outlined above there were numerous reasons for the population in the Upper Cross River area to object to the German presence in their area. While the population in the areas south of the river had already had their own 'war' from 1899 to 1901 with hostilities continuing in 1902, the people in the 'overseas' and the central area had not yet felt the full blow of German violence. Even before the resistance of 1904 they had displayed their disinclination to follow German orders (Basho in 1901, Besogbang 1901; cf. chapter 7.1.1. 'A peaceful situation' and hostilities (1901):259). The expeditions penetrating their area had been rather small, so that these people seemingly felt strong enough to put up armed resistance against the Germans. From both oral traditions and written documents I gather that, in fact, Mpawmanku from Bachama was the one who instigated the preparations (cf. Ebai 2001; Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905).

One man who really stood at the front of this rebellion was called Mpawmanku. He is from Bachama in the Anyang area. The man gathered forces and fought with the Germans. When he took the lead, all those who were maltreated supported him and the war spread. (AEN, 06.07.2000)

Mpawmanku had been a prominent figure in the area by 1900, when Ramsay passed through Bachama as the first German and listed "Fomaku" as the chief of the Bachama (Ramsay, Dec. 1900:19). Mpawmanku exerted a considerable influence both over Assumbo in the grassfields and also over Basho in the forest area. In 2000/2001 his name was "Mpawmanku" or "Mpawmanku" in the northern areas, e.g. in Bachama and Basho. In the southern areas (Ngonya, Njemay, Upper Banyang) his name had been altered into "Nforh Manku" or "Mlaw Manku" respectively, i.e. "Chief Manku". In contemporary German sources, his name is "Fomanku" or "Fomaku". It remains uncertain whether his name included the title mFaw and would be possibly a reference to his control over the area of the river "Maku" in the Basho area, or whether his full name was "Mbpawmanku".

Although he seems to have been a pronounced leader, he planned the resistance in close cooperation with the other powerful leaders of the 'overseas' areas, namely Evo Ekye of Basho, Abangma (Avama Mboou)193 of Bache, and Asah Akwo Nddey of Assam192. Takamanda of Takamanda, Mbi Ayuketa of Eshobi, and Eno Karansh193 of Kesham (APA, 14.10.2000; AG, 05.11.2000; Ebai 2001:30). These extended the network and induced other people to join them. Assam communicated with Mkakwe, Takpe and Okpamba into Enoayuk194, a chief in Basho, who was the brother of Asah Akwo Nddey of Assam, and extended the network to Nbor-Eshua195 of Kajifu, Ashuatuk196 of Beteme, Enokaranshi of Kesham, and Nde Epa of Agborkem. Nde Epa came on the way to participate, and Kesham united with Eshobi (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905). People of the following places held that they received messages about the imminent resistance: Takpe, Takamanda, Obonyi (EJ, 17.10.2001), Kajifu (AEN, 06.07.2000), Kekukisem II (08.07.2000), Kesham, Badje (MM and AG, 08.11.2000), and Agborkem (DMA, 12.10.2000).

People were openly accused of collaborating with the Germans, most prominently Ebot Arrey, the chief of Ossing, who supposedly conveyed a message to the coast about the resistance taking place further north (RTB, 20.06.2000; Gorges 1930:9).

192 "Abam" (Heinicke to KST, 15.09.1904:154).
193 According to Schulz, Assam was the most influential person in the overseas area (Schulz, 31.03.1906:176).
194 "Enokaranshi" (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905:116). Enow Akrasa (Anderson 1929:4). Pückler in 1903 had described Kesham as a thriving market place and "Enokaranshi" as an influential chief, feared by his neighbours who could profitably be used by the government, as soon as he had stopped his suspicion and fear of Europeans (Pückler, 25.05.1903:65).
195 "Enno" (Pückler, 25.05.1903:66).
196 "Itebetschu" (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905:116).
197 The people in Beteme held that the person executed by the Germans after the Mpawmanku war was Asu Bessong Eno, "not the chief, but a strong man honoured like the chief, because there was no chief" (AMO, 05.07.2000).
The messages sent to the various places seem to have contained an element of force. Some of the 'chiefs' exiled at the coast stated that the common 'juju' had obliged them to take part and those involved in the driving out of the Germans had tried to charge compensation from the people in the Njemaya area who had refused to cooperate (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905; ASK, 15.03.1910; cf. Ballhaus 1968:155-158). The use of *nsibiri* signs and the supernatural methods of fighting further points to the connection of the resistance network to the associations, especially *ekpe* (cf. chapter 7.2.6. Tactics:305; cf. Oru 1996:38, relying on Raphael Tabi Besong of Mamfe). The different branches of *ekpe* had agreed on joint action. In 1907 Mansfeld witnessed the meeting of all heads of *ekpe* in Mbabong within the 'German' *ekpe* polity. It was their first meeting after the Mpwamanku wars, and people from the Njemaya and Ngonyaya area were present (Mansfeld 1908:158-159).

Some people in the Mamfe overside area blamed the 'Basho people' for killing the German, because that was perceived to be the cause for their local 'underdevelopment':

The Basho people spoiled all their good plans [...] I am still angry with them. I wished that a Basho man should never be employed. The Germans came to civilise us, educate us and develop us. (TE, 06.11.2000)

The office of Mamfe was supposed to have been established in Basho. But due to the war, the Germans decided to abandon the Basho station and transferred it to Mamfe. (ET, 07.11.2000)

Maybe due to that killing the road which is going to Akwaya did not pass through Basho, but it is not so. It is because there are so many hills between Basho and Tinta. (Kekukum II, 09.07.2000)

But others stressed the unity in action, especially the people in Basho themselves:

The whole people started driving the Germans. The Germans then resisted and there was a clash between the local people and the Germans. This problem caused the death of both blacks and Germans. (AOF, 07.07.2000)

Not only the Basho people killed the white man, it was the whole of Akwaya Subdivision [but] Mpw Mankwu from Bachama was the one who actually killed the white man. (AJG, 05.11.2000)

The people of Akwa, Mukonyong, Nyang and Okpambe claimed that the people of Kesham, Assam and Basho were the ones killing the whiteman.

Basho, Kesham, Badje, Agborke, and Assam were the villages concerned. Mukonyong did not fight, Mpw Mankwu was ruling Basho at the time. He planned with the Basho people to kill the Germans. He stood as the leader and fought with the Germans.

197 Akwaya Subdivision encompasses the whole of the 'Mamfe overside' area north of the Cross River.
198 Transcribed thus by MTA.

It started in Basho and spread to other places. [...] They did not send us a message to participate. (MM and AG, 08.11.2000)

Those people in Basho started the fight [...]. The villages like Nyang, Mukonyong and Okpambe were not concerned. (ET, 07.11.2000)

Pückler also recorded a more cooperative attitude from the people in Nyang. During his first and second journey north of the river he had spent one night in Nyang, before continuing to Bitieku and one 'chief' of Nyang – Abossong – had supplied his column with abundant food, while another, chief 'Tari' was described as very friendly (Pückler, 25.05.1903:66; Pückler 24.10.1903:158). In fact, one chief of Okpambe and "Abam", i.e. Abangma or Avama Mbouou, of Bacee were awarded a certificate by the sixth company squadron (Heinicke to KST, 15.09.1904). Since Abangma of Bacee has been identified as one of the instigators of the resistance, this may not serve as an indication for a pro-German attitude. Enoayuk of Bache, brother to Assam was executed by the Germans (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905). At this point it cannot be certain whether Enoayuk and Abangma were the same or different people. It may be assumed that Enoayuk was a chief in Bache who had been the local leader of the resistance as described above, while Abangma presented himself to the Germans in the course of the actions, either in an attempt to aggrandise his own position by extraving German power, or in an attempt to conceal the Enoayuk's identity. The fact that Enoayuk was finally executed by the Germans would indeed point to the first assumption. Mansfeld also cited the "Ektu-Häuptling" Ogba Borajep holding that Okpambe joined Assam, Takpe and Mfakwe in the ambush on Pückler's expedition (ibid.).

The settlements of "Nyang II" – possibly Mukonyong – had not been destroyed during the war – as opposed to Nyang I. This settlement was destroyed; one chief died in combat and his successor went into hiding (Heinicke to KST, 15.09.1904:153).

The population had begun by not only agreeing on united action, but also by accumulating weapons, especially gunpowder:

The natives due to the German hostility decided to stand a fight against them. They took their dane guns. When the war became serious, the well to do people started buying gun powder from the shops of the Germans and supplied it to those with guns. (MIA, 05.07.2000)

The wealthier people added by buying gun powder and distributing it to those with guns. The fact that the gun powder was obtained from "German shops" (i.e. GNK trading posts), may seem ironic, and indeed during the military actions of 1904 the officers of the Schütztruppe did indeed wonder why the GNK had not been alarmed at the amount of gun powder that was demanded by the population (Wolff, 29.02.1904:67).

199 "Tawi" (Pückler, 24.10.1903:158).
The colonial administration was puzzled by the fast and wide spread of the resistance, having acted on the assumption that no political union bigger than the village or village group existed.

There was a time when the neighboring villages sent word to Agbor Bessong [of Abonandu] to drive the Germans because they do not like him. Agbor Bessong reported the problem to the Germans, and openly told the Germans that he has refused the request from the blacks. [...] The only thing I can remember is that the Agborkem people are responsible for the war. For that reason all the chiefs who were guilty were hanged in Agborkem. Abonandu people did not support them, because the Germans had a shop here and also an estate. This was an opportunity for their development. (Abonandu, 04.07.2000)

This account does not 'prove' that the people of Abonandu refused to take part in the Mpwamanku war. Although in the German sources the planter Paschen was informed of the advancing enemy by 'Abonandu people', the village of Abonandu had purportedly served as the base of the joint forces attacking the plantation in Abonandu on the 25th of January, 1904 (Wolff, 29.02.1904:54-55).

As can be gathered from the various references to 'development' – they also mentioned that they had hoped for hospitals and schools, they wanted to stress to me, since I was perceived as a representative of the 'Germans' – that 'the people of Abonandu were in excellent relationship with the Germans, even during the war' (ibid.).

It shows that people had communicated before the hostilities broke out and that at least in retrospect it was judged possible by the people to refuse to join the resistance. The testimony of the chiefs in 1910, that the 'common juju' had forced them to join under threat of the death penalty, thus seems exaggerated and was probably meant to minimise the respective chiefs' guilt. This 'juju' was 'Ewi-ngbe' (ASK, 15.03.1910), i.e. ekpe. The use of ntshiri signs further points to the crucial role ekpe played in the network conspiracy (cf. chapter 2.4. ekpe politik: 64).

7.2.3. Pückler and Küster

Most people today living in the areas that took part in the wars divided it into two phases (cf. Ebai 2001):

We defeated the Germans in the first battle. The Germans then went and prepared for the second battle, which they won. (AE, 05.11.2000)

The beginning of the first phase was not, however, the killing of Pückler-Limpurg and his expedition in January 1904 as is held by conventional academic wisdom (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpwamanku wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit einzustehen":319). In fact, this event was preceded by minor hostilities and diplomatic controversies. Both in the oral traditions and in the written records there are abundant references that traders of the GNK were molested and their goods stolen (Wolff 02.03.1904:47). In the oral traditions of Akwa, Nyang, and Mukonyong this is expressed by the greed of the people for the German goods (TE, 06.11.2000; ET, 07.11.2000; MM and AG, 08.11.2000). From oral tradition I gather that a German trading caravan on its way from the post in Takpe to Basho was attacked along the Basho-Kekpana road, and some of their goods were stolen. In the German records this raid is solely connected to Ramsey's journey overside 1900, with the 'beautiful observation lantern' singled out as object of dispute. It seems that the original attack, for which the Germans sought compensation in 1903, was indeed the one on Ramsey in 1900, which took place along the Basho-Kekpana road (cf. chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?:206; Dielh, 08.03.1904; AAKA-Gutachten no date:4; GNK 1913:25).


While in the contemporary written documents these people are identified as "Anyang" (Wolff 02.03.1904:47), oral tradition points to instigation by Mpwamanku and the Bachama (cf. Ebai 2001:35). GNK agent Küster and the D.O. Pückler-Limpurg had agreed to ask the Bachama for compensation:


In the correspondences that survived in the German records between GNK and AAKA, the GNK clung to the fact that Pückler-Limpurg had 'provoked' Mpwamanku by demanding "minor items", such as an expedition lantern that had been
stolen from Ramsay in 1900 (GNK to AAKA, 29.2.1904:176; Diehl to GNK, 08.03.1904:190; GNK 1913:25; cf. Michels 2002). I assume that the GNK – in their quest for compensation for the serious damages suffered during the Mpwamanku wars – grasped all possible means to transfer the maximum amount of guilt onto Pückler alone. They therefore wilfully downplayed their role in Pückler’s intrigues with the people of Basho and Bachama. When the Pückler’s case was again taken up during the law suit between GNK and German state in 1914, Mansfeld stated that obviously the GNK believed all files of the station Ossindinge had been destroyed, but in fact, he still possessed some important documents, namely a letter by GNK general agent Diehl from 02.01.1904 to Pückler (Mansfeld to KGK, 21.01.1914).

As I have pointed out above and elsewhere (Michels 2002) at the stage before the outbreak of the Mpwamanku war the differences in ideology, aims, and measures between the GNK and Pückler – former employee of the GNK – were minimal. Just as the population perceived them as one unit – one inseparable from the other – the Germans formed one “ethnic identity” within the Upper Cross River region. I therefore conclude that quite certainly Pückler had demanded Ramsay’s expedition lantern from Mpwamanku, but he had done so with the consent of the GNK agents who wanted to secure and extend their trade networks. While Pückler – and probably also the GNK agents – sent messages to the Bachama, i.e. Mpwamanku, demanding he come to the station in Ossindinge to settle their disputes, Mpwamanku in turn, sent messages to Pückler – through Assah Akow Ndey of Assam – summoning him to come to Bachama (Diehl to GNK, 08.03.1904:190-191; Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905; DMA, 12.10.2000).

The GNK in 1913 quotes one of those messages – to be conveyed by Küster – thus:

Sollten Sie [Küster] bereits mit den Leuten in Badschama (eine Tagesreise nördlich Bascho) Handelsbeziehungen angeknüpft haben, so wäre ich Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn Sie diese Leute von meinem Kommen in Kenntnis setzen und sie auffordern, Ihnen einzeln die seinerzeit dem Hauptmann Ramsay gestohlene Beobachtungslupe sowie ein Rind für die Diebstähle an der Ramsays’Sehen Expedition für mich auszuliefern. Sind diese beiden Dinge bis zu meiner Ankunft nicht in Bascho, so brenne ich die 5 Badschama-Dörfer nieder. (Pückler, quoted in GNK 1913:25)

Although Diehl in his report to the GNK general assembly in Berlin held that he had opposed the idea of a military expedition against the Bachama and that local agent Küster was of the same opinion, his argument is not very convincing. Diehl and Küster were convinced that the people of Basho would join the Germans in an attack against the Bachama (ibid.:191-192; Diehl to KRS Ossindinge, 02.01.1904). Diehl could also not offer a convincing explanation as to why Küster participated in an expedition of which he was certain would fail:

Es entsprach auch seiner [Küsters] Ansicht, sich an der geplanten Expedition v. Pückler nicht zu beteiligen; wenn er dies dann später, entgegen unserer Abrede, doch
genan hat, so geschah es wohl hauptsächlich um Herrn Graf v. Pückler unter diesen schwierigen Verhältnissen mit seiner reichen Erfahrung zur Seite zu stehen, und um durch seine Person vielleicht beschwingend einzuwirken. (Diehl to GNK, 08.03.1904:193)

In the letter cited by Mansfeld in 1914 Diehl explicitly stated that he was also of the opinion that Bachama could only be brought to reason by a 'penal expedition' and that such a military operation would comply with the interests of the traders (Mansfeld to KGK, 21.01.1914).

Wir neigen vielmehr der Ansicht zu, dass die Badschamas noch zur Einsicht gelangen wenn sie erst merken, dass seitens der Station Vorbereitungen zu einer Strafexpedition getroffen werden. Die G.N.K. sieht der Entwicklung dieser Angelegenheit mit Spannung entgegen, da die Eröffnung der Badschama Strasse zur Weiterentwicklung des Gemischtgutes nötig und von grösstem Interesse ist. (Diehl to KRS Ossindinge, 02.01.1904)

It seems that Pückler and Küster had jointly planned the expedition against the Bachama with the tacit consent of both the KGK and the GNK. Küster – residing in Talpe in the overside area and frequently visiting Basho, where one of the black GNK clerks was stationed – had received some information about the population’s resistance preparations on the 8th of January (letter of Pückler, cited in GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:16). Pückler responded to the letter he had received by Küster by expressing his desire to act quickly and urged the GNK to participate. The GNK later stated that their agents were forbidden to partake in military actions and the planned expedition against the Bachama was surely expected to involve fighting (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:17; cf. Michels 2002). Küster thus acted contrary to the GNK’s policies and possibly contrary to the advice of general agent Diehl. Although Küster had warned Pückler about the situation in Basho and Bachama, it is unlikely that he wanted to discourage Pückler from undertaking the action.

This interest identity of the colonial trader and the colonial administrator was de facto displayed by this 'joint expedition' of Pückler and Küster.²⁰⁶ The expedition was headed by Pückler, and joined by Küster. The majority of the might consisted of police soldiers, but a number of armed black GNK clerks accompanied them:

Bei Herrn Küster waren wir 20 Soldaten, 7 Cape Coast-Leute. (GNK clerk Hooper, cited by Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:189)

Carpenter Saki and clerk Bonaventura, for example, who survived the hostilities defended their lives with one M88 gun, 50 bullets, and one revolver (Willhöft

²⁰⁶ This had also been the case during Pückler’s journeys in 1903 (cf. chapter 7.1.3. Pückler-Limpurg – ‘young’ and ‘inexperienced’:262) as well as Glanning’s journeys (cf. chapter 7.1.1. ’A peaceful situation’ and hostilities (1901):259).
Pückler's intentions to intimidate the Bachama by threatening to use force were displayed by the boxes of ammunition he sent to Basho about a week before the expedition's departure. Given that Mpawmkunku and his allies had sent similar signs of strength (bag of stones, painted calabashes) to the German station in Ossinde, the boxes were indeed perceived as a sign of imminent warfare and have survived in the oral tradition in Bachama as:

The soldiers came here to Bachama. The Germans said they were going to solve the problem. Everybody should come into the village hall. All the people entered the hall. The hall did not have any windows. The soldiers came with boxes. Guns of the white men were in those boxes. The people of Bachama thought the white man had come to give them presents. They entered inside the house. The soldiers carried those boxes. They kept them at the center as if they were going to give them presents. Before this time, Mpaw Manku, the person who they believed to be the cause for the problem, had escaped into the bush. His son was inside the hall. The white men saw that all the men were inside, because a war is not fought with women. The soldiers closed the door and said to open the boxes. After opening the boxes, they saw only guns. Then the people of Bachama became confused, but the doors were already closed. The soldiers had guns. They asked for the person who was Mpaw Manku. They could not see Mpaw Manku. They asked whether his son was there. The people of Bachama said that the son was there. The Germans arrested the son. The mother of the child was also there. That woman was a noble woman. The son of Mpaw Manku was called Tam Tuk Tiku. They sent the people of Bachama to call for Mpaw Manku in the bush. When Mpaw Manku came, he said because of his son to go and die, he himself will go and die. Then Mpaw Manku went and up till date we do not know whether he has gone to Yaoundé, however, we did not see him again. (APA, 14.10.2001)

As indicated above and elsewhere, Pückler failed in taking Bachama because of lack of ammunition and soldiers and due to the foresight of the Bachama people, who had fortified their village (cf. for a detailed account Michels 2002; Diehl, 08.03.1904:193-194). Pückler did not succeed and had to retreat to Basho, which was deserted. Although Pückler believed that the only hostilities to be expected were from the Bachama people, his expedition was again attacked on the next day, the 22nd of January, on their retreat from Basho towards Ossinde. This attack was most certainly carried out by people from Basho, Assam, Mfakwe, Takpe, and Okpanbe (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905; Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:184; Moisel 1904b). They had followed the expedition's movement and finally attacked while the column was crossing a river. Pückler, his black sergeant, and at least ten police soldiers were killed immediately, while Küster and the remaining police soldiers, boys, and GNK clerks managed to flee to Oboniny (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:188; GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:18-19). Küster was then shot in Oboniny (GNK clerk Hooper, cited ibid.:18). Twelve police soldiers and at least three GNK clerks* and four Cape-coast people managed to make their way to the station in Ossinde (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:18; Wolff, 02.03.1904:40). All of them were wounded, eight of them seriously (ibid.). Since the people of Kesham, Kajiju, Beteme, and Agborkem had been informed about the imminent attacks, news about the success over Pückler's expedition quickly led to subsequent actions:

The Kesham people killed Côme, the GNK clerk, who had resided in Kesham for about one month (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:183) and continued, joined by the Esobi people to Mamfe, where the people of Bachuo and Mamfe had already gathered and killed GNK agent Schmidt (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905:116; BAB R1001/404:103).

The GNK clerks Bonaventura, carpenter Saki, four 'Cape Coast-people' and GNK agent Schoof were attacked in Takpe at the GNK post by the people of Kajiju and Assam (GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:18; Moisel 1904b). The fact that only Schoof was killed and the black clerks managed to make their way back to Badje and from there to Nsamakang illustrates that the population had identified the white men as the most undesirable objects that they had to exterminate.

Enon Fache summoned the people of Kajiju and Beteme and united with the Agborkem and Tawo people. These were the people who finally attacked Abonando on the 24th of January and Agborkem (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904; Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905:116; Wolff, 29.02.1904:55; Paschen to AAKA, 10.05.1904). Wolff estimated the number of attackers at 300-400; on the German side there remained two Germans and six soldiers, after one had been killed at the beginning of the hostilities (ibid.). Abonando had to be hurriedly vacated by the Germans, even leaving the corpses of the victims behind in situ (Wolff, 25.04.1904, cited in Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:184). Since Wolff was left with only seven able police soldiers and was short of ammunition, Willhöft joined him with one Vai, and two black clerks, armed with "Karabiner" and 160 bullets. Soldier boys and workers were also armed. The GNK post Agborkem and the station Ossinde were defended by only 17 men, including five Germans* (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:184-185; Wolff, 29.02.1904). While Wolff burnt down the village of Agborkem in order to protect the station, he was fired at and decided that it had been the 'chief of Agborkem'. On the 26th of January the GNK trading post in Agborkem was attacked by 200 men, but without success. The chief of Oban - whom Wolff trusted - begged Wolff to abandon the station since it was not safe (56). On the same day Willhöft left Agborkem back to Badje via canoe with the sick GNK clerk Paschen, two seriously wounded soldiers, the treasury and important clerks.

203 Hooper, Bonaventura, Saki (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:189; GNK to AAKA, 04.05.1904:18).
204 Police Master Wolff, customs assistant Müller, GNK agents Willhöft, Rein, and Paschen, the latter sick of fever and of no military use (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904).
documents of the station Ossidinge. The GNK post in Badje also came under attack, but the black clerk withstood the invaders with the help of the people of Badje whom he had armed. Willhöft continued to Nsanakang, where everything remained calm, and the people of Nsanakang also offered their help (Willhöft to GNK, 26.01.1904:186). Finally, on the 28th of January the GNK trading post had to be abandoned by the Germans, because it was impossible for them to defend both the trading post and the station at the same time. At this point Wolff estimated that he was fighting against 600 adversaries, although he suspected an even stronger might, since he had been informed that Badje had been seized simultaneously (ibid.). In a decisive attack in the early morning hours of the 30th January, the Upper Cross River people succeeded in taking the government station Ossidinge. Wolff and his remaining staff retreated to Nsanakang on foot along the bank of the Cross River. The estimated number of his opponents had increased to 800 to 1000 men—a large part was presumably added to underline the heroic defence he and his crew had put up. The only reason why he had abandoned the station was the lack of ammunition (61-62).

Also 11 abgetetete tomblide Männer gegen 800! Wahrlich ein zu großer Unterschied. Keine einzige Patrone! Hätte ich genügend Munition gehabt, wir wären nie eher gewichen, als bis alles verschossen gewesen wäre. Meine größte Ehre wäre es gewesen, hätte ich die Station halten können, aber es ging nicht. Wäre ich jetzt nicht gewichen, nachdem keine Munition mehr vorhanden war, so hätte ich mir nur den Vorwurf zu machen, der Mörder meiner Leute zu sein (ibid.).

The GNK post in Nsanakang had at that time not yet been attacked, but on the 8th of February two chiefs of Nsanakang came to the GNK station and seriously warned the Germans of an imminent attack. The remaining Germans who had sent for reinforcement and were awaiting it desperately decided not to abandon Nsanakang without a fight. The weakness of the German bunch might be illustrated by the case of police soldier Semambo, who had survived the attack on Pückler's Bachama expedition and returned to the station Ossidinge on the 25th of January. During the attack on Abonandu he was seriously wounded. Still Wolff sent him on a patrol towards Agborkem from their last stand in Nsanakang on the 20th of February from which Semambo did not return (Wolff, 29.02.1904:67). When Nsanakang was attacked on the 9th of February the 21 remaining men—most of them wounded—could not hold out against an enemy force judged by Wolff at 1200 men, before they had to turn to the two remaining canoes and flee down the Cross River. They had set fire to the station before leaving to secure their safe departure. On their way down the river they met a British column that had been sent for their rescue (Wolff, 29.04.1904:64-65).

On the 9th of February 1904 — nineteen days after Pückler's death— all German traces had been wiped from the Upper Cross River area. They had been killed or expelled; their bases, and their goods looted. The first phase was entered by hostilities of Pückler against the village of Bachama and their 'chief', Mpawmaku, north of Basgo in the overside area. Pückler and his 35 soldiers did not succeed in taking the village, had to retreat, came under attack and were almost entirely wiped out (cf. Michels 2002 for a detailed account).

Hostilities then continued against all German trading posts, as well as the station in Agborkem and the GNK main post in Nsanakang, the Germans' last stand, which was surrendered on the 10th of February when the Germans with their remaining employees fled by canoe downriver towards Nigeria (cf. Wolff, 29.02.1904).

They fought in all the settlements, also in our main settlement [Kekusisem]. The war extended up to Agborkem and finally to Nsanakang. (EN, 07.07.2000)

I have assessed Pückler's attitude elsewhere (Michels 2002) with the conclusion that Pückler and Küster had underestimated the military potential of their opponents as well as their determination to withstand German appropriation.

In the case of Besongang the initial resistance was non-violent involving disobedience to the prohibition of felling down palm trees; in all other areas, the first phase was characterised by the killing of the German representatives—white or black—and the destruction of their bases. German defence was weak or non-existent.

7.2.4. Operations south of the river

The 'Anyang-Expedition' of the Schutztruppe officially lasted from 5th February to the 20th September 1904, when the 'state of war' was revoked for the areas south of the river (KGK to AAKA, 20.09.1904). This was the duration of the second phase of the Mpawmanku wars, generally held to have ended with the defeat of the Upper Cross River people. During this time the state of war had been declared in the whole district of Ossidinge and all authority was transferred to the general commander of the Schutztruppe, Oberst Müller. The civil administration, including the Gouverneur Puttkamer were merely informed about his orders—at times via the KOS and AAKA in Berlin (cf. KGK to AAKA, 08.05.1904).

News about the successful dislodging of the Germans from the Cross River area first reached Buea on the 3rd of February—twelve days after Pückler's death and five days after the fall of the German's last stand in Nsanakang. Four German officers under command of Lt. Nitschmann and 35 soldiers of the Schutztruppe were immediately dispatched from Buea via Rio del Rey to Ossidinge and reached the district on the 14th of February. These were reinforced with 20 police soldiers. Knobloch with a Schutztruppe squadron from the military post in Bamenda—a four day long journey from Ossidinge—arrived on the 27th of February in Tinto. All these forces were united on the 3rd of March in Bachuo (Manfe central) and established their base camp in Manfe (AAKA, 12.03.1904). The first operations of the Germans concentrated on the areas
along the Cross River, where the German station and most GNK posts had been. Nitschmann, passing from Nsanakang via Ossidinge to Tawo, reported not only the destruction of the German buildings and one grave, but also a number of burnt villages. It seemed that the population had burnt down their own settlements and were prepared to withstand the Germans by hiding in the forest and the area. A column of combatants from Tawo, Nkemetchi and Ogomoko (Njomaya) had started crossing the Munaya and spread the resistance towards the Njemaya and Ndian areas. Ogba-Bomajep from the Njemaya area had disclosed to Mansfeld in 1905 that the men had come to ask for compensation payments from the Njemaya people, because they had not participated in the fighting although they had been asked to do so (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1905). The presence of at least a few German soldiers had led to a change in their strategy and they turned against this new German presence within their area (ibid.; Langheld, 04.03.1904). Nitschmann's column was attacked in Tawo, two soldiers were seriously wounded, and two other soldiers were wounded lightly. The Germans erected defense works around their base in Tawo. Nonetheless, during subsequent attacks, German losses were considerable: five soldiers killed, three seriously, two lightly wounded soldiers, two wounded soldier boys, four wounded carriers. Nitschmann complained profusely about the inexperience of his soldiers who had only been employed four weeks earlier and was forced to withdraw from Tawo towards Ogomoko from where he had to dispatch the wounded to Rio del Rey. The Njemaya area remained 'peaceful' and was thus used by the Germans as one of their supply lines. The Ball road that was 'secured' by the fourth of March became the main supply line (ibid.). The Mamfe-Tinto road was not as easily secured and in June 1904 a provisions caravan was fired at around Bachu Ntai (Müller to KOS, 03.07.1904:106; BAB R1001/4014:104). The German's enemy had displayed that the initial force sent to the Cross River was by no means sufficient to achieve a total military victory. Nitschmann therefore had to call for reinforcements of about 100 soldiers (Nitschmann, 23.02.1904).

One could propose that between the initial victory of the population — culminating in the ultimate removal of all German traces in their area on the 18th of February and the major German counter-offensive initiated by the arrival of Oberst Müller and the main contingent of the Schütztruppe, lay a distinct phase of theMpawmanku wars. During this time, the German's main efforts were concentrated in confining hostilities and preventing their spread. The German power during these weeks was too weak to achieve or even attempt any military victory in the center of the war. Nitschmann was forced to passively await reinforcements in Mamfe, while Langheld secured the western and southern front. Within the first two weeks the Germans had lost twelve percent of their soldiers (Langheld, 09.03.1904:36; BAB R1001/4014:104). The people along the Bali road and Tinto were not prone to join the rebels, while the situation in the Obang area north of Abat was hostile. Langheld's intervention slowly convinced the people to 'remain loyal'. As Nitschmann had noted on the 4th of March, those already involved in the fighting had tried to actively spread the resistance, even revolting against those who were unwilling. Those who refused to cooperate were notably those who had chosen the 'extraversion' strategy and profited from the power the Germans had started establishing, e.g. the 'German appointed' chief Ebule of Tawo (Langheld, 09.03.1904:36).

On the 30th of March the main contingent of the Schütztruppe under Oberst Müller arrived in the area. On the 6th of April the soldiers were stationed along the Cross River with the headquarter in Nsanakang and the main base for operations in Ndebayu. At this point the Germans had lost 15 soldiers, and six carriers. Additionally 20 soldiers and ten carriers were wounded (Müller, 06.04.1904). Reinforcement of one officer, one non-commissioned officer and 40 soldiers had to be sent to the Cross, because operations were more difficult and lengthy than expected due to the terrain and the good arms possessed by the Cross River people (Puttkamer to AAKA, 24.04.1904). By May 1904 Müller had not advanced into the Basho and Bachama territory, although he commanded about 300 soldiers and 21 officers. Operations concentrated on the area south of the river, and only very gradually advanced into the overside area.

The difficulties encountered by the Schütztruppe in the Upper Cross area were unexpected and also unbelievable for the administration in Buea (KGK to AAKA, 01.06.1904). The German force summoned in the Upper Cross River area was extraordinary, yet it could not achieve any considerable impact. Reinforcements had to be accumulated from all over Cameroon.285 Difficulties in obtaining enough food for the soldiers and problems with their baggage train, which was four times larger than the number of soldiers, seems to have further slowed the advancement. The KGK also accused the Schütztruppe of not having employed sufficient carriers before advancing into the Cross area and of not ordering their supply lines accordingly.

Dieser zögernde Aufmarsch mag vielleicht ein gutes Teil mit dazu beigetragen haben, das Siegesbewußtsein und damit gleichzeitig die Widerstandskraft der eingeborenen mit zu stigmatisieren. (KGK to AAKA, 10.10.1904:159)

While by June 1904 military operations south of the river ceased and headquarters with light military staff were established in Ossidinge and Mamfe, commander Müller had to concede that the majority of the rebelling people had sim-

285 Schlosser interrupted his operations at the Sanaga (Babimbi); Heinicke came from Buea; Knobloch from Bamenda, leaving the military station in Bamenda bare off German soldiers. In June 1904 the following districts were declared as being in a 'state of war': Bamenda, Ossidinge, Tinto, Fontemdorf, Johann-Albrechtshöhe, and Rio del Rey. For all except for Ossidinge this had been a precautionary measure which was rebuked on the 5th of August (KGK to AAKA, 19.06.1904:77; KGK to AAKA, 06.08.1904 ).
ply abandoned their settlement sites and retreated north of the river, e.g. Tawo, Mamfe and Agborkem (Müller to KOS, 02.06.1904).

7.2.5. Operations north of the river: military post Basho (1904-1906)

The majority of the GNK posts destroyed lay in the overside area: Obonyi, Takpe, Badje, Abonandu, Kesham. In March 1904 the GNK reported that, according to rumours, their shops operated by Vai in Toko and Kendem in the wider Tinto area had also been looted by people who had crossed from the Bitieku area (GNK to AAK, 04.05.1904:20). Oberst Müller pointed to the fact that especially in the areas north of the Cross River German penetration had been weak or non-existent prior to the his military campaign and that in these areas resistance was fiercest.


In fact, in the overside area, especially north of Basho, all the settlements opposed the Germans either actively by fighting or passively by evasion.

Knobloch shifted his base from Mamfe to the opposite bank of the Cross River – a wide stretch of grassland due to the rocky ground – on the 13th of May and was joined by Heinicke's detachment on the 25th of May. Heinicke had advanced from Tinto via Toko, which was peaceful, and the Baku area (Eshobi, Mfato, Eyang), where he had met resistance (Müller, 02.05.1904; Müller to KST, 09.05.1904; Müller, 27.05.1904). Later the Germans suspected that although in the Toko and Kendem area no fighting occurred these people reinforced the rebels in the Baku area (Müller to KOS, 03.07.1904:105). Toko and Kendem fell into the area of the Tinto post and thus into the district of Fontem. The river Mo established the boundary and by July it became a serious barrier for communication, since the rains had made it too full to be crossed easily. Rausch, head of the post in Tinto, undertook a journey into the Toko and Kendem areas in July 1904 and found the area peaceful and calm. He nevertheless decided to abduct three chiefs to the station in Tinto and thus demonstrate to the people that a cooperation with the rebels was not appropriate. He also stationed three soldiers in their area (Rausch, 07.07.1904).

The Baku-people had retreated to Bakumba in the Bitieku area, and on the 7th of July 1904 Bakumba surrendered (Müller to KGK, 27.07.1904).
In May 1904 Schlosser was based between Badje and Boka and after serious fighting, he advanced towards Kajifu (Müller, 02.05.1904; Müller to KST, 09.05.1904).

When the Germans came back and saw the store empty, they took their own forces and went to Bodam. They killed everybody in a certain farm called Nko Bekwy. The chief had been hiding there and there the Germans seized people's guns. The place is today called 'a place where they seize guns'. They even penetrated to Danali in Nigeria and killed everything, even the cows. The Germans burnt down all our houses. (BL, 10.07.2000)

Bodam and Danali finally surrendered on the 20th of July, 1904 (Müller to KGG, 27.07.1904).

On the 28th of May he occupied Basho after serious fighting. The Germans lost five soldiers and one carrier. Four soldiers, two carriers and one soldier boy were seriously wounded. 13 soldiers, four carriers, two soldier boys and two servants were lightly wounded. ObLi. Schlosser received a grazing shot at the left hand and a shot at his collar-bone. The success of 'occupying' Basho was seriously diminished by the fact that the adversaries were retreating rather than defeated, and serious resistance was expected to persist (Müller, 07.06.1904:84; Müller to KST, 07.06.1904). Schlosser had erected a permanent and fortified base in Basho in July 1904. Although the patrols undertaken from Basho were successful in killing a number of adversaries, the fact that all the people north of Basho put up serious armed resistance made the process extremely slow and tedious (Müller to KOS, 03.07.1904:105).

Heinicke and Schlosser with their respective company squadrons continued operating in the oversize area after Dr. Mansfeld had assumed his duties as new civil head of the district and general commander Müller had returned to Soppo (cf. chapter 8.I. Establishing power and healing wounds: 324).

By September 1904 Schlosser judged that the resistance had been crushed in the whole northern areas up to the grassfields. The post in Basho was commanded by Lt. von Oertzen who had patrolled most of the area up to the Bachuna settlements and had not met any further hostilities. Still, a number of people were unwilling to accept the 'terms of peace', i.e., the reparation payments, and refused to surrender their guns. The Germans did also not succeed in capturing Mapwanku.

Von den als Hauptstaifer des Aufstades bezeichneten Hüptlingen sind bis auf einen alle gerichtet beziehungsweise gefangen. (Jahresbericht Kamerun 1904/1905)

In Basho a military post was created, and a Schutztruppe squadron of 80 soldiers remained in the area until August 1905, when it was reduced to the size of 30 soldiers. The post had been created at the site where formerly the biggest Basho settlement had been (Abteilung Bascho zu KGG, 11.06.1907). The main aim of this might remained the subjection of the population and especially Mapwanku's followers. In this endeavour, however, the German soldiers were not
successful and the reduction of the post’s garrison further limited their influence (Adamez, 06.01.1907:5).

Als die Verminderung der Besatzung auf 30 Mann erfolgte war die Kraft und der Mut der Häuptlinge der Badschama Fomaku, nicht gebrochen, der einzige verantwortliche Erreger des schweren Aufstandes, der verantwortliche Mörder von 4 Weißen, vielen Schwarzen Clerks und deren Anhang, dessen Gebiet 4 km vom Posten beginnt, erfreute sich - und tat es noch heute [06.01.1907] - der goldenen Freiheit, unbefangenen Einflusses auf seine Badschamas und anderen Angststräume. (ibid.)

The post in Basho was ordered to cease all military actions between July 1905 and June 1906 with the result that the population was not accessible for any demands of the Germans, neither the clearing of roads, nor carrying of loads, nor provision of food. Its effect was judged most unfavourably by leader of the Schutztruppe detachment Basho, Lt. Adamez (Adamez, 06.01.1907:5). The Governor’s decision to reduce German intervention in the Basho area and beyond was caused by the inadequate force of the Schutztruppe and the high costs for the maintenance of a newly established strong military post (KGK to AAKA, 14.03.1904). The "Anyang-Expedition" had once again brought to light the rivalry between military and civil spheres in the colony. Participants of the expedition had seemingly been of the opinion that the civil administration was about to break down in the whole colony which would result in a purely military administration. In the light of these threats and jealousies, Puttkamer refrained from supporting the demands for an increased force of the Schutztruppe, but instead reduced the area in which Germany actually employed any power (cf. KGK to AAKA, 06.08.1904).

The "ruler of the district" was Mpawmank(u) and not the German post (Adamez, 06.01.1907:5-6). Mpawmank(u) was reportedly an old and frail man and his ‘brother’ had acted as his war leader. Mpawmank(u) had been moving to the southeast and was early 1906 reportedly hiding in the Bitiku area (Schulz, 31.03.1906:175). The whole population of the area (Mfakwe, Kekpane, Basho, Bachama, etc.) had left their settlements in 1904 and lived in temporary shelters in the forest; some had withdrawn into the mountain range of the Muntuhi/Tiv area at the Anglo-German boundary (Adamez, 06.01.1907:6. 8; Schulz, 31.03.1906). Adamez judged that the ‘Assumbo’ (Tinta and Ntemele) to the north of Bachama in the grassfields were willing to establish peaceful relations with the Germans, especially since they were engaged in trade with the Basho people in the south and thus depended on peace in the area (Adamez, 06.01.1907:8; Schulz, 31.03.1906). But the ‘Assumbo’ had merely sent a goat to the German post in Basho, asking to be left alone and when a German patrol entered their area in June 1905, they found the area deserted of people and were attacked in the mountains, which left the head of the post in Basho, Schulz, with the impression that these areas were not yet ‘ready’ for German intervention (Schulz, 31.03.1906:175-176).

In June 1906 military patrols started manoeuvring against Bachama, and Mpawmank(u)’s ‘general’ was killed. The impact of the patrols was considerable. The population provided carriers, envoys from distant places sent gifts, the roads were cleared and the soldiers who were paid in the German currency were able to buy food with it at the local markets (ibid.; Schulz, 31.03.1906:176).

The chief of Assam, probably Asah Akwoh Ndley, had become one of the German allies in their endeavour to establish ‘normal’ relationships with the population, and especially to bring them back into their old settlements. Soon the people of Basho complained about Assam’s misuse of his newly gained powers (Schulz, 31.03.1906:174).

After the offensive of June 1906, all political powers were withdrawn from the post of Basho and most of its territory became part of the civil district of Osdinga – a measure judged most detrimental by the leader of the post in Basho Obolt. Adamez. Basho was transformed into a police post and its zone of influence limited to a radius of fifteen kilometres around it, including only the settlements of Basho, Mfakwe and Kekpani. The cooperation of the local population had indeed been upheld only by force, and the provision of food and carriers was stopped immediately if this element was absent (ibid.; 8; Glauning, 15.08.1907:127-128; BAB R1001/4414:80).

The territory to the south became part of the civil station Ossindie, including Akwa, Bache, Eshobi. The zone north of the police post Basho had been declared ‘closed territory’ and penetration by civilians was prohibited. An effect of the Mpawmank(u) war was thus that the Bachama and Assumbo area was not included into the zone of German colonial power (cf. Adamez, 06.01.1907:5; Glauning to KGK, 15.08.1907). On the contrary, Mpaumanku and his people had achieved what they endeavoured: full power and control over their way of life.

Wenn erst alle Ortschaften - (was erst zum Teil der Fall ist) - gemerkt haben werden, daß der Posten nicht in der Lage, die Station Ossindie nicht willens ist, den Forderungen Nachdruck zu verleihen, wird ihr der Zustand wieder eintreten, wie er sich zu Beginn des Jahres 1906 darstellte. (Adamez, 06.01.1907)

Although Adamez vigorously pointed to the negative effects of the weak position of the Germans in the area around Basho vis-à-vis Mpawmank(u), he could not convince the Governor to send a strong expedition to Basho. The Governor thus willfully accepted to abandon any political and economic claims to the area:

Die politische und wirtschaftliche Restauration, eine Erziehung der Bevölkerung zur Arbeit, ein Einfluß auf ihren Famnabau, auf Kultur von Produktenpflanzungen, auf Un tellassung des Gummibaubaus, auf ihre soziale Aufnahme sind unmöglich, als nicht die Geilie des Bezirks, too na (Mpawmank(u) · gestraft, sein Stamm und seine Anhänger unterworfen und unschädlich gemacht sind. Gerade die lange Verschleppung dieser Notwendigkeit erfordert jetzt festes Zapacken durch eine Expedition, die mit den
In the area north of Basho, the population had actually defeated the Germans. Mpaumanku was held to be invincible (s.b.) The German staff there, bore the weakness and passivity forced upon them crudely:


Mpaumanku knew about his power and continuously declared war on the post in Basho by sending a stone (Schulz, 31.03.1906:79). This was a provocation the men on the spot were willing to take on:

Solange Badechams und die übrigen Anyangstämme nicht durch Waffengewalt bezwungen sind, wird diese Tatsache als Druck auf der Gegent lasten und eine Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung bemühen. (ibid.87)

German colonial policies had started developing in a different direction (cf. chapter 8. New "Eingeborenenpolitik" – "Gebranntes Kind scheut das Feuer" (1904-1914):317).

In 1908 the administration was forced to half-heartedly 'submit' the area, in preparation for the third Anglo-German boundary commission, which was to survey the boundary north of Basho (cf. chapter 8.2. Extending marginal power:351).

7.2.6. Tactics

The events taking place in a wide area were carried out by the respective local groups. People agreed that the fighting was not coordinated by a single person but by the leaders and elders and that people fought in groups of 50 to 150 persons (AE and AJG, 05.11.2000). The fighting south of the river, for example the looting of the store in Agborkem, was assigned to the Agborkem and Tawo people (Beteme, 05.07.2000), while the store in Badje was destroyed by the people of Dadi and Bodam (Beteme, 05.07.2000; Dadi, 11.07.2000; Bodam, 10.07.2000).

In the oral traditions people either held that they had no guns or that they had "only dane guns". Oblt. Leitner described how the people of the Rumpi hills handled these guns: the gun powder was usually mixed with sand, iron bullets, as well as stones, pieces of pots and glass. With the iron bullets the acceleration was considerable, and they were effective weapons. The recoil after firing the gun was immense. Therefore the gun was fired with stretched arms, which made aiming difficult (Leitner 1904; Rudin 1938:311-312). The use of these dane guns in the manner Leitner described is confirmed for the Upper Cross River area in 1904. The major disadvantage of these guns was their short range – just a few steps. The people employed true 'guerilla tactics', never countering the Germans in an open combat but firing from hide-outs in the forest (Wolff, 29.02.1904:66; BABR1001/4014:104). The population had captured a number of German M 71 and M 88 rifles from Päckler's expedition and ammunition and gunpowder in the shops they had looted or bought beforehand (Wolff, 29.02.1904:66). The Germans retreated from Agborkem, Badje and Nsankang made sure to sink the guns and gunpowder they could not take with them in the Cross River (Wolff, 29.02.1904).

The local population was not only fighting with their weapons – dane guns206, spears and cutlasses207 but also 'supernatural powers'.

The German living in Basho was called Anderson. He was driven by shooting him with a dane gun. The one in Assam, called Caiser, was deceived by painting a round calabash with white, red and blue, and the calabash was put under somebody's loincloth and thrown to that German: "If you do not leave here, you will be affected with this kind of a sickness!". The man then decided to run away. A white man was also killed. (SE, 03.11.2000)

Means of 'supernatural fighting' were the transformation into animals, even bees, vanishing, and creation of pools of waters against the advancing enemies (cf. Ebai 2001:14). Diviners were consulted before engaging in warfare and a "local gun proof" (Oru 1996:16, 40) was developed, which the fighters drank and rubbed on their bodies.

Once shot, the soldiers placed the hand on the spot and shouted e-ja-éh and pulled out the bullets, threw [sic] and kept fighting. (Oru 1996:16)

The Germans were strong people. He was always killing many people. But the black people at that time had also power. They had war medicine. They did not have weapons but they had war medicine. (DE, 15.10.2000)

206 "Danish Black Guns" (flint-lock) muzzle-loaders (Chilver 1961:242-243).
207 Hermann in 1906 held that the Cross River people used poisoned arrows (Hermann, Sept. 1906:83); they were, however, not mentioned to me in 2000/2001.
This 'war medicine' was prepared by eja – a military organisation. It was during the preparation of the 'medicine' that a slave was offered as a sacrifice and infrequently reference is made to the use of the clitoris of a female slave in the concoction (cf. Bessong 1986:11).

[They also] used artificial human beings in form of robots. In which someone in hiding, gives orders and they behave like human beings in a battle. The German soldiers on seeing this thought they had got their enemies and will start shooting. All this happened in a certain deep valley in the form of a cliff, near Eshobi [overseas] when the people left the station and settled in Nyamke houses in the valley singing and dancing. The fun was that, they could see the German soldiers without the latter seeing them. As such they could shoot and kill all of them and the Germans were only sending [for] reinforcement. (Oru 1996:38, citing from an interview with RTB)

These 'human robots' might be a reference to slaves used in the war, or to a tactic that was frequently described: The people constructed poles in the form of human beings that they raised and when the German soldiers started firing at them, the people knew from where they were advancing and the soldiers had wasted some bullets in vain (JT, 18.06.2000, Kempong, 20.11.2000). As in the German-Eko war, they used "sharpened sticks and poisoned spears put on the paths suspected to be used by the German soldiers" (Oru 1996:37).

All members of the community in the fighting age were required to defend the community, and they were assembled by the gong of the person eligible for summoning for war (ntumfam, defang).

Frequently in their recollections, reference is made to "hunters" who acted as "early warning systems" and warned the people.

As they [the Germans] arrived in Badje, one man from Badje who was a hunter quietly left and informed the other Boki villages that the white man had come to fight them following the last incident [looting of the store in Badje]. Either they run to the bush or they stand and fight the white man. The Boki people decided to arm themselves and took arms against the Germans. Another hunter came and told them that the Germans were advancing and that they had long eyes to see people even here in Dadi [binoculars]. So the people should be careful. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

As can be gathered from this account, the Germans led the war in their usual way as a 'war of extinction': "killing everyone and everything, even cows", and burning down villages. Most of the cows and other livestock had been 'killed' by the Schutztruppe in order to feed themselves. Oberst Müller justified the sending of patrols even after the main fighting was over because of lack of food for the soldiers (his remark on Jahresbericht Osstidinge 1904/1905:146) and Mansfeld stated that the ten months long presence of the Schutztruppe 'naturally diminished the stock' (147). The population reverted to their bush hide outs, which were probably their temporary shelters on the farms and in the forest. Some who lived close to the border crossed into British territory (Nsanakang).


In some interviews the people held this 'war of terror' to be a reaction to the military difficulties the Germans were encountering – and possibly they are right about this:

The Germans unbelievably shocked by the strength of the people to give up, passed an order of which the whole Division from Mamfe to Basho, was terrorised. Villages were burnt, crops destroyed and men and women were shot down unmercifully. Since Mamfe alone stood to fight the Germans, when other villages took refuge in bushes, she was practically decimated. This therefore accounts for her present size today. (Oru 1996:38)

A number of villages held that their population was severely reduced and never recovered from the war, e.g. Mamfe (Gorges 1930:10) and Boka:

How the Germans massacred the Boka people was that all the villagers went out for a fishing expedition and only old people remained in the village. The German soldiers were passing on the old road and saw the people as they were fishing and they opened fire on them and everybody died. Only one woman managed to escape [..] The Boka village of that time was ten times bigger than now. (Boka, 09.07.2000)

In the overside area, where the 'state of war' persisted for two years, the impact on the civil population must have indeed been enormous. The people lived in their temporary shelters for nearly two years, at times longer, and were not able to do any farming during this period. All livestock, even chickens, had disappeared from the area after the war. I suspect that the majority of the population must have moved across the boundary to Nigeria (KRS Osstidinge to GK, 01.04.1906:164).

Mansfeld, who arrived in the Cross River area on the 20th of August 1904 when the army squadrons were still at work in the areas north of the Cross River, calculated a population decimation of 35 percent of the men: 10 % died in action, 10 % of other causes, and of the 35 % sent to work in the plantations at the coast as forced labourers according to his own estimate only half were expected to return. He did not calculate the percentages of women who died during the war, but guessed it should have been 'a great part' that died because of starvation. Additionally the birth rates dropped during the war and the mothers had killed 'almost all of their babies', because they would have directed the soldiers to the bush hide-outs (Mansfeld 1908:21; cf. ANY FA 169:224). These 'heroic' acts of the mothers that vividly illustrate the determination, but also desperation, of the population, have been maintained in some oral traditions of the area.208

208 Interestingly the two texts that contain the most detailed information about both the mothers killing their babies and the Germans taking children and selling them as slaves were produced by women, both of which were eye-witnesses. Ava Eyo was the oldest person in the Basbo area and Aghinse Osong Osyark the oldest person in the Boki area.
The women and children all fled to the bush during the war. When a child was crying, the mother will hit his head with a stone and kill it in order to save the other people. Many people died of hunger in the bush. (AE, 05.11.2000)

When the soldiers were coming, everybody escaped to the bush with their children, and if a child was crying, the child was either killed or abandoned in the bush to save others. (EN, 07.07.2000)

There was a certain woman who was having a baby during the war. She was escaping from the Germans and her baby was crying. She then decided to kill the baby in order to save herself [...]. The woman who killed her child when escaping from the Germans was called Anne. The child on her back was called Utempong. They only got the child, but the mother was safe. (AAO, 07.07.2000)

In the latter account the killed baby was perceived has having been 'taken' by the Germans. The story of the mothers killing their babies has thus been transformed into the more abstract notion of Germans seizing babies:

When someone gives birth to a baby, the Germans will come and seize the baby from you and sell it as a slave in exchange for money. (AAO, 07.07.2000)

The Germans used to steal people's children. (AE, 06.07.2000)

So, in the end due to their 'war of terror', their higher numbers and superior weapons, and the suffering the war caused for the local people, they surrendered.

As the fight started, the soldiers started killing the people because they did not have good guns. (SE, 03.11.2000)

The blacks did not know that the whites had automatic rifles. The white took his rifle and finished all the blacks who were using dane guns. Many people died. (EN, 07.07.2001)

After some time the Germans were progressing in the war. This was because the Germans had very strong weapons, like the rifles. The blacks were destroyed in their numbers. The few that were left surrendered. (AE, 06.06.2000)

The blacks started shooting at random until their guns were empty. As they were sitting to re-load their guns, the Germans progressed and wiped out everybody. There was no way to resist and they surrendered. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

The Germans won because of their good guns. They were portable guns. Only the whites were able to operate these guns.209 (AE, 05.11.2000)

Although the majority of the people in the Upper Cross River area today stress their weakness as opposed to the Germans, the Germans at the time had to acknowledge the enormous difficulties the fighters of the Upper Cross River people represented for them. Schlosser and Müller, in their respective final reports, even countered the usual discourses about African enemies whose comportment was normally termed 'cheeky' and 'recalcultrant'.

Sollten hier und da noch kleiner Putsche entstehen oder ein Einschreiten mit Waffengewalt gegen säumige Zahler notwendig werden – ich halte dies übrigens für unwahrscheinlich – so ist das auf den ganz unzuverlässigen, ausnahmsweise harmlosen und heimtückischen Charakter der Bevölkerung zu schreiben. Ich habe schon manchen Teil des Schutzgebietes kennen gelernt, aber kaum je einen so schwierigen zu behandelnden unfolgsamen Stamm gefunden, wie diese Anangs, abgesehen vielleicht von den sogenannten unabhängigen Heidenstämmen Adamaus, die aber den Anangs an Widerstandsstärken weitaus nachstehen. (Schlosser to KST, 09.09.1904:151)

While acknowledging their extraordinary 'ability to resist', he characterised his opponents as 'unreliable', 'exceptionally obstinate', ‘perfidious', 'difficult to handle', and 'disobedient'. Müller, in his final report about the operations at the Cross River, acknowledged that the German colonial army had encountered extreme difficulties, stemming partly from the difficult terrain and the provision problems, but mainly because the population was 'numerous', 'intelligent' and 'well-armed'.

Die Aufgabe, die die Truppe bei dieser Unternehmung zu lösen hatte, war eine außerordentlich schwierige. Ein ungeheures, von dichtem Urwald bestandesenes, von zahlreichen tiefen und breiten Flüssen durchflossenes Gebiet mit einer starken, zahlreichen, intelligenten, gut bewaffneten Bevölkerung war zu unterwerfen. Dazu kamen noch die enormen Verpflegungsschwierigkeiten. Bei der großen Menschenmenge, etwa 1000 Menschen, die in Bewegung gesetzt werden mußte, konnte dies nur dadurch geschehen, daß die Truppe in Landesteile marschierte, wo Verpflegung zu finden war, und auf einen großen Raum verteilt wurde, was wieder die Verbindung erschwert. Die Eingeborenen hatten gelernt, wie sie sich dem von Europäern geführten Truppen gegenüber am besten zu verhalten und zu verteidigen. Der alte Erfahrungsgut, daß nämlich die Eingeborenen aufstünde an Widerstandschaft zunehmen, hat sich auch hier gezeigt. (Müller 1905:698-700)

Langhald and Müller had encountered a dangerous enemy, one that they had to take seriously and one that they had to respect. Müller's characterisation of the population as 'intelligent' is an extraordinary discursive event.

The German war tactics were later euphemistically excused, since both parties were not part of the 'civilised races':

Krieg ist ehen Krieg und warum will man gerade verlangen, daß es in einem so uncultivierten Lande wie Kamerun, wo Neger gegen Neger ficht, glimmpther zugehen sollte, als in Südwestafrika oder in Ostasien, wo doch ein oder sogar beide Gegner der zivilisierten Rasse angehören. (R. E. 1905:191)

German officers fighting in the Upper Cross area also felt that the population deserved being exterminated because of the serious crimes they had committed:

209 This is probably a reference to a machine gun. One machine gun was used during the Mpwumunku war – obviously in the eastern area, where the second and fourth company squadron operated.
Die Bewohner wissen genau, welch schweren Verbrechens sie sich schuldig gemacht haben und daß Vernichtung ihnen droht. Sie kämpfen daher den Verzweiflungskampf. (Nitschmann, 23.04.1904:31)

The people therefore seeing that such barbaric acts [shooting of children, men, and women, destroying of crops, burning of houses] could lead to their total distinction, had to give up. (Oru 1996:40)

Killing a German, destroying his infrastructure and driving him from the territory that had become his colonial property by means of diplomatic contentions was not part of the 'ideal position negro', who was expected to assume his position of inferiority vis-à-vis the white man and regard him with the canonical mixture of 'trust' and 'fear'. The people of the Upper Cross area had thus committed a most serious crime and deserved being exterminated. Police Master Wolff, an eye-witness and possible victim of these initial crimes, who had to retreat in the face of his opponents' power, ended his 'heroic' report of 29th February, 1904 with the wish for the harsh punishment of these people. A passage that did not pass censorship by the AAKA before his report was published in the DKB:

Möge die Strafe für diese Greuelaten eine recht harte sein! (Wolff, 29.02.1904:67)

Mansfeld described the scene of the war upon his arrival in August 1904 thus:


The Germans, too, suffered considerable losses: apart from the twenty-one police soldiers, three soldier boys, three workers, eight servants, and five Germans of the first phase, the Schutztruppe lost 60 soldiers (one German) and suffered 143 wounded (three Germans) (R.E. 1905:190). One German officer, 210

210 He had been lightly wounded during the last attack on Nsanakung on the 9th of February, 1904 (Wolff, 29.02.1904:68).

211 Sixteen police soldiers of Packler's Bachama expedition either died on the 22nd of February (eleven) or were missing (five); the rest died in Badje (27.1.1.): Agborlom (27.1.1.), Ossidings (30.1.), one in the Nsanakung on the 29th of January from a wound received on the 25th in Abonandum; one was missing since the 2nd of February after he had gone on a patrol from Nsanakung towards Agborlom (Wolff, 29.02.1904; Wolff, 02.03.1904).

212 Including government clerk Dibussi Din from Douala (Dibussi to KGG, 18.07.1904. In: ANY FA 1/85:192).

Sanitätsunteroffizier Haase, died at the station in Tinto of blackwater fever. His sickness was less attributed to the climate as to the strain of the operations during the Mpwawmkwu wars (Rausch, 01.04.1905:52). Eleven black soldiers were promoted after having taken part in the campaign; seven became "Gefreiter", one "Unteroffizier", one "Sergeant", and two "Feldwebel" (the highest rank accessible for the African members of the Schutztruppe) (Müller, 21.08.1904:127).

7.27. 'Carrying the German load'

After the population had surrendered and hostilities ceased, the Germans immediately set out to identify those who had instigated the war, namely the chiefs of the villages that took part.

The Germans came back and deceived the people that they wanted to make peace since they were trade partners. Instead they arrested all the chiefs and executed them. (Dodi, 11.07.2000)

After the war the Germans came to the villages to find out who really caused the war. (EN, 07.07.2000)

After the war, the Germans requested for all the chiefs to be executed. That ended the revolt. [...] The Germans killed all the chiefs from the Boki area. (BL, 10.07.2000)

It seems that as a general rule the 'chiefs' and 'leaders' in the area where the Mpwawmkwu war took place were either executed, exiled or deposited.

They relied heavily on information from within the population to achieve this and there is reference both in the oral testimonies and in the written sources that they used certain people to betray others. Certainly their motivation was to gain a superior standing within the society by allying with the German power that had just demonstrated its uncompromising strength. In Mamfe slaves were reported to have disclosed information about the hide-out in Esahobi, whereafter the people in Mamfe started killing the slaves among them (cf. Oru 1996:38). Those who betrayed the leaders of the war were held to have been rewarded by the Germans with stock fish and rice (ibid.). Cooperation with the Germans was of course also a means of avoiding one's punishment.

Nobody was telling the Germans so they decided to execute all the chiefs of most of the villages. The chief of this village was not executed. That of Kajifu was executed and that of Beteme, Obonyi and the rest. This is because our chief was judged and it was realised that he did not take part in the sharing of the German goods that the blacks had looted. So the Germans set him free [...] The chief was called Egemene. When the Germans were coming to arrest these chiefs for execution, Egemene also fled into the bush, because of fear, until the people had gone. Then he came back. (EN, 07.07.2000)

However, some war leaders and resistance chiefs were not captured easily. Preeminent in the collective memory in the Mamfe central region is chief Tamba of Besongangbe, whose case has been picked up by Ngoh.
La réaction allemande s'avéra prompte. Le Chef Tambe prit la fuite et se cacha dans une cave, Tonkorong, derrière le village. Plusieurs autochtones, dont le chef, purent être capturés. Tambe fut exilé dans une île à Bota où il passa le reste de sa vie. Les autres furent expulsés dans les plantations allemandes de Calabar. (Ngo 1988:61)

In the long version of the story, Tambe hid in the cave Tonkorong, together with other leaders and upon the German command to surrender the 'chief' in charge of the resistance, a different man was sent, but "a sell out" disclosed to the Germans that the person was not the rightful chief. In most villages the people had tried to present 'replacements' to the Germans, and in many cases, the Germans were able to detect their 'unrightfulness', e.g. in Betemé, Kajifu. When the Germans threatened to exterminate the population of the corresponding villages, the chiefs surrendered themselves in order to save their people, an act for which up to today they are held in high esteem in their places of origin, e.g. Ashu Gakaling of Dadi (Dadi, 11.07.2000).

However, some were able to save their respected leaders.213

The Germans built a store in Nsanakang, Badje, Abonandu, and Agborkem German [Ossidinge]. After some time, they extended up to Basho in the Anyang area. The Germans then started transferring some of their goods to Basho. Some of the carriers usually stole some of these goods or even abandoned some in the bush.214 The Basho people started thinking that the Germans were a threat to them. The Basho people killed one man called General Cornwall, in order to drive the Germans away. When the news spread, the Germans reacted and killed a number of blacks. The Germans after the war decided to execute all chiefs of the area. The great-grandfather called Asu Bessong Enu was executed. He was not the chief, he was just a strong man and honoured as a chief because there was no chief. So when the Germans requested for the execution of all the chiefs, the Betemé people decided to leave Asu Bessong Enu behind and send a different person.215 But the Germans rejected the person and asked for the right person. The whole community cried to lose this great man. The Germans announced that any village that refused to send their chief would be burned. The whole community then was scared and ran into the bush. Asu Bessong Enu decided to present himself for execution instead of the whole community being burnt down. The other chiefs were waiting to be executed, they confirmed Asu Bessong's identity.216 Then Asu Bessong Enu openly told the people that he has come to save his people. He continued to say that any person who is going to kill him must also die, if only his nostrils are pointing downwards. He took a rope put it on his neck, turned his face and looked at the Commander. The Commander removed his pistol and shot himself under his chin and died.217 After the death of Asu Bessong Enu, the Germans needed carriers and most people escaped. The Germans then threatened to burn the village down if they do not carry the loads. Again, our grandfather Eban Bessong for fear of his own children decided to stand and carry the German load. The Germans then took him to Germany. He was having a bangle in his hand. After his death, the Germans sent the bangle to us, telling us that Eban Bessong Enu was dead. The man who pulled the bangle out of his hand was called Asu Ndorn Ake Ekye. He died here218 That is the story that was told to me by my father. (EDT, 05.07.2000)

Some chiefs managed to "win their cases" and returned to their villages after having been judged. This was recollected in those villages that insisted that they did not take part in the war, like Nyang and Mukonyong219 (ET, 07.11.2000).

The Germans imposed reparation payments upon the people as a condition of their surrender:

[For jede Dorf am linken Ufer: 20 Strafarbeiter, 20 Gewehre, 20 Ziegen, 2 Elfenbeine; für jede Dorf am rechten Ufer: 30 Strafarbeiter, 30 Gewehre, 30 Ziegen, 2 Elfenbeine. (Mansfeld to KGK, 04.04.1905:145)]

The figure 'twenty' was not only remembered in Boka, but also in Kekukusim I, although not in connection with violence, but part of the general 'German system of forced labour':

Sometimes the Germans came and asked the chief to give them about twenty young men who will go either to Kumba or elsewhere and do some work. The Germans always dug the roads with their hands using tools such as diggers, hoes, shovels and even machetes. Some of these young men did not come back. (EN, 07.07.2000)

One year after the 'peace conditions' had been announced, the German demand for 'penal workers' had not been satisfied. While for the southern shore, only 32 workers were outstanding, in the northern areas 170 remained to be provided (Mansfeld to KGK, 16.07.1905). In 1908 'penal workers' were still doing most of the work at the station of Ossidinge. They were being paid one M. per week (Revisionskommission, 02.11.1908:129).

Compensation payments were remembered in the Upper Cross area up to today but were at times merged with taxation:

---

213 A prominent example just outside the Cross River area is chief Fontem of the Bangwa, who had successfully hid his existence from the Germans for eight years, when a slave disclosed the information to the D.O. in Ossidinge (KMS Dschang to KGK, 01.06.1911).

214 This might be a reference to the initial attack on a GKN trading caravan in 1903 along the Kekpate-Bashe road (cf. chapter Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.:: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.).

215 In 1905, Mansfeld stated that the 'chief of Betemé', one of the leaders of the war, whose name was given to him as Ashuayuk by Ogba-Bomajep, had not yet been captured (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1904:118).

216 Assam, Nga-Eshua of Kajifu had been executed before him. Enoayuk of Bache had died in prison in Ossidinge before he was captured (Mansfeld to KGK, 29.08.1904:118).

217 Cf. oral tradition about Maji-Maji (Laurien 1995), where disaster was replaced by heroism.

218 These two people were probably among those forced labourers that worked on the plantations at the coast.

219 The present villages of Nyang ('big Nyang') and Mukonyong ('small Nyang') moved to their respective settlement sites during the German period and both named a place called Metey as their residence during the German time. The oral traditions in both these villages parallel each other in all aspects (MM and AG, 08.11.2000; ET, 07.11.2000).
After the surrender the Germans instituted taxes as a sort of compensation. (AEn, 06.07.2000)

In the German records their unwillingness to surrender the guns is noted (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:147)\(^{220}\), but the labourers each village had to give is most remembered in local historiography. This is not surprising since Mansfeld estimated that only half of them returned (Mansfeld 1908:21). In many areas men demanded as forced labourers were considered as being either abducted as slaves or going to be killed:

When the Germans came and asked for 20 able men to be killed, the chief offered himself [...] The Germans then left the people and the man was killed on behalf of the people. He considered that if 20 reproductive people from Dadi are killed, it will be a greater loss of lives than if he who is already old is killed. (Boka, 09.07.2000)\(^{221}\)

The German demand for penal labourers was at times perceived as a compensation offered voluntarily for the Germans who lost their lives:

They offered blacks in exchange for the whites. (MM and AG, 08.11.2000)

At first, the penal labourers were employed within the district, but the high numbers of fugitives led to a change of the practice and they were taken to the plantations at the coast (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:150; Mansfeld to KGK, 06.07.1905).

The severe 'punishment' executed by the Germans led the population to remember German 'rule' as 'harsh' and the Germans as 'strong':

The Germans usually arrest strong people and put them either to death or suffering. (A0O, 07.07.2000)

The 'chiefs' of areas that had not been directly engaged in violence during the Mpawmanku wars in the Njemaya area, expressed their solidarity with their neighbours who had to comply to the 'repayment payments' by intervening on their behalf (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:149).

On the 28th of April 1905 a man named Doboadje had been executed in Basho for the murder of Pickler (Schulz, 31.03.1906:175). Two men were identified as Schoof's murderers in Mfakwe; one was executed, the other, called Ewaja, hid in Ote (Schulz, 31.03.1906).

The exhibition of power and the imposition of repayment payments did not apply to the area north of Basho, where a military post was created.

Freiwillig ist noch keine Strafauszahlung eingegangen, die Häuptlinge thun sogar über jede Forderung entrüstet. Besonders empfindlich scheint den Leuten die Abgabe von

\(^{220}\) The people of the southern bank of the Cross River had delivered the demanded guns by June 1906 (Mansfeld to KGK, 06.07.1905).

\(^{221}\) This account rationalizes why Ashu Gakalang was executed by the Germans. His giving of his life for his people made him into a 'hero' and he is remembered as such. Whether he actually succeeded in curtailing the German demand for 20 labourers is doubtful.

7.3. Tinto (1901-1907)

The post in Tinto dated back to Zinggraft's time (1892) and had served to secure the Bali road after 1901. In 1901 military operations were carried out against the Bangwa to the east of the Upper Cross area, and its influence on the relations between the Upper Banyang people and the post in Tinto were appraised positively by Glauung, head of station Ossidinge, in 1901 (Glauung, 03.10.1901; cf. chapter 4.2.3. Military post Tinto (1901):160). Although no direct fighting took place in Upper Banyang, Tinto was used as the base for the soldiers, and carriers were 'recruited' from the Banyang (KST to KGK, 25.11.1901).

By April 1903 the Bangwa area was declared 'pacified', and a military post was established in Fontem. Tinto – formerly independent – became a subsidiary of Fontem. This was done for two reasons: easier control of the seemingly 'rebel-like' Bangwa and, second, to establish a new road to Bali that could 'alleviate' the burden of the old 'Bali road'. A trader reported that this 'burden' was manifested by the demands on the local population to provide carriers, who did often not return to their villages or returned in a deplorable state (R.E. 1905:190).

Lt. Rausch became the new station leader (DKZ 1903, vol. 32:328). The 'old' Bali road was partly abandoned for a new route from Kokobuma via Fontem to Bali and from there to Bamum (KGK to AAKA, 29.05.1903). The new route partly circumvented the malaria impregnated forest (DKB 1904:409). The area once needed as the 'passage to the grasslands' had thus lost its prime importance in the German colonial project of Kamerun. When the Douala-Nkongsamba railroad was opened in 1907 the Bali road became of minimal importance within the German colonial project. Missionaries still used it, as well as the Hausa traders who were importing cloth from Nigeria (Unruh to KGK, 12.01.1914).
Tinto remained an important link between the stations of Ossidinge, Fontem and Bamenda (cf. Glauening, 03.10.1901:166). In the records not much is reported about the post's relationship with the people in the area (Banyang), mainly because the post's prime concern was the establishment of power in 'difficult' regions, especially Bangwa and Mbo and at the extension of their influence, e.g. towards Kendem and Toko. The 'Banyang' feature mainly as those upon who 'the demands were heavy', referring to forced labour, and also provision of food. During the Mpawmanku wars the Upper Banyang area remained calm, while the military forces of the post 'secured' its western front, especially Toko and Kendem. After the hostilities in connection with the Mpawmanku wars subsided, the garrison of the post in Tinto was reduced to one German non-commissioned officer and 20 soldiers and the detachment of Fontem was envisaged (Rausch, 01.04.1905; cf. chapter 7.2.5. Operations north of the river: military post Basho (1904-1906):298).

In 1904 the station started experiments with a rice-farm (DKB 1904:481; cf. Schmieriez, 01.04.1906:182; Rausch, 01.04.1905:51, 54-55), that are still remembered in the area today:

The Germans made a rice farm and they had white overseer, his name was 'white Agbomkwaw' (ndi k Agbawg'kwa). He liked potatoes (Bayawka). (TNT, 06.08.2000)

The rice-farm was quite successful; in 1904 it had produced 600 bags of rice (Rausch, 01.04.1905:54), and it was stressed that the population was also interested in the cultivation of rice and started integrating it into their farming systems (ibid.)

The workers for this rice-farm were recruited from the local population and they performed those deeds without open resistance, but a general tendency of the people to migrate from the Tinto-Mundame road, where the demands upon their labour weighed heavily, was observed (Rausch, 01.04.1905:51-52).

Another German who is still remembered, is the 'white doctor' who died and was buried there.

Up there, if you have time I can find somebody who can show you, you see the area of the houses and the grave of a Doctor (Ngang) who died. He was white, they called him 'bushman'. If you go to see his grave, you will see his name there. (TNT, 06.08.2000)

His name cannot be seen anymore, since the white marble slate that was placed at the head of his grave, has disappeared. The grave itself is still intact, but difficult to find in the overgrown remains of the station. I assume that it is the grave of 'Sanitätssegeant' Hans Haase, who took part in the 'Anyang-Expedition' of 1904, and died in the station of Tinto on the 26th of July 1904, after being sick of blackwater fever for ten days (Müller, 21.08.1904:126; Rausch, 01.04.1905:52).

The station in Tinto remained a sub-station first to Fontem, and in 1907 briefly to the newly created district of Dschang (Runderlüß Nr. 244, 10.05.1907).

If you did a bad thing, you were judged at Tinto, hanged in Tinto, but the prison (eket kenawg' : house jail) was at Dschang. (Tinto, 05.08.2000)

The people of Upper Banyang had seemingly 'learned their lessons' through their early interactions with the Germans (cf. chapter 3. Making the road to Bali – Upper Banyang 1888-1923:93). While all around them people were engaged in militant confrontation (Fontem/Bangwa 1900; Mpawmanku 1904; Bamileke and Mbo 1905; Mildum 1906), they remained peaceful, even though the demands of the labour recruiters were heavy on their area. They seemed to have followed a new strategy after the phase of violence directe had been passed in their area, practicing evasion as revolt, both by withdrawing physically at the advancement of labour recruiters, but also by disobeying the German orders. In 1906 the people of Tuli had reportedly illicitly judged cases, using mpham (Schmieriez, 01.04.1906:177).

On the 18th of October 1907 the station in Tinto was dissolved and its territory (Upper Banyang) became part of the district Ossidinge (Runderlüß Nr. 261, 18.10.1907). Mansfeld celebrated it as the 'unification of Banyang country', 'ein Umstand, der von der Bevölkerung mit Freuden begrüßt wird' (KRS Ossidinge 1907/1908:264). Its importance had declined since the new route to Bali via Yabassi had been opened and in 1908 the old Bali road had almost been abandoned and the post in Tinto was only staffed with one black administrative clerk whose main duty was overseeing the station. All administrative authority had been transferred to Ossidinge (Revisionskommission, 02.11.1908:124).

7.4. Summary

Nach den mancherlei trüben Erscheinungen der beiden vorigen Berichtsjahre zeigen sich heuer fast überall freundlichere Bilder. Die Kolonie hat die Störungen und Hemmnisse verwunden und befindet sich in einer Periode aufsteigernder Entwicklung, die andauernd gute Erfolge verspricht. Ins Gewicht fällt dabei vornehmlich, dass die Unruhen und Aufstände im Inneren grossenteils niedergeschlagen sind, dass man neue Stationen und Posten eingerichtet hat, durch die man die jeweilige Umgebung auf erhebliche Entfernung im Zeume zu halten vermoch. So ist im Nordwesten, im Gebiete der Crosssschnellen, die Station Ossidinge eröffnet worden, welche die Ekoistämme beherrscht und sie bereits so weit an das deutsche Regiment gewöhnt hat, dass sie ihre Produkte zum Stationsmarkt bringen, auf Verlangen die nötigen Träger stellen und bei Streitigkeiten die Entscheidung des Stationsleiters anrufen. Weniger gross ist der

222 In the long run rice cultivation was not adopted by the local population (cf. Michels 2000).

223 He was born 13.09.1877, had entered the Schuttruppe in Kamerun on 06.06.1901 (BAB R1001/6787:70; DKB 1904, nr. 19, 1904:584).
deutsche Einfluss zur Zeit bei den Kukavstämmen, östlich des Ayaflusses, deren Heimat sehr fruchtbart und dicht besiedelt ist und deshalb um so mehr eine stärkere Annäherung an die Station wünschenswert macht. Um ferner die wichtige Balustrasse unbedingt zu sichern, ist das frühere schon belegte, aber wieder aufgelassene Tinto abermalens zur Station erhoben. Die Besatzung trat bald darauf gegen die rebellischen Banti in Aktion und erzielte deren Unterwerfung. (Seidel 1902:256)

In 1903 the "occupation effective" (Seidel 1903:93) was celebrated as finally have come true in Kamerun, a development of 'deepest importance' (ibid.). The Germans were deemed as the 'masters in the house' wherever they had erected stations from which they would start their 'peaceful relations' with the people and commercial exploitation of their riches (ibid.). In its assessment of the developments in Kamerun the next year in the same magazine – *Globus* – the high expectations of 1902, especially with regard to the Upper Cross River area had to be revoked.


The fact that Pückler had not been an officer in the Schutztruppe and the station in Ossidinge had not been staffed with 'real soldiers' was later regarded as a cause for the extinction of Pückler, his expedition and all German dependencies in the area:

Mit aller Bestimmtheit kann man wohl behaupten, daß es einerseits den Eingeborenen nicht gelungen wäre, einem so vollständigen Sieg über einen Zug Schutztruppe unter einem aktiven Offizier davonzutragen und daß andererseits ein gemeinsamer Aufstand so vieler, zum Teil bereits unterworferener Stämme nicht möglich gewesen wäre, wenn sich der Eingeborenen infolge ihres Erfolges nicht eine Art Siegestaumel bemächtigt hätte, welcher sich auch den umwohnden Stämmen mitteilte. (R.E. 1905:190)

Das gleiche [as about the Schutztruppe] kann über die Polizeitruppe leider nicht behauptet werden, die wiederholt, z.B. [...] bei der Vernichtung der Expedition des Grafen Pückler im Vorjahr, versagte. Diese Tatsachen reden eine so überzeugende Sprache, daß ein so warmer Freund der Polizeitruppe, wie der Gouverneur von Puttkamer war, in diesem Jahre nicht eine Vernichtung der Polizeitruppe, sondern eine Vernichtung der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe befürwortet hat. (Herold 1905:415)

Even though Pückler had served as an officer in the Prussian army, he lacked the experience needed:

[D]er beste Zivilbeamte aber, selbst wenn er Reserveoffizier ist, kann den aktiven Offizier auf militärischem Gebiete nicht ersetzen, wird auch niemals soviel Interesse und Zeit für seine Soldaten übrig haben, als dieser, da er sie ja nur gewissermassen im Nebenamt verwaltet. (R.E. 1905:190)

I propose that the 'System Puttkamer' functioned and was perceived as a whole, with the differences between the 'practices of the government' and the 'practices of the traders' being overemphasised in the inner-German correspondences (cf. chapter 3.8. Summary:145). Therefore the population resisted not 'soldiers' or 'traders', but the general system, just as they had done during the German-Eko war (cf. chapter 4.3.1. First phase – Quets f 1899-162).

Although we do not have any reported statement from Mpwamunku himself, from all the evidence of his behaviour it can be judged that he acted in the same manner as a man in the Manenguba area, Nocho, who reportedly boldly stated after general commander of the Schutztruppe Müller had entered the area with 75 soldiers that he never considered following the German commands before he had acknowledged their superior power:

Charakteristisch ist die freimütige Äußerung des Häuptlings, daß es ihm nie eingefallen wäre, Anforderungen der Regierung zu entsprechen, bevor er sich von deren Übermacht überzeugt habe und im Kriege unterlegen sei. (Müller 1905:499)

Demink also held that generally the people of Kamerun did not submit without being defeated in a war:

In Kamerun kenne ich – einige Tikars, Balis, Bamus [sic], Mandiangolos ausgenommen – keinen Stamm, der sich ohne Kampf wirklich dauernd unterwerfen hätte. (Demink 1905:531)

This general disinclination of people to allow strangers impose new rules and regulations was not only a Cameroonian phenomenon, but observable in other German colonies as well:

Ihr Klein sei die Wolken und das Gewitter sei ihr Schlag, sie herrsche über Mpororo, und auch die Europäer, von denen sie allerdings noch keinen gesehen, seien ihre Kinder, sie hätte sie aber ganz gerne [...] Ich entgegnete ihr, wenn Europäer in ihr Land kämen, müsse sie ihnen friedlich gegenüberstehen, müsse ihnen bei allen Dienstleistungen, vor allem bei der Verpflegung, behelflich sein und dürfte auch nicht im Streit mit den Nachbarn liegen. Vor allem sei es ihr nicht erlaubt, Wegezoll zu erheben, wie sie es letzten getan. Darauf sagt sie mir wieder, in ihrem Lande werde sie Wegezoll nehmen, so viel sie wolle, und ich solle ihr jetzt auch sofort welchen geben. Als ich ihr nun ernst entgegnete und sie aufforderte, sofort als Zeichen ihrer Unterwerfung und als Ruf für den nunlich erhobenen Wegezoll ein Rind zu stellen, machte sie lange Gegenreden, behauptet, das brauche sie nicht und sie werde mich strafen. Bei der nunmehr folgenden heftigen Auseinandersetzung wird sie hinter ihrer spanischen Wand immer aufgeregt, kreisch heftig, droht mir und allem, was in der
8. New "Eingeborenenpolitik" – "Gebranntes Kind scheut das Feuer" (1904-1914)


After the armed conflicts not only in the Upper Cross area but in many other parts of Kamerun, overshadowed by the Herero war in German South West Africa and the Maji-Maji war in German East Africa, two diverging opinions emerged.

The first clung to the conviction that 'only force could help', it sought to 'radically exterminate' what was undesired. The armed conflicts in many parts of the territory called Kamerun by the Germans served as an indication that the 'means of power' were still insufficient. Supporters of this view called for a reinforcement of the Schutztruppe. Force was their ultimate answer to any conflicts; the 'negro' was perceived as a 'malicious child' that could understand no other 'language' than force.


Although the Schutztruppe was reinforced in 1905 with two company squadrons (R.E. 1905:191), this view did in the end not prevail.

The second view was one of reform' and rather than on extermination it centred around 'prevention'. Even during Puttkamer's era, clashes between military and civil domain had resulted in a strained relationship and a competitive atmosphere, which turned Puttkamer into an opponent of further strengthening of the Schutztruppe especially with regard to creating new military districts. He turned to preventative policies, e.g. the decree with the prohibition to import
muzzle-loaders and gunpowder into Kamerun and the temporary prohibition to trade with them of 14th April 1905. In September 1905 trade of all 'war material' was banned in the district Ossidinge north of the Cross River, in Fontemdorf-Tinto, Johann-Albrechtshöhe north of the Manenguba mountains, Bamenda, Lomie and in the Njong area above Akonolinga (cf. Verordnung des Gouverneurs vom Kamerun, betreffend Verbot der Einfuhr von Vorderladern und Handelspulver und Bekanntmachung des Gouverneurs von Kamerun, betreffend die Einfuhr von Kriegsmaterial und den Handel mit solchem). (388 in the appendix). While these proclamations met the German desire for security, it seriously obstructed trade, and the GNK called for a lifting of the prohibition, since it feared that smuggling across the Anglo-German border would be a severe consequence (KRS Ossidinge, 01.04.1906:163).

The administration tried to convey the impression to the German public that the situation in Kamerun was under control. Their main concern was to counter the fears that Kamerun was to encounter similar catastrophes like German South-West Africa and German East Africa. Official organs therefore continuously stressed the 'local nature' of all armed conflicts in Kamerun, as well as the quick repression of these 'obstructions':


Nevertheless, German colonial practices came under serious criticism 'at home'. The pressure on the administration to reduce further disquieting information flow to the German public increased (Hausen 1970:22). Puttkamer — discontent with the military's usurpation of power — became an advocate of preventing of armed conflicts, rather than extermination. But his earlier shortcomings, especially against the Duala, resulted in his deposition as Gouverneur in 1906.

When in 1907 the new Gouverneur Seitz assumed his post, a number of general policy changes were introduced. Their main aims were the prevention of further armed conflicts. Three decrees passed in 1907 point not only to the new "Eingeborenenpolitik", but also to some 'real' threats to peace in the colony: the carrier decree, and the policy of 'closing' territories for all German penetration, and the prohibition of the illegitimate use of German uniforms. The third decree — which has not yet received much attention in 'conventional' historiography (but cf. Warnier 1996), tried to curtail an undesired and un-asked for 'extraversion' of German power — an opportunity sought and practiced on many levels. The first two decrees directly restricted Germans. The first one can pass as a real 'reform' as the 'era Dernburg' is generally praised. The second decree and its execution over several territories, e.g. along the Ossidinge/Bamenda border until 1907 and in the southern areas around Ebolowa, was actually a real disappointment for colonial enthusiasts and especially traders. Its main aim was to prevent further hostilities by slowing German penetration. Although not all traders were in favour of the practice, the GR generally acknowledged its significance (GR, 26.02.1907). 'Closing territories' actually admitted to be areas within Kamerun where German power was zero, and where Germany — at least temporarily — had no ambition of changing the situation. It was a setback for the hopes and glories generally celebrated in the colonial propaganda. Therefore much 'maturity' of this last phase in German colonialism (cf. Fieldhouse 1998) stemmed from the fact that bad experiences had taught the Germans a lesson. They were 'burnt children' that now 'feared fire'. The change in the colonial practices initiated in 1904 halted the politics of forceful submission with extermination as ultimate ratio. The regions in which the Germans had not yet demonstrated their 'strength' remained out of German influence. The areas that had been 'burnt' prior to 1904 were to enter an 'ordered' administration and mise-en-valeur. In the Upper Cross River area this 'maturity' in colonial policies began with the appointment of Dr. Alfred Mansfeld, a medical doctor with prior experiences in Latin America and China, as the new Bezirksleiter in 1904 over those territories that had surrendered. Mansfeld's assumption of office pre-dated but also previewed the 'great change' (Rudin 1938:212) that German colonialism and Cameroon in general underwent from 1907 onwards. However, the 'learning process' of the Germans was still going on and manifested itself in clashes between the administrator Mansfeld and the military, the administration, plantation owners, and especially the traders. He was accused of being too 'native friendly', although violence and force were continuously displayed by him towards the local population, who responded with evasion rather than confrontation. At the same time the involvement of some within the German project became more intense, and the opportunities for extraversion became an important means to achieve authority for others.
8.1. Establishing power and healing wounds

Wi bi get sam bik man wey i bin bi stey for Mamfé, Dokkoo Mamfé, i bi Jaman man. Na i bin get paua ova ool pipul [...]. I bin gi gut man for i oon fashion. (MTA, 31.10.2000)

Als Grundprinzipien für die Verwaltung habe ich aufgestellt:

a. anständige und taktvolle Behandlung der Einheimischen
b. weitgehendste Unterstützung der Handelsfirmen.

(Mansfeld to KGG, 22.10.1907:118)

Dr. Alfred Mansfeld – locally known as Dr. Mamfe or Dr. Mamfred – left for Kamerun on the 10th of March, 1904 (DKB 1904, no. 8:231) and was sent to the Ossinde District with Police Master Wästeneck and 40 police soldiers on the 13th of August, 1904 (KGG to AAKA, 13.08.1904) in order to re-establish civil administration. General commander of the Schutztruppe Müller left the district on the 22nd of August. Müller assumed that he would continue executing the authorities transferred to him from the headquarters of the Schutztruppe in Soppo (Douala), given that the two company commanders Heinricke and Schlosser remained in the area, operating in the Bitieku area in the east and the area along the border to Nigeria up to the grassfields in the west, respectively (Müller, 21.08.1904). The KGG, however, protested against these assumptions to the AAKA (KGG to AAKA, 08.09.1904; KGG to AAKA, 14.09.1904; KGG to AAKA, 19.09.1904). In October KGG and Oberst Müller finally agreed that Müller would not interfere in any of Mansfeld's political decisions and would restrict his authority to the Schutztruppe officers in charge of overseeing reparation payments (KGG to AAKA, 10.10.1904). Mansfeld decided to re-build the station Ossinde at its former location close to the village of Aegborkem, even though the Schutztruppe officers had complained that the terrain was not safe and difficult to defend. Initially its realm of authority was confined to the areas south of the Cross River in the Njema and Ngoma area. The northern and eastern areas remained under the authority of the military and their posts in Basho and Mamfe (Schlosser to KST, 09.09.1904; Heinricke to KST, 15.09.1904). The Schutztruppe officers successively handed over the places that had surrendered and started reparation payments (Schlosser to KST, 09.09.1904:149).

Mansfeld held that the population could only be expected to engage in 'normal and peaceful' relations with the German station if violence ceased. In this view he clashed with the officers of the Schutztruppe who were still stationed in the district (Jahresbericht Ossinde 1904/1905:146). The people whose villages and farms were destroyed and who were living in temporary shelters in the for-

est were not easily convinced to return to their former settlement sites and start reconstructing them. Mansfeld's policy of establishing direct and peaceful contact with a few chosen people yielded slow success:

Die Anfangsarbeit, die darin besteht, einige Leute zu überreden, zu einer ruhigen Be- sprechung zu kommen, ist eine der schwierigsten und oft sehr entmutigend. Gelingt es endlich wirklich drei bis vier Leute nach dem alten zerstörten Dorfplatz zu locken und hat man die bestimmte Versicherung gegeben, daß der Krieg zu Ende sei, und haben die Leute geschworen, daß sie morgen alle Weiber und Kinder veranlassen würden, wieder zu kommen und neu aufzubauen, so kann man in neun von zehn Fällen darauf rechnen, daß diese Untertäniger in den nächsten zwei Monaten nicht wieder zum Vorschein kommen. (Mansfeld 1908:19)

In the Boki area this slow process was still going on in 1906, when the Anglo-German boundary commission operated in the area:

Die Lage der Dörfer ist teilweise eine andere als vor dem Kriege, auch sind sie sämtlich noch nicht fertig und ein Teil der Bevölkerung lebt noch in zerstreuten Farmen. (Herman to AAKA, 16.03.1906:39)

Mansfeld came into conflict both with the GNKR traders and with the plantation owners of the south because of his non-cooperation with regard to labour recruitment. Mansfeld's opinion about the German GNKR agents was most unfa- vourable. He ascribed most of their shortcomings to their low morals and general behaviour, especially alcohol misuse and sexual relationships. He was disappointed and at times even bitter about their inability to grasp the economic opportunities of the Upper Cross River area and also about their lack of interest in cooperating with the administration (e.g. Mansfeld to KGG, 01.09.1905; cf. also chapter 6.6.1. 'Lack of competence and moral: 245 and 6,6. Lack of success: 241')

In 1908 a revision commission visited the district and their evaluation of the 'System Mansfeld' was devastating. It was criticised in toto. Mansfeld was ac- cused of a number of shortcomings, the gravest of which was the instalation of a 'system of spies' (Seitz, 10.11.1908; Mansfeld to KGG, 22.10.1907). He used black clerks, soldiers, and the local population to inform him about activities planned by German traders who had tried to intervene in Buea in order to depose Mansfeld (Mansfeld to KGG, 01.11.1908). He had also chosen to refrain from discussing policy measures with his fellow officers, instead depending on two 'chiefs' from the area, presumably chief Ogba and chief Egbe (cf. photographs in Mansfeld 1908: 168, subtitled the pillars of the administration of the Ossinde district). In addition to these two chiefs, Mansfeld relied on Ajayuknde, the eldest chief, and his interpreter, whom he described as 'incorruptible'. Chief Ogba is very likely the same person as Ogba-Bomajep, possibly the 'Okpa' of Mbenyan who had cooperated with the Germans since 1900. In the picture we see a middle-aged man, dressed in 'white-man' attire, with a tropical pith Identical with the one Mansfeld is wearing and a striped shirt. Mansfeld described him as the 'mentally most important man' and 'chief Egbe', probably the same age as

24 "Die Station und Private sind mit Erfolg bemüht, die Wunden, die der Aufstand geschlagen hat, möglichst zu heilen" (Jahresbericht Kamerun 1904/1905:40).
Ogba, displays non-European signs of authority in his dress: a cap, adorned with cowries, necklaces, a piece of cloth over his right shoulder and a staff in his left hand. He does however also wear a shirt, although it seems to be of the Hausa-style. The interpreter is considerably younger, dressed in what seems to be a uniform jacket, neatly buttoned up, including what seems to be the chain of a pocket-watch. Ajayunkdep, visibly old, is dressed in a dark shirt, wears a cap (possibly red) and rests his hands on a stick. The origin of Egbe and Ajayunkdep are not certain. Following Mansfeld's sympathies for the 'Ekol', it may be assumed that they are all from the Njemaya area.


Mansfeld's bitterness and harsh tone may be better understood if his following explanatory remarks are taken into account:

Daß ich zu alleinigen Beratern für Eingeborenenfragen zwei Hauptlinge erwähnt, ist Tatsache. Wenn – wie dies in Ossidinge vorgekommen ist – der eine mir unterstellte Beamte, der die 3ste Dienstperiode in Kamerun zubrachte, nicht weiß, wie eine Pflanze plantain aussieht, ein neu aus Deutschland eingeführter Landwirt ohne weiteres heimattreue Methoden in den Urwald übertragen will und ein Techniker Brücken baut, ohne auf tropische Regengüsse und auf die in allen noch nicht regulierten Flußläufen treibenden Baumstämme Rücksicht zu nehmen, – dann wird vermutlich jeder Stationsleiter sich genötigt sehen, über die Spezial-Fachkenntnisse eines tropen-unerfahrenen Beamten seine eigenen allgemeinen Erfahrungen zu setzen und aus diesem Grunde ist das Wort 'mechanisch' eingefügt worden. (Mansfeld, 01.11.1908:119)

He had reduced the demands of the station on the local population to a minimum, especially with regard to 'forced labour'. The revision commission especially found fault in the fact that the roads had not been cleared in the way expected and that Mansfeld refused to provide workers for the plantation and railroads. Gouverneur Seitz lamented that Mansfeld had exchanged the development of the district for good relations with the population (Seitz, 10.11.1908).

Mansfeld was ordered to Buea and difficult arguments between the Gouverneur and Mansfeld followed and resulted in Seitz threatening to remove Mansfeld from his post if he did not change his system:

Ich hoffe, daß Dr. Mansfeld nach den eingehenden Auseinandersetzungen, welche ich hier mit ihm gehabt habe, sein Verwaltungssystem Weißen und Eingeborenen gegenüber ändert; auf die Dauer wäre es nicht möglich, an der Spitze eines Bezirkes einen Mann zu lassen, der in den meisten Beamten nur mechanische Werkzeuge sieht und sich in allen seinen Maßnahmen auf den Rat von zwei Hauptlingen stützt. (Seitz, 10.11.1908:114-115)

The troubles Mansfeld took to establish good relationships with the population may be an indication of his more humanitarian intention. It may also be an indication of his fears about renewed violence against the German presence in the Ossidinge district.

In 1906 the KRS Ossidinge in its yearly report stated that a force of 60 police soldiers was too small in case of an armed conflict. They pointed out that reinforcements would need too much time to aid them immediately – as had been the case in 1904. While the relationship with the population was generally described as good, the KRS was conscious of the fact that its presence was regarded suspiciously and only accepted grudgingly.

Der die Bevölkerung noch durchaus nicht in Anwesenheit einer weißen Obrigkeit als in ihrem Interesse liegend erkannt hat, da der Charakter aller im Bezirk lebenden Stämme mangelhaften Erwerbsstimm, Neigung zu Gewalttätigkeit und Hang zu einem zwangslosen Beschaffensleben in sich vereinigt, so wäre es höchst bedauerlich, wollte man Ereignisse wie die des Jahres 1904 als für alle Zukunft ausgeschlossen betrachten. (KRS Ossidinge to K.G.K., 01.04.1906:164-165)

Although the K.G.K. had strongly advised him to change his policies and contribute to the 'development' of the colony Kamerun, Mansfeld's will to maintain peace in his district was stronger.

Ein 'Zusammenarbeiten' mit den Beamten und den Offizieren des Beklagten [German state] ist Klägerin [GNK], von rührmlichen Ausnahmen abgesehen, recht schwer gemacht und oft in schroffer Form abgelehnt worden. (GNK 1915:25)

Mansfeld harshly criticised the personalities and character of the GNK agents throughout the years. The government officials who had to work hand in hand with him were not taken seriously by Manfred, because they lacked experience in the tropics. Mansfeld was explicitly not part of the "ethnie group" that is under normal circumstances formed by the white expatriate community.


While Mansfeld thus clashed within the German arena and was accused of being too friendly with the 'natives', the local population did not in turn uniformly praise the way he 'administered' their area.
Doctor Mammfeld [Mansfeld] came back [after the Mpawmunku wars]. That one was here and burnt our house. He was a child, I saw him with my eyes. Mammfeld bought an 'obest' and a crocodile from Akwen and put it in a box. He was a German who was in the village. He left for three days and then he came back and he knew his former headman by his name. He was discussing about the past and present, now he was old and he had become friendly. He even gave money to the people. (DMA, Agborkem)

The last ten years of German presence in the Upper River area were shaped by Mansfeld's administrative system. The 'German system' as remembered and transmitted by the people of the River area should thus mainly refer to the 'System Mansfeld'. According to these testimonies the following characteristics of the German system evolved - starting with the most frequently mentioned features:

- rape
- hiding from the Germans
- trade
- problems with the chiefs
- forced labour
- local people joining the German army
- construction of roads
- tax
- voluntary labour with the Germans
- German plantations
- carrying loads
- schools
- amalgamation of the village

One activity by Mansfeld that was not mentioned once to me was the so-called 'Leprahenim' Osun in which hundreds - some even say more than a thousand - of lepers were imprisoned. Mansfeld - a medical doctor - had been the only Bezirksamtmann to have established such a 'Leprahenim' and references to it in the German records are frequent (Haase 1915:25-28; cf. Eckart 1997:208-217 for a detailed discussion). It was established in 1911 and dissolved due to WWI:

The scheme [...] was very unpopular with the natives and it was doubtful with no small degree of relief that the lepers seized their opportunity and dispersed at the outbreak of war to their own homes. (Hunt 1916:12)

Rape, problems with the chiefs, forced labour, construction of roads, tax, carrying loads, and even medical measures such as the 'Leprahenim' were generally connected to the exertion of violence directe. Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of the people I talked to concluded that the Germans had been brutal and their system marked by contempt for the local population who were treated as 'monkeys'.

They were working the Africans as slaves, they called them black monkey. [...] The moment the black man said no, he received 25 strokes. [...] They take this paper, so they say: 'We are the white, you have to obey!' They were wiping some cow skins, they wrapped like that, it came singing, they gave it on your buttocks. If they ask you to beat, they first of all finish with you before they beat the other man. They say give them man 25, it is instruction, whether it is your father or not. If you do not do it, they say, give me the cane, I will give you first. They did not know about the value of human beings.

They chained women and took them to Fontem. (Ejwengang, 02.08.2000)

Mansfeld, the 'defender of the natives', was here perceived as 'a wicked German'. He was - as we have seen - obliged to operate within the 'colonial conditions'. The following discussion of the most prominent of the above named features might elucidate the seeming contradictions between the German view of the 'native-friendly Mansfeld' and the hegemonic local view ('wicked and brutal'). The German system not only remained an alien superplant onto the population, it became a resource which benefited those who succeeded in extraverting the power it offered (cf. chapter 8.3. Extraversion of power - "so that their fellow blackmen should be afraid of them".353). This power could not, however, exist outside or next to the established social systems. The spaces in which the German power could not enter remained vast and made evasion the most successful strategy of resistance (cf chapter 8.4. Evasion of power:358). Although the Germans had acknowledged their position of weakness in the area around Basho, they cautiously endeavoured to extend their power but until 1914 it remained marginal in these areas (cf. chapter 8.2. Extending marginal power:351). The 'System Mansfeld' unfolded itself south and immediately north of the Cross River. Extraversion mainly took place in these areas. Due to limitations of space I concentrated on some crucial aspects. Two aspects that would certainly deserve more attention are missionary activities and the German involvement with slavery. The German sources on slavery are meagre and non-conclusive, and the subject is still highly controversial in the area today. Only extensive and focused research would provide a satisfactory foundation. Suffice it to say here that the slaves maintained their status as dependents during the German era. Mansfeld acknowledged their instrumental role in economic activities:

An die Beteiligung der Hausklavei zu denken, wäre ein Fehler, weil dies einen sozialen Nachteil für die ganze Landeskultur zur Folge haben würde, unter welchem die Kaeutsche, die Pflanzer und die Regierung zu leiden hätten; erstere weil ein großer Teil der Arbeit für die Anlieferung von Rohstoffen durch die Klaveien verrichtet wird, bei Aufhebung der Hausklavei aber ein großer Procentsatz der Bevölkerung, der jetzt als
Arbeiter für die Küste frei wird, in Wegfall käme; denn die Sklavenarbeit müßte dann der Besitzer selbst verrichten; letztere, weil sie indirekten Nachteil durch die Schädigung des Handels und des großen Plantagenbetriebs erleiden würden. (Mansfeld 1908:168)

Although Mansfeld is quick to stress that the fate of the slave was not a harsh one, since he was 'physically free', his argument raises just one more fundamental contradiction of German colonialism. Mansfeld argues that German traders, planters, and administrators profit from the institution of slavery. In 1890 the argument that one of the main aims of German intervention in Kamerun was the abolition of slavery had yielded the support of the Reichstag for substantial financial support. Slave trade was officially abolished in 1902 but continued to be practiced secretly. Since it was a criminal offence, a number of times people were accused and imprisoned for 'slave trading', e.g. the 'chief of Tall', Bayimbi [Mbaye Mb] (Gorges 1930:11).

The complex of missions and schools has also been ignored for this study, since its impact during the German era was minimal. In 1912 the Catholic Pallottines and the Basel mission opened a station in the Upper Cross River area, both first of them in Ossing, and in 1913 the Basel missionaries moved to Bongsabang. The Basel mission had erected schools with 'native teachers' in the Cross area by 1910. Although the scramble of the catholics and the protestants and the administrative stance towards it elucidates some pertinent issues, the limited impact on the local population due to the short period of intervention did not justify extensive treatment. One of the characteristics of the encounter of the local population with the German colonial project was the absence of missionaries and the absence of a new source of extraversion.

8.1.1. Rape

'Rape' was generally regarded as an act performed by the black German soldiers, without the consent of their white masters. Rape, adultery, and the kidnapping of women had been one of the principal causes of the Mpwamunku war. It is impossible to assess whether the situation improved afterwards, because the German records remain completely silent about the issue. Evidence can only be gathered from oral traditions, and in fact, a change was suggested:

After some time this hostility by the German soldiers was reported to the D.O. of the Germans. He then intervened. This intervention stopped the beating and raping. The D.O. then started an exercise of touring the whole area. This exercise made the people to build special huts for the D.O. Such huts were always built at the onset of the village. (Kekukusim II, 08.07.2000)

Others hold that the situation continued after the war in the same way as before (MM and AG, 08.11.2000). In the letters of protection given to officially recognized chiefs, rape was explicitly mentioned as a crime committed by German representatives that was to be reported to the government station ('Schutzbrief Defang', 'Schutzbrief Taiyor'). Therefore the German administration was aware of the fact that the Africans employed by them, especially soldiers, were prone to 'misbehave' in this respect.

In only one interview was there reference made to the active participation of the population in the 'distribution' of local women for the German soldiers, explicitly without knowledge of their German master:

Sometimes when they arrest you for taxes, they seize your woman and make forceful sex with her. If your wife escapes, they will send the youngster ones or soldiers to get her back. Some of the local people usually collect money of adultery for their wives who were seduced by the white or soldiers. But when it is reported, you have to give the money back. (EN; 07.07.2000)

What emerges from this story is an underground system set up between the black German soldiers and the local population. The soldiers had the power to arrest and torture those people who could not pay their taxes. Their wives could render sexual services to the soldiers and their husbands then collect the money they needed. While the system seems to have worked at times, there was pain involved, which aggravated the already disgraceful situation.

While almost all people interviewed held that rape was carried out solely by the black German soldiers, some very few references exist on the relationship of white Germans and local women.

In the early days of German colonialism in Cameroon relationships between German men and African women were part of everyday life, judged favourably, and defended on all levels (cf. Rudin 1938:212). Puttkamer himself lived with a concubine in his residence in Buea and described the general 'West African System' quite explicitly in 1896 thus:


228 Possibly a reference to the 'soldier boys'.
229 A sort of 'compensation' for damages.
Puttkamer had tried to defend the system against missionaries who had protested against the fact that some of their female students were 'used by Europeans for sexual intercourse'. By 1900 the sexual relationships of German men - both traders and civil servants - were deplored:

Auch in puncto sexto werde von den Weißen erschrecklich gesäugt. 'Man muss dringend wünschen', rief Herr Schrempf (a conservative member of parliament during budget session), 'dass die Regierung Verheiratete Beaumt hinausschickt, so wie unter dem Regime des Herrn v. Puttkamer dürfte es nicht weitergehen' (Seidel 1901:347).

The 'impeccable' gentleman Dr. Alfred Mansfeld himself never referred to the issue. In his book, he published a photograph subtitled 'papawtree', where indeed we see a papawtree, but more prominently a young girl, dressed with headscarf and a cloth cooly tied around her breasts. Her hands are folded provocatively behind her head, drawing attention to her nude torso and her clothed bosom (Mansfeld 1908:93). The same girl in the same attire features again in a set of four photographs, subtitled 'act studies'. We know nothing about the girl, and - although it would be too far fetched to speculate on any sexual relationship between her and Mansfeld - Mansfeld clearly exhibited a sexual interest in her that went beyond the more 'academic' sexual interest displayed in his ethnographic photographs.

Mansfeld himself was more outspoken on the undesirable sexual relations of the GNK agents. In 1905/06 the entire white population of the district of Osindinge consisted of fifteen people. All of these were men, two were married, with the wives being abroad (Mansfeld, 28.08.1906:80-82).

8.1.2. 'Problems with the chief'

The problems with the chiefs related in the testimonies of 2000/2001 mainly referred to the hanging and exile in connection with the Mpawamku wars (cf. chapter 7.2.7. 'Carrying the German load':311). Those who had remained 'peaceful' were maintained in 'office'. The 'office' of a 'chief' as envisaged and needed by the Germans did however not exist within the Upper Cross River area (cf. chapter 2.5. 'Owners of the community':70). The Germans did not understand the complex power relations existing within the Upper Cross River area:


In Upper Banyang 'chiefs' had been officially recognised since 1900. 'Letters of protection', badges and the German flag recognised a 'chief' (cf. chapter 4.2.2. Besser in Upper Banyang (1900):157). Ruel (1969:102) was shown the letter of protection of Fotabe, and I saw the ones of 'Defang' and 'Taiyor' (all in Upper Banyang). In the case of 'Defang', i.e. Difang Eyonga, the present chief was the grandson of the person who was originally in the possession of the 'paper'. In Fotabe it was the son (ibid.). In Taiyot the present chief had no kinship connection with the former holder of 'the paper'. These papers, which all run as Ruel (1969:102) has transcribed and translated, indicated the stretch of the path the respective community had to clear and were all given out during the 'era Puttkamer', when Upper Banyang was perceived and utilised as the 'Bali road area'. The papers 'protected' the local communities from the unpaid seizure of carriers and food and regulated how the 'chief' could complain in case 'carriers' assaulted or raped his people (ibid.; Schutzbrief Defang, Schutzbrief Taiyor).230 All these papers were used by their respective holders to be recognised by the Germans successors - the British - as the legitimate 'chiefs', and the two 'papers' I saw bore the stamp of the British D.O. As Ruel (1969) observed for the British era:

The village leader [i.e. Chief] tended to become the main spokesman and negotiator for the village in relation to the administration, or a visiting administrative officer. (ibid.:105)

He [Ojong Atumba, father of the speaker] was the one who the whitman interacted with when he came. He owned this village. (NNF, 12.10.2001)

The office remained what it had been during the German time. The Chiefs derived their status from their position vis-à-vis the colonial administration. The German administration in turn used them "as agents of their own authority" (Ruel 1969:109). As can be gathered from the expression "he owned the village", the German authority in turn wielded much power on them. [NB the implicit merging of political and economic power in the expression used.]

Ruel was of the opinion that the Chiefs formally recognised by the Germans were in the main "accredited leaders of established communities" (ibid.:102). He supported his conviction by the fact that he was able to "locate the 'chief' named by Mansfeld [1908] without difficulty" (ibid.:103) in eighteen of the 27 existing Kenyang-speaking villages listed by Mansfeld (1908:264-266). There were surely incidents where this was the case, especially in Upper Banyang, where Chiefs recognised by the Germans had ascertained their position early within the colonial project and almost 60 years before Ruel carried out his fieldwork. However, 'chieftaincy' and 'succession' are highly debated and contested within the whole Upper Cross River area even today. It is therefore extremely difficult and at times even dangerous to enquire into this issue. The original causes of present 'chieftaincy problems' were most often found in the German intervention when the "wrong families" were put in. The chieftaincy problems thus represent the longest lasting 'German legacy', although it is rarely discussed in terms of such and what a person reveals about the 'rightful chief', his authority and com-

230 In his English version Ruel (1969) does not translate "Vergewaltigungen" with rape, but with "assault" - reasons unknown (101).
ing into office largely depends on this person's stance in the current political struggle of his community (cf. Enoh 1987). It would be impossible and unwise of me to present any specific cases in this work, especially since I cautiously avoided entering into ongoing 'chieftaincy disputes'. Rather, I will try to describe the perception of the new office created by the Germans, which was translated into the local political system as *ntfum inkuk* (Kenya) or *ntfum omakaara* (Ejaghama), i.e. "whiteman chief". Up to today a "whiteman" like myself asking about "the chief" during the German times will generally be presented the name of the "whiteman chief" and only second question reveals the "dual-chieftaincy" that was present:

Question: Ebhu aji, ntfum nyo Bakwelle are ene (Who was the chief [ntfum] of Bakwelle at the time)?

Answer: Chief Ashu Tambung.

Question: A kumi ofu are ntfum nyo omaka kera nere nyo etek (Was he a white-man chief [ntfum nyo omaka] or the chief of the community [nyo etek]?)

Answer: Are ntfum nyo omaka. Asu Ojong Ndiy ya nyo etek. (He was the whiteman chief. The chief of the community was Asu Ojong Ndiy).

(REA and EMST, 11.10.2001)

Ruel stressed that the relationship of the 'whiteman chief' and the 'chief of the community' was not one of distinct spaces, 'modern' and 'traditional', but 'to the area between traditional and modern (administrative) political structures, an area of interaction where new political forms and relationships have emerged, influenced by both structures but existing in a single, continuous field of political behaviour' (Ruel 1969:114).

Ntwaram [in Mambo village] has agreed to assume his duties as Village Head [in 1929], which he declined in the first place only because he thought Fobbe would be better to deal with 'white man', an essential requirement under the former regime. (Gorges 1930:15)

After the M paramount king wars, new 'chiefs' were selected by the 'elders' of the respective settlements either in the settlement itself or at the station in Ossindenge in the presence of the German administrator (Mansfeld 1908). We do not know exactly which criteria the 'elder' used to select the "whiteman chief", but there is evidence that one strategy was to 'put in' 'poor dependants' (cf. Bayart 1993:136), because the office of the 'chief was perceived as too dangerous, risky and disgraceful for the more respected men.

When the white man comes he will ask, where is the chief, so he is automatically taken to him [i.e. the oldest person]. It was when they [the Germans] were giving a lot of trouble, worrying the chiefs, carrying, beating some even, so they started putting in some young men. They put in even wrong families because once a German entered here and they saw that you did not clear the road, he will start beating and even to force the chief to carry a load from here to Mamfe. So what could they do? They called other people to be the chiefs who were not really the chiefs. When the Germans came, it was as I told you the real chiefs were the old people so when they told us it was now strange. (Kempong, 20.11.2000)

That is why the chiefs did not like to be tax collectors, they appointed other persons, because they did not want to be killed. (Ejwengang, 02.08.2000)

In this and other texts the collective action of the community is stressed. In a number of cases the person's prior relationship with the Germans made him an eligible candidate for the 'chief'. In Ejwengang, the person who became chief had been a messenger for the Germans (Ejwengang) (cf. Bayart 1993:136; Gschiere 1997). He was either selected by the people themselves or chosen by the Germans:

There was John Ayamba who was a cook, cooking food for the white men. He was rich, he was made chief. (EMST, 11.10.2001 in Bakwelle)

The first chief was selected by the Germans. Because he was working in the rice farm. The Germans selected him because he worked with them, the people did not select him. I am not talking about the present chief Manga, but about the chief Manga who began with the German people, they gave Enow the name Manga. They met him when he was young and was a very successful worker, that is why they gave him the name Manga. (Tinto, 05.08.2000)

At times the Germans will just pick, you know even a strong man and since he is very strong and can understand sometimes a little German, you automatically claim yourself the man and the other people in town are afraid of you since you are close to the white man. We feared the white man in those days. You will say: 'The white man says I am the man to rule'. The people will just agree and so you seize it by force and soldiers were seizing the government from the correct people by force, took it and gave it to the others. (Kempong, 20.11.2000)

The above statement is almost identical with the British impression of the way the Germans chose their chiefs:

In fact the villages say they [the Germans] would approach any young man and implore him to accept the post of village head or official chief as the chiefs were given little rest by the administration. (Swaby 1937:9)

The forceful German deposition of the chief is also remembered for 'minor' offences by the chief.

He [Mbony, 'chief' of Egbeakaw], happened to have gone to the German administrator to ask for something with about five of his followers. While there he happened to have complained too about eggs. The German administrator [...] got furious and slapped him adding that at any moment he comes, he complains of eggs. Meanwhile as a result of the slap, his cap fell, and the administrator took it and gave to one of his followers who automatically became the chief in the person of Bawak. This to the people, was considered as gross disrespect to their traditional leaders. Bawak was then a German chief and not the people's chief. After his death, chieftaincy went back to the Mbony's family, the original owners and up till now it has remained with them. (Oru 1996:30, after an interview with Raphael Tubi Besong of Mamfe carried out in 1995)
The above text describes how the chieftaincy was taken away from the legitimate person. The immediate reason was because Mbianyoh "complained about eggs", while in the context it states that Mbianyoh asked for eggs from the German administrator, I am certain that this is an inverse transmission of the 'original' story. "Eggs" were generally demanded from the Germans for feeding by the local population. Chief Arrey of Ossing, a child when the first Basel missionaries became their neighbours in 1912, remembered:

All the good eggs for the missionaries. [...] My mother always said: the good eggs are for the whiteman. (chief Arrey, Ossing, 2001)

Even today mothers scold their heady children by asking them, whether they have become a "German child" if they refuse eggs. Therefore the people of Egbekaw – a village on which the German headquarters in Mamfe not even up to one kilometre away surely relied on for their feeding – had very likely sent a delegation of their most respected men with Mbianyoh as spokesman in order to "complain" that the demands for food to be given to the station was too heavy for them. This complaint led to the removal of Mbianyoh. Chieftaincy is symbolised by the cap. The cap was taken by Bawak, who was backed by the German power. This German power is expressed by violence ("slapping"). Bawak was called the "German chief" and not "the people's chief" – a differentiation that was remembered until the chieftaincy 'returned' to the legitimate family. In 1929 he was still in office (cf. Anderson 1929:5).

The Germans thus 'made' chiefs that were identified as 'German chief' or generally as 'white men's chiefs', since the office was maintained by the British, who only changed the selection process. The 'white man's chiefs' – as described in Kembong – were often 'young men, who spoke a bit of German'. They were the ones who directly interacted with the Germans.

The chiefs were officially recognised by the German administration through 'letters of protection' and badges. Additionally in each settlement 'local police' were established who were also awarded badges. The main duties of the 'local police' was the supervision of the clearing of roads as prescribed in the 'letters of protection' and the deliverance of messages, mainly summons, from the station to the local population. These go-betweens volunteered their services and perceived them as a privilege (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:150; Schutzbefr. Defang; Schutzbefr. Talyor). The German colonialists had thus started establishing a new source of prestige and power in the Upper Cross River Area that stood outside the existing reference scheme, while not altogether ignoring it.

The 'whiteman chiefs' were the persons directly liable for the German administration. Their most important duties were the running of the lower courts and the collection of taxes, as well as the supply of labourers for the plantations and carriers (cf. R&A 1929:6).

Mansfeld tried to establish a system of courts as soon as he arrived in the Ossidinge district. The beginning was difficult, because he lacked an apt interpreter and 'chiefs' who were willing to participate. The 'accused' who were to be summoned by a messenger with or without police soldiers were not traceable in most incidents in the aftermath of the Mpawmanku wars (Jahresbericht Ossidinge 1904/1905:149).

Just as the population sought to extravert the German power for their respective personal problems, the station in turn tried to extravert their desire for extraversion. Mansfeld – in contrast to his deputy – decided to accept all personal cases, since he was of the opinion that this would create a strong bond between the people and the station. He judged those cases with the aid of two or three respected men from the area (Mansfeld to KGK, 04.04.1907:94-95).

Whipping was not only a punishment for minor offences imposed by government courts, but could also be inflicted unto employees of Germans (Rudin 1938:202). In 1907 – due to the opposition to this form of corporal punishment – Domburg asked to reduce the usage of whipping as a punishment. In 1909 Gouverner Seitz cautioned local administrators to respect local chiefs and restrain from beating them (Rudin 1938:203, 213). The imposition of the death penalty normally depended on the consent of the Gouverneur (ibid.). The two lowest courts were run by the chiefs. In the third court appeal came to the 'white man' (Rudin 1938:213).

Mansfeld was a wicked German, when he orders that you should be condemned, you cannot appeal. He has the final orders. (DMA, 12.10.2000)

By 1907 Mansfeld had discovered the binding authority of ekpe ("Ewi-ngbe") that he tried to involve into the administrative process and even became a member himself. He also actively sought to spread the association over the whole district (ASK, 15.03.1910). Therefore Mansfeld was an exception to the general rule deplored by attorney Prange in 1913:

Oberhaupt scheint es mir, als ob sowohl in unser [sic] Eingeborenen-Gesetzgebung als auch in der Rechtsprechung das Recht der Eingeborenen zu wenig berücksichtigt wird. (Prange, in GR, 26.-29.11.1913:58)

8.1.3. Amalgamation (nchemti)

Mansfeld had changed the 'peace conditions' after the Mpawmanku wars to the effect that the reconstruction of destroyed settlements was only allowed along the main roads, and isolated compounds or hamlets were prohibited (Mansfeld to KGK, 04.04.1907:94). Political and social organisation had previously been expressed in terms of settlement patterns (cf. Ruel 1969), and during the amalgamation of villages and relocation the population was forced to reorganise their settlement patterns. This entailed much friction, since it was an opportunity for some (especially those who maintained their original settlement site) to assume a position of greater power vis-à-vis those who had to accept the position of 'newcomers'. Indeed, Mansfeld reported, that a number of 'chiefs' faced prob-
It had become accepted truth during the litigation case between German state and the GNK, relying on testimonies of many witnesses, that the 'road construction' could only be carried out if enforced by the administration (Lobe, 27.04.1914).

One of these Maßnahmen [resettlement along the roads] is eine Wegeunterhaltung gar nicht durchführbar. (Jäger, in GR, 26-29.11.1913:68)

One of the purposes for the relocation and amalgamation with a very low profile in the German sources was the so-called 'flag mail system', or 'akaw-kaw' ('move-move') as it is locally known. It remained almost invisible within the German sources, but the references to it in 2000/2001 were overwhelming in all the areas except Njemaya.231 Its description was quite uniform: the German letter had to be carried from village to village; it had to be delivered instantly; failure to do so resulted in severest punishment.

The German mailing system was equally resented by the Mamfe people. By this system, people were used as post offices. By this any letter written by an administrator, destined to either Bamenda, Kumba or Buéa, is entrusted in the hands of any individual who gets it, and as a rule, will run non stop until he delivers it to some other person in the next village informing him that it was a government letter. He too gets it to the next village. Worst of all you do not have to sleep with such a letter232 so even if you get it at night, you are on the move to the next village. Failure to do so, you have to be hung (Otu 1996:30, interview with Raphael Tabi Bessong of Mamfe, 1995)

In those days when the Germans were here, to get a message from Mamfe to Badje was just a day. There were no vehicles, but what they did is they will send a letter from Mamfe to Kesham. The chief of Kesham will then send someone immediately, just until the letter reaches its destination. Anyone who disobeys usually gets it hot from the Germans. Their letters do not sleep anywhere. This attitude also was very negative on the side of the local people. (EN, 07.07.2000)

The 'flag mail system' freed the soldiers from this task, for whom mail services had previously consumed up to 75 percent of their time (BAB RB1001/4014:98).

A great number of such letters were sent. The people even created a proverb about it, warning people about idleness:

Lazy people who neither go to the farm nor hunting in the forest will die while transporting the German mails. (Boka, 10.07.2000)

The extent of force employed by the Germans surfaces in a British statement from 1916:

231 As mentioned above, World War I - as the closest experience with the Germans viewed from the present - is bound to occupy an overproportionate share of the collective memory. During it the demands on the population in terms of flag mail services was evidently enormous in the areas where fighting took place (Nsakang, Kembong, Mamfe, Upper Banyang - not in the southern Njemaya area; cf, Stolz, Dec. 1915).

232 I.e. keep it over night.
As part of the scheme also the Germans had established [...] the villages of Akirwa [Akiriwa] and Sumbe between Etnkam and Nguti, bringing the people, whether they liked it or not, from their original settlements at Tembang [Ntembang] and Defang to live by the road, look after a section thereof, and assist with the flag post. (Hunt 1916:9)

The nature of the German colonial enterprise entailed the constant movement of messages, goods, and people. During their journeys they needed accommodation, food, and sometimes carriages. These were 'demands' upon the local population and a constant cause for friction, and violence. The colonial administration had to acknowledge that not only their white personnel, but in greater numbers their African staff, soldiers, messengers, clerks, often misused the powers granted to them by the Germans, often with their weapons. The Mpompanklu war was to a large degree caused by such infringements. The Germans therefore tried to prevent unpleasant incidents by setting up an infrastructure with rules and regulations. 'Resthouses' were to be erected in certain villages in order to alleviate the burden of accommodation on the local people. Previously the members of caravans had simply dislodged the population from their houses. 'Reliable' people were selected and placed in charge of the resthouse, as well as the provision of food to the caravan by the population. The caravan had to pay for the food, but the person in charge received a certain percentage. This system was first introduced in the Tinto-Fontendorf area in 1904.

Die Station hofft, daß durch diese Maßnahmen nicht nur viele Überraschungen von Karawanen und Soldaten vermieden werden, sondern daß auch die Verpflegung der Karawanen in geregelte Bahnen geleitet wird. (Rausch, 01.04.1905:55-56)

The Germans always took along about 25 persons to carry their luggage when going on a journey. The D.O. usually moved around all the villages to see that there is calmness in all the villages. That is what my father told me. (JAT, 06.11.2000)

There were no vehicles. People walked on foot. They slept inside rest rooms (beket baywe mwah upstream rest). They had them in Fotabe and Defang. When you got there, the chief gave order that they should get fowls and eggs. They came with it. Women brought water. The chief assigned four people to carry the loads. Anyone who did not carry had to pay a fine. (Fotabe, 11.08.2000)

Along the Nguti-Ossing road these 'resthouses' were identical with the 'community hall' and their walls were painted with ornaments and pictures, and the poles were at times carved. A 'throne' for the 'chief' was placed in the middle (Haase 1915:15).

The forced amalgamation along the roads was a response to the most successful means of resistance, namely evasion. By moving the people to the road and identifying those to be held responsible (the chiefs and the local police), the Germans sought to alleviate this problem, which was experienced throughout Cameroon:

In many testimonies that I gathered in 2000/2001 these advantages were also noted; however, the 'force' employed was evident throughout:

There were different villages. The Germans and their strict administration, they wanted the people to be here in one place and that is why you see people here. They sent Ojong Ayfere243, an Agborkem man, to drive all the people from their old settlements. (Kembong, 20.11.2000)

There were many scattered hamlets in the bush which were ordered by the German administration to migrate and amalgamate into Kembong. Most often, the natives refused, and the Germans resorted to burning the hamlets, forcing the people to migrate to Kembong. (Fa Batu Ayuk, Tanyi Ashu, Kembong village, April 1, 1986, cited in Bessong 1986:95)

The amalgamation was supported by the then "chief" of Kembong – Tambe Ndip Arrah – because it asserted his authority over people who had not previously recognised him as paramount chief (cf. Bessong 1986:95). Similar cases were Eteme with Eyanchang, Mbinjong with Are (Ali) and Mbinchang (Ruel 1969:119).

A number of communities succeeded in achieving 'independence' as Ruel terms it. Their leaders got a 'paper' by the Germans and they were thus recognised as a 'village' of their own, e.g. Mfaifok, Ashum, Bakebe, Tinto II, and Tinto Mbu (Ruel 1969:119-122).

During the discussion of the resettlement policies in the GR 1913, the Bezirkssammt of Kribi held that the population perceived it as an advantage and that therefore no force needed to be employed. I assume that by 1913 the population regarded 'work' as carriers and selling of foods as desirable sources of the cash needed for payment of taxes.


The German desire for ordered, condensed settlements was a necessary preconditions for the enforcement of the 'culture' that Mansfeld had envisaged in 1904, i.e. liability for taxation, carrier services, and in general easier control. It was appraised by their followers, the British:

The villages are well built on a uniform plan of a single wide street, and are exceptionally clean and sanitary, but this is due to the stringent rules of their former rulers rather than to any natural virtue in the people (Hunt 1916:3)

The resettlement and amalgamation of communities along the main roads has altered the settlement patterns in the Upper Cross River area up to today.

243 In 1927 both returned to their former site close to Defang and Fotabe (Anderson 1929:6).

244 Also known as Ojong Ekuri in Agborkem (cf. statement of his son, PAO, 12.10.2000).
8.1.4 Taxation - 'a metal called mark hung round the neck'

They came with their tax [faks] which was a half metal [néchán]. They called it nawmbá. Whether you like it or not, you have to buy it and if you do not give the money, they arrest you and sent you to prison [house – prison/iron/Zekeke - konawng] (Ejwengung)

The debate about taxation began in 1902 and was connected to the 'inmate indolence of the natives' (cf. chapter 4.1. 'Sufficient means of power':147; Schkop 1903a; Rudin 1938:338-345).

Gewiß ist der Staat berechtigt, von den Bewohnern, denen er seinen Schutz zuteil werden läßt, eine Gegenleistung zu beanspruchen, und zwar nach der Maßgabe, nach der er ihre Interessen fördert. Die Besteuerung zwingt den der Arbeit abgeneigten Einwohner zur Arbeit; er muß erwerben, die Steuer hat somit eine die Kultur fördernde Bedeutung (DKZ 1903; vol. 1:3-4).

In ihrem sorgenlosen Dahinleben denken die Schwarzen nicht an den kommenden Tag und arbeiten nur gerade soviel, um ihren täglichen Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen [...] Hat die eingeborene Bevölkerung aber jährlich Abgaben an das Gouvernement zu entrichten, so ist der einzige von ihnen gezwungen, der angeborenen Trachtigkeit zu entfangen, um als schwarzer deutscher Steuerzahler dem kaiserlichen Gouvernement gegenüber seinen Plichten nachkommen zu können. Die Neger werden demnach zu erhöhter Arbeitsleistung angehalten, was der Kolonie zu Gute kommt und von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung für die Erziehung der Gesamtheit ist. (Schkop 1903a:171)

Apart from the 'education to work', taxation was considered to contain a number of advantages: firstly, the 'regard' of the administration would be elevated, because taxation would intensify the contact of the local population with the colonial administration and would imprint its existence into the 'native's conscience' (Schkop 1903a:171). It would also provide census statistics and introduce cash as the sole means of payment and trade. In the absence of cash, labour would serve as a substitute, which would alleviate the constant labour shortage (ibid.) (cf. chapter 3.7.4. Transport:140, and chapter 6.1. Who commands the land?:210; Rudin 1938:339).

The collection of taxes depended on the power the Germans executed over the respective territory, and it was even proposed that the Germans were only the 'true masters of the country', if they had enough power to collect taxes:

Aber gleich wie bei uns daheim wird man sich auch in Kamerun nur höchst ungern auf das Steuerzahlten einlassen und nur bei einem entsprechenden Druck von oben wird es möglich sein, Steuern zu erheben. Dort aber, wo wir noch nicht in der Lage sind, diesen Druck auszuüben, sind wir auch noch nicht die Herren des Landes, denn unsere Macht in den Kolonien reicht nur soweit, als wir das Recht ausüben können, Steuern zu erheben. (Schulte im Hofe 1905:413)

This view was countered by Picht, who stated that in many areas the imposition of a tax would unnecessarily increase the burden on the people, who were already obliged to clear roads, provide carriages and make provisions for the sta-
tions. Picht assumed that the German power was very weak in Kamerun and harsh measures would provoke new hostilities:

Wie die Verhältnisse in Kamerun liegen, müssen wir bei der sehr schwachen Macht, die der Regierung zur Verfügung steht, jeden zu starken Zwang auf die Eingeborenen vermeiden, um nicht einen Aufstand hervorzurufen, dessen Ende gar nicht abzusehen ist. Und der stärkste Zwang ist das Ansetzen der Steuerschraube. (Picht 1905:485)

Picht held that taxes should only be imposed in the coastal districts (ibid.). In 1903 a tax was introduced in Douala. In 1908 a general 'head tax' of six M. was introduced to the areas 'completely under German control' (Seitz, 10.11.1908; Rudin 1938:341) in Kamerun. In 1913 the tax was increased to ten marks for all able-bodied men. The Bezirksamtmann could, however, judge the areas in which the ten mark rate should be applied (339-342). In Ossidinge taxation was not introduced before 1909 (Jahresbericht KGK 1908/1909), when all adult, male, able-bodied inhabitants in the 'peaceful areas' were subject to a 'head tax', which could be paid in cash or as 'tax work'. The rate of taxation differed in the Upper Cross River area according to area and time. Initially it was five marks; by 1914 the full amount of ten marks was collected. A special 'leper tax' was included (Hunt 1916:11; Eckart 1997). In 1910/11 the following direct and indirect taxes, customs duties and fees were obtained from the stations Basho, Ossidinge and Nsanakang:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>liquor tax</th>
<th>pedlar tax</th>
<th>direct taxation</th>
<th>import duties</th>
<th>export duties</th>
<th>other customs duties</th>
<th>court fees etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ossidinge</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>39,230</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>5,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsanakang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58,152</td>
<td>5,583</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DKZ 1912, no. 38:646 (all brought to round figures)

The taxes were collected by the "whiteman chiefs" who were allowed to keep five to ten percent (Rudin 1938:214, 343). These chiefs often used this authority to enrich themselves and further increased the burden on the population:

Some greedy chiefs compelled natives to pay double the rate, and then made personal use of the difference. (Interview with Pa Eta Ojong, Nkemetchi village, March 30, 1986, cited by Besong 1986:82; cf. Rudin 1938:344 almost identical)

As noted above 'the problem of tax' has left an imprint in the collective memory of the people in the Upper Cross River area, at times perceived as the punishment for the Mpayamanka wars (AEn, 06.07.2000, s.a.). Most of the incidents of torture were related to the collection of taxes:
Apart from the head tax, Wandergewerbesteuer (tax for peddlers) was introduced in 1908, mainly affecting the Hausa and the black clerks of European trading companies (cf. Rudin 1938:344-345; Jahresbericht KGK 1908/1909. In: ANY FA 1/71).

In 1913 the German system of taxation was open for much evasion and evasion. The clerks, for example, who registered the population, were known to omit a person from their register who "bought themselves out", i.e. they paid a small sum, e.g. two mark to the clerk (KGK, 6-9.06.1913:14). Thus, the Germans "never knew the right number" (DTAM, Defang village).

8.1.5 Njokmansi — 'work without pay'

The road is beautiful,' said Meka, 'really beautiful. O road, daughter of all our labours, lead me to the white man!' (Oyono 1967 — The old man and the medal:11)

By 1903 two opposing views had emerged with regard to labour and the 'education of the negro to work' (cf. chapter 4.1. 'Sufficiens means of power':147). Some held that 'an element of force' was needed, while others claimed 'mental and moral elevation' as the appropriate means. The first view was expressed by traders and plantation owners, e.g. Johannes Thommelen, the second by missionaries and a minority of traders, e.g. J. K. Vietor. As demand for labourers increased and the scarcity of the resource became more and more acute, the administration started taking a stand for the 'preservation' of human labour. By 1909 the 'Arbeiterverordnung' had been amended and after 1912 a general reform of labour recruitment was under way (cf. Hausen 1970:277; Thommelen 1902; Vietor 1902 — and general discussion in DKZ 1902).

In 2000 in roughly half the interviews conducted in the Upper Cross River area, the element of forced labour was mentioned and roughly one fourth of the people interviewed held that the Germans had owned slaves and were involved in the slave trade.

They liked the chiefs from whom they always bought slaves and those chiefs who gave them favours. They gave money to those chiefs who were involved in the slave trade. (Sjwengang, 02.08.2000)

The perseverance of the topic of 'forced labour' in oral traditions into the 21st century clearly reflects the impact it had on the region. In fact, the German system of forced labour, locally known as njokmansi — 'work without pay', remains the main source for local resentment of German colonial practices, succeeded only by 'war' and 'rape'.

235 According to Rudin it was introduced in 1904.
236 Also: "njoungmasi" (Ehui 2001:28). The term is not of local origin and seems to refer to a geographic location outside of Manyu Division, probably along the Douala-Nkongsamba railroad. The term is known in the meaning of "work without pay" also by Cameroonians from the southeast of Cameroon.
They caught people here. They caught Ette Nuii and late Ette Tabot. They worked at a hill called njokmnasi around Douala and Yaoundé. They forced people to work with them. They had to dig a tunnel. That is what I was told. (EPNE, 18.10.2001)

*Njokmnasi* is an area there in Bamileke, Douala, all along, they call it njokmnasi – work without pay. (DE, 15.10.2001)

During the German time, they employed many people from our area to go and do njokmnasi work. Some of the people working in a hill were buried in the hill and died. (Bodam, 11.07.2000)

They had a project at Etoo in which people here from Inokun where going to work. Every family (ndebbinju) gave one person, every village (eek) gave one person. They stayed there for one month before they came back and sent the next person. For nothing. No money was given to them. They paid labour only cups of rice and stock fish, they never gave real money. (SOO, 19.10.2001 in Inokun)

In the first tentative assessment of the Upper Cross River area by the British in 1918, 'forced labour' represented the main source for 'hated' for the Germans in the area:

Most of the hatred for German rule is due to their methods of forced labour and the feeling on this point is reflected throughout the statements of the chiefs. (D.O. Ossidinge 1918)

The 'innate indolence' referred mainly to the male 'native'. Women were perceived as the main supporters of the household. The removal of the idle labour potential of the male population was thus not regarded as detrimental to the well-being of the 'natives' (Schiopp 1903a:172).

Providing labour for the plantations in the south was regarded as the most important duty of the north of Kamerun, i.e. the districts of Ossidinge, Bamenda, and Banyo (KRG to RKA, 06.03.1908). The method of labour recruitment was a highly controversial issue in the Ossidinge district. The beginning of the works on the railroads and the increased demand of labour for these enterprises further fuelled the disputes. Eventually in 1908 reforms both in the recruitment and the working conditions were introduced (cf. DKZ no. 34:562-563). Since these changes had to be adopted by the GR, in which all colonial interest groups were represented, concessions had to be made in order to get its support. Provisions for improved sanitation were abridged, the rights of control and sanctions of the administration drastically curbed, and the decree did not apply to the practices of pure trading enterprises (cf. Hausen 1970:279-280). The administration of Kamerun was too weak to settle the labour issue according to their needs. In the Upper Cross River area – as a recruitment area – the disputes were enacted by Mansfeld and the labour recruiters, and often settled by rule of force.

The chiefs, who were always consulted by the recruiting agents, were able to use the forced labour system to their own advantage, since it became an easy method to dispose their opponents (Pa Assem, Ewelle village, March 29, 1986, cited in Bessong 1986:85).

The Germans, when they came to a village, they will ask the chief to provide young men for forced labour. The chief must do so [...] He usually gave stubborn people to the Germans for forced labour. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

The labour recruitment system of the Germans was at times perceived as slavery. The high mortality rates, especially on the plantations (up to 20%, cf. Victor 1902:170), nursed the feeling that those who were 'selected' were likely not to return:

The Germans were buying people who went and never came back. Our parents usually sold the most stubborn children to the Germans. (EJM, 02.11.2000)

The Germans were also trading in the slave trade. They were getting slaves because our brothers and sisters who were stubborn were bought and then sold to them and they were used in their plantations. They transported them home to their various plantations in Europe. (FNA, 13.10.2000)

They came here and took people as slaves. (DE, 15.10.2001)

Even within contemporary German discourses these comparisons were used (Pr. 1903:150-151):

Die schwarzen Arbeiter, sagte er [Cartap Quernheim], würden hart gehalten, ungenügend oder falsch beköstigt, so dass Krankheiten und Todessfälle eintreten, und sehr ge- ring bezahlt. Wenn die 'freiwillige' Anwerbung nicht brachte, pflanzten auch die gebotenen Menschen mit List oder Gewalt aus ihren Dörfern zu entführen und auf die Plantagen zu bringen. (Seidel 1901:347)

Hält man dagegen die Ziffern der Pflanzungen, dann wird einem verständlich, dass die von den Hauptlingen angebrachten Leute sich wie Opfer vorkommen, die zur Schlachtbank geführt werden. (Schipper to KGK, 07.02.1913:244)

*Wenn der Arbeiterkommissar die Polizisten in der Dörfer sichtet, so sahnten die eingeborenen aus und vernachlässigen ihre Pflanzungen und den Handel. Eine derartige Anwerbung liegt nicht im Interesse des Handels und geht dem Sklavenhandel. (van de Loo in GR, 26-29.11.1913:67*241

In 1913, compensation payment for those who died during their contract time at the plantations of 100 M. was planned (GR, 26-29.11.1913:55)

The movement of carriers necessarily increased the burden on the villages they passed through, especially regarding the supply of food. As Etu Ojong, cited by Bessong 1986 pointed out, the carriers were forced to pillage people's farms lest they suffer starvation (Bessong 1986:84). Nobody in the Upper Cross River area has made reference to women being used as carriers. It seems that 'women and children carriers' was a problem of the southern districts (cf. GR, 26-29.11.1913:68-70). The women in the Cross area were only involved in the clearing of the roads (Atibong, 02.08.2000; Ejwengang, 02.08.2000).

241 He specifically referred to the recruitment of 150 labourers in the Yabassi district who were abducted to the station in chains.
The Germans not only abducted people to the plantations or to the railroad and used them as carriers, they also forced them to do local work, most prominently the clearing of roads, but also providing thatches for the houses they were building. The provision of thatches was mentioned by some people I interviewed in the Boki and Njemaya area and Mansfeld had in 1905 sent messengers to the villages along the Rio-Nsamanweg road and in the boundary area ordering the people to produce 3000 thatches ('mats') (Mansfeld to KGG, 06.04.1905; Boka, 09.07.2000).

In 1907/1908 a total of 403 workers were recruited in the district. 213 were for the railroad, 100 for the plantation Debundscha, and 70 for the GNK employed locally (50 on the plantation in Abonando). (KRS Ossidinge 1907/1908:266). The majority was abducted from the district.

In 1909 a labour recruiter of the Kamerun Nordbahn had acquired the right to recruit 300 workers from the district of Ossidinge after he had unsuccessfully tried to recruit people in Bamenda and Dschang, which were assigned the duty to provide the workers for the Nkongsamba-railroad (cf. ANY FA 1/182:75). The labour recruiter Ulrich returned from his 'impressario journey' in the Ossidinge district without having obtained a single worker. Ulrich blamed Mansfeld for his failure, since he outspokenly refused any cooperation with Ulrich, and even impeded his efforts by gathering all 'chiefs' of the district, informing them that the Bezirksamt did not support Ulrich and that they were all not obliged to cooperate (Ulrich to KBB, 28.09.1909; Ulrich to KBB, 13.10.1909; cf. DKZ no. 34:562-563) Mansfeld stated that the district could not sustain any further demands on labour. Mansfeld knew that if the labour demands were increased, unrest would be the result and more people would revolt by migrating. Ulrich quotes Mansfeld thus:

Wie Ihnen geschrieben, braucht Ossidinge Tausende von Trägern, stellt ausserdem 500 Pflanzungs- und 300 Bahnarbeiter jährlich, kann Ihnen mit bestem Willen keine Leute geben. Es ist oft kaum möglich, die nötigen Träger zu stellen, da die Leute vielfach auf englisches Gebiet gehen und dort infolge bedeutend besserer Bezahlung Trägerdienste leisten. (Ulrich to KBB, 13.10.1909:87)

The KGG had fixed an amount of workers that each district had to send to the plantations; in Ossidinge 800 in 1909.242 The additional 300 workers for the railroad would have exceeded that limit. The fact that Ulrich - without the 'forceful' support of the administration - was utterly unsuccessful, underlines how unpopular the work at the railroad was (Ulrich to KBB, 28.09.1909; ANY FA 1/182:85).

242 1800 in 1912/13. The figure was calculated either by taking 15 percent of the tax-payers (12,150) or 20 percent of the able-bodied population (9,375) (Mansfeld to KGG, 22.05.1913:197).
The work on the plantations attracted some voluntary labour, but the bulk of the labour force 'involuntarily' went to the coast (Ulrich to BKB, 13.10.1909; Mansfeld to KGK, 22.05.1913).\textsuperscript{243} Clashes between 'private recruiters' like Ulrich and the local administration led to a reform of the system by mid-1912. All private recruiting was outlawed and the administration wholly took over the duty to recruit labourers according to fixed quota (Schipper to KGK, 07.02.1913).

Deputy D.O. Schipper had suggested in 1913 that Ossidinge could provide 1800 workers. In 1913 Mansfeld argued against this number, stating that 'voluntary' migration to the coast had to be included (ibid.).\textsuperscript{244} According to Schipper's calculation, half the able-bodied male population was to be extracted from their homes, a procedure he judged tenable. Mansfeld was of the opinion that the abduction of the envisaged number would strain the population proportionately.

By 1913 evasion of German demands by 'disappearing' within Kamerun had become a successful strategy – either by leaving local homes or by escaping from the plantations. The numbers could be estimated because the local administration had by then prepared tax-rolls in which all the tax-payers were listed. 'Officially' they could only be cancelled in case of death or temporary as 'contract labourers' at the coast. 'Unofficially', no identification and registration system had been developed and 'free' movement was thus possible. The Ossidinge administration deplored this situation since it allowed people to withdraw from their local obligations, increasing the burden for those left behind, since they had to provide the taxes of those on 'unofficial' leave. Since labour was in short supply, those leaving their home had no difficulty to find work at the plantations on the coast, the railway, as soldiers boys in the army, or as servants for Europeans (Schipper to KGK, 07.02.1913; KRS Ossidinge to KGK, 09.09.1913). Whether the 'depopulation' of the villages Haase passed through in 1912 stemmed primarily from evasion or from administrative abduction is difficult to ascertain, but the fact remains that the rupture was massive:

\begin{quote}
Seit einiger Zeit hat die Regierung die Arbeiteranwerbung übernommen, und es ergab sich ganz von selbst, daß die bestgeleiteten Bezirke des Inneren [..] die Hauptmasse der Pflanzungs- und sonstigen Arbeiter zu stellen hatten. Selbstverständlich bemühte man sich, eine gewisse Grenze innezuhalten. Wenn man aber bedenkt, wieviel Männer außerdem noch zu Wegebauten, als Träger und Stationsarbeiter herangezogen werden, ungerechnet diejenigen, welche aus eigenem Antrieb auf Arbeit gehen oder als Händler
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{243} In 1912/13, 741 had gone to the coast voluntarily, while the required quota of 1800 went 'unvoluntarily' (Mansfeld to KGK, 22.05.1913:197).

\textsuperscript{244} He had only succeeded in sending 1440 men to the plantations and thus did not meet the required number. By adding the 'voluntary' workers, the envisaged figure of 1800 was even exceeded by 385 men (Mansfeld to KGK, 22.05.1913).

\[\text{Izz Innere wandern, so ergibt sich daraus doch eine bedenkliche Entvölkerung der Dörfer. (Haase 1915:11)}\]

Force labour did exist. In the dispute over this issue after the war Mansfeld acknowledged this and informed the RKA in a private note:

\begin{quote}

Berlin, 20. III. 1919 Mansfeld (BAB R1001/4703:36)
\end{quote}

\[\text{Berlin, 20. III. 1919 Mansfeld (BAB R1001/4703:36)}\]

Officially the Germans never admitted that a system of forced labour existed in Cameroon (37).

8.2. Extending marginal power

In September 1904, Mansfeld had decided to re-erect the station at its old site in Ossidinge due to political considerations, giving the 'unhealthiness' of the place only secondary importance. Ossidinge was judged to be in the centre of the district and within the main operation areas of the GNK (Mansfeld to KGK, 06.09.1904). The government station Ossidinge was frequently described as a 'primitive bush-station', without adequate means of transport, and relying on the ships of the GNK or the unpractical transport via land to Rio del Rey (Herrmann, Sept. 1906:80; Revisionskomission, 02.11.1908). In 1906/07 the total number of Europeans in the district of Ossidinge was thirteen, but the non-native blacks employed by them were 109, with the majority as soldiers (ANY FA 1/69:144). In 1908 the station was moved to Manfe and the KRS Ossidinge was transformed into a Bezirksamt, Mansfeld became the Bezirksamtmann.
The area northeast of Basho at the boundary of the military district Bamenda had been declared 'closed' territory since the 13th of April, 1907 (Glauning, 15.08.1907; KGK to RKA, 01.10.1907). Private people, including traders and agents of the GNK, were not allowed to enter the area (cf. chapter 7.2.5, Operations north of the river: military post Basho (1904-1906):298). The Basho post did not execute any power in these areas. Its intervention was limited to a radius of fifteen kilometres. The people in the vicinity of the post were still in the process of returning from their bush hide-outs and temporary settlements in 1907, but some had started visiting the post's market. In 1908 Mansfeld characterised the 'Anyang' as the most resistant 'tribe' of the district, mainly because he could not relate to their chiefs, from whom he expected to achieve improvement by executing 'patience' and 'rigour' (KRS Ossidinge 1907/1908:265).

Obit. Adametz was deposed from his position as head of the post and replaced by 'Feldwebel' Dombrowsky in 1907 (Glauning, 15.08.1907:128). The reasons remain unknown. All the inhabitants of the transitional area between forest and grassland and at the very margins of both the district of Ossidinge and Bamenda were neither willing to comply to any German demands nor to abandon armed resistance. The 'letters of protection' awarded to the 'chiefs' were regarded as 'slips of worthless paper' (125), an unarmed German messenger was beaten and his boy shot in the knee when he tried to summon the 'chief of Widekum' to the post in Basho. Glauning then closed the road Ossidinge-Widekum-Bamenda for 'German' traffic. An expedition by Glauning turned into a full-fledged military operation with casualties on both sides (ibid.). The armed resistance was seemingly confined to those areas at the margins of prior German influence. Those in whose areas the Schuttruppe had intervened during the Mpawmkonu wars and its aftermath refrained from armed resistance.

While the northern areas of the grassland/forest transition zone were judged to be of minor importance in the German colonial project, the safety of the road Bamenda-Widekum-Basho/Ossidinge was listed as a prime concern of Glauning's in 1907 along with the closure of the gaps in the boundary areas between Bashu and the Katsina (Glauning, 15.08.1907:135-136). The situation in 1907 in these areas was judged most unfavourably and was considered unbearable:

Lidi und Assumbo haben sich jederzeit feindlich benommen, schwächere Patrouillen zurück geworfen und ihnen grosse Verluste beigebracht, vor kurzem auch den bisherigen Leiter des Postens Basho, Oberleutnant Adametz bei seinem Versuch einer friedlichen Annäherung zum Rückzug genötigt, wobei er selbst verwundet wurde. Badschama ist seit der Ermordung des Grafen Püchler noch nicht bestraft worden und hat sich dem Posten gegenüber noch in letzter Zeit frech und herausfordernd benommen. (Glauning, 15.08.1907:136)

In March 1908 the post in Basho was staffed with one German and 20 police soldiers (Kröger, 31.03.1908:80).

The intricacies of the third Anglo-German boundary commission of 1908 forced the Germans to change the state of this area. Although the German administration did not greet this endeavour fervently, it had to bow to international diplomatic considerations and was thus also forced to send a military expedition to the areas north of Basho, also known as the Munchi-Basho-expedition. During this expedition itself. Glauning died in hostilities north of Bamenda on the 5th of March, 1908 (DKZ 1908, no. 13:215, no. 49:853) (cf. chapter 5, Making colonial boundaries:181). The power displayed by this exhibition was primarily aimed at the British. Only by the end of 1913 a new post was established in Tinta/Assumbo (ASK 1/14), staffed with one police officer and 25 soldiers (Hunt 1916:13).

The British in their first report of 1916 stated that "the Wetschu and Basumbo tribes in North-East and North are the most uncivilised, as their countries have been opened up for the last four or five years only" (2).

8.3. Extraversion of power - "so that their fellow blackmen should be afraid of them"\(^{266}\)

Extraversion of German power became a means to aggrandise material and immaterial wealth and prestige, especially for socially younger people who grasped the opportunity of these new 'indeterminate areas' of power and became 'homines novi' (cf. Bayart 1993:136). In the Upper Cross River area this refers

\(^{266}\) JOE, Ogomoko.
nes novi' (cf. Bayart 1993:136). In the Upper Cross River area this refers especially to the 'German soldiers'.

Question: Were there people from this village who worked with the Germans?
Answer: There were. My own father was a soldier (suya).

Question: Why were they soldiers?
Answer: So that their fellow blackmen should be afraid of them.

(NNF, 12.10.2001)

They were mainly young men trying to raise dowry (Kekukisem I, 07.07.2000; Boka, 09.07.2000). Not all 'German soldiers' are remembered as having come back as rich people, but some cases are exceptional:

People went to Manfe to join the army. My father knew a little of the German language because he had worked in Badje as a store boy when he was young. He was then paid in kind, i.e. he was selling tobacco and the Germans in turn gave him tobacco. Then he went to the local people, sold his own tobacco to them. He sold snuff, gunpowder and cloth to the local people and collected money for his master.247 The second reason that motivated him to go to the army was that all the money he had earned with the tobacco [as a peddler] was given to his uncle called Eban Kekung. He asked Eban Kekung to marry a wife for him [i.e. to pay the dowry for a woman]. Eban used the money and married an old woman for him with which he was not happy. All the money he had earned was wasted and if he remained at home he could not again raise enough. That was the main reason why he left for the army. When my father came back from the war [WWI, where he had been to Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria] he was respected. He brought a woman from Ogomoko near Manfe [in the Ngonaya area]. That woman was unproductive. He came home and got married to three women. During that time, my father always hosted all important visitors, even though he was not the chief. He was the only person who could communicate in English and German. When he retired and came home, he built a very large mud thatch house. The colonial officials normally lodged in his place. My father was called Ojong Boki by the Germans but his real name was Eban Ncha. He died in 1981. (JEN, 09.07.2001 in Boka)

It started that my father wanted to marry my mother, but he was young and did not have enough money. So he decided to join the army. He was staying with on German called Dominik. Dominik was a very wicked German soldier [...] He went to Fernando Po with Dominik and at that time my father was having a concubine who was also black. He stayed for a very long time in Fernando Po and his family here in Kekukisem II thought he had died. They then consulted the traditional method. The dresses of my father were taken and blessed and if he was still alive he would immediately return home. After his family had done it and because of all the maltreatment by Dominik my father abandoned everything and came home. He came without any money and was cracking kernels, because that was the only way to get money [...] and trading with camwood. He did all this together with Eban Ncha from Boka. [...] They always went to the administration in Manfe in their uniform. They said that will make them give their money faster, but he died without collecting the money248 [...] He used to go to the German cemetery in Nsanakang to pay homage to the dead soldiers:249 [...] It was a way for them to communicate with the Germans. When Eban Ncha from Boka came they were always speaking their own language. They were pretending to communicate in German.

There was also another man of the Ejigbaram side called Awo Kegboshi250 who also communicated with them. (Kekukisem II, 08.07.2001)251

The most interesting aspect of the second text is that the extraversion of 'German' power continued even after they had ceased being the 'colonial power', had lost WWI, had maltreated the soldier from Kekukisem II, and had not even paid him fully. Still, he used his proximity to them as a source of prestige vis-à-vis his countrymen, who detected that they were only "pretending to be communicating in German". However the fact that he went to the cemetery in Nsanakang to pay homage to the dead German soldiers was not ridiculed but respected. The respect and prestige accumulated by men who were 'German soldiers' is further expressed by the fact that they were buried in their uniform, to "show honour that he was a great man" (EN, 07.07.2000).252

The conflict between the homines novi and the established elite is highlighted in the following story that Lene Haase related:

A young man from Ossing had served at the coast for many years. He returned as a wealthy man and rich enough to marry a woman. Soon they had a child, but the child died, and the man was accused of having killed the child with witchcraft. The chief reportedly hated the young man, because he was not sure of his dignity (ibid.:21). The man had obviously denied entering any associations, and had thus refused redistributing part of his wealth to the community and was accused of witchcraft (cf. chapter 2.6. Levelling and accumulating:85). He was forced to undergo the exere ordeal and died (ibid.:20-21). Haase saw his grave, on which his statue was erected, and all his belongings were placed:

In einer kleinen offenen Hütte saß auf einem Stuhl eine ausgestopfte Puppe, die einen jungen Mann in europäischer Kleidung darstellte. Ringsherum waren, wie üblich, seine Habseligkeiten aufgebaut; aber hier keine Perlen, sondern ein Topenblechkofer, Feuerhalter, Haarbürste und sonstige europäische Sachen. (ibid:20)

247 He worked as a 'peddler'.

248 Akili, a famous German soldier of the Upper Banyak area, reputedly received some money by the German government in the 1960s that he shared among the ex-German soldiers who had even formed the 'ex-German soldiers' union of Manfe'. Whether the men from Boki were not members of Akili's union and did thus not receive payment is uncertain.

249 In Nsanakang three German and two British officers were killed during WWI; their tombstones are still there.

250 I could not trace this name. In Ayukaba (Ngonaya) a 'German soldier' with the name Eta Awo Ncha was mentioned, which comes closest to Awo Kegboshi (NNF, 12.10.2001).

251 Both men were buried in their German army uniforms.

252 The children of 'German soldiers' in Kekukisem I & II, Boka, and Ejigbang remembered their uniforms in much detail and confirmed that they were buried in them.
The potential power to be extraverted by assuming a position within the colonial machinery was attractive to many who sought this opportunity without actually having obtained that position. Warnier (1996) has drawn attention to the ‘cadiens’, young male bachelors, who formed armed groups called ‘Tapentia’ in the grassfields, wearing red caps just like the German soldiers, pressing for food and women, while shouting in Pigdin: ‘Lef mi, mi big boy, mi bi Tapenta boy’ (missionary Spellenberg 1914, cited in Warnier 1996:117). These ‘big boys’ had not only adopted German dress, but also their language (Pigdin was introduced into the areas by German colonialism), and also their hierarchy (‘Tapenta’ being a vulgarisation of ‘interpreter’ – cf. Warnier 1996, fn 1:123). No specific incidents of this nature are reported from the Upper Cross River area, but it seems to have been a phenomenon occurring in the whole colony, since in 1907 a decree was passed that forbade all ‘illegitimate use of German uniforms’, that had previously been for sale in trader’s shops (cf. BAB R1001/4313:81–83).

Those who legitimately held positions in the German system, soldiers, clerks, interpreters and messengers were still apt to act likewise (Schulz, 31.03.1906:174):

Daß ein einzeln verwendeter Soldat im Vollgefühl seiner Überlegenheit über die Besehleute, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, stiehle, raubte, mishandelte und mordete, dürfte allgemein bekannt sein, ebensogut auch durch die schärfste Disziplin diese in der natürlichen Veranlagung des Negers begründeten Gefühlsäußerungen nicht hinnehmbar werden können. Weniger bekannt ist, daß auch Stationsboten, die der Bevölkerung des Bezirks entnommen sind, ihre amtliche Stellung zu den raffiniertesten Erpressungen gegen ihre eigenen Landsleute mißbrauchen und sich ihrer Aufgabe, ein gutes Verhältnis zwischen diesen und der Station herzustellen keineswegs bewußt sind. Ihr Treiben ist so gefährlicher, als sie natürlich überall im Auftrage der Regierung zu handeln vorgaben und es verstehen die Eingeborenen derart einzuschätzen, daß sie an keine Schmerzen denken. (KRS Ossidinge to KGK, 01.04.1906:166)

The Germans tried to interact with the population through messengers ("interpreters") from the local communities. These acted as go-betweens and eased the German’s access to people with whom direct interaction could have been difficult. At the same time these messengers boosted their own position (e.g. Glanling, 15.08.1907:129).

European goods had been luxuries since the beginning of Africa’s trade with Europe (cf. the pyramids of empty liquor bottles, chapter 5.2. Bottles and flags - Nsanakang 1900-1901:191). The influx of these goods became greater during the German colonial time and was extended to food and dress. The Germans themselves regarded the accumulation of these objects with contempt and reduced their status to that of ‘trash’, ‘shabby junk’, and ‘cheap inferior stuff of doubtful origin’.

Es ist doch sehr betrübend, wenn in diesem Lande, das an Fruchtbarkeit seines Gleichseins sucht, die Eingeborenen sich von Reis, Commodisch, Salzleisch, Hartbrot und Salz, die von Europa und Amerika eingeführt werden, nähren, dazu Tabak aus Virginia rauchen und das alles täglich mit Hamburger Fusel begießen. Dazu kommen noch die schäbigsten Plunderartikel: minderwertige Stoffe und Perlen, billiges Parfum (!), Blechwaren und Handwerkzeug zweifelhafte Provenienz und unsolider Putz. Die eingeborenen Färberei einfacher aber solider Artikel geht dabei immer mehr zurück, was die Eingeborenen in ihre ländereiche aufgeschürten Hütten sammeln, ist Schande. (Hermann, Sept. 1906:80)

By 1908 the "whiteman dress" had become a sign for power both symbolic and factual (cf. pictures in Mansfeld 1908, e.g. chief Ogba with the tropical pith). The Germans generally judged these so-called 'Hosenmänner' with contempt, attributing them characteristics such as 'haughty vis-à-vis the European', 'sad caricature', etc.

En großer Teil der Küstenleute, speziell in Arisibor’s sind englische Christen; als solche setzen sie ihren Stolz darin, lesen und schreiben zu können, wie es denn bei ihnen für das höchste gilt. Clerk in einer Faktorei zu werden und sich als teure Ratsch aus westlichen Kleidern zu behängen, womit das unverschämte Benehmen dem Europäer gegenüber wächst. (Hermann, Sept. 1906:84)


However, in 1912, the population of the Ossidinge district had hardly adopted the fashion of the areas further south, i.e. long loin-cloths for men and cotton dresses or loin-cloths for the women. The spread of this attire was seemingly connected to the influence of the missions (cf. Haase 1915:13-14). In the Upper Cross River area in 1912 European dress ("steife Kragen mit gelben Stiefern") was mainly popular in the vicinity of the district headquarter Mamfe (ibid:23).

The KRS Ossidinge was frequently called upon by the population to mediate in legal matters, mainly concerning women or slave matters. Here, the German idea of jurisdiction clashed with the local one. While the Germans wished to hear both parties in court and judge the case after having heard their testimonies, the prosecutor who reported his case to the station went their with a 'ree', e.g. chicken, and then expected the station to intervene in his favour. As was stated in the annual report of 1905/06, the station was thus 'paid' to lay execution levies on the accused. When the administrators then sent for the accused, he was certain that his case had already been settled and he was called upon to be penalised. Since the administration was not keen on employing force in these cases, the cases brought to the attention of the station in this manner usually did not lead to any legal action (KRS Ossidinge to KGK, 01.04.1906:167).
8.4. Evading power

Their letters were put in a special envelope and when someone sees the envelope, they run to the bush to avoid carrying it. (Boka, 10.07.2000)

One bad thing with the Germans was that they used them for forced labour. This always made people to escape to the bush when the Germans were coming or while they were working. This is why there was migration from one place to another. They always force you to work as a machine. They do not allow you to rest. (EN, 07.07.2000)

In my interviews the references to people 'hiding in the bush' upon the German arrival were almost overwhelming. Instead of a 'colonial encounter', they enacted the 'colonial evasion'. In fact, it became the most successful strategy to undermine 'colonial power'.

A number of villages or village groups permanently changed their settlement sites to Nigeria, namely Mmobui, Ekang, Babong (Bessong 1986:92; Mansfeld to KGBK, 07.01.1907), Bashu, Ndebiyi and part of Nsakpe311 (Gallwey to KGBK, 15.08.1900:120. 123; Glanning, 30.07.1901). Others who did not live close to Nigeria moved their settlement site away from the German stations, e.g. Tawo after the Mpawmanku wars (Bessong 1986:91), the population along the Tinto-Mundane road (Rausch, 01.04.1905:51-52), the population around the post Basho between 1906 and 1908 (Kröger, 31.03.1908). Those who remained developed the general strategy of 'hiding in the bush' upon the arrival of a German, German soldier or messenger. The most successful method of evading the 'reparation payments' imposed after the Mpawmanku wars was to migrate into British territory to the steep hills at the forest/grassland transition or revert to the 'bush hide-outs', e.g. Ewunjji, Bachama, Assumo, Aligere in 1906 (Schulz, 31.03.1906). Since the German colonial administration was devoted to seeing the people return to their regular settlements, in order to access them, be it for provision on journeys, carriers, labour, 'reparation payments', or taxes, administrators were thus forced to refrain from any harsh or forceful measures (KRS Ossinde to KGBK, 01.04.1906:164).

At times those living close to the Nigerian border claimed they were residents of Nigeria, borrowed British tax plates, and were as such not subject to German power (Pa Eta Ojong, Nkemetchi village, March 30, 1986, cited in Bessong 1986:87). The opportunities the population along the border had for temporary or permanent withdrawal from the respective zones of power led to a politics in which everything but force could help. Mansfeld held the people in the Njemaya area ('the Eko') in high esteem and opposed any measures to confine them into German territories by force. Instead of controlling the boundary by patrols, he persuaded the people to stay in German territories by 'bribing' the chiefs (Mansfeld to KGBK, 14.12.1906; cf. chapter 3.5. Control over land or people?: 206).

People not only evaded the Germans physically, they also evaded their demands whenever they felt in the position to do so. When, for example, the German presence in the Assam-area weakened in October 1906, after it had been transferred from the military post Basho to the civil station Ossinde, locals immediately stopped supplying the station-market in Basho with food (Schulz, 31.03.1906:89).

Die Küstenbevölkerung ist feige und verwirrt; im Inneren, speziell am Cross, gewinnt man aber den Eindruck, als ob die Eingeborenen gegebener Falles recht rabiat sein könnten, was ja auch der Aufstand bestätigt hat; dessen Unterdrückung hat dann aber das Land derart entvölkert und ausgepowert, daß die Leute für die nächsten Jahre wenigstens alle Lust zu Putsch verloren haben dürften. Da die Eingeborenen auf englischer Seite, wo die Regierung sich selbst in Calabar noch nicht recht sicher fühlt und landeinwärts von der gesicherten Wasserstraße des Cross kaum etwas zu sagen hat, ungemein verwöhnt werden, so macht sich, wie schon oben erwähnt, bei den deutschen Eingeborenen an der Grenze ein Zug ins englische Gebiet bemerkbar; es wird uns, wollen wir die Grenzzone nicht gänzlich veröden, weiter nichts übrig bleiben, als unsere Ansprüche an die Bevölkerung (Steuern und Arbeit) und unsere Behandlung mit der in Süd-Nigeria in Übereinstimmung zu bringen. (Hermann, Sept. 1906:84-85)

Man findet hier [am Awa, Njemaya] im Urwald viele Lichtungen: verlassene Dörfer und frühere Farmen. [the following passage is later cancelled:] Die meisten Dörfer haben nämlich in den letzten Jahren ihren Ort gewechselt, teils wegen Krieg, teils in Folge sonstiger unliebsamer Vorkommnisse. Ganz verlassen ist Anom, das lange verlassene Nsakpe ist wieder aufgebaut [end of cancellation]. Die wertvollen Produkte des Urwaldes werden hier auch nur spärlich ausgenutzt und an die Faktoren am Cross verhandelt. (ibid.:76)


Some of our people were escaping to Nigeria. When they were crossing the river Okun with a rope - there was no canoe - one woman called Nnee drowned and died. [...] There was forced labour. Most of the people preferred to go to Nigeria but died in the rivers when crossing. (AA0, 07.07.2000)

A quarter of Nsanankang went to Calabar. They migrated from here during the war. They remained in Nigeria, they are now Nigerians. (FNA, 13.10.2000)

The whole of this area was called Nsan. They called them ahebn Eyemen [children of Egemen], which included Nsan Eyemjojnek, Nsanankang, Nsanaragati and Ermat and Nsan Okem Isughi. Now Nsan Okem Isughi during the German wars, they would not like

---

293 In 1906 Nsakpe had been reestablished (Hermann, Sept. 1906:76).
to stay with us, because the problems were too many and they went down the river and they are now Nigerians. (NN, 15.10.2000)

People 'hiding in the bush' also could not be registered by the Germans, but the register decided how much tax a village had to pay and how many workers it had to provide. The 'chiefs' who were responsible for the collection of taxes frequently reported a number of 'absentees' - in 1913 amounting to more than one hundred - whose whereabouts could not be traced (Mansfeld to KKG, 13.11.1913). The introduction of 'work booklets' as a means to curtail the free displacement of people outside the district in order to seek job opportunities was still discussed in 1913 (KKG, 06.-09.-06.1913:11).

'Evasion' was not the initial, 'default' strategy. Where we have reports about the first encounters of Europeans with the local population, e.g. Zinggrafl in Upper Banyang 1887/88, Besser/Close 1895, Ramsay 'overside' 1900, the population is present. The people also enacted their sovereignty by dictating the agenda (Zinggrafl), and displaying power, i.e. their weapons (Zinggrafl, Ramsay). After these 'first encounters', evasion was practiced, both temporary and permanent, with differing intentions and effects.

Mpawmanku had asked the Germans to see who is stronger, and the Germans had displayed their strength. The German power was then acknowledged, but at the same time restricted, creating a vast space in which it could not enter. These spaces were material: across the border into Nigeria, to the 'coast', or into the forest, the wilderness, the bush. The first two strategies took opportunities up that colonialism itself had created - the population thus integrated it into their strategies. The 'hiding in the bush', which is so prominently remembered in all the area today - made use of the population's major advantage over the Germans - their knowledge of the environment.

8.5. Summary

Up to 1904 both the Germans and the local population had practiced a general policy of the physical extermination of the undesired other - power thus was directly contested. Mpawmanku wanted to "see who was stronger" (cf. chapter 7.2 Mpawmanku wars (1904-1906): "Angst, die Wahrheit eingestehen":265). Ultimately this physical extermination had been carried out more successfully by the Germans at least in the areas south of the river, where new arenas of encounters were then opened. The 'German front', the unity of trader, soldier and administrator was opened up, and the 'African front' opened up likewise, partly by force, partly voluntarily. Wherever and whenever the Germans had demonstrated their power to exterminate the local population at will, evasion of the system became the most successful resistance strategy of the people. Instead of a colonial encounter they enacted the colonial evasion and withdrew into invisible or inaccessible areas. On the other hand, the Germans sought to curtail this evasion and the spaces within which it was possible, e.g. by forceful amalgamation, relocation, and enforced border control. The German power was also at least partly 'vulgarised' by being extraverted by the local population. These 'extraversions' were bi-directional, i.e. while the 'whiteman chiefs' sought to arrogate their personal powers, the Germans likewise extraverted their powers within the local systems for their purposes and made evasion more difficult, although not impossible (cf. the preparation of tax rolls). The new space of power that the German system opened up initiated "interlinking processes of continuity and change" (Bayart 1993:148), in which homines novi successfully used these new opportunitues and thus challenged the existing sources for power, authority and prestige, but could not exist outside of these systems. The death of the man accused of witchcraft in Ossing in 1912, who was still honoured by the community after his death for his success with the 'whiteman', exemplifies this (Haase 1915:20-22). On the one hand the 'whiteman's' power was acknowledged and used as a source for pride and prestige, especially vis-à-vis the 'whiteman'; on the other hand the complete disrespect for local power was impossible, because it remained strong.

In those days when the Germans were here, there was a shrine, which protected the village against witchcraft. When the Germans came, they came with their own religion. There was a carved stick in the shrine that looked like an alligator. The Germans asked the people to destroy the shrine. Almost six to ten Germans tried to lift it, it was only about 1.6 metres long, but they could not lift it. They said maybe we do not have the strength. They decided to go and roll a very big stone to see whether they have power or not. They succeeded. (EN, 07.07.2000)254

The two reference schemes for power were separate, but not separable. Between the strategies of evasion and the extraversion of power, a complex field was created in which the extent of appropriation was negotiated. Economic and political arenas remained to be perceived as interdependent and the instruments to adjust the two (witchcraft and the associations) remained powerful and even today continue to shape the contestation of power, and thus the 'politics of the belly' in the modern state of Cameroon (cf. Austen 1993; Bayart 1993).

254 The influence of the mission and 'western education' remained of marginal importance during the German colonial time, but has been quite successful afterwards and initiated a more profound change. Continuity was ensured, although the impact of Christianity and formal education still remains marginal in a number of spaces.
9. Germany must go (1914-1939)

Here they started the 1914 war, here in Nsanakang. They made history here. (JOE, 13.10.2000)

World War One was explicitly mentioned in almost half of the interviews from over the whole area. It was perceived as a strange, miraculous event by the people in the Upper Cross River area. The most logical explanation put forward was that Britain and Germany were "fighting for their stomachs" – the riches of the Upper Cross River area. The causes for the war in Europe remained obscure:

The Germans then started fighting without going back to Europe to settle the dispute. (EAE, 06.07.2000)

The English and the Germans were fighting to get the slaves. (MTaa, 31.10.2000)

The English people chased the Germans. The Germans had not done anything to offend the English. They had only planted palm trees. (Atibong, 02.08.2000)

For the reconstruction of the events during WWI the oral testimonies are most valuable. Since WWI was the last important event in the German era the population in the region experienced, it has maintained its prominent position in the collective memory and many details recalled are specific and reliable.

Although WWI in Kamerun has been a topic of scholarly interest for some time (Mveng 1978:187-190; Crowder and Osuntokun 1994; Nuhu 2000:357-360), the operations in the Upper Cross River area have either been neglected altogether (Mveng 1978; Nuhu 2000) or been reduced to the victory of the British at Nsanakang. In the reference books used in schools, operations in the Cross area are passed over in silence (F&G 1989:73-74; E&B 1979). Crowder and Osuntokun (1994) give a well-balanced overview over the Kamerun-operations. They point to the successful German counter-attack across the Anglo-German boundary in August 1914, during which three British officers and 71 rank and file were killed (ibid.; mentioned also in Haupt 1989:116). The reference here is certainly to the battle of Nsanakang on the 6th of September 1914 (cf. Esse 1993; Stolz Dez. 1915; DKZ 1914, no. 33:558).

There are considerable indications in the oral testimonies that the Germans forcefully recruited local people into the army during WWI.

They enter the house and catch you for the war. (SOO, 19.10.2001)

They were arrested and put into the army. (EJM, 02.11.2000)

They were forced to join the army and fought in Bakumba [towards Widekum and Bamenda]. They were also forced to shoot their brothers. (MM and AG, 08.11.2000)

They went to every village and took three or four strong/powerful people to send to the war. It was also an honor to have soldiers (baw nnu) from your own village. [...] They gave them a water bottle (wata bawtwaw) and clothes (ndan). They also gave them a small allowance (small money for food - mandu nku npe). (Atibong, 02.08.2000)

The majority of those 'caught for the war' acted as carriers (Stolz, 23.08.1914, 30.08.1914, 01.10.1914). The administration tried to calm the situation by giving presents of salt and money to the local chiefs (Stolz, 01.10.1914). Some were 'real soldiers' or 'soldier boys' - retreating with the German army up to Spanish Muni (Boka, 09.07.2000; Kekukisem II, 08.07.2000). The most prominent of the local people fighting during WWI was Akali, a man from Upper Banyang:

He was a German soldier, a friend to the German president, his name was Akali. [...] This man [Akali] went to Military school in Berlin in 1918. He had fought the 1914 war. The German president stayed in Germany to attack there, they sent Akali to attack there. Akali was the commander, fighting this side with his army [...] Akali was strong, he was a German man, strong like the Germans. (Taiyori, 24.08.2000)

Some of those recruited for the army tried to desert the army (cf. also Stolz, 31.12.1914; Steer 1939:175), as the following account by Peter Asanga Ojong from Agborkem about his father Ojong Ayisen Ekuki suggests:

He worked in shift in Nsan. He went back to Nsan and stayed there about one month. He wanted to return. He removed his army uniform, put it in his bag and said that he is going. Two other soldiers came from Mamfe, going to Obubura in Nigeria, they saw him, they arrested him, saying that he is running away from the war, put a chain around his neck and took him back to Nsan. From there they took two other people and went to Mamfe, from there they trekked to Limbe and from there to Loloâ€”. They gave them food, they had to dig their own graves and each person dug for three days. Then they said, tomorrow they will hang you. Some of them were crying that they would be killed that night. They gave them drink that night and at midnight the British came and attacked the German and opened the prison. Anybody could just come out, they came to the coast and took a canoe to Limbe. From there he walked on foot for seven days until he reached Ikom, from there he returned to the village [...]. When he returned to the village he was singing a song: People do not run away, it is me Ojong Ayisen, come back, it is not the bad army. (PAO, 12.10.2000)

Pauline Stolz, a Basel missionary's wife in Besongbang and eye-witness to the retreat of the Germans at the end of 1914, observed that the last German officer had to return to the main troop alone, because all his soldiers had abandoned

---


256 baw nnu: people head, means strong people of the village (especially selected)

257 Fernando Po.

258 This song was performed at this place.
him. These 'soldiers' were probably local people who saw no reason to continue fighting with the German officer, during the imminent take over by the British:


If friends are more than the others in fighting, the other will leave. The English were more than the Germans. So the Germans left. (JOE, 09.10.2001)

The German troops in the Ossidinge district were initially made up of company squadrons led by Rausch and Rammstedt. After the first battle, they were constantly re-ordered and reinforced by the police troops and staff of the KRS Ossidinge (Schaade, 23.01.1915). The "bloodiest battle" (Dadi, 11.07.2000) took place in Nsanakang, but there was fighting throughout the area. Oral traditions report of the initial German victory and the death of one British officer:

In 1914, there was a German here in Ekok in the junction of the Awu and Cross River. During that time, Nigerian soldiers started stretching from Ikong towards Mamfe to come and attack them here in Ekok. When they attacked them here, for good three months before they came out here, they arrived in Nsanakang. Some of them died, the graves are still there. When the English soldiers from Nigeria attacked them in Nsanakang, they left and went inside Cameroon. The Nigerian soldiers first attacked them in Mfum, at the customs post. They made their barracks at the Awu junction. (NJ, 15.10.2000)

When the Germans had the war with the British at Nsanaragati, the German commander was Captain Denis. Lt. Col. Mac Lean came to fight for the English from Nigeria. Coast regiments, Nigerian regiments, West African troops and so on came to fight. For the first time ever to attack Nsanakang, they were defeated by the Germans and so they found their way back to Nigeria with tiredness. They found their way inside the forest and they were going and there were many deaths. Now when the British people prepared better and had more troops, joined with the French troops, the Senegalese troops and started attacking. After they had defeated the Germans they went right to Duala under Colonel Zimmam259. The Germans were surrendering and went to Fernando Po. (NN, 15.10.2000)260

The Germans came from Cameroon and the British came from Nigeria. The Germans shot a white British here and he died. The British was buried at a village called Byajia in Nigeria. He did not die at the same place where he was shot. [...] The British and the Germans fought a serious battle at Nsanakang and the British defeated the Germans. (Dadi, 11.07.2000)

Colonel Mair led the so-called 'Cross River column' of the WAFF (West African Frontier Force) towards the border from Ikong on the 17th of August 1914. By 259 "Colonel Zimmermann" was the general commander of the Schutztruppe in 1914. His name is frequently mentioned in reference books, e.g. Crowder and Osuntokun 1994:550, at times including his photograph (F&G 1989:74).
260 This person was a retired schoolteacher and held that he had learned some of the information he was giving at the teacher's training college.

the 21st of August they had reached Nsanaragati in German territory (Stolz, Dez. 1915:13), and on the 24th of August the British troops occupied Nsanakang, the German customs post, after a battle with the German forces which totalled only 35 soldiers and three Germans (Stolz, 25.08.1914, 27.08.1914; DKZ 1914, no. 33:558 – quoting British sources). One British officer and ten black soldiers were killed during this battle. After the German retreat, the British advanced without any fighting, and by the 28th of August they had reached Inokun, Tawo, Mbakam, and Eyang. The Germans were combining forces – one company under command of Rammstedt came from the south via Ossing and Hptm. Sommerfeld arrived from Bamenda (Stolz, 28.08.1914). On the 29th of August the German force consisted of three companies with five machine guns, and 1,100 men, of which 375 were soldiers (Stolz, 07.09.1914). They launched a counter-attack on the 29th of August (Stolz, 29.08.1914) and the British troops retreated to Nsanakang. The second battle of Nsanakang took place on the 6th of September, 1914.261 On the British side three Europeans and at least 32 black soldiers died; four British, one physician, one lieutenant and ten British soldiers were imprisoned, and the British had to retreat (Stolz, Dez. 1915, 06.09.1914, 07.09.1914, 13.09.1914).262 During the second battle of Nsanakang, three Germans, Hptm. Rausch, Lieutenant of the reserve Glock263, and Gefreiter Schrader264, as well as eight black soldiers265 died. Two German officers266 and 22 black soldiers were wounded, one later died of his injuries (Schaade, 23.01.1915; Stürmell 1926; Stolz, 13.09.1914).267

In Germany the events around Nsanakang were reported as follows:

259 In most official sources only the battle at Nsanakang on the 6th of September is noted (cf. BAB R1001/7024:2; BAF N521/21-Sonderakten des Ka-Feldzuges4).
260 Other sources hold that on the British side three Europeans died and six prisoners were taken (cf. BAB R1001/7024:2) or that 100 black soldiers and ALL British officers died (cf. DKZ 1915, no. 4:49, according to a report from the British Magazine "African World").
261 Philipp Glock (cf. Stürmell 1926:88).
262 Julius Schrader, * 02.04.1885. He was a planter from the coast and had been called from the reserve, where he was a lance-corpsal among the rank and file. He died of a shot to the head (Bundschuh, 11.08.1916:28) and was buried in Nsanakang. A simple cemented cross with the name "Schrader" (broken) is part of the so-called 'second cemetery' of Nsanakang – about 20 minutes south of the village at the Cross River, across a small stream.
263 One non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals and five ordinary soldiers, all identified by name (Schaade, 23.01.1915).
264 Hptm. Rammstedt and Sergeant Schumm (Schaade, 23.01.1915).
265 According to other sources two officers died, one officer and three non-commissioned officers were wounded (cf. BAB R1001/7024:2).

(Buttkamer, "Kamerun". In: DKZ 1915, no. 2:19-20, here 19)

By the 26th of September about 40 German soldiers had died either in combat or from their injuries (Stolz, 26.09.1914). By October the advances of the allies in Kamerun suggested, despite reports to the contrary, that Kamerun would soon be lost to them. Douala had been occupied by the allies on the 27th of September. News about the decisive role the Duala had played during the British attack on Douala had spread into the Upper Cross area, where a great number of Duala worked for both the mission and the administration. Their situation became quite tense, because they were suspected of continuously collaborating with the enemy, and some were sentenced to prison, beatings, and fines. Some of the Duala teachers of the Basel mission escaped and went into hiding, after they had heard that Mansfeld would have to take the missionary teachers with him upon the retreat to Bamenda - in chains. A few returned with their wives and children, and others were 'captured' - the administration had awarded 25 M. for each Duala in the local population turned in. They had planned to hide until the British had advanced and had paid the local population to support them. The male teachers were chained and imprisoned in the government station in Mamfe and later taken to Dachang. During this march they were forced to carry heavy loads and were mistreated by the soldiers. One of the teachers reportedly died of maltreatment in Tinto (Stolz, 21.12.1914). Eight Duala, including two women, seemed to have managed to leave the Upper Cross area (Stationschronik Besongbang:32-33). On the 30th of October the neutrality of Nsanakang was lifted and the military hospital there resolved, but it remained occupied by German troops (Stolz, 31.10.1914). On the eighth of November the Germans reportedly advanced into British territory for a battle at Ikom, where one British officer died (cf. BAB R1001/7024:9; BAF N521/21, Sonderakten des Ka-Feldzuges:4). In November - the beginning of the dry season - the British gathered their forces along the border - from Danali to Otu (BAF N521/21:65).

The Bezirksamt started preparing for its retreat to Tinto and Widekum, and one company was moved back to Ossing. In December the British troops were advancing from the south, and parts of the army that had previously hindered the British troops from advancing from the boundary were redirected to Dschang (Stolz, 17.12.1914). The Germans' soldiers were not strong enough to resist further British advances, and on the 31st of December 1914 the German troops retreated to Tinto and Widekum and the Bezirksamt in Ossitine was abandoned (Stolz, 30.03.1915; cf. DKZ 1915, no. 6:81; Buttkamer 1915b; BAF 521/21:6). The front remained through the Widekum and Upper Banyang area until October 1915. During this time only occasional fighting took place, e.g. Eshobi (3.05.1915), Mfanitchang (03.05.1915) (BAF 521/21:8, 10, 12).

Infrastructure was destroyed, e.g. the concrete pillar bridge over the river Mfi in Upper Banyang, part of the station in Ossitine (Hunt 1916; 9, 11), and the catholic mission in Ossing (NAB 5d 1928/2). All livestock was confiscated in the Banyang area (Anderson 1929:25).

We were only afraid that they catch our animals. Because when they came, our fathers hid and fled so that they can find nobody. They killed our goats and fowls and went with them. (Ejwengang, 02.08.2000)

During the 1914 war they were in Agborikem Osisinge. When they left there, they came and put up their barricades here in Mkpot. (EAE, 11.10.2001)

When some of the German soldiers were passing through the village to attack the British soldiers, the Boka people killed one German soldier. The Germans at that time did not take action. After the fighting, they retaliated. (Boka, 09.07.2000)

During the war there were trenches. Up till now you can still see some. (FNA, 13.10.2000)

I no go make any problem but when war come that time all thing been spoil, chalkara. You know when country fine nothing no di happen but as war come. People all use for run go for bush because make i no kill them. (MTA, 31.10.2000)

There was no fighting with civilians. They were fighting with the armies. They were not fighting with civilians. But when a bullet hits you, you die. [...] We lie down. The Germans will give an order, show us a place to hide and we hide there. That is what our people told us. They hide us there and then go out and begin shooting. When they went, we followed them, we will sleep where they sleep. (JOE, 13.10.2000)

The people all ran, everybody ran. They escaped, they all left, because of the guns. Guns do not have a brother. When they shoot the gun: 'Kpat!' whether the bullet is for me or for you, you cannot know. So you have to run to save yourself. [...]. All the people were hiding in the bush and some died of hunger. (NJ, 15.10.2000)

They did not fight in the middle of the village here, because people were scattered. But they fought between Ewelle and Kemborg. There was a signboard there even kept to show that the Germans had forgotten one of their Generals, who was shot, there. Not a grave. I do not know where the man was buried. (Kemborg, 20.11.2000)

These testimonies indicate that the involvement of the people was enormous, not because they were actively involved in the fighting, but because their area had become a battleground.

The question of whether Cameroonians revolted en masse against the Germans during WWI, or whether the majority remained loyal as been debated for quite some time (cf. Crowder and Osuntokun 1994:554; Steer 1939:174-175; MacLean 1940:41-43). Crowder and Osuntokun hold that a 'general' revolt only.
took place in Douala, whereas the Bamilke, Sanaga and Mungo areas remained 'loyal' (ibid.), which conforms to German discourse during the war (cf. Puttkamer 1915a:20, Vöhrender 1915; Karstedt 1915:99; Möbius 1915:139). The popularity of the British advancing from Nigeria has been noted early. Steer (1939:175) ascribed it to their connection with richness and prestige, due to Britain's superior role in trade. In the Upper Cross River area, the anti-German feelings inspired the welcoming of the British. The people of Agboklem, Boka, Ekpor and Kembong stated that they collaborated with the British during WWI: During that war the Germans saw that the Kajifu chief was supporting them [the Germans]. They then wrote a document and gave to the Kajifu people to prove that they were supporting them. Unfortunately, one of the chiefs has lost the document. (EAE, 06.07.2000)²⁷⁰

The Germans were not friendly with the people, so when they were hiding, we showed where they were [...]. Because of their system of forced labour, we directed them where they were [...]. When they came and asked who saw the German people, we told them they went this way [...]. They were catching them one by one, until they all went. Then the English came and remained here. (MT626 and BTT, 31.10.2000)

People in the border area assisted the British with food, canoes, and acted as scouts (Stolz, 23.08.1914, 31.12.1914). A number of villages, especially in the Ngonaya area, did not take sides and supplied food to both sides, trying to remain neutral (R&A 1929:7; cf. Stolz, 07.09.1914).

The Germans executed a number of people in Upper Banyang for collaboration with the British: Tafang Tiku (reported by Ntembang and Kendem), the chiefs of Sabes, Ebeagwa, Ejiweng and EBU, uncle of the chief of Tal, and three of his brothers (Gorges 1930:10). This incident is well remembered in Upper Banyang, and it seems even more chiefs had secretly collaborated with the Germans:

Any chief who said the he preferred the English went back²⁷¹. They killed those chiefs, some were put into prison (kawang'). Others were left (as the chief) because they said that they preferred the Germans.²⁷² [...] The chiefs that were killed, their chieftaincy was not changed.²⁷³ (Aitingong, 02.08.2000)

The chief of Sabes, the junior brother to my father, Miyimi, was killed by the British, because they were supporting the German, when the British came and they were siding people who were supporting Germans, they killed them; there is another man in Mbang who they killed, the father of Defang. (Ejiwengam, 02.08.2000)

The general inclination of the population to assist the British in driving out the Germans is also supported by the observations from Pauline and Karl Stolz, Basel missionaries in Besongang, upon the retreat of the Germans:


Although in the face of the Germans the population continuously stressed their faithfulness (cf. Stolz, 25.08.1914, 07.09.1914), the heavy demands on their labour as mail carriers and porters, is in today's collective memory as a most detrimental attribute of German colonialism and might have contributed to the willingness of the people to cooperate with the British.

The hopes of the population for better days after the removal of the Germans were, however, disappointed. By 1916 the wild rubber was no longer in demand because of the better quality of the rubber produced on plantations (Hunt 1916:4). As a result, the population of the Cross River area lost one of their main sources of income. All former German trading posts were closed, and the points from where desired goods, such as salt, tobacco, cloth, and gin could be acquired were far (Nigeria, Mundame). The prevalence of the mark as medium of payment constrained the establishment of British trading companies. Mambé


²⁷⁰ Although the story clearly says that the chief of Kajifu and the people of Kajifu were supporting the Germans during WWI, I believe it was the other way round. In Kajifu I was perceived as a resource and a representative of the German government. The reference to a document that could prove Kajifu's pro-German stand, but was "unfortunately" lost, was probably meant to convince me of the truthfulness of the speaker's claim.

²⁷¹ (Ejiweng' Ewap): to go armpit (idiomatic: return/ go back).

²⁷² One such case was surely Akpok Ako of Ntembang, who "acted as a German spy" and "was responsible for the hanging of the old chief of Defang [Tafang Tiku]" (Gorges 1930:22).

²⁷³ It means that the chieftaincy remained in the same lineage.
and Tali, the main depots of the GNK, were closed down, and the indigenous trade was revived with Tali as the most important market. The petty trade of the Hausa intensified (Hunt 1916:7). Up to today most people hold that "the Germans were harsh, but the British poor".

Some people grew annoyed when the English took over. Formerly we carried kernels from here to UAC and made much money. At once things changed. People thought that much money came, but on the contrary. (TE, 06.11.2000)

Since the income opportunities from trade had become meagre after WWI, migration to the south became a mass phenomenon. The 'enemy property' was sold at auctions. Germans were allowed to bid, and since British nationals did not have much interest in them, the majority returned to their former German owners (Steer 1939:177). Men from the Upper Cross River area worked on the plantations, while the women started working as prostitutes.

Many of the men were absent, working on the Kumba and Victoria Plantations, and some from the Villages in the western area, working in the French Sphere. (Anderson 1929:14)

I spoke to a number of men who had worked on the plantations at the coast which were run by Germans. The Germans were described as huge, superior in strength and intimidating:

I trekked to Tiko and worked there with the Germans. One was called Paul. He was a very huge man, his finger was almost like the wrist of a healthy adult male. If you greet him, he always removed his handkerchief and wiped his hand. It was when I was working in the plantations that I met him. (TE, 06.11.2000)

It was generally held that after 1922 the British part of former Kamerun more resembled a German colony than a British; the main economic activities were performed by Germans and the Basel mission continued with their German or Swiss (German speaking) personnel. Only the Catholic German missionaries were replaced by British, e.g. the Mill Hill mission in the Upper Cross River area.

Two names of Germans have entered the collective memory of the people in the Upper Cross River area: Mansfeld and Otto Born. Otto Born is well remembered as a German trader, not only because an Otto Born beach exists in Mannfe at the Cross River, but also because he operated in the area in the interwar era, and I met a number of people who had come into contact with him as children. The Germans only finally left Cameroon at the outbreak of WWII. The 'final defeat' of the Germans by the British is thus placed in the 1930s. At times this gives way to speculations that the British were searching for Adolf Hitler in Cameroon:

As the Germans escaped to Buea [during WWII], the English followed them and the fighting continued up to 1936, when it ended. (JOE, 13.10.2000)

When there was peace after WWII, the Germans were still living here until they were defeated in WWII. But they still maintained the plantation and the rest. We had a German who was running a business in Mannfe Otto Bon. There was an Otto Bon beach in Mannfe, by then I was a school boy and I saw a white man, a German man, short, with a big stomach. He moved like that and he had a big shop where we now have the staff quarters of Government School Mannfe town, after that you get to the beach. We were not children then. I saw that with my own eyes. Finally back up when they were defeated in WWII, they did not excite them again because Adolf Hitler did his own part and they were looking for him and the British people entered here and took southern Cameroon, took East Cameroon, took North Cameroon, it may be with Northern Nigeria. (NN, 15.10.2001)

The time of the Germans in Cameroon ended only in 1939, and now they are 'coming' back with 'development', e.g. DED (German volunteers) or GTZ (German Technical Assistance) and in the Upper Cross River area, especially in Mannfe central, the Snowball Project of a German high-school cooperating with PHS Besongbang (the former Basel missionary school) and MACEFCOOP (Mannfe Central Farmers Cooperative).

---

274 United African Company – the reference here is to the place in Mannfe, where the former GNK trading post had been.

275 In 1930 the price for palm products dropped considerably (Gorges 1930).

276 Preoccupation with the 'prostitutes' and their return to their home communities becomes evident in the "Tanyi Nkongo Clan Federation By-laws, Takwa, Mannfe" of 1952 (Ruel 1969:328-331).

277 Variations of Mansfeld were: "Dr. Mannfe", "Dr. Manfred", "Dr. Manfred"; the general realisation of Otto Born was "Otobon", also "Atobon". Mansfeld was referred to in nine cases, Otto Born in eight. Other German names remembered were only mentioned once, except for Dominik and Anderson (a GNK clerk), who were mentioned twice.

278 These "beaches" were where the canoes landed bringing goods to the trading posts. In Mannfe there is also the "UAC beach" and the "John Holt beach".

279 I myself taught German to form one of this school, where I lived in 2000.
10. Conclusion – 'blood has fertilised the soil'

Colonialism was a quest for power. The most vivid and simple manifestation of power was physical power, i.e. force or violence. Violence often occurred out of the position of weakness. Taking somebody's life is the ultimate, absolute, and final demonstration of power, in that the very existence of the adversary has vanished. As a result, the need to compete vanishes. In the case of the Upper Cross River Area, experiences of violence have shaped the relationship between those who came to colonise and those who were already there to a great degree. Violence had become the 'easy' and only answer to any contradiction the Germans faced in their colonial project – should the 'nigger' not assume his ideal position, the ever-so-often cited mixture of trust and fear, he was beaten, tortured, or killed. When Fanon legitimised the use of violence as a means to unite the people and visualise their situation, he pictured violent resistance by an 'oppressed,' 'colonised' people. The colonisers, on the other hand, seem to have used violence for similar purposes. Every time they enacted it, they assured the superiority of their project, their 'culture', and their 'race'. Its background contained the 'grotesque' colonial policies that mainly stemmed from the shortcomings of the 'era Puttkamer' and the 'big plantations, big concessions' politics (cf. Steer 1939:173) – unsuccessful policies, because 'the Cameroon was no economic asset for Germany as a nation' (Rudin 1938:418). The visible manifestation – by means of violence – of superiority assured continued validity of the truth in colonial discourses. These were discourses that provided the legitimisation for the colonial enterprises, discourses that clashed with personal experiences of failure and weakness. The 'land question', the 'labour question', 'transport problems', and 'evasion' from economic, political and physical spheres re-

280 "Die Entwicklung der Kolonialländer vollzieht sich nach einer bestimmten Gesetzma-
ßigkeit. Entdeckung und Erwerbung, Erforschung und Erschließung heißen die ersten Stufen, die zu der friebergischen Angliederung an das Mutterland hinführen, zu der großen Erntezeit, die das Ziel jeglicher Kolonisation ist. Am Anfang jeder Machtentfaltung steht jedoch vorerst der Kraftheitsausgleich, wo sich das unaufhaltsame Neue mit dem widersetzlichen Alten auseinandersetzt, damit der Same gelegt werden kann, aus dem später die Frucht erwächst. Die Erde aber wird mit Blut gedüngt. Dies ist die herzliche Zeit der Kolonie. [...] Viel edle Namen stehen auf der langen Ehrenliste jener, die sich darum verdient machten, aus einem geschickten-
ßen Stück afrikanischen Buches eine deutsche Kolonie zu schaffen, und die ihr Blut gaben für ein größeres Deutschland über See. [...] Heute, 50 Jahre nach der Erwerbung der Küsten-
strick am Kamerunfuß und Kamerunberg, sollen sie hell und herrlich strahlen, die Namen der Zingraft, Zeuner und Hutter, der Kund, Tappenbeck und Weißenborn, der Morgen und Hör-
hold und Zenker, der Dominik und Zimmermann, der Stetten und Hering, der Ochtertitz und Passarge, der Čarnap und Kampitz, der Nolte und Radke, der Ramsay, Besser und Glaunning, der Bülow und Thierry, der Scheunemann und Stein" (MacLean 1940:37).

mained unresolved contradictions within the German colonial project in Kamer-
un, its discourses and its reality.

Only by his superior arms could the white man maintain his control over the colony. (Rudin 1938:310)

Although there is some 'truth' in Rudin's statement, the case is not as clean and straightforward. As has been pointed out by the various violent encounters be-
tween the Germans and the inhabitants of the Upper Cross River area, there were many instances in which the local population had actually achieved initial military successes (Zingraff 1887; German-Ekoi war 1899; Mpwamaukwa wars 1904; cf. Killingray 1989:147-148). The Germans had been able to force the people to surrender only because they employed the method of extermination against them: hunger rather than superior weapons eventually won the wars for the Germans, not only in the Upper Cross River area, but also in the Maji-Maji wars in German East Africa and the Herero war in German South West Af-
rica. The extremely brutal and sadistic nature of these wars may indeed justify calling the Schutztruppe 'organised bands of incendiaries' and the German 'sub-
mission practice' 'lethal terrorism' (Steoccker 1968:7). The main aim of terrorism is intimidation. The same applied to the aim of the colonial wars. As Wesseling (1989) states, the opponent was 'not a Government or an enemy army but the population itself' (4). Intimidation did not only apply to military victories, but also on the conquêtes des âmes (ibid.) – the German preoccupation with their regard and the pursuit of the 'ideal negro', who would regard the Germans with a mixture of trust and fear. Wesseling also questions whether the generally ac-
cepted dichotomy of 'war' and 'peace' holds true in the colonial situation, and whether the colonial term 'pacification' did actually refer to a situation that was easily differentiated from a 'state of war'. The blurring of the German-Ekoi war and the Mpwamaukwa wars in the Njemaya area and of the Mpwamaukwa wars and the military campaign of 1908 in the overside area in the collective memory of the people may substantiate these doubts. In this case an 'uprising' – as re-
ported in colonial discourse – never took place in the Upper Cross River area.

In the collective memory in Upper Banyang, where no full-fledged colonial war took place, exists the element of "nkeng'ken' na war?". It means: "Is it peace or war?" – an enquiry made by the population everytime a German repre-
sentative approached their settlement, upon the answer they decided whether to hide or stay. Violence directe continued being practiced throughout the German colonial period in the Upper Cross area (torture, burning of villages, hanging chiefs), and structural violence certainly continued to intimidate the population. But the Germans would not have been able to carry out the measures they did without reciprocal extraversion of power. In a society that was marked by con-

281 This was a general characteristic of colonial war tactics in the 19th century (cf. Wesseling 1989, Killingray 1989).
stant competition over status, prestige, and power, some discovered and used the Germans as a source for advancing personal prestige. Thus, although the German claim to colonial power in the Upper Cross River area was legitimised only by violence, it could not have been effected the way it was without the local German allies.

Not the superior weapons, but the continued violence against the civilian population and their livelihood forced the people to acknowledge that violence directe was not the grounds on which to challenge German power. They changed their strategy and started evading this power, both physically (relocation, hiding) as well as conceptually (mfaw ndek, ntimfam okarara). This was only possible to a limited degree, especially since a number of people employed a contrary strategy and started extraverting German power. Therefore the Germans were able to actually exert some kind of 'control' over the Upper Cross River area, but not nearly in the exclusive way Rudin suggests. Especially north of the Cross River and in the mountains bordering the grasslands, German influence remained marginal or even negligible.

But physical violence was not their only battlefield: power was also manifested symbolically. The symbolic acquisition of power mainly remained invisible for the opposing sides, i.e. the discourses were closed, "the other" was not allowed to imprint its own power in it. Germans had to maintain their discourse about superiority: fear, hate, love, admiration and amazement were out of place. Local discourses created powerful people and objects ranging from martyrs, being killed by the Germans to protect their people, to allies, most prominently "German soldiers". The people thus possessed a power that the Germans knew nothing about but that was very real to them. This also refers to spiritual power with which they fought the Germans. The Germans were powerless in discourses they did not know, against the things they did not see - so the most successful way of the people to utilise this power was to withdraw from the Germans into places where the Germans were weak: the forest, the hills or the territory that had been defined as British to the West. People who were not present could be discursified only in their absence and while the absent is powerless in the discourse, the discourse's only power is in stating the absence - the power thus remains discursive and has no 'real' effects on those who are absent (unless they return).

In the beginning the German colonialists and the inhabitants of the Upper Cross River Area existed without knowing about each other. They were not part of one society; they were not a part of the other's discourses. The production of knowledge about the respective other started in 1895 with the first expedition into the Cross River Area. From this year on, the Germans started gathering knowledge about the area, producing maps, defining boundaries and economic possibilities as well as strategies for exploitation. They thus started discursifying the Cross River Area and cast their net of power relations over the area.

At a first stage this discursive power went uncontested by the people of the Cross River Area because the power was solely within the German imagination and materialised only in reports, maps and letters, which in turn were contested solely by the British with whom the Germans shared a discourse. The non-discursive field remained virtually untouched. Nevertheless, where there is power, there is resistance (Foucault 1998:116), implying that there is no need to resist weakness.

The first Germans who showed up in the Cross River Area were indeed weak as opposed to the people, e.g. during the first Anglo-German boundary commission 1895, and Ramsay's journey override in 1900 (cf. also Fabian 2001). While they were weak in the field of non-discursive encounters with the people, the respective discourses still remained separated. As soon as the Germans tried to transform their discursive power into non-discursive practices, the people resisted. Since they did not share a discourse with the Germans, they resisted by non-discursive means, i.e. violence (Zintgraf and Defang; German-Ekoi war, Mpawmanak war). The Germans likewise reacted by violence. These non-discursive encounters shaped the discourses on both sides and altered the knowledge about each other. The altered knowledge also produced complex power relations with respect to time and space.

Challenges to the power of colonial discourse were fed into by local administrators (Mansfield) who experienced an 'other' that did not correspond to their construction within colonial discourse. The German colonial institutions (Governement, AAKA, RKA) struggled to maintain their incipient power, partly succeeding, partly failing (Demburg). This implies that the power did not exist, neither in institutions nor in discourses nor in practices (cf. Foucault 1998:12). Power is linked to an order of relations, relations of power and resistance. What is perceived and termed as resistance and what as power depends on the place from which one argues. Power and resistance thus shape relations and by these relations they are constantly contested. As Foucault put it: power is the name given to a complex strategic situation in a society (114) and war and politics are two different strategies to integrate unbalanced and unstable power relations that can turn into the other at any time (114-115).

The instability of power relations in the colonial field was not easily acknowledged in German colonial discourse. But by linkages between the non-discourse field and the German colonial discourse this gnosis ultimately altered not only the discourse but also experienced reality.

Colonial discourse created an illusion, it was the illusion of legitimacy, power and order in the German colonial enterprise. The radical destruction of this illusion has proved impossible due to a number of discursive techniques (censorship, silencing, discrediting, glorification) and possibly cognitive deficits. This discourse has entered all popular and academic arenas - first in Europe and only later in Africa. It is omnipresent, but not unchallenged, and its weapons - stereo-
types, mass distribution of never changing images and speech – continue to work. While the contents of the labels Colonialist (offender) and Colonised (victim) have undergone a reconceptualisation some general assumptions are just beginning to be challenged.

Exploitation has an ugly sound to-day, perhaps because the mandatory system has nearly succeeded in wiping it out of the colonial vocabulary; at any rate, even in colonies not under Mandate we use more delicate synonyms, of which development is one. (Steer 1939:162)

A radical critique continues to be difficult or impossible, because currently a hegemonic discourse seems to purport a truth about the relation between Africa ('underdeveloped third world') and Europe ('developed industrial first world') that relies on the same conceptional assumptions as colonialism. For example, the phrases "Africa needs development", "Poverty reduction is the goal of the BMZ", "I am interested to work in HIV/AIDS awareness because this is what donors like" fall under the same rhetoric asserted by colonial administrators. The last statement by a young educated journalist in Mamfe employed by the local GTZ project demonstrates that reciprocal extraversion and the conquête des âmes is still taking place. A radical critique of colonialism implies a radical critique of globalisation, not because of what globalisation might entail but because of its distribution and its use of a discourse that constructs the inhabitants of the "third world" as mute, powerless and aimless. What is not in a discourse still exists, but the discursive inertia complicates its entry into a discourse that it opposes. Only the most radical experiences are successful, like the collapsing World Trade Center. And although the images could not go unacknowledged, the discourse itself has not (yet) been altered.

### Languages, tribes and ethnolinguistic groups – a compilation

The following table assembles the nomenclature used by linguists and contrasts it both with colonial terminology and the "ethnolinguistic groups" being studied by anthropologists. Included are some of the neighbouring groups and languages: Bangwa, Bafaw, Mbo, Manta, Ambele, Wetchu, Otutu/Akong, Ipolo, Ieeve. The most common name is underlined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CROSS RIVER – BENDI</strong></td>
<td>Boki (dialects: Bodam, Kajifu)</td>
<td>Boky</td>
<td>Boki, Boki, Eba Mbu and Ekokisam$^\text{a}$, Nki$^\text{b}$</td>
<td>Boki$^\text{i}$, Boky</td>
<td>Njemaya$^\text{c}$, Ndemaya$^\text{d}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CROSS RIVER – UPPER</strong></td>
<td>Korop</td>
<td>Ododop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kodop$^\text{e}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CROSS RIVER – LOWER</strong></td>
<td>Efik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Efik$^\text{f}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern Bantoid – Ekoid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekwe</td>
<td>Ejagharm</td>
<td>Ekwe, Eko, Ekhõi, Khoi</td>
<td>Ejagharm, Ekwe subgroup (subdivided in Upper and Lower Ekwe or Abuh and Ane osaw$^\text{h}$)</td>
<td>Ejagharm, Keke subgroup</td>
<td>Ejaghã$^\text{a}$, Ngonaya$^\text{a}$, Kimbo$^\text{a}$, Nham/Obam$^\text{a}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keaka</td>
<td>Ejagharm dialect: eastern Ejagharm</td>
<td>Keaka, Kéyaka, Kejåka, Yaka$^\text{iv}$, Buyaka$^\text{v}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obang, Ebon</td>
<td>Ejaghams, Obang subgroups (subdivided in Upper and Lower Obang)³³²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitieku</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denya (dialects Basho, Takanamba, xvi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyang</td>
<td>Denya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anyang, Anjang, Danyang, Ajang (Anyang, Basho, ³³³ Bitieku (separate from Anyang)³³²</td>
<td>Anyang, Anya³³²</td>
<td>Danyan³³³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenyang (dialects Upper Kenyang, xvi Lower Kenyang, ³³³ Kitiwi³³³)</td>
<td>Banyang, Banjang, Banjang³³³ Nyang³³³, Manyang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN BANTOID-MANVU³³⁴</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Banyang (differentiation between Upper and Lower Banyang, ³³³ Kenyang Kendem³³³)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumbo</td>
<td>Ipulo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asumbo, Bassumbo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avande</td>
<td>Evand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olii</td>
<td>Iceve</td>
<td></td>
<td>Icenv, Maci several dialects e.g. Olii, Akwaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manta</td>
<td>Manta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manta (Amasi)</td>
<td>Banta ³³⁵, Manta ³³⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN BANTOID-WIDE GRASSFIELDS - WESTERN MOMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ato</td>
<td>Atong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Otutu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN BANTOID-WIDE GRASSFIELDS - NARROW GRASSFIELDS - Mombi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menka</td>
<td>Menka</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wetchu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundani</td>
<td>Mundani</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mundani</td>
<td>Bantu ³³⁷, Mundande, Mundani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moğhano</td>
<td>Moğhano (Widekum)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Widekum (dialect of Meta³³)</td>
<td>Widekum ³³⁸, Babe³³⁹</td>
<td>Moğhano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN BANTOID-WIDE GRASSFIELDS - MAM and BAMB &amp; BAMBÉLIKE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwe</td>
<td>Ngwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangwa; Fonten³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN BANTOID-WIDE GRASSFIELDS,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mungaka</td>
<td>Mungaka (dialects Bali</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³³² Kenyang subgroups in Upper and Lower Kenyang are differentiated.
³³³ Bitieku is a separate subgroup from Anyang.
³³⁴ SOUTHERN BANTOID-MANVU refers to the southern Bantoid-Mankan branch.
³³⁵ Banta and Manta are additional tribes in the western Momolu region.
³³⁶ Banta is a subgroup of Manta.
³³⁷ Bantu is a subgroup of Mundani.
³³⁸ Widekum is a dialect of Meta.
³³⁹ Babe is a dialect of Meta.
³³⁰ SOUTHERN BANTOID-WIDE GRASSFIELDS include wide-grassland regions.
³³¹ MAM and BAMB refer to the Mambila and Bamfwa-speaking tribes.
³³² Assumbo, Bassumbo are subgroups within the Assumbo tribe.
³³³ Kitiwi is a separate subgroup from Upper Kenyang.
³³⁴ SOUTHERN BANTOID-MANVU is a major linguistic group in the southern regions.
³³⁵ Banta is a major subgroup within the Manta tribe.
³³⁶ Manta is a major tribe in the western Momolu region.
³³⁷ Bantu is a major subgroup within the Mundani tribe.
³³⁸ Widekum is a major dialect within the Meta tribe.
³³⁹ Babe is a major dialect within the Meta tribe.
³³² Kenyang subgroups in Upper and Lower Kenyang are differentiated.
³³³ Bitieku is a separate subgroup from Anyang.
³³⁴ SOUTHERN BANTOID-MANVU refers to the southern Bantoid-Mankan branch.
³³⁵ Banta and Manta are additional tribes in the western Momolu region.
³³⁶ Banta is a subgroup of Manta.
³³⁷ Bantu is a subgroup of Mundani.
³³⁸ Widekum is a dialect of Meta.
³³⁹ Babe is a dialect of Meta.
tic' group | other |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NARROW</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nyonga, Tl, Nd</td>
<td>Mbo</td>
<td>Mbo, Kebu, Mbu, Kabo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRASSFIELDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBAM-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKAM-NUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARROW</td>
<td>Mbo</td>
<td>Mbo, Mbooo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANTU -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHWEST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUNDU-</td>
<td>Bafaw</td>
<td>Bafaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bafu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALONG-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The concept of tribes clearly uses the static, essentialised concepts of culture and identity. Since it is part of colonial discourses, anthropologists working within this framework, e.g. Hirschberg 1979, even after formal independence, are also included here.
2 The differentiation only by the British, cf. Gregg (1925).
3 Hirschberg 1979:365; Zinggraf 1895 (map); Koelle 1854.
5 Moisel's map 1912 F.1. Ossingdige.
6 DKZ 1904, no. 11:90.
7 Williamson and Blench 2000:33.
8 In Nigeria (Upper) and Cameroon (Lower) (cf. Röschenthaler 1993:21).
9 Those who have salt ponds and those who do not (cf. Röschenthaler 2000:192).
10 Edmondson and Edmondson 1977, comprising fourteen villages in West Cameroon, including "Osijing", i.e. Aghorkem, generally held to fall under "Keaka", as well as seventeen villages of Ikom Division, Nigeria and 28 villages in Calabar Province (ibid.:1). Watters 2001 claims "Etung" to be a synonym for "Ejaghâm" (ibid.:55); Röschenthaler (1993:21, 2000:191) names "Etung" as an Ejaghâm sub-group living along the Cross River between the border to Cameroon and Ikom in Nigeria.
11 Ebot 1994/95.
12 SIL. 1997 states it as the same dialect known as "Etung" in Nigeria.
13 "Zu den Ekois rechnet man die Ejaghâms als die eigentlichen Ekois, ferner die Keaka, Manta, Ndê, Akparabong, Nku, Oban und Ohulmo" (Hirschberg 1979:365).
14 Clarke 1848.
15 Over the water' (Crabb 1965:105).
16 Glauning (1901), Moisel (1901:5).
17 DKZ 1904, no. 11:90.
18 Ittmann 1935/36.
19 Besser 1900, Ittmann 1935/36.
20 "Keaka" is how Kenyang-speaking people call their western neighbours. The Obang call the Keaka "Eyafê" or "Eyañin" (Röschenthaler 1993:20). According to her the "Keaka" themselves prefer the name "Central Ejaghâm" (ibid.).
21 Speakers of this dialect refer to their language as "Ejaghâm" in contrast to those of the western Ejaghâm who refer to their language as "Ejaghâm" (cf. SIL 1992). SIL has developed literacy material both for "Ejaghâm" and "Ejaghâm". There are only slight differences to the Ejaghâ speakers of the Obang area, which are also found in Ossing, as witnessed in a seminar held by the Ejaghâm literacy coordinator Ayamba Nkiri-Erem in Okoroba with teachers using the Ejaghâ-primers (62000) and a native speaker from Ossing.
22 Ruel 1969:5 (name by which the "Ekwe" refer to the "Keaka"); Kamanda 1999/42; Moisel 1991:5.
23 Clarke 1848; probably referring to 'Kembong'.
24 Clarke 1848; according to Crabb 1965 spoken near Alok, Ogoja, Nigeria (ibid.:53).
According to Röschenthaler 'Obang' is the term the people use to identify themselves, just as 'Etung' (Röschenthaler 1993:20).

With Voelitz (1978) I prefer Manyu to 'Mamfe', since the former is a river flowing through the area, that merges with the Cross River, and the latter is the administrative headquarter of Manyu Division, originally in the 'Lower Kenyang' area.

Both dialects named after villages located in the centre of the dialect areas (cf. Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983:9).

Both dialects named after the clan-names of their speakers (ibid.).


Sharwood Smith 1924.

Tyhurst 1984.

"The language of Anyang, Boki" (Kamanda 1999:42).

Staschewski 1917. He also notes that the "Anjang" call them "Kiepenne" (ibid.:2) while according to Ruel the Anyang call the Banyang "Kecui" (ibid.:10).


Röschenthaler 2000 refers to Upper as Eastern and Lower as Western (ibid. 192, fn 4).

Ruel 1969.

Kamanda 1999:42: "Some authors list Awanchi and Kendem amongst the Banyang. However, although the members of this village group are very close to Banyang and speak Kenyang as a second language, they should be regarded as a small, distinctive group, with a dialect of their own "Kendem" related to Bitikku, itself a dialect of Banyang" (He was seemingly inspired by Ruel 1969:10, Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983).

Centered around the village of Tali (Tyhurst and Tyhurst 1983:8).

Centered around Mamfe town (ibid.).

k Around Manyucen, today in Meme Division.

l Kamanda 1999:42.

m Ayuk 1993.

n Clarke 1848.

o Koelle 1854:20.

p Adametz 1912:246.

q Only used during British colonial time; are called a 'grass-field' people (Sharwood Smith and Cantle 1924). Hirschberg (1979) seems to group "Manta" under the "Ekoi", cf. above (Hirschberg 1979:365).

r Conrau 1898.

s Ambele, Menka, Mundani and Widekum are terms used by Sharwood Smith 1924 - rather than calling them "tribe" he refers to a rather "arbitrary consortions" of groups (ibid.:5).

t D.O. Osidinge 1921.

u Anderson 1929:3.

v The 'Bali' consisted of the 'aristocracy' of Chamba Leko origin that had cumulated a number of grassfield's peoples. The 'aristocracy' spoke 'Mubako' (Chamba Leko) but had also adopted 'Mungaka' or 'Mungakka'.

vi According to Conrau (1898:195) Bali Nyonga called themselves Banyang in contrast to the Bakimpat and Bagam (east of Bali).

vii 'Bali' is a misunderstanding by the Germans, the term actually used was 'Ba'ni', a term of the Munggaka language (cf. Conrau 1899:a2:01, Jeffreys 1962, Fardon 1988:208).

Proverbs in Kenyanga

Kenyanga | German (Ittman) | English
--- | --- | ---
Ye mū amot ane ba be, eyi kē-bene bē: Mfaw, a pu. | Nicht ein einziger ist bis jetzt geboren, der sich nicht gerne König nennen würde. Ein König versteckt sich nicht. | No one has been born, who would not like to be called king. A king does not hide. |
Mfaw a pu bese. | 299 | 694 | 150 | 310 |

Bafaw ba mbo betang a nye, ba ke ped e gog badak a defi. | Wena die Greifen begonnen haben Recht zu sprechen, sollen sie nicht mehr auf das hören, was im Hofe vorgeht. | When the big men have started judging cases they no longer listen to the things happening in the compound. | Two chiefs do not do well together. Two chiefs do not do well in one town. |
| | 122 | 123 | no | |

| | 149 | 140 | no | 209 |

Etok emot e pu do kafaw bapae | In einer Stadt tun zwei Häuptlinge nicht gut. | No. | |
| | 299 | 140 | no | |

Ye mafaw a mibb nced na, a ci mafaw. | Ist ein Häuptling noch so klein, so er doch Häuptling. | However small a chief is, he is still chief. | |
| | 695 | 299 | no | |

Mfaw a nye, ye ci, on e,ya'a go. | Ein Häuptling ist, was er gerade sieht. Ein Häuptling heiratet einen Hof voll Frauen zusammen, nicht weil er sie liebt, sondern um ein großes Anwesen zu haben. | A chief eats whatever he just sees. A chief does not marry a court yard full of women for love, but in order to increase his prestige. | |
| | 150 | 123 | no | |

| | 149 | 123 | no | |

Nto mafaw a pu yode nto. | Die einem Häuptlinge folgen, werden satt, bekommen aber auch reichlich Mühe. | Those who follow chiefs will be satisfied, but will also have much work to do. A chief does not embarrass another one. | |
| | 476 | 123 | no | |

Enyeng e nca mafaw, o ke mof. | Ist die Sache zu schwierig für einen Reichen, so versuche dich nicht daran. | If something is too difficult for a rich man, you should not try it. |
| | 138 | 189 | |

Nya mafaw a ndong, ta mbo ti; a beke deng, ta mbo ti. | Gehst das Tier eines Reichen weg, so ists einerlei; geht es nicht weg, so ists auch einerlei. | If the animal of a rich man goes away it does not matter; if it does not go, it also does not matter. |
| | 189 | 481 | 33 |

Mfaw a pu gu ndu eked eyi. | Ein Reicher stirbt nicht in seinem Hause – Er hat sehr house. viel Geld- und Handelgeschäfte, die ihn überall herumführen. Wenn ein Reicher nicht getötet ist, bist du dann im Stande, es zu lüften? | If a rich man is not enough, are you then able to do it? |
| | 311 | 150 | no | |

Mafaw a mme, bo ba nce neko; mū nebb a mme, e mbak ci ndem. | Ist ein Angesessener krank, so erschrecken die Leute; ist aber ein Armer krank, so soll das nichts sein. | Is a respected man sick, the people are scared, is a poor man sick, it shall be nothing. |
| | 150 | 234 | no | |

| | 142 | no | |

Kafaw ke ku nsem a mbeu. | Das Besitzenwohl (der Desire to possess) Reichum war die Ursache, war das war the reason why the slave died. | Das Besitzenwohl (der Desire to possess) Reichum war die Ursache, war das was the reason why the slave died. | |
| | 232 | 233 | no | |

| | 234 | 234 | no | |

Mo da a pu kwen kafaw. | Ein Waisenkind kann nicht reich werden. An orphan cannot become rich. | |
| | 152 | no | |

O ci eeb, o mbe baka ci mū; o ci kafaw, o mbe baka ci mū. | Bist du armut, bist du reich. Bist du arm, bist du auch ein Mensch. | If you are poor, you are a human being; if you are rich, you are also a human being. | |
| | 326 | 388 | no | |

O nja mbo bak reb, o ke ya mbo o mong kafaw. | Sei zuerst arm, wolite nicht von vornherein viel Reichum wealth from the beginning. | First be poor, do not seek wealth from the beginning. |
| | 293 | 293 | no | |

Abod ne nceeb, csongodi ne kafaw. | Trägheit und Armut, Mühe und Wohlstand. Laziness and poverty, trouble and wealth. | |
| | 120 | no | |

Basioni ba pu gwa ne enem. | Alle zanken nicht in der Trockenzeit – da sitzen sie nämlich zusammen beim Palmweintrinken. | Elders never quarrel in the dry season – because they are no Palmwine to drink. | |
| | 126 | 63 | |

Basioni ba pu pu na ecem koku tabuo. | Dorfverstecher gehen nie von einer Gerichtssitzung weg, ohne daß sie Tabak reiben. | Village heads never leave a court session without grinding tobacco. | |
| | 125 | 62 | |
Southern Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Commission Protocol

The undersigned Commissioners authorized by their respective Governments propose, after they have travelled over and surveyed the boundary district in question, the following boundary between Southern Nigeria and Kamerun

[... concerns the southern part...]

Note: The pillars marking the boundary are of cement, pyramidal in shape, with a base of about one metre square and a little over one metre in height.

From here the boundary runs in a straight line to the highest point of the mountain Mongum. [...]

THENCE in a straight line to the highest point of the mountain Ojum Ojum. [...]

THENCE in a straight line to a pillar on the road Nkunu-Abong, thence in a straight line to the highest point of a mountain (name unknown) [...], thence in a straight line to a large cairn of stones on the source of the Awa River which has been agreed upon by us. [...]

From here the boundary follows the Awa River past its confluence with the AGEGAM or ARTEKAN River, (the river after the junction being known as the AWA), to where it flows into the Cross River, and then follows the Cross River upstream through the Rapids to the mouth of a small stream, flowing from the north, between NSANAKANG and BADJE [Monuwita on map of 1912], its confluence with the Cross River being marked by a pillar.

The boundary then follows this stream up to a pillar at its source, and from there proceeds this stream up to a pillar at its source, and from there proceeds in a straight line at right angles to the line Centre of CROSS RAPIDS-YOLA, to a pillar about one mile distant which lies on this line. The Boundary then follows this line to the N.E., and is marked by the following pillars:

No. 1 On the ROAD BADEE-DANARE
No. 2 " SOUTH DANARE-BODAM
No. 3 " NORTH DANARE-BODAM
No. 4 " ABO-BODAM
No. 5 On the OKON River (left bank)
No. 6 On the Road BASHU-BODAM
No. 7 On the Road ABO-KEKUKESSEM [Kekukisem]

The division of the Villages in the neighbourhood of the boundary line is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASHU</td>
<td>BIG BODAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH DANARE</td>
<td>LITTLE BODAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH DANARE</td>
<td>DARI [Dadi]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The position of the centre of the rapids agreed upon is:

Lat. 5° 48' 35.5" N  
Long. 8° 50' 39.3" E

[...position of Yola and the azimuth between Cross rapids and Yola...]

2. In all cases where a river or stream forms the boundary, the thalweg shall be the boundary line.

3. The pillars and other objects put up by the Commissioners to mark the Boundary are to form the political boundary, even if later, through more accurate determination of the positions, their geographical positions are altered.

The last boundary pillar No. 7, between the OKON and OYI Rivers shall be the starting point of any future demarcation of the boundary from there to Yola. [...]

5. When the Boundary Agreement has been finally approved by His Majesty's and the Imperial Governments, there is to be allowed to those Natives who have changed their Nationality through the alteration of the boundary, a period of six months in which to move themselves and their belongings across from one side to the other, should they desire to do so.

The natives near the boundary line have been notified of the probable change of the Boundary, and have been informed that they will receive information in due course when the new boundary shall take effect.

6. This paragraph concerns the free navigation on the Cross River and is to be settled by His Majesty's and the Imperial Governments.

German Commissioner Captain, R.E. British Commissioner.

(BAB R1001/3476:93 – 96)
Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Kamerun, betreffend Verbot der Einfuhr von Vorderladern und Handelspulver.

§ 1. Die Einfuhr von Vorderladern und von Handelspulver in das Schutzgebiet ist verboten.

§ 2. Aus den amlichen und privaten Lagerhäusern werden Vorderladern und Handelspulver vorläufig nicht mehr herausgegeben.

§ 3. Zuwiderhandlungen gegen die Vorschriften dieser Verordnung werden mit Geldstrafe bis zu fünftausend – 5000 – Mark oder mit Gefängnis bis zu drei Monaten oder, soweit sie von Eingeborenen begangen werden, mit Gefängnis mit Zwangsarbeit bis zu drei Monaten, allein oder in Verbindung miteinander, bestraft.

Die Vorderladern und das Handelspulver, welche Gegenstand der Zuwiderhandlung sind, unterliegen der Einziehung.


Buea, 14. April 1905
Der Kaiserliche Gouverneur
v. Puttkamer


1. Die Einfuhr von Kriegsmaterial und der Handel mit solchem ist bis auf weiteres in folgenden Teilen des Schutzgebietes verboten:

In den Bezirken Ossadinje rechts des Groß-Flusses, Fonendorg-Tinto, Johann-Albrechtshöhe nördlich des Manenguba-Gebirges, Bamenda und Lomie und im Njong-Gebiet oberhalb Akonolinga.

2. Die Grenzen des Gebietes, für welches das Verbot gilt, bestimmt im Zweifel die Lokalverwaltungsbehörde (Bezirksamt, Station).


Buea, den 10. September 1905
Der Kaiserliche Gouverneur
v. Puttkamer

Namentliches Verzeichnis der Expeditionstruppe – Pückler’s column of 1904 (casualties)
Telegram Diehl to AAKA, 28.08.1900

Photographies

Pückler, Hetebrügge, Ramsay, Garega in Bali
(Ramsay 1904:201)

GNK trading post in Nsanakang – Faktorei Nsanakang (Ramsay 1904:198)
Steamlaunch 'Cross' with two lighters - Dampfer 'Cross' mit zwei Leichtern (Ramsay 1904:200)

Salt-works in Mbakang – Salzstiederei in Mbakang (Keakaland) (Mansfeld 1908:130)

„The pillars of the administration of Ossidinge: chief Ogba, intellectually most important; chief Ayukndep, the oldest chief; chief Egbe, the most intelligent person; interpreter Ojong, an incorruptible character“

Die Stützen der Verwaltung des Ossidinge-Bezirkes: Häuptling Ogba, der geistig bedeutendste Mensch; Häuptling Ayukndep, der älteste Häuptling; Häuptling Egbe, der schlaueste Mensch; Dolmetscher Ojong, unbestechlicher Charakter (Mansfeld 1908, XXII)
Meeting of the chiefs with D.O. Mansfeld.

Vom Bezirksleiter entbundene Hauptlingsversammlung in Abben im Ekwiland.

The Ossidinge station at the Cross River in 1907 (before it was moved to Mamfe) – Die Station Ossidinge am Crossfluss im Jahre 1907 (Mansfeld 1908:11)

Workers in the quarry of Mamfe (the stones were used to build the new station) – Arbeiter im Steinbruch von Mamfe (DKZ 1911:460)
Oral Testimonies

The two to three capital letters in the first column identify the person as referred to in the main text, followed by their full name, age, place and date of interview. In the Boki area I did not enquire after people's ages. The capital letters in the last column identify the assistants that were who present during the interviews and translated when necessary. When their initials are followed by a quotation mark "" they carried out the interview alone, without my presence. When their initials are followed by an asterisk *** they did the transcription and written translation. In the case of interviews in the Boki language, no transcription was prepared, since no native speaker was available to do it. MTA bilingual with Boki provided an English translation. "SM" indicates that I did not use an assistant, neither during the interview, nor for transcription and the language of the interview was standard English or Pidgin English in these cases.

AAJ Ako Abang John, 62 Neembang 08.08.00 ET/RM*  
AAS Assem Asu Samuel, approx. 100 Ewelie 09.10.2001 REA*  
AE Agnes Etong, approx. 90 Neembang 08.08.2000 ET/RM*  
AEn Aghor Enow Kajifu 06.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
AG Asa Gregory, over 90 Mukonyong 08.11.2000 MTA*  
AJG Ayah John Genke, approx. 100 Kettaya 05.11.2000 MTA*  
AMA Aha Martin Apa, 70 years Bacharre 14.10.2001 MTA*  
AMO Anda Moses Ousang Beteme 05.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
AO Assanga Ousang Kajifu 06.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
AOG Agnes Ayo Oyark, over 100 Kekuksem 1 07.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
BL Benson Lare Bodam 10.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
BTT Ben Tanyi Tambe, over 90 Kemong 31.10.2000 REA/HMF*  
CN Chief Ntari of Taiyor, 70 to 80 Marnfe 29.09.2000 SM*  
DA Dorothy Akpaw, approx. 85 Neembang 08.08.2000 ET/RM*  
DE David Emer, approx. 90 Eyoimojock 15.10.2000 HMF*  
DMA Daniel Mgboki Awoor, approx. 98 Aghorikem 12.10.2000 HMF*  
DNT Daniel Njeg Tatave, 68 Ejiwengang 02.08.2000 ET/RM*  
DTAM Defang Tarh Mben Ayuk Martin, 67 Defang 11.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EAA Enow Abraham Agbor, 79 Fotabe 11.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EAB Enow Ayuk Edward, 76 Migop 11.10.2000 REA*  
EAB Enow Abraham Etta Kajifu 06.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
EDT Enbe Daniel Takam Beteme 05.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
EBJ Enow Biajye Jacob, 65 Defang 09.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EJ Egbe John, 73 Takpe 17.10.2001 MTA*  
EJA Egbe John Agbor Toby, 72 Neembang 08.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EBJ Ekorh Johnson Brown, over 90 Ejiwengang 02.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EJM Elvis Jevinah Mukayi, 85 Mbu 02.11.2000 MTA*  
EME Ette Manyo Emer, 71 Eyoimojock 17.10.2001 REA*  
EMST Ette Manya Stephen Tabot, 83 Bakwelie 11.10.2000 REA*  
EN Enw Nifong Kekuksem 1 07.07.2000 MOL/MTA*  
ENF Egbe Njag Emmanuel, 62 Ejiwengang 02.08.2000 ET/RM*  
EPNE Ette Patrick Ntui Eta, over 70 Ayakoe 18.10.2001 REA*  
ESE Essim Samuel Eyong, 64 Fotabe 11.08.2000 ET/RM*  
ET Eyoing Tikia, 66 Nyang 07.11.2000 MTA*  
FNA Felix Nifong Abang, 70 Nsanakang 13.10.2000 HMF*  
JAN Jakues Ehab Naka Boka 09.07.2001 MOL/MTA*  
JAT Jacob Angga Takau, over 90 Tassoome 06.11.2000 MTA*  
JB Johnson Besong, about 100 Ekpore 23.08.2000 ET/RM*  
JOA John Ousong Abang (chief) Badje 12.07.2000 MOL/MTA*
Bibliography


"Balitrabe" 1892. DKZ, no. 13:174-175.


Berry, Sara 1989. "Social institutions and access to resources". *Africa* 59, no. 1:41-55.


Michels, Stefanie 2000. *Adaptations to constraints in smallholder farming systems: case studies from manyu Division, Cameroon*. Hamburg/Münster: LIT.


Mirtt, Carl 1915. "Die Wirkungen des Krieges auf die Eingeborenen in unseren Kolonien". *DKZ*, no. 8:137-139.


Moisiel, Max 1904b. "Vom Crofffluß". *DKZ*, no. 12:111.


Nachitgal, Gustav 1884. Without title. DKB, no. 18:396.


Niger-Thomas Agbaw, Margaret 2000. 'Buying Futures': the upsurge of female entrepreneurship crossing the informal/informal divide in West South Cameroon. Leiden: CNWS Publications.


Pr. 1903. "Die Arbeiterfrage in den Kolonien". DKB, no. 16:150-151.


R.L. 1885a "Gustav Nachtigal". DKB, no. 11:341-344.


Report on the collection of taxes in the Ouest-Sud Division, Cameroon Province for the year 1916-17. NAB Buca Kog 1916/1.


Thomä, Johannes 1902. "Die Arbeiterfrage in Kamerun". DAZ, no. 21:201-203.


Tyrwhurst, James 1984. Cultural identity perceived as linguistic identity: results from a survey of the Nyang languages. Yaoundé: SILL.


Voelz, Eberhard 1978. The languages of the South West Province of Cameroon. MS.


"Westgrenze des deutschen Schutzgebietes Kameruns" 1889. DAZ, no. 9:72.


Wright, Donald 1999. "What do you mean there were no tribes in Africa?: thoughts on boundaries – and related matters – in precolonial Africa". History in Africa 26:403-426.


Archival Bibliography
AAKA-Aufzeichnung, no date. In: BAB R1001/3470:3-5.
Adametz, 06.01.1907. "Jahresbericht Abteilung Bascho 1906". In: ANY FA 1/68:5-10.
Agreement concerning the demarcation of the Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons from Yola to the Cross River. In: BAB R1001/3770:19-22.

Bericht über die Außenstationen (1898). In: BAB R 1001/4338:70-74.
Bericht über die Außenstationen (1899). In: BAB R 1001/4338:76-80.
Besser to KGK, 06.07.1900. "Expedition Cross-Schnellen". In: ANY FA 5/11.
Besser to KGK, 18.06.1900. Without title. In: ANY FA 5/11.
Besser to KGK, 18.06.1900. Without title. In: ANY FA 5/11.
Besser, 04.06.1900. "Expedition Cross-Schnellen". In: BAB R1001/3348:77-78.
Besser, 06.11.1900. "Anlage der Militär Station später Zoll Station Nasukpe". In: BAB R1001/3373:13-16.
Deutsche Tageszeitung, 05.05.1901. "Koloniales". In: BAB R1001/3348:183.
Diehl to KRS Ossidinge, 02.01.1904. Without title. In: ANY FA 1/413.
Dresky, von, 02.07.1891. "Bericht über die Aussichten der Expedition Dr. Zinzgraf [sic], sowie über die Verhältnisse im Kamerungebiet, 02.07.1891". In: BAB R1001/4283:122-123.
Galloway to KGK, 10.05.1900. Without title. In: BAB R1001/3348:117.
Gebhardt (GKN) to MST, 06.05.1902. Without title. In: BAB R1001/3469:50.
Glauning, 01.11.1901. "Bericht über die Anlage der Station Ossidinge". In: BAB R1001/4373:53-54.
GNK to AAKA, 05.01.1905. Without title. In: BAB R1001/3470:49.
GNK to KGK, 27.05.1903. Without title. In: ANY FA 1/421:42.
GNK, 19.05.1913. "Verwaltungsratsitzung". In: BAB R1001/3476:36-38.
Mansfeld to KGK, 07.01.1907. "Betreffend Monatsbericht November". In: BAB R1001/4373:93-94.
Mansfeld to KGK, 07.05.1907. "Betreff Bezug auf diesseitige J. No. 556/07, betreffend Gummiankauf im Konzessionsgebiet". In: ANY FA I/66:163.
Mansfeld to KGK, 07.05.1907. Without title. In: BAB R1001/3764:121-122.
Mansfeld to KGK, 21.01.1914. "Process G.N.K., auf Erlass V. Geh. 4.1/14". In: ANY FA I/413.
Mansfeld to KGK, 22.05.1913. "Betreff: Pflanzungsarbeiter, Bericht auf Erlass IV. 777/1913". In: ANY FA I/183:196-197.
Mansfeld to KGK, 25.11.1913. "Bericht auf das Chiffre-Telegramm aus Baua vom 14.11.13". In: ANY FA I/413.
Mansfeld to KGK, 30.03.1911. Without title. In: ANY FA I/182:186.


MS Fomentorf to KGK, 17.10.1906. "Auf den Erlauff vom 21.9.05 Nr. 16712/05 in Anschluß an die siebente J. No. 1192 vom 16.10.05, betreff:Grunderwerb der Firma John Holt & Co.". In: ANY FA 1/356/47.


Müller to KOS, 07.06.1904. "Abschrift zu Bz. No. 778; Anyang-Expedition; Kommandeur J. No. 413". In: BAB R1001/3352/86-87.

Müller to KST, 09.05.1904. "Anyang-Expedition, J. No. 275; Expeditionsbefehl". In: BAB R1001/3352/79.

Müller, Oberstl, 02.05.1904. "Anyang-Expedition J. No. 221". In: BAB R1001/3352/59.


Müller, Oberst, 27.05.1904. "Anyang-Expedition, J. No. 357; Expeditionsbefehl". In: BAB R1001/3352/62.


Rausch, 26.03.1914. "Bericht betr. die Tätigkeit der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun". In: ANY FA 1/413.


RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914. "Schriftsatz in Sachen Nordwest-Kamerun gegen Fiscus". In: ANY FA 1/413.

RKA to KLG, 28.03.1914. "Schriftsatz in Sachen Nordwest-Kamerun gegen Fiscus". In: ANY FA 1/413.


Randerlaß Nr. 244, 10.05.1907. In: BAB R1001/4361:19.


Schulz, Leutnant, 31.03.1906. "Offizier-Posten Bascho, Bericht über das Jahr vom 1. April 1905 bis 31.03.1906". In: ANY FA 1/66:174-169 (page numbers here inconsistent!); also: ANY FA 1/68:77-91 (here more details)


Stachow, Rosenthal, and Brecht, 11.06.1914. "Urteilsbegründung, GNK vs. Fiskus, Königliches Landgericht Berlin". In: ANY FA 1/413.


Stolz, Pauline, 30.03.1915. "Über unsere Gefangenschaft". In: ABM E-4:3.


Unrah to KKG, 12.01.1914. Without title. In: ANY FA 1/413:75.
Verwaltungsratssitzung GNK, 09.08.1901. In: BAB R1001/3468:71.

Archival Sources

ABM E-4-3 Weltkrieg und Gefangenschaft, 1914-1922.
ABM E-6-1,4 Stationschronik Besongbang 1912-1915.
ANY FA 1/66 Jahresberichte 1905/1906.
ANY FA 1/65 Jahresberichte 1904/1905.
ANY FA 1/68 Jahresberichte 1906/1907.
ANY FA 1/69 Jahresberichte 1906/1907 (Anlagen).
ANY FA 1/70 Jahresberichte 1907/1908.
ANY FA 1/71 Jahresberichte 1908/1909.
ANY FA 1/80 Ständesliste Ramsay.
ANY FA 1/84 Expedition Zinggrafl.
ANY FA 1/85 Akten betr. die Ursachen des Aufstandes im Ossidinge Bezirk und die Entscheidungsansprüche der Ges. Nordwestkamerun, 1904-1905.
ANY FA 1/110 Verwaltungsangelegenheiten der Station Bamenda, 1908-1912.
ANY FA 1/152 Yola-Cross-Grenzexpedition.
ANY FA 1/184 Akten betr. Arbeiter Anwerbung, Bd. 3:1913.
ANY FA 1/306 Verzeichnis über die Grundbesitzverhältnisse im Bezirk Ossidinge, 1906-1913.

ANY FA 1/356 Landangelegenheiten Ossidinge.
ANY FA 1/357 Landkommision in Ossidinge.
ANY FA 1/413 Akten des Konzessionsgebiet der Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun, Bd. 4:1913-1914.
ANY FA 1/421 Akten betr. die Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun 1899-1913.
ANY FA 5/11 Crosschnellenexpedition Besser.
ANY FA 5/28 Erster Weltkrieg, Verlustlisten.
BAB R1001/3348 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 4, März 1900 - Mai 1901.
BAB R1001/3349 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 5, Mai 1901 - Jan. 1902.
BAB R1001/3350 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 6, Jan. 1902 - Dez. 1902.
BAB R1001/3352 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 8, Apr. 1904 - März 1905.
BAB R1001/3353 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 9, Apr. 1905 - März 1906.
BAB R1001/3354 Militärische Expeditionen, Bd. 10, Apr. 1905 - Juli 1907, 1912.
BAB R1001/3468 Gesellschaft Nordwestkamerun, Bd. 3, März 1901 - Mai 1902.
BAB R1001/3469 Gesellschaft Nordwestkamerun, Bd. 4, Mai 1902 - März 1904.
BAB R1001/3470 Gesellschaft Nordwestkamerun, Bd. 5, März 1904 - Juli 1907.

3 Pagination in this file is completely confused, three different numbers at the same page, some crossed out, some not.
4 Without page numbers.
BAB R1001/4014 Schutz- und Polizeimanne in Kamerun, Bd. 1, Febr. 1900 - Sept. 1913.
BAB R1001/4283 Innere Verhältnisse Kameruns, Bd. 2, Okt. 1889 - Okt. 1891.
BAB R1001/4284 Innere Verhältnisse Kameruns, Bd. 3, Okt. 1891 - Juni 1893.
BAB R1001/4287 Innere Verhältnisse Kameruns, Bd. 6, Nov. 1896 - Dez. 1901.
BAB R1001/4292 Innere Verhältnisse Kameruns, Bd. 11, Apr. 1907 - Juni 1908.
BAB R1001/4296 Innere Verhältnisse Kameruns, Bd. 15, Sept. 1911 - Okt. 1914.
BAB R1001/4338 Berichte über die Außenstationen, Mai 1894 - Jan. 1902.
BAB R1001/4361 Posten Tinto, Fontembai, 1892-1907.
BAB R1001/4373 Acta betreffend die Station Nsanke/Ossidinge, Aug. 1900-Febr. 1914.
BAB R1001/4414 Militärstationen in Kamerun, Juli 1906 - Nov. 1907.
BAB R1001/4454 Entschädigungsansprüche, Bd. 2, Juni 1902 - Dez. 1904.
BAB R1001/4455 Entschädigungsansprüche, Bd. 3, Dez. 1904 - Sept. 1906.
BAB R1001/4699 Presseangriffe der Entente gegen die deutsche Kolonialverwaltung, Bd. 1, Juni 1918 - Dez. 1918.
BAB R1001/6789 Grabdenkmäler in Kamerun Bd. 2, März 1903 - Apr. 1914.
BAB R1001/6796 Verlustlisten, Kamerun; Provenienz Abt. M, Kommando der Schutztruppen.
BAB R175F 265 contains ANY FA/I/22, FA I/23 (1912-1913).
BAB R175F 271 contains ANY FA I/66 (Jahresberichte 1904/1905).
BAB R175F 275 contains ANY FA I/69 (Jahresberichte 1907/1908).
BAB R8024/275 GNK Statuten, 1909-1913.
BAG 251/21 Nachlass Zimmermann: Krieg in Kamerun.
NAB Af 1(b) Local Customs Report on, and Superstitions Reports of Ossindinge Division, 1921 (D.O. Ossindinge 1921).
NAB Af 10 Intelligence Report on the Assumbo District of the Mandfe Division. (Cowan 1935).
NAB Af 17 Assessment Report – Banyang Tribal Area 1930. (Gorges 1930).

NAB Af 20 Banyang Clan Area Reassessment Report.
NAB Af 24 An Assessment Report on the Boki, Eba-Mbu, and Ekokissam Clans of the Mamfe Division, Cameroon Province, 1925. (Gregg 1925).
NAB Af 29 Intelligence Report on the Kembong Area - Mamfe Division - Cameroon. (Swaby 1937).
NAB Af 3, 6 Assessment Report on the Assumbo District of the Mamfe Division of the Cameroon Province, 1923. (Cowan 1923).
NAB Af 36 An Assessment Report of the Menka District of the Mandfe Division in the Cameroon Province 1924. (Sharwood Smith 1924).
NAB Af 52 An Assessment Report of the Obang and Balunu Districts of the Mandfe Division, Cameroon Province, 1924-25. (Cantie 1924).
NAB Ca 1916/1 Report on the Ossinding Division, Kamerun Province. (Hunt 1916).
NAB Bd 1928/2 Roman Catholic Mission, Mamfe.
NAB Bd 1920/1 Complaints by the Christian Community, Ossidinge.
Schutzbrief Defang personal archive of Defang Tari Mben Ayuk Martin, chief of Defang
Schutzbrief Taiyor personal archive of Taiyong Daniel Baye, Taiyor village

Magazines and proceedings
Deutsches Kolonialblatt, ed. by AAKA, since 1907 RKA; 1890-1921. contains official reports (often censored); proclamations, obituaries.

Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, ed. from 1884-1887 by Deutscher Kolonialverein, since 1888 by DKG. Weekly publication, details about day-to-day activities in the colonies and overseas territories of other nations; longer essays about recent developments, e.g. expeditions, missions, schools, etc.; also background reports (geography, ethnography, linguistics); photographs; literature reviews; news about the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft and events; emphasis on "Progress" (i.e. development, e.g. new postal agencies), bad news only if unavoidable; relies on what the Kolonialabteilung publishes, but also contains private information (rumours) and public opinion in Germany.


Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902 (1903), 1905 (1906), 1910, 1924. edited by Deutscher Kolonialkongreß, Berlin.

Ethnologie: Forschung und Wissenschaft

Wim van Binsbergen

Intercultural Encounters
African and anthropological lessons towards a philosophy of interculturality
This book brings together fifteen essays investigating aspects of interculturality.

Like its author, it operates at the border line between social anthropology and intercultural philosophy. It seeks to make a contribution to intercultural philosophy, by formulating with great precision and painful honesty the lessons deriving from extensive intercultural experiences as an anthropologist. Its culminating section presents an intercultural philosophy revolving on the tenet ‘cultures do not exist’. The kaleidoscopic nature of intercultural experiences is reflected in the diversity of these texts. Many belong to a field that could be described as “meta-anthropology”, others are more clearly philosophical; occasionally they spill over into belles lettres, ancient history, and comparative cultural and religious studies. The ethnographic specifics supporting the arguments are diverse, deriving from various African situations in which the author has conducted participatory field research (Tunisia, Zambia, Botswana, and South Africa).

vol. 4, 2003, 616 pp., 40.90 €.
ISBN 3-8258-6783-8

Grevenstr/Fresnostr. 2 48159 Münster
Tel.: 0251 – 62 032 22 – Fax: 0251 – 23 19 72
E-Mail: vertrieb@lit-verlag.de – http://www.lit-verlag.de

Meetings/Begegnungen
Geschichte und Gegenwart der afrikanisch-europäischen Begegnung/History and Present of the African-European Encounter
Hrsg. von Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst, Reinhard Klein-Arendt und Stefanie Michels
(Universität zu Köln)

Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst:
Reinhard Klein-Arendt (Hrsg.)
AfrikanerInnen in Deutschland und schwarze Deutsche – Geschichte und Gegenwart
Die Konferenz „AfrikanerInnen in Deutschland und schwarze Deutsche – Geschichte und Gegenwart“ richtete sich gleichermaßen an ein interessiertes Laienpublikum und an WissenschaftlerInnen. Die hier vorgestelle Sammlung von Vorträgen stellt dementsprechend eine Verbindung zwischen wissenschaftlicher Beschäftigung mit diesem aktuellen Thema und der Öffentlichkeit her. Die Diskussionen zeigten, dass die Aufbereitung und Darstellung von Forschungsergebnissen nicht automatisch mit der Wissensvermittlung an Nicht-Fachleute gleichzusetzen ist, und dass der Informationsbedarf zu dieser Thematik gewaltig ist.

Bu 3, 2004, 264 S., 20.90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6824-9

Maps

Moisels’ map 1912, F.1 "Ossidinge"


*Kamerun mit Togo": 1,200,000.


*Ergebnisse meiner Forschungen im Nordhinterland von Kamerun 1891-1893, kartographisch niedergelegt, nach meinen Tagebüchern entworfen und gezeichnet von Hutter*, 1:500,000.

In: Hutter 1893.

"Karte des Ossidinge-Bezirkes in Kamerun", 1:1,000,000, In: Mansfeld 1908:311.

"Carte du Cameroun, 1:500,000, Buca-Douala".

"Britisch Kamerun", ABM D-31.2.3.

Maps

Moisels’ map no date
ORSTOM 1973

Hutter 1893

Mansfeld 1908

ONAREST 1976

Basel Mission
Florian Carl
Was bedeutet uns Afrika?
Zur Darstellung afrikanischer Musik
im deutschsprachigen Diskurs des
19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts
Schon im 19. Jahrhundert hatte afrikanische
Musik den Status eines modernen
Mythos. Vor allem Berichte von
Afrikareisenden nährten die europäische
Imagination. Mit den Völkerschauen und
Kolonialausstellungen sowie vor allem der
gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts entwickelten
Auffahrenztechnologie gewinnt der Mythos
afrikanischer Musik in Europa gleichsam
physikalische Realität. Dieses Buch verfolgt die
Geschichte des kolonialen Diskurses über
afrikanische Musik, der ihr Bild noch heute
prägt, in den Texten deutscher Reisender,
Ethnologen und Musikwissenschaftler vom
Bd. 4, 2004, 184 S., 19,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-7153-3

Begegnungen
Autobiographische Beiträge
zu interkulturellen Kontakten
hrsg. von Prof. Dr. Jürgen Jensen
(bei der Universität Hamburg)

Maria Blechmann-Antweiler
Ohne uns geht es nicht
Ein Jahr bei Frauen in Indonesien
Dieses Buch ist das Ergebnis eines
ungewöhnlichen Abenteuers. Maria
Blechmann-Antweiler erfüllte sich einen
Traum: sie lebte ein Jahr lang mit ihrem
Mann und ihrem Baby, fern von zu Hause,
auf einer Insel im Pazifik, auf Sulawesi
in Indonesien. Wo Fernreisende nur ein
paar Tage verweilen, tauchte sie in den
Alltag einer einheimischen kinderreichen
Familie ein. Ein einfühlamer ethnologischer
Bericht über die Warmherzigkeit der
Menschen, ihre Gastfreundschaft und
Anteilnahme, und über die Häute der Natur,
die Äquator-Hitze rund um die Uhr und den
tropischen Regen. Wie sind die faszinierenden
Verwirrungen interkulturellen Umgangs zu
entschlüsseln? Was verstehen die Indonesier
unter Pünktlichkeit, unter Wahrheit und
Freundschaft? Was denken sie von uns
"Weißen"?
Bd. 1, 2001, 208 S., 15,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-3645-3

ASA-Studien
Arbeits- und Studienaufenthalte in
Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika
hrsg. von Dr. Peter Müller-Rockstroh
(ASA-Programm der Carl Duisberg
Gesellschaft e. V.)

Denis Dressel; Jochen Neumann
The Long Road to Peace
Constructive Conflict
Transformation in South Africa
Political dominance of the white minority
in South Africa has been abolished since
the early nineties. But the road leading to
a more just society with equal chances for
all, confronted with still existing racism
and harsh differences between rich and
poor, still will be a long one. Within the
poles of societal transformation numerous
conflicts occur which can only be addressed
in a comprehensive and long term peace
process. Denis Dressel and Jochen Neumann,
sponsored by ASA programme in 1997 for
a three months field study term in South
Africa, explain in this book actual meaning
and relevance of the conflict topic and the
different methods of conflict transformation,
developed in South Africa by many actors
of civil society and put into practice by,
amongst others, the National Commission on Truth
and Reconciliation, within youth education
and schools, and in local communities.
In a case study the work of the 'Centre
for Conflict Resolution' is described. The
authors point out that agreements on national
level can not easily be transmitted to local
actors. Those who are involved directly in
conflicts, have to develop themselves the
ability of reconciliation and the willingness
for cooperation, in day-to-day local contexts of
their own.
vol. 35, 2001, 168 pp., 15,90 €, pb.,
ISBN 3-8258-4663-6